

Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

儒教文化研究

Vol. 29 / February 2018

成均館大學校 儒教文化研究所

Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
Sungkyunkwan University

*Journal of Confucian
Philosophy and Culture*

儒教文化研究

Vol. 29 / February 2018

Editorial Board

Advisory Board Members

Donald BAKER (University of British Columbia, Canada)
Anne CHENG (College de France, France)
KAWAHARA Hideki (University of Tokyo, Japan)
LI Xueqin (Tsinghua University, China)
SONG Young-Bae (Seoul National University, Korea)
TU Weiming (Peking University, China)
YOON Sa-Soon (Korea University, Korea)
ZHANG Liwen (Renmin University of China, China)

Director

SHIN Jeong-Keun (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea)

Editorial Board Members

Roger T. AMES (University of Hawaii, U.S.A.)
CHEN Lai (Tsinghua University, China)
CHENG Chung-yi (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, China)
CHUNG Byung Suk (YOUNG NAM University, Korea)
GUO Qiyong (Wuhan University, China)
HUANG Chun-Chieh (Taiwan National University, Taiwan)
HUH Nam-jin (Seoul National University, Korea)
HUR Nam-lin (University of British Columbia, Canada)
JANG Seung-Hee (Jeju National University, Korea)
KATAOKA Ryu (Tohoku University, Japan)
KIM Sea Jeong (Chungnam National University, Korea)
LEE Junghwan (Seoul National University, Korea)
LEE Kwang Ho (Yonsei University, Korea)
LEE Sang Gon (Wonkwang University, Korea)
LI Cunshan (Chinese Academy of Social Science, China)
LIAO Mingchun (Tsinghua University, China)
NGUYEN Tai Dong (Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences, Vietnam)
PARK Jeoung Sim (Pusan National University, Korea)
WANG Frederic (INALCO, France)
YAN Binggang (Shandong University, China)
YANG Guorong (East China Normal University, China)
YOO Kwon Jong (Chungang University, Korea)
YOO Weon-Ki (Keimyung University, Korea)
ZHANG Xuezhi (Peking University, China)

International Editorial Board Members

YU Huang Chieh (Fu Jen Catholic University, Taiwan)
CHIU Chien Shuo (Fu Jen Catholic University, Taiwan)
FAN Pik Wah (University of Malaya, Malaysia)
YAM Kah Kean (University of Malaya, Malaysia)

Editor-in-Chief

PARK Youngwoo (Sungkyunkwan University)
JO Jungeun (Sungkyunkwan University)

編輯委員會

顧問 尹絲淳(韓國 高麗大學) 宋榮培(韓國 首爾大學)
李學勤(中國 清華大學) 張立文(中國 人民大學)
川原秀城(日本 東京大學)
杜維明(中國 北京大學)
Donald BAKER(加拿大 UBC)
Anne CHENG(法國 College de France)

主任 辛正根(韓國 成均館大學)

委員 片岡龍(日本 東北大學) 朴正心(韓國 釜山大學)
阮才東(越南 社會科學院) 李存山(中國 社會科學院)
李光虎(韓國 延世大學) 金世貞(韓國 忠南大學)
李相坤(韓國 圓光大學) 李定桓(韓國 首爾大學)
張承姬(韓國 濟州大學) 楊國榮(中國 華東師範大學)
俞原基(韓國 啓明大學) 郭齊勇(中國 武漢大學)
陳 來(中國 清華大學) 許南進(韓國 首爾大學)
張學智(中國 北京大學) 黃俊傑(台灣 台灣大學)
廖名春(中國 清華大學) 劉權鍾(韓國 中央大學)
鄭宗義(中國 香港中文大學) 鄭炳碩(韓國 嶺南大學)
顏炳罡(中國 山東大學) Nam-lin HUR(加拿大 UBC)
Roger T. AMES(美國 Hawaii 大學)
Frederic WANG(法國 INALCO)

國際委員 尤煌傑(台灣 輔仁大學)
邱建碩(台灣 輔仁大學)
潘碧華(馬來西亞 馬來亞大學)
嚴家建(馬來西亞 馬來亞大學)

編輯部主任 朴榮雨(韓國 成均館大學)
趙貞恩(韓國 成均館大學)

Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

Vol. 29 / February 2018

Contents

ARTICLES

- | | | |
|------------------------|-----|---|
| KIM Doil | 1 | Four Types of Moral Extension in Mencius |
| Roger T. AMES | 21 | Making a Text One's Own: Reflections on Reading Chinese Philosophy Properly |
| YOO Weon-Ki | 41 | Yi I's Understanding of Human Beings as Viewed from Ibn Sina's Perspective |
| LEE Hae-Im | 63 | The Characteristics of the Earlier Philosophy of Han Won-jin: Major Issues in <i>Yulgok byeoljip bucheon</i> |
| HAN Zhenhua | 91 | How to Interpret Mencius' Concept of "Xing" 性?: The Debate in Western Sinology and Its Current Significance |
| SHENG Xia | 113 | How Is It Possible for the Sage to Know by Listening? |
| DENG Qingping | 133 | A Comparative Study of the Development Patterns of Zhuzixue in China and Korea |
| HAN Sung Gu | 151 | Yan Fu's Scientific Thought and Mutual Understanding |
| WEN Bifang
LI Xiang | 171 | From "Return to Kang Youwei" to "Back to Mou Zongsan": A Study on the Political Confucianism of Mainland New Confucianism |
| JUN Byungsul | 185 | Being-psychology and Confucianism |

203 APPENDIX

儒教文化研究

第二十九輯 / 2018年 2月

目 錄

學 術 論 文

金渡鎰	1	孟子的四種道德擴張模型
安樂哲	21	把文本變成自己的 —— 恰當閱讀中國哲學之反思
俞原基	41	從伊本西納的角度考察李珣對人存在問題的理解
李海任	63	《栗谷別集付籤》主要爭點中所含韓元震初年哲學之特徵
韓振華	91	如何詮釋孟子的“性”概念 —— 西方漢學界的兩場論戰及其當下意義
盛 夏	113	聖人聞而知之何以可能？
鄧慶平	133	中韓朱子學發展模式的比較
韓成求	151	嚴復的科學思想與會通觀
文碧方 李 想	171	從“回到康有為”到“回到牟宗三” —— “大陸新儒家”政治儒學之反思
田炳述	185	存在心理學與儒家
	203	附 錄

Four Types of Moral Extension in Mencius

KIM Doil

Abstract

In the existing body of relevant literature, the different types of moral extension in Mencius's thought are not clearly differentiated. The purpose of this paper is to show that at least four types of moral extension can be found in Mencius's thought. First, as is well known, the idea of *kuochong* 擴充 in Mencius's thought is that one should extend one's moral attitude or reaction, such as *ce yin zhi xin* 惻隱之心, to a broader range of people. *Ce yin zhi xin* is arguably a moral attitude or reaction towards another person in distress. Mencius argues that such a moral attitude should be expanded to everyone, not solely the single individual in need right now. Second, another type of moral extension is in fact what has wielded more influence in the development of Confucian thought in history: the extension from family to nation. This is distinguishable from *kuochong* as the expanded attitude is not a purely moral one, but rather an attitude applied initially to blood relations. Third, there is yet another type of moral extension in Mencius's thought: the diffusion of moral attitudes or actions among different people. This type is different from the first two types because it has to do with the expansion of the number of people sharing a certain kind of moral attitude or action. Fourth, in his understanding of Mencius, the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 would not be too concerned about the difference between the first type and the second type, which are equally related to the extension of a certain kind of attitude, either *ce yin zhi xin* or a familial attitude, since he understands both the two types equally in terms of the expansion of *ren xin* 人心 (the human mind) as such. What Zhu Xi regards as Mencius's can be understood as the fourth type of moral extension in Mencius's thought. This paper aims to explore the differences among the above four types, which have not been carefully differentiated in the literature.

Keywords: Mencius, Zhu Xi, *kuochong*, moral extension, *ce yin zhi xin*, *xin*

* KIM Doil is an assistant professor at the Department of Confucian Studies, Sungkyunkwan University (philosokim@skku.edu).

** This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2015S1A6A4A01013171).

*** Earlier versions of this paper have been presented in several conferences, including ISCP (International Society of Chinese Philosophers) Conference held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2015), the "Confucian Ethics and Contemporary Society" Conference organized by the Institute of Confucian Studies and Culture, Sungkyunkwan University (2015), and APA (American Philosophy Association) Pacific Division Conference held in Seattle (2017).

1. Introduction

Mencius (c. 372-289) is well known for the idea of *kuochong* 擴充.¹ Roughly, the idea is that one should extend one's moral reaction or attitude that arises in a particular situation to another.² In *Mengzi* 孟子 (Mencius) 2A.6, what is considered to be extended is *ce yin zhi xin* 惻隱之心, which can be understood as "a moral attitude that causes immediate action," such as wanting to help upon witnessing a baby in fatal danger. Thus, the process of *kuochong* enables one to generalize and demonstrate the same moral reaction or attitude in various similar situations.³

However, *kuochong* is not the only theory of moral extension for Mencius. In order to examine this possibility, in this paper I will employ the word "extension" in a broader sense than that just involved in *kuochong*, referring more generally to the expansion of one's moral attitudes or actions towards a broader scope of people, as well as to influence on others to share the same moral attitudes or actions. Given this broader definition of "moral extension," at least three more types can be read from the context of *Mengzi*. This paper aims to discern and describe these four types of moral extension, which do not seem to be clearly differentiated in the literature.

In fact, what wielded more influence in the development of Confucian thought in history is "the type of extension from family to nation," namely the idea of generalizing one's commitment to family to others, and then to one's country. For example, in *Lunyu* 論語 (Analects), filial piety and brotherliness (*xiaoti* 孝悌), namely attitudes towards parents and siblings

¹ *Mengzi* 2A.6. Passages are cited according to Yang, *Mengzi yizhu*. However, in this paper, I will refer to passages as 1A-7B rather than 1-14.

² In this paper, I do not address the issue of how *ce yin zhi xin* can be characterized according to modern terminology. For the sake of convenience, I will understand *ce yin zhi xin* as a kind of "attitude," which has cognitive and conative aspects. As such, I can sidestep the issue, more particularly the issue of whether *ce yin zhi xin* is a desire or a judgment.

³ Just for reference, I will briefly introduce a couple of secondary sources concerning the idea of *kuochong*. Kwong-loi Shun understands the expansion of *ce yin zhi xin* as the process of enabling the application of the same reactions and attitudes in similar situations through analogical reasoning. See Shun, "Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics." David B. Wong interprets the expansion of *ce yin zhi xin* to be a process that allows for the exhibition of compassionate response as a result of one's practical deliberation in which another person's suffering becomes a reason to act. See Wong, "Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi." On the other hand, Phillip J. Ivanhoe believes that the expansion of *ce yin zhi xin* allows one to appreciate one's own nascent moral sense when it is not wholly apparent in a specific situation. See Ivanhoe, "Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi's Notion of Extension."

related by blood, are understood as the root (*ben* 本) of the execution of *ren* 仁, one of the foundational values in Confucian thought. This seems to propose a model of advancing attitudes learned and practiced within the family to relationships outside of the family.⁴

Mencius also seems to advance similar thought in *Mengzi* 4A.5, maintaining that the root of all under heaven and of nations (*tianxia* 天下) lies in the family (*jia* 家).⁵ Moreover, during a conversation with King Xuan of Qi (Qi Xuan wang 齊宣王), Mencius refers to the attitude of treating others' elders as one would treat one's own elders (*lao wulao, yiji renzhilao* 老吾老, 以及人之老), which may be considered a similar model of moral extension.⁶ This can be interpreted as an order to apply sentiments felt towards blood relations to people outside of kin.⁷ So this type of moral extension should be regarded as the second type, one that is differentiated from *kuochong*.

On the other hand, the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) would not provide special treatment to the difference between the first type and the second type in his interpretation of Mencius. The two types are equally related to the process of broadening the scope of application of a certain kind of attitude. But, Zhu Xi seems to understand the crux of Mencian thought not as the two types or the difference between the two, but as the expansion of the ability of *ren xin* 人心 (the human mind) as such. What Zhu Xi regards as Mencius's idea, namely the expansion of the mind, is another type of moral extension that can be found in Mencian thought.

Finally, there is yet another type of moral extension that Mencius strongly advocates: the diffusion of moral attitudes or actions among different people. This type of extension is different from the three types discussed above because it has to do with the expansion of the number of people who share a certain kind of moral attitude, rather than with the

⁴ *Lunyu* 1.2. Passages are cited according to Yang, *Lunyu yizhu*. This paper will discuss Zhu Xi's interpretation of this passage later in Section 5.

⁵ *Mengzi* 4A.5: "天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身."

⁶ *Mengzi* 1A.7. I will further discuss this phrase in Section 4.

⁷ In relation to this model of extension from family to nation, Confucian ideology is often taken to claim that the affection between blood relations should be expanded and applied to members of wider social groups. For example, the passage in *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning) that explains that governing a country (*zhi guo* 治國) should follow ordering one's own family (*qi jia* 齊家) is widely considered a good demonstration of this Confucian model of extension. Hu, *Daxue zhangju daquan*, 8. Page numbers refer to *Wenyuange siku quanshu dianziban*, which is based on *Wenyuange siku quanshu* 文淵閣 四庫全書 (Wenyuange Edition of the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries). Subsequently, I will refer to this as *Siku quanshu*.

process of broadening the scope of application of one's attitude or mind.

This paper aims to show the differences among the above four types of moral extension, which have not been carefully differentiated in the literature.

2. The Model of Diffusion

Prior to examining the aforementioned first three types of moral extension in Mencius, namely *kuochong* of *ce yin zhi xin*, the extension of the affection towards blood relations, and the extension of the mind as such, it is necessary to mention the last one that is distinctly different from the other three.

Suppose that I exemplified myself as a filial son, so that the people around me would also have filial piety towards their own parents. In this situation, the attitude of filial piety would have been diffused among the numerous people with whom I have come into contact. Mencius suggests such diffusion as a method of governing the country. He states that if each person treats his or her parents in a manner befitting the close relationship (*qin qin* 親親), all under heaven will be rightly governed.⁸ Furthermore, he understands this as seeking the *dao* 道 in a close place and as the easiest method of doing something.

This diffusion of the same attitude among a broader range of people is also found in the passage of *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning) that states that if rulers properly treat their elders as elders, filial piety will pervade among the people.⁹ This method of one person behaving exemplarily in order to spread an attitude throughout the world is also suggested as a means of governing all under heaven. In addition, it is denoted as a type of *jieju zhi dao* 絜矩之道. *Jieju* is a way to infer a thing through understanding of another similar thing.¹⁰

Why the diffusion of the same attitude among different persons is considered a kind of *jieju* is not immediately clear, and this question requires further interpretation. For this reason, it is worth taking note of the following

⁸ *Mengzi* 4A.11: “道在爾而求諸遠，事在易而求之難。人人親其親，長其長而天下平。” In identifying this model of diffusion as a type of moral extension in Mencius's thought, the following paper was of great help: Kim, “Deongmok-euroseoui hyo-wa geu gyoyuk,” 37.

⁹ Hu, *Daxue zhangju daquan*, 53: “所謂平天下在治其國者，上老老而民興孝，上長長而民興弟，上恤孤而民不倍，是以君子有絜矩之道也。”

¹⁰ This is Zhu Xi's interpretation. Hu, *Daxue zhangju daquan*, 53: “君子必當因其所同，推以度物。”

passage of *Daxue*, which connects *jieju zhi dao* to the idea that one should not treat inferiors in a way that one would dislike as a way of being treated by one's superior, nor should one serve superiors in a way that one would dislike as a way of being served by one's inferior.¹¹ This idea is the same as the concept of *shu* 恕 in *Lunyu*.¹² To act with *shu* is to refer to one's own mind in order to understand another person, thereby treating the other person properly. In *Lunyu*, *shu* is also expressed as *neng jin qu pi* 能近取譬, namely finding similarity from nearby places.¹³

Then the reason why the spread of filial piety is considered a type of *jieju zhi dao* can be explained as follows: the same attitude can be diffused precisely because all people fundamentally have the same mind. Rulers must understand this aspect in order to govern the world. Moreover, everyone naturally wants to give affection to his or her beloved persons. If rulers could understand this, they would realize that the spread of filial piety cannot be forced. Rather, rulers should act in exemplary ways; then, the governed people will accordingly come to act with filial piety.

In *Lunyu*, *jieju zhi dao* is also understood as *ren zhi fang* 仁之方 (a way to practice *ren*).¹⁴ Then it can be said that the diffusion of filial piety is also suggested as *ren zhi fang* in early Confucian thought. This is similar to Mencius's execution of *ren* (*renshu* 仁術). Given its connection with *ren*, the model of diffusion, that is, the diffusion of the same attitude such as filial piety among a broader scope of people, is a kind of moral extension in early Confucian thought. For now, it is important to note that this model is to be distinguished from the three other types of moral extension that I will explicate in the following sections.

3. The Model of *Kuochong*

Kuochong is the abbreviation for *kuo er chong zhi* 擴而充之 in *Mengzi* 2A.6. It literally means "to extend" or "to fill up." In the context of *Mengzi* 2A.6, what is to be extended and filled up is very likely *siduan* 四端 (four moral sprouts). Among *siduan*, *bu ren ren zhi xin* 不忍人之心 or *ce yin zhi xin*

¹¹ Hu, *Daxue zhangju daquan*, 55: "所惡於上，毋以使下，所惡於下，毋以事上。所惡於前，毋以先後，所惡於後，毋以從前。所惡於右，毋以交於左，所惡於左，毋以交於右。此之謂絜矩之道。"

¹² *Lunyu* 15.24: "子貢問曰，有一言而可以終身行之者乎。子曰 其恕乎。己所不欲，勿施於人。"

¹³ *Lunyu* 6.30: "夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人。能近取譬，可謂仁之方也已。"

¹⁴ *Lunyu* 6.30.

should be the object that is to be extended in relation to *ren* 仁.¹⁵ *Ce yin zhi xin* is an attitude that reacts to another person in danger, immediately causing one to want to help. Almost anyone witnessing a crawling baby on the verge of falling into a well would immediately be compelled to help. This reaction would not be based on any special relationship with that baby, neither the honor that would follow the successful rescue of the baby, nor the shame that would follow disregarding the baby in peril.¹⁶ In other words, it is not influenced by private relationships or selfish interests. Mencius's point is that this attitude is purely moral.

Mencius claims that success in *kuochong* of *ce yin zhi xin* would protect all people of the world, whereas failure in this would not even allow for the proper care of one's own family. This claim implies that *kuochong* is a process in which an agent expands his moral attitude and gradually applies it to many people.

The same concept can be seen in *Mengzi* 1A.7, in which Mencius advises King Xuan of Qi to protect his people (*bao min* 保民). Mencius suggests the execution of *ren* as a method for protecting people, thus advising the king to apply *bu ren* 不忍 (the mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of other creatures), which the king demonstrated in the past when he saw a cow being sacrificed, to his people in distress. King Xuan of Qi made the error of failing to exercise the same moral attitude towards his people in distress, even though he spared the life of an ox on witnessing the terror in its eyes as it was dragged away to slaughter. Evoking this, Mencius advises the king to apply the sentiment he felt for the beast towards his people.¹⁷ Mencius believes that *ren* can eventually be executed through such expansion and application.

In addition, in *Mengzi* 1A.7, the expression *tui en* 推恩 (extension of grace) appears.¹⁸ This denotes increasing the number of recipients of dispensation. Mencius says that the whole world can be protected through *tui en*, whereas failure to exercise it would preclude even proper care of one's own family. This

¹⁵ Later in this paper, I will discuss the possibility that *bu ren ren zhi xin* is distinguished from *ce yin zhi xin*.

¹⁶ *Mengzi* 2A.6: “今人乍見孺子將入於井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心。非所以內交於孺子之父母也，非所以要譽於鄉黨朋友也，非惡其聲而然也。” In the above, I understand the last phrase of the passage according to Zhao Qi's 趙岐 interpretation, which is accepted by Zhu Xi. See Jiao, *Mengzi zhengyi*, 233. On the other hand, Yang Bojun suggests a different understanding of the last phrase. See Yang, *Mengzi yizhu*, 80.

¹⁷ *Mengzi* 1A.7: “舉斯心加諸彼而已。”

¹⁸ *Mengzi* 1A.7: “故推恩足以保四海，不推恩無以保妻子。”

is the same consequence as that mentioned in the discussion of the results of *kuochong*. Thus, *tui en* is analogous to *kuochong*.

In *Mengzi* 7B.31, the process of applying the un-bearing mind (*bu ren* 不忍) to what the mind can bear (*da zhi* 達之) is understood as *ren*.¹⁹ This use of *bu ren* alludes to *bu ren ren zhi xin* in *Mengzi* 1A.7, and it can thus be understood as a purely moral attitude such as *ce yin zhi xin*. The *da* 達 of *da zhi* used here is similar to the *tui* 推 of *tui en*, meaning that the un-bearing mind could reach many more people. This is analogous to the meaning of *kuochong*.

Both the model of *kuochong* in this section and the model of diffusion in the previous section are the methods for executing *ren*. However, these two are completely different models of moral extension. That is, *kuochong* of *ce yin zhi xin* has to do with one agent's gradually applying a certain attitude to various situations and numerous people, whereas the model of diffusion has to do with many more people's gradually sharing an agent's exemplary attitude.

4. The Extension of Familial Attitude

It is possible to identify yet another model of moral extension that is distinguished from *kuochong* in *Mengzi*. This model of extension is similar to *kuochong* in the sense that it has to do with the expansion of one's specific attitude to many more people. However, the expanded attitude is not a purely moral attitude such as *ce yin zhi xin*, but rather an attitude that is initially applied to blood relations. More accurately, it is a model of extension that applies reactions or attitudes learned within kinship relations to people outside of blood relations. For convenience, I will call this model "the extension of familial attitude."²⁰

For instance, one may treat strangers as if they were one's own family. This treatment can be considered an outcome of the extension of familial attitude. There is an expression in *Daxue* that reflects such an extension: *ru*

¹⁹ *Mengzi* 7B.31: "人皆有所不忍，達之於其所忍，仁也。人皆有所不為，達之於其所為，義也。人能充無欲害人之心，而仁不可勝用也。人能充無穿窬之心，而義不可勝用也。"

²⁰ In fact, it is debatable whether Mencius actually gives clear thought to this type of moral extension. I am writing a separate paper based on this doubt, in which I will argue that most of the relevant expressions and ideas, which will also be explained below in this section, either are ambiguous or encompass different types of moral extension, so that it is not clear if Mencius takes the extension of familial attitude seriously.

bao chizi 如保赤子, which means “protecting as if an infant.”²¹ The subsequent passage states, “There are no people who marry after learning how to raise a child.” This is to say, anyone can figure out how to take care of her own infant even without a formal education of child-rearing. Then the expression, *ru bao chizi*, advises a ruler to care for his people as if they were his own children. Thus understood, *ru bao chizi* is a piece of evidence that shows that the extension of familial attitude is adopted by early Confucian thinkers.

Moreover, in the case of Xunzi 荀子 (c. 313-238 BCE), the extension of familial attitude is explicitly advanced. Relevant passages in *Xunzi* include: “The people should treat the ruler as they would their own parents and be willing to die for him,” “The people will treat the ruler fondly and joyfully as if he were a parent and be willing to die for him,” and “The people will treat the ruler fondly and joyfully as if he were a parent, and even death would not make them deter allegiance to him.” These passages demonstrate the attitude of treating the ruler as if he were one’s own parent.²² As a matter of fact, a similar expression appears in *Mengzi* as well, even though it does not allude to familial attitude: “If the ruler acts with compassion, the people will treat the ruler fondly and be willing to die for him.”²³

A sentence in *Mengzi* that may convey the idea of the extension of familial attitude is “*lao wulao yiji renzhilao*” 老吾老, 以及人之老.²⁴ To delve into the meaning of this sentence, it is worth considering its various translations: Seong Baek-hyo’s Korean translation reads, “I serve my elders as elders, thus influencing others and their elders.”²⁵ Yang Bojun’s Chinese translation reads, “Through respecting the elders of my family, I push forward and expand to respecting the elders of other families.”²⁶ D. C. Lau’s English translation reads, “I treat the elders of my family properly according to their ages, and expand this treatment to elders of other families.”²⁷ Strictly

²¹ Hu, *Daxue zhangju daquan*, 48: “所謂治國必先齊其家者, 其家不可教而能教人者, 無之。故君子不出家而成教於國。孝者, 所以事君也。弟者, 所以事長也。慈者, 所以使眾也。康誥曰如保赤子。心誠求之, 雖不中不遠矣。未有學養子而後嫁者也。一家仁, 一國興仁。一家讓, 一國興讓。一人貪戾, 一國作亂。”

²² Li, *Xunzi jishi*, 204: “故仁人在上, 百姓貴之如帝, 親之如父母, 爲之出死斷亡。”; Li, *Xunzi jishi*, 215: “百姓皆愛其上, 人歸之如流水, 親之歡如父母, 爲之出死斷亡。”; and Li, *Xunzi jishi*, 251: “故下之親上, 歡如父母, 可殺而不可使不順。” See also Li, *Xunzi jishi*, 257 and 343.

²³ *Mengzi* 1A.12: “君行仁政, 斯民親其上, 死其長矣。”

²⁴ *Mengzi* 1A.7.

²⁵ Seong, *Hyeonto wanyeok maengja jipju*, 36.

²⁶ Yang, *Mengzi yizhu*, 20.

²⁷ Lau, *Mencius*, 19: “Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families.”

speaking, Seong's translation does not in any way suggest that any familial attitude plays a part in the model for the attitude that should also be adopted towards relationships outside of blood relations. In contrast, in Yang's and Lau's translations, the idea of the generalization of one's attitude toward family to other non-blood-related individuals is both plausible and strongly inferred; it is clearly implied especially in Lau's translation.

In addition, the following passage in *Mengzi* 7A.15 could also suggest the extension of familial attitude: "*qin qin, ren ye. . . dazhi tianxia ye*" 親親, 仁也. . . 達之天下也. The question of whether this reflects the extension of familial attitude depends on how the phrase, "*dazhi tianxia*" 達之天下, is understood. It may be interpreted as "gradual application to all the people under heaven." The whole passage then means "to gradually apply *qin qin*, namely the familial attitude, to all the people under heaven." Thus understood, the passage reflects the extension of familial attitude.²⁸

In relation to the Mencian idea of the extension of familial attitude, there is one more point to make. When *qin* is used as a verb, the subject of its application reaches beyond the constraint of blood-related family members. Examples in early Chinese texts include *qin min* 親民 (giving affection to the people) in *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Rites), *qin you* 親友 (giving affection to one's friends) in *Xunzi*, and *qin xian* 親賢 (giving affection to the wise) in *Mengzi* and *Xunzi*.²⁹ In these instances, *qin* is an attitude assumed towards the people, friends, and the wise, all of whom are non-blood relations. Mencius especially emphasizes the importance of treating the wise with the attitude of *qin* as a priority for ultimately realizing *ren*. This is an attitude necessary for an effective process of selecting talented people on the basis of merit, and without the influence of nepotism. *Qin xian* can plausibly be understood as an outcome of the extension of *qin qin*, even though Mencius does not explicitly mention it. Since *qin qin* is the starting point for the realization of *ren*, *qin xian* can be regarded as an example of the application of attitudes learned from one's

²⁸ This understanding is suggested by Kwong-loi Shun. He equates *dazhi* in the passage to *dazhi yu* 達之於 in *Mengzi* 7B.31. See Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought*, 146. This understanding is shared by Lau, as he translates the passage as follows: "What is left to be done is simply the extension of these [*qin qin*] to the whole Empire." Lau, *Mencius*, 293. On the other hand, Zhu Xi's followers acknowledged the possibility of the above understanding of the passage, but in the end they opposed it. Refer to the following passage in Hu, *Mengzi jizhu daquan*, 30:23: "問仁義不止於孝弟，而孟子以爲達之天下，還是推孝弟之心，以友愛天下？是仁義否。潛室陳氏曰，此章無推此及彼之意。所謂達乃達道達德之達。"

²⁹ Hu, *Daxue zhangju daquan*, 1: "大學之道，在明明德，在親民，在止於至善。"; Li, *Xunzi jishi*, 23: "故君子隆師而親友，以致惡其賊。"; Li, *Xunzi jishi*, 681: "不親賢用知，故身死國亡也。"; and *Mengzi* 7A.46: "仁者無不愛也，急親賢之爲務。"

familial relationships to subjects outside of one's family. Thus, the use of *qin xian* in *Mengzi* can be considered circumstantial evidence to substantiate Mencius's model of the extension of familial attitude.

In summary, while the model of moral extension discussed in this section is partially similar to *kuochong* in that it extends and applies a specific attitude to various subjects, the related attitude is initially directed to one's family, rather than a purely moral attitude such as *ce yin zhi xin*. The extension occurs when applying this familial attitude to people outside of blood relations. As examined above, it is possible to glean this type of moral extension from several passages of *Mengzi*.

5. The Perspective of Zhu Xi: The Expansion of *Xin* 心 (Mind)

In the context of *Mengzi* 2A.6, the subject of extension seems to be *ce yin zhi xin*; Mencius there seems to suggest the *kuochong* of *ce yin zhi xin*. In this line of thought, I have interpreted *kuochong* as applying one's purely ethical attitude, such as *ce yin zhi xin*, to a broader scope of people in the foregoing sections. Zhu Xi also uses an expression such as "the four sprouts (*siduan* 四端), [which includes *ce yin zhi xin*,] undergoing *kuochong* (used as a noun)" or "*kuochong*-ing (used as a verb) the four sprouts."³⁰

However, according to Zhu Xi, moral extension is not solely limited to the extension of *ce yin zhi xin*. For him, the expansion of *ren xin*, from which *ce yin zhi xin* emanates, is much more important. This idea is apparent in his annotation of *Mengzi* 2A.6: "As discussed in this passage [*Mengzi* 2A.6], the *xing qing* 性情 (nature and feelings) of human beings and the *ti yong* 體用 of the mind [namely the underlying essence and manifestation of the mind] are wholly embodied [in everyone], and each [manifestation of the mind] similarly has its coherence and reason (*tiaoli* 條理). If the learner reflects and searches for this fact and expands (*kuochong*) it, then he will fulfill what is given to him by heaven."³¹ Here, presumably, what is to be expanded is *xin* that wholly embodies *xing*, namely human nature.

According to Zhu Xi, the mind embodies *wan li* 萬理, that is, every principle or essence underlying things and beings all over the world. When

³⁰ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 53:1285: "四端漸會擴充矣。"; and Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 53:1292: "若能擴充，於這一事發見，知得這是惻隱之心，是仁。於別底事便當將此心充去，使事事是仁。"

³¹ Hu, *Mengzi jizhu daquan*, 3:56: "此章所論人之性情，心之體用，本然全具，而各有條理如此。學者於此，反求默識而擴充之，則天之所以與我者，可以無不盡矣。"

the embodied *li* does not emerge outside of the mind, Zhu Xi calls it *xing* 性 (human nature). *Ren* 仁 falls under *xing*. The mind responds to external stimuli and emanates various *qing* 情. By *xin tong xing qing* 心統性情, Zhu Xi refers to the mind's emanating *qing* based on its inherent *xing*. This means that the mind embodies both *xing* and *qing*.³² In this line of thought, the *ce yin zhi xin* described in *Mengzi* 2A.6 is to be understood as one example of the mind reacting based on *ren*, a kind of *xing* inherent within the mind; thus it is a kind of *qing* that emanates from the mind under the very specific situation, in which a crawling baby is about to fall into a well.³³ In other words, it is just one case in which the mind produces a specific *qing* appropriate to the given circumstance. That is, the mind has to produce different kinds of *qing* depending on varied situations. Then, the key of moral cultivation is how the mind can produce *qing* appropriately on the basis of *xing* in a wide variety of situations. The issue of how frequently the mind can appropriately emanate *qing* based on *xing* also comes to the fore.³⁴ Thus, according to Zhu Xi, *kuochong* is related to the mind emanating *qing* properly based on *xing*, in increasingly varied situations with increased frequency. To Zhu Xi, it is the expansion of the mind itself.

In relation to the above understanding, it is interesting to consider what the *zhi* 之 of *kuo er chong zhi* 擴而充之, the original expression for *kuochong*, in *Mengzi* 2A.6 refers to, when it is understood as a demonstrative pronoun. It may refer to *bu ren ren zhi xin* 不忍人之心. So far, I have equated *bu ren ren zhi xin* to *ce yin zhi xin*, for this equation is also plausible. As a matter of fact, the equation of these two terms is found in many translations. In Seong Baek-hyo's Korean translation, *bu ren ren zhi xin* is understood as the mind that cannot bear to hurt other people.³⁵ Zhao Qi 趙岐 (d. 201) understands it as the mind that cannot commit evil to other people.³⁶ Yang Bojun regards it as the sentiment that pities and thus helps other people.³⁷

³² Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 5:94: “心之全體湛然虛明，萬理具足，無一毫私欲之間。其流行該備，貫乎動靜，而妙用又無不在焉。故以其未發而全體者言之，則性也。以其已發而妙用者言之，則情也。然心統性情，只就渾淪一物之中，指其已發未發而為言爾，非是性是一箇地頭，心是一箇地頭，情又是一箇地頭，如此懸隔也。”

³³ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 14:271: “統而言之，仁義禮智。以其發見而言之，如惻隱羞惡之類。以其見於實用言之，如事親從兄是也。”

³⁴ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 53:1294: “擴是張開，充是放滿。惻隱之心，不是只見孺子時有，事事都如此。今日就第一件事上推將去，明日又就第二件事上推將去，漸漸放開，自家及國，自國及天下，至足以保四海處，便是充得盡。”

³⁵ Seong, *Hyeonto wanyek maengja jipju*, 102.

³⁶ Jiao, *Mengzi zhengyi*, 232.

³⁷ Yang, *Mengzi yizhu*, 80.

D. C. Lau translates it in English as a heart (mind) sensitive to the suffering of others.³⁸ According to these translations and understandings, *bu ren ren zhi xin* is a purely ethical attitude that is not related to kinship. However, a more suitable expression for such a moral attitude would be *bu ren zhi xin* 不忍之心 or *bu ren* 不忍, leaving *ce yin zhi xin* aside.

On the other hand, in his interpretation of *bu ren ren zhi xin*, Zhu Xi states that people attain this *bu ren ren zhi xin* because they have adopted the heaven's mind that bears all creatures as their own mind.³⁹ Here, *bu ren ren zhi xin* can be understood to be consistent with the abovementioned translations. But there is another possible reading of Zhu Xi's interpretation: Zhu Xi refers by *bu ren ren zhi xin* not to a specific *qing* emerging in a certain situation, such as *ce yin zhi xin*, but to the human mind itself. This reading enables us to see that Zhu Xi's statement focuses more consistently on the origin of the human mind itself. Thus understood, *bu ren ren zhi xin* can be interpreted as "the human mind (*ren zhi xin*) that has the characteristic of *bu ren*." The focal point of the term lies in the mind, rather than in a specific *qing* that emanates from the mind.

The above understanding of *bu ren ren zhi xin* suggests an interesting implication: when this is referred to by the *zhi* of *kuo er chong zhi*, *kuochong* can mean the expansion of the human mind itself, rather than the extension of a specific *qing* such as *ce yin zhi xin* to a broader range of people.

At this point, it is necessary to articulate how the expansion of the human mind is different from *kuochong* of *ce yin zhi xin*. From the perspective of Zhu Xi, the model of *kuochong*, understood as the process of broadening the scope of application of a certain kind of attitude such as *ce yin zhi xin* (Section 3), should be regarded as a process related merely to the level of *qing*, in that *ce yin zhi xin* is a kind of *qing*. Zhu Xi would not completely exclude this kind of process in moral self-cultivation, but he thinks of moral extension as a more comprehensive process than that. For him, moral extension is to be understood with a focus on the development of the mind as such rather than with such a limited focus on a certain kind of *qing*. In this respect, what Zhu Xi considers to be Mencius's moral extension can be regarded as the fourth type of moral extension that can be extracted from the context of *Mengzi*.

³⁸ Lau, *Mencius*, 73.

³⁹ Hu, *Mengzi jizhu daquan*, 3:47: "天地以生物爲心，而所生之物，因各得夫天地生物之心，以爲心，所以人皆有不忍人之心也。"

Moreover, the expansion of the mind encompasses more; especially, it additionally involves the mind appropriately demonstrating the familial attitude. To understand this, Zhu Xi's interpretation of *Lunyu* 1.2 needs to be considered. Relevant part of *Lunyu* 1.2 reads: "The ruler makes efforts on the root (*ben*), and if the root is established, the Way will emerge. Filial piety and brotherliness (*xiaoti*) are the root of the execution of *ren*."⁴⁰ When annotating this passage, Zhu Xi pays closer attention to the latter part, thereby emphasizing that filial piety and brotherliness are not the root of *ren*, but rather the root of the execution of *ren*. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how filial piety and brotherliness are the root of the execution of *ren*.

Zhu Xi relates the above passage from *Lunyu* to *qin qin* 親親 (loving one's kin), *ren min* 仁民 (showing benevolence towards the people), and *ai wu* 愛物 (sparing living creatures) in *Mengzi* 7A.45. He juxtaposes filial piety and brotherliness as the root of executing *ren* to *qin qin* as the root of *ren min* and *ai wu*.⁴¹ *Qin qin* is the attitude of treating blood relations well, while *ren min* and *ai wu* are attitudes towards subjects that are not within the circle of one's blood relations. Zhu Xi then understands the relationship between *qin qin*, on the one hand, and *ren min* and *ai wu*, on the other hand, through a comparison with the relationship between *ben* 本 and *mo* 末, namely the relationship between a plant's root and its leaves. The meaning of *Mengzi* 7A.45 may vary according to how this analogy is interpreted.

The relationship between *ben* and *mo* is basically understood in terms of the natural phenomenon in which leaves (*mo*) are derived from their root (*ben*). Accordingly, the idea that *qin qin* becomes the root of *ren min* and *ai wu* may imply that varied attitudes towards non-blood relations are derived from familial attitudes. This could mean that one's showing *ren* towards other people and concern towards various living creatures is possible due to what one learns from one's familial relationships, or that part or all of familial attitudes are applied to non-blood relations. Then, Zhu Xi's thought probably is that *Mengzi* 7A.45 reflects the extension of familial attitude discussed in Section 4, as does *Lunyu* 1.2.

40 *Lunyu* 1.2: "君子務本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其爲仁之本與。"

41 Hu, *Lunyu jizhu daquan*, 1:11: "孝弟行於家，而後仁愛及於物，所謂親親而仁民也。故爲仁以孝弟爲本。" This is a quotation of Zhengzi's 程子 words. Also see the following annotation by a follower of Zhu Xi. Hu, *Lunyu jizhu daquan*, 1:13: "仁是性，孝弟是用。譬如一粒粟生出爲苗。仁是粟，孝弟是苗，便是仁爲孝弟之本。又如木有根有幹有枝葉。親親是根，仁民是幹，愛物是枝葉。便是行仁以孝弟爲本。"

However, Zhu Xi understands the relation between *ben* and *mo* with a different focus. He regards it not as a derivative relation, but as temporal order between the beginning and its ending (*shi zong* 始終).⁴² In other words, he uses the analogy with the relation between *ben* and *mo* by focusing on a particular aspect of it, which is that the tree comes into leaf only after it is enrooted. Therefore, this analogy has a different implication for the above passages.

From Zhu Xi's point of view, *qin qin*, *ren min*, and *ai wu* differ only in temporal order, and people can achieve *qin qin*, *ren min*, and *ai wu* over time. According to him, people already fully possess the embodied *li* that, in temporal order, manifests familial attitudes and then attitudes towards non-blood relations. This manifestation is considered as natural a process as branches growing from the roots of a tree.⁴³ Thus, Zhu Xi does not see the need for an educational process that uses familial attitudes as a root to cultivate attitudes to properly treat non-blood relations. Importantly, this implies that Zhu Xi would not accept the model of the extension of familial attitude discussed in Section 4.

In relation to the above point, it should be noted that Zhu Xi does not interpret the expressions discussed in Section 4, such as (1) "*lao wulao yiji renzhilao*" and (2) "*qin qin, ren ye. . . dazhi tianxia ye*," as reflecting the extension of familial attitude. More particularly, Zhu Xi understands the former (1) in relation to another expression just discussed in the above, *qin qin, ren min*, and *ai wu*. This obviously implies that Zhu Xi has in mind only the temporal order in the manifestation of the mind in relation to the former (1).⁴⁴

In the case of the latter (2), Zhu Xi understands the phrase *dazhi tianxia* as meaning that *qin qin* is common to all people under heaven.⁴⁵ For him, the phrase does not reflect the extension of familial attitude at all. This

⁴² Hu, *Lunyu jizhu daquan*, 1:13: "孝弟爲仁之本. 此是由孝弟可以至仁否? 曰非也. 謂行仁自孝弟始, 孝弟是仁之一事. 謂之行仁之本則可, 謂是仁之本則不可." For a debate on this topic see Shin, *Saramdaum-ui balgyeon*, 367-373.

⁴³ This interpretation is reflected well in the following annotation. Hu, *Lunyu jizhu daquan*, 1:13: "孝弟是合當底事, 不是要仁民愛物, 方從孝弟做去. 或問如草木之有根, 方始枝葉繁茂. 曰固是但有根本則枝葉自然繁茂, 不是要得枝葉繁茂, 方始去培植本根." Also see Hu, *Lunyu jizhu daquan*, 1:13: "問爲仁以孝弟爲本. 卽所謂親親而仁民, 仁民而愛物. 孩提之童, 無不知愛其親, 及其長也. 無不知敬其兄是皆發於心德之自然. 故論性以仁爲孝弟之本, 爲仁以孝弟爲本. 曰是道理都自仁裏發出, 首先是發出爲愛, 愛莫切於愛親, 其次便到弟其兄, 又其次便到事君, 以及於他, 皆從這裏出. 如水相似愛是箇源頭漸漸流出."

⁴⁴ Hu, *Mengzi jizhu daquan*, 1:34: "故古人必由親親推之然後及於仁民, 又推其餘然後及於愛物. 皆由近以及遠自易以及難."

⁴⁵ Hu, *Mengzi jizhu daquan*, 30:22-23: "言親親敬長, 雖一人之私. 然達之天下, 無不同者所以爲仁義也."

understanding in fact fits better with the point of the whole passage *Mengzi* 7A.15.⁴⁶ The point is that all people have *liangzhi* 良知 (the innate and pure knowledge of good). Presumably, the fact that everyone commonly executes *qin qin* is mentioned as a piece of evidence for the claim that everyone has *liangzhi*.

Even so, it is important to note that Zhu Xi also does not deny that one must properly nurture familial attitudes in order to display these attitudes toward non-blood relations. It is precisely because he thinks that the human mind must be able with blood relations to achieve the manifestation of various *qing* based on *xing* (the embodied *li*) in order to grow, and only through this growth can the mind move on to the temporally later stage of its natural development, in which the mind manifests various other *qing*, in accordance with *xing*, in interactions with non-blood relations.

The idea that is excluded from Zhu Xi's position is that the *qing* that manifests in relationships with non-blood relations can be cultivated based on the *qing* that manifests in familial relations. For Zhu Xi, the human mind already embodies every *li* that enables humans to react appropriately in all relationships, so one just needs to maintain this innate ability in such a way that the ability can manifest gradually in relation to a broader scope of people. That is to say, all the principles required for a person's psychological and cognitive development is inherently present. This can be defined as a rather optimistic theory of determinism.

6. Conclusion

As shown throughout the foregoing sections, four different types of moral extension can be found in Mencius's thought. First, the model of *kuochong* or *kuochong* of *ce yin zhi xin* is the process of extending one's moral attitude or reaction to many more people (Section 3). *Ce yin zhi xin* here is understood as a purely moral attitude towards other people, such as someone in fatal danger. Second, the extension from family to nation is the process of extending an attitude applied initially to blood relations to people outside of blood relations (Section 4). Third, there is yet another type of moral extension that can be found in Mencius's thought: the diffusion of moral attitudes or actions among different people. This third type is distinctive in the sense that it has to do with the influence of one's exemplary attitudes

⁴⁶ *Mengzi* 7A.15: “孟子曰，人之所不學而能者，其良能也。所不慮而知者，其良知也。”

or actions on other people, which encourages those people to assume the same attitudes or actions of their own accord.

On the other hand, in his understanding of Mencius, the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi would not be much concerned about the difference between the first type and the second type, which are equally related to the extension of a certain kind of attitude, either *ce yin zhi xin* or a familial attitude, since he understands them both equally in terms of the expansion of *ren xin* as such. According to Zhu Xi, Mencius's moral extension is mainly the development of the mind in a way that emanates *qing* properly based on *xing*, in increasingly varied situations with increased frequency (Section 5). This interpretation of Mencius presents the fourth type of moral extension that can be found in his thought.

As pointed out in the previous section, in Zhu Xi's view, Mencius's moral extension is to be understood in terms of the cultivation of the mind that naturally has the capability to emanate different kinds of attitudes appropriately in differing situations, rather than in terms of the process of broadening the scope of application of certain kinds of attitude. Thus, for him, the aforementioned first and second types of moral extension, namely the extension of *ce yin zhi xin* and the familial attitude to many more people, do not capture the key feature of the Mencian concept of moral extension.

However, it would not be plausible to conclude that the extension of the scope of application of either *ce yin zhi xin* or the familial attitude is not present in the context of *Mengzi*. As shown in Sections 3 and 4, the two types of moral extension can plausibly be read from the context of the text. Moreover, Zhu Xi's understanding does not exclude the two types in the sense that when it comes to its detailed process, the development of the mind is comprised of the two types of moral extension.

REFERENCES

- Hu, Guang 胡廣, et al., eds. 2002a. *Daxue zhangju daquan* 大學章句大全 (Great Compendia of Commentaries on the *Great Learning* in Chapters and Verses). In *Wenyuange siku quanshu dianziban* 文淵閣 四庫全書 電子版 (Electronic Version of the Wenyuange Edition of the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries). Hong Kong: Dizhi wenhuan chuban.
- _____. 2002b. *Lunyu jizhu daquan* 論語集註大全 (Great Compendia of Collected Annotations on the *Analects*). In *Wenyuange siku quanshu dianziban*. Hong Kong: Dizhi wenhuan chuban.
- _____. 2002c. *Mengzi jizhu daquan* 孟子集註大全 (Great Compendia of Collected Annotations on the *Mencius*). In *Wenyuange siku quanshu dianziban*. Hong Kong: Dizhi wenhuan chuban.
- Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2002. "Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi's Notion of Extension." In *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi*, edited by Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Jiao, Xun 焦循. 1987. *Mengzi zhengyi* 孟子正義 (Correct Meaning of the *Mencius*). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
- Kim, Dongin. 2007. "Deontifgmok-euroseoui hyo-wa geu gyoyuk" 德目으로서의孝와그教育 (Filial Piety as a Virtue and Its Education). *Gyoyuk sahak yeongu* (History of Education) 17.2: 27-51.
- Lau, D. C., trans. 2003. *Mencius*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
- Li, Disheng 李滌生. 1979. *Xunzi jishi* 荀子集釋 (Collected Interpretations of the *Xunzi*). Taipei: Xuesheng shuju.
- Seong, Baek-hyo. 1991. *Hyeonto wanyeok maengja jipju* 懸吐完譯孟子集註 (Complete Translation of Collected Annotations of the *Mencius*). Seoul: Jeontong Munhwa Yeonguhoe.
- Shin, Jeong-Keun. 2005. *Saramdaum-ui balgyeon* 사람다움의 발견 (The Discovery of Humanity). Seoul: Ihaksa.
- Shun, Kwong-loi. 1989. "Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 16.3-4: 317-343.
- _____. 1997. *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Wong, David B. 2002. "Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi." In *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi*, edited by Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe, 187-220. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Yang, Bojun 楊伯峻. 1980. *Lunyu yizhu* 論語譯註 (Translation and Annotations of the *Analects*). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
- _____. 1996. *Mengzi yizhu* 孟子譯註 (Translation and Annotations of the *Mencius*). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1986. *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (A Classified Collection of the Conversations of Master Zhu). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

孟子的四種道德擴張模型

金 渡 鎰

中文摘要

根據文獻資料，孟子思想裏有不同類型的道德擴張，顯示較為模糊的差別性。故本文聚焦於在孟子思想裏的道德擴張模型，予以探究並導出有至少四個方面的特色。首先，眾所周知，孟子思想裏的擴充是指人應該擴張自己的道德態度或者反應，例如包括對別人更廣範圍的惻隱之心。誠然，惻隱之心是對於處於危難之中的人的純粹道德態度或反應。第二，另一種類型的擴張，實際上是對儒家思想史上的發展產生了較大影響：從家庭到國家的道德擴張(延伸)。此點，區別於擴充作為擴展的態度不是一種純粹道德態度，而是一種最初應用於血緣關係的態度。第三，孟子思想中還存在著另一種類型的道德擴張：道德態度或行為在不同人群中的擴散。這一類型不同於前兩種類型，因為它與分享某種道德態度或行為的人數的增加有關。第四，新儒家朱子(朱熹)對孟子的理解，不會那麼注重關於第一類和第二類之間的區別，這是正與一種態度的擴展密切相關，無論是惻隱之心或一個家族的態度，因為他對此兩者都同樣以人心擴張方面來理解。在朱熹看來，孟子思想可以理解為孟子思想中的第四種道德擴張模型。綜上所述，本文的宗旨是張顯這四種類型的差別，以補歷來文獻中所乏較為仔細區分之憾。

關鍵詞：孟子，朱熹，擴充，道德擴張，惻隱之心，心

Making a Text One's Own: Reflections on Reading Chinese Philosophy Properly

Roger T. AMES

Abstract

If we are going to allow the Chinese texts to speak on their own terms, we have to begin by establishing the interpretive context for reading them—the process cosmology that is made explicit in the *Dazhuan* 大傳 (Great Tradition) commentary of the *Yijing* 易經 (Book of Changes). The argument is that, true to the premises of the text itself, the *Lunyu* 論語 (Analects of Confucius) is not only continually reconstructed and made corporate in successive readings, but is in fact reauthored and reauthorized by each reader in every generation and cultural site, including our own. I will argue that this processual understanding of the *Lunyu* highlights the centrality of situated particularity, collateral relationality, temporality, and productive indeterminacy as persistent defining features of a grounding Confucian cosmology, precisely those cultural assets that process philosophers A. N. Whitehead and John Dewey deem threatened in the commitment of the fallacies they have called “misplaced concreteness” and “the philosophical fallacy” respectively. I want to use the concrete and continuing “process” of reading the *Lunyu* as a heuristic to support my claim that Confucius is indeed a process philosopher.

Keywords: interpretive context, process philosophy, authorship, *Lunyu*

* Roger T. Ames is Humanities Chair Professor and Berggruen Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Peking University, China (rtames@hawaii.edu).

** A Chinese language version of this essay has been published as “Ba wenben biancheng zijide: qiadang yuedu zhongguo zhexue zhi fansi” 把文本變成自己的：恰當閱讀中國哲學之反思, *Kua wenhua duihua* (Transcultural Dialogue) 22 (2007). Reprinted in *Boshidunde rujia* 波士頓的儒家 (Boston Confucian), edited by Huang Wansheng 黃萬盛, Harvard-Yenching/Jiangsu Educational Press, 2009.

1. An Interpretive Context for Reading the *Lunyu* 論語 (Analects of Confucius): Chinese Process Cosmology

The word “proper” is derived from L. *proprius*—to make something one’s own. Hence, “proper” is cognate with words such as “appropriate” and “property.” In this essay I will explore what Mencius (c. 372-289 BCE) might mean in describing the books that we read properly as our “friends in history.” I begin from the claim that the classical philosophical canons in the Chinese tradition need to be located within the process cosmology outlined in the *Yijing* 易經 (Book of Changes), and to be read as reflecting these process assumptions. Along the way, I introduce process philosophers familiar in the Western philosophical narrative who provide us with additional points of reference for reading philosophical texts in an open-ended, provisional, and emergent way.

In classical China, with the *Yijing* being the first among the classics, the presumption has long been that knowledge is to be found in what John Dewey has described as “the mutual interactions of changing things”—the omnipresent processes of “generation and transformation.” Chinese cosmology subscribes to an assumption that Alfred North Whitehead has come to call “the ontological principle”—the notion of an ontological parity of finitude that gives all such things an equal claim to being real—what we might alternatively term “a realistic pluralism.”¹ This ontological principle is an affirmation of the reality of any thing as it is constituted by the harmony of its constitutive relations, whether it be each and every thing, each and every kind of thing, or the unsummed totality of things, as experience itself. In the *Zhongyong* 中庸 (Focusing the Familiar) we read:

The way of the world can be captured in one phrase: since events are never duplicated, their proliferation is unfathomable.²

Such a world of unique particulars is a *kosmoi* rather than a *kosmos* in the sense that construals of order are many, and the totality is not dominated

¹ Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 356. This assumption is addressed explicitly in the “Qiwulun” 齊物論 (Parity Among Things) chapter of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子.

² All translations of Chinese texts are my own. *Zhongyong* 26: “天地之道，可壹言而盡也。其爲物不貳，則其生物不測。”

by any one thing. There is no “God” in this pluriverse. Rather, order is the emergent harmony achieved in the contingent relationships among “the myriad things and events” (*wanwu* 萬物 or *wanyou* 萬有), with the closest analogue to God being the spirituality attained by a thriving community living inspired lives. With no assumed “One-behind-the-many” as the ultimate source of meaning, there is no single-ordered world, no “uni-verse,” only an ongoing evolving harmony expressed as the quality of life achieved by the insistent, co-creating particulars.

This radically situated co-creative process is described unambiguously in the *Zhongyong* 25 proposition:

Resolve (*cheng* 誠) is self-consummating (*zicheng* 自成), and its way (*dao* 道) is self-advancing (*zidao* 自道). Resolve references a process (*wu* 物) taken from its beginning to its end, and without this resolution, there would be no things or events. It is thus that, for exemplary persons (*junzi* 君子), it is resolve that is prized. But resolve is not simply the self-consummating of one's own person; it is also what consummates other things and events. Consummating oneself is becoming consummate in one's conduct (*ren* 仁), while consummating other things and events is living wisely in the world (*zhi* 知). It is achieved virtuosity (*de* 德) in one's natural propensities (*xing* 性) and is the way of integrating what is more internal with what is more external. Thus, when and wherever one applies such excellence, it is fitting.³

In this world in which things are constituted by their conditioning relations, meaning, instead of arising *ex nihilo* from a single external source—some conception of God or Natural Law or the Platonic Realm of Ideas—is always situational. Meaning arises *in situ* through the cultivation of deepening relations that we have elsewhere called “the art of contextualization (*ars contextualis*).”⁴

Thus, classical Chinese cosmology, like that of A. N. Whitehead and John Dewey, also subscribes to the mantra, “the only kind of creativity is situated co-creativity.” And, in the wake of Whitehead and Dewey, a sustained reflection on the fact that there is no transcendentalism in the classical Chinese assumptions about cosmic order may pay us an important philosophical dividend. This pervasive Chinese assumption about the always emergent nature of order speaks to the more basic question of why Chinese

³ *Zhongyong* 25: “誠者自成也，而道自道也。誠者物之終始，不誠無物。是故君子誠之爲貴。誠者非自成己而已也，所以成物也。成己，仁也；成物，知也。性之德也，合外內之道也，故時措之宜也。”

⁴ Hall and Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius*, 246-249 and *Thinking from the Han*, 39-43.

philosophy might at this particular historical moment provide us with a salutary intervention in the Western philosophical narrative. That is, in this classical Chinese worldview, there is an alternative nuanced and sophisticated processual way of thinking about cosmology that can join the ongoing internal critique of transcendentalism that is taking place within the still Eurocentric discipline of philosophy itself. Simply put, with the present surge of interest in Whitehead and particularly the American pragmatists, this newly emerging Western version of process philosophy, as it matures within our own philosophical culture can, with profit, draw both substance and critique from a Chinese tradition that has been committed to various forms of process philosophy since the beginning of its recorded history.

2. A Process Reading of the *Lunyu*

In this essay, I want to use the concrete and continuing “process” of reading the *Lunyu* as a heuristic to support my claim that Confucius is indeed a process philosopher. The argument is that, true to the premises of the text itself, the *Lunyu* is not only continually reconstructed and made corporate in successive readings, but is in fact reauthored and reauthorized by each reader in every generation and cultural site, including our own. I will argue that this processual understanding of the *Lunyu* highlights the centrality of situated particularity, collateral relationality, temporality, and productive indeterminacy as persistent defining features of a grounding Confucian cosmology: precisely those cultural assets that Whitehead and Dewey deem threatened in the commitment of the fallacies they have called “misplaced concreteness” and “the philosophical fallacy” respectively.

Situated particularity, collateral relationality, temporality, and productive indeterminacy are evidenced in the reading of the *Lunyu* in many different ways. Let us consider how the “logic” or “coherence” of the text is recovered and indeed extended as it continues to be read. If we look at the history of the translation of the *Lunyu* into the English language, Arthur Waley early on allows that “it is clear . . . that the different Books are of very different date, and proceed from very different sources.”⁵ In the most recent translation, Ted Slingerland observes that “there is no doubt among contemporary scholars that it is a somewhat heterogeneous collection of

⁵ Waley, *The Analects of Confucius*, 21.

material from different time periods.”⁶ Waley and Slingerland then go on to cite available historical scholarship and commentary that provide the context necessary to produce what they take to be a coherent, focused, and responsible reading of the text that best recovers the vision of the Master. For Waley,

Thought grows out of an environment. Ideally speaking the translator of such a book as the *Analects* ought to furnish a complete analysis of early Chinese society, of the processes which were at work within it and of the outside forces to which it reacted.⁷

Similarly for Slingerland, “our knowledge of the late Spring and Autumn and Warring States language usage, society, history, and thought should delimit the parameters of possible interpretations of the text.”⁸

Waley and Slingerland are fine scholars providing necessary historical scholarship that enables a particular English-speaking readership to engage the *Lunyu* as a reasonably determinate artifact. There are other translators who have more confidence than I do that deliberate historical research can provide us with the resources to take this always provisional and incomplete task of situating the text to a level of transparency that goes far beyond the claims that either Waley or Slingerland would be willing to make. If scholars such as Waley and Slingerland continue to do historical spadework on the *Lunyu* in an effort to bring it into clearer sight, Bruce and Taeko Brooks bring heavy equipment to the archaeology of recovering what they claim to be *The Original Analects*. In a contemporary reenactment of the episode of the well-intentioned attempt by the Lords of the North and South Seas to bring proper order out of Lord Hundun 渾沌 recounted in the *Zhuangzi* 莊子, the Brooks’s in their translation work have sought to overcome what they take to be the veritable chaos of the received *Lunyu*—heterogeneity, pervasive interpolation, divided and conflicted viewpoints, the later insinuation of veiled attacks on the Master, hopelessly corrupt passages, and so on—by aggressively dismantling and reorganizing the entire structure of the text.⁹

⁶ Slingerland, *Analects*, xiv.

⁷ Waley, *The Analects of Confucius*, 13.

⁸ Slingerland, *Analects*, xvi. Slingerland does allow that “this set of assumptions is by no means the only angle from which one might approach the text.”

⁹ To rehearse the *Zhuangzi* “Ying di wang” 應帝王 anecdote: “南海之帝爲儵，北海之帝爲忽，中央之帝爲渾沌。儵與忽時相與遇於渾沌之地，渾沌待之甚善。儵與忽謀報渾沌之德，曰：‘人皆有

By conjuring up *Zhuangzi*'s well-known account of the death of Lord Hundun, the Brooks's remind us of why *hundun* in the context of classical Chinese cosmology is better rendered positively and productively as "Lord Spontaneity" rather than as the familiar "Lord Chaos." In the cosmology assumed by the *Lunyu*, *hundun* is the integral indeterminacy that allows for unique particularity and the possibility of the spontaneous emergence of novelty that honeycombs all construals of order. The imposition of an overly determinant order upon *hundun* might well threaten the progress of ongoing self-reconstruction and the novel meaning that emerges from it. After all, it is the collaboration of Lord Spontaneity with the received order of Lords Swift and Sudden that has made the world hospitable, and it is their attempt to impose their own order on Lord Spontaneity that not only snuffs out his life, but is certain suicide for themselves. Applied to the *Lunyu*, it is the interface between a somewhat determinate "text" and the indeterminacy of one's own experience that is the source of life itself, making our lives deliciously uncertain and in degree, unpredictable.

To go too far in enforcing any given design—any single interpretation of the text—is simply selecting one out of myriad candidates for order and privileging that one possible understanding over other possibilities. To the extent that Swift and Sudden would transform the unsummed and interpretively open *Lunyu* into a single-ordered world, they do so to the detriment of both text and reader. We must, after all, follow Whitehead in worrying that an over-determination of the *Lunyu* might come at a cost, where the "sense of penetration"—the stuff of life itself—might be threatened if not even lost "in the certainty of completed knowledge."

Without a doubt one necessary element in recovering the logic and coherence of the *Lunyu* is providing as much historical context as we can. In our own recent translation of the *Lunyu*, Henry Rosemont and I have focused on certain philosophical dimensions of the interpretive context—primarily the cosmology and the language—to attempt to join other scholars in setting what we also take to be appropriate constraints on possible textual

七竅，以視聽食息，此獨無有，嘗試鑿之。’日鑿一竅，七日而渾沌死。” The ruler of the North Sea was “Swift,” the ruler of the South Sea was “Sudden,” and the ruler of the Center was “Hundun,” or “Spontaneity.” Lords Swift and Sudden had on several occasions encountered each other in the territory of Lord Spontaneity, and Spontaneity had treated them with great hospitality. Swift and Sudden, devising a way to repay Spontaneity’s generosity, remarked that: “Everyone has seven orifices through which they can see, hear, eat, and breathe. Spontaneity alone is without them.” They then attempted to bore holes in Spontaneity, each day boring one hole. On the seventh day, Spontaneity died.

interpretation. But in clarifying the process nature of the cosmology and the paronomastic openness of the language of the *Lunyu*, we also argue that this text taken on its own terms must also be treated as aporetic, a work in progress, a never-ending-story.¹⁰ That is, the interpretation must do better than the classical Greek aesthetic sensibility harshly criticized by Whitehead for losing sight of the balance needed between the particular details and some abstracted and “objective” sense of coherence. There must be room for what different readers bring to the emerging logic of the text. The determinacy achieved by historical scholarship must be balanced by the creative indeterminacy of particular interpretation. Indeed, in Francois Jullien’s book, *In Praise of Blandness*, he is attempting to overcome the negative associations of indeterminacy and to reinstate the value of pregnant vagueness as the gateway through which novelty and creative advance emerges, and as the source of endless metamorphoses. For Jullien, then, another name for borderless and uncontained blandness (*dan* 淡)—in this case, the as yet undetermined and always novel reading of the text—is “plenitude,” the repleteness of inexhaustible possibilities.

Dewey too exhorts us to use the historical artifact—here it would be the *Lunyu*—as an instrument to live forward:

Imaginative recovery of the bygone is indispensable to successful invasion of the future, but its status is that of an instrument. To ignore its import is the sign of an undisciplined agent; but to isolate the past, dwelling upon it for its own sake and giving it the eulogistic name of knowledge, is to substitute the reminiscence of old-age for effective intelligence.¹¹

As Dewey insists, the contextualism of process philosophy—and our argument is that the *Lunyu* is process philosophy—requires “fat” rather than “thin” contexts. If we are going to understand Confucianism as something other than a scholasticism or an antiquarianism, there is a second perhaps even more vital dimension of historical and philosophical context that must be considered. We must concern ourselves with the life and times of its readers as a continuing source of additional meaning. The *Lunyu* is a didactic, living text as well as an historical artifact, and readers are co-respondents in their growing relation to this text. A serious and responsible reading of the *Lunyu* is a collaboration, requiring from the reader

¹⁰ Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*.

¹¹ Dewey, *The Essential Dewey*, 50.

a kind of co-creative responsiveness. Readers grow their own interpretations by aggregating organic associations among passages and ideas, and those who know the text best change their lives dramatically on account of it. Peimin Ni has quite appropriately made much of what he terms the “*gongfu*” (功夫 or 工夫) dimension in his work on Confucianism, characterizing the *Zhongyong* in the following terms:

It remains, however, characteristically Confucian in the sense that its fundamental aim is not to *describe* what or how the world is; it is rather to *instruct* people *how* to live their lives. . . . It is therefore entirely proper to talk about Confucian cultivation as the Confucian *gongfu*—what kind of efforts should be made and how to make them, what abilities one will be able to achieve through the efforts, and what the functions of the abilities are.¹²

Ni is certainly correct in saying that the *Lunyu* is devoted to instructing the reader in the project of *how* to become most fully human (*ren*). It takes the cultivation of familial reverence (*xiao*) as the grounding value and as the very source out of which emerges the flourishing human community:

Exemplary persons concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root having taken hold, the proper way will grow therefrom. As for family and fraternal reverence, it is, I suspect, the root of consummate conduct.¹³

The *Lunyu* provides an unambiguous description of the vital Confucian project: one’s energies or *gongfu* are to be directed primarily at cultivating oneself to become an effective member of the family, and to extend those familial feelings to the community at large:

The Master said: “As a younger brother and son, be filial at home and deferential in the community; be cautious in what you say and then make good on your word; love the multitude broadly and be intimate with those who are authoritative in their conduct. If in so behaving you still have energy left, use it to improve yourself through study.”¹⁴

But familial deference does not entail self-abnegation. On the contrary, it requires that each person realize themselves uniquely. Six times Confucius

¹² Ni, “Reading *Zhongyong* as a *Gongfu* Instruction,” 190.

¹³ *Lunyu* 1.2: “君子務本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其爲仁之本與。”

¹⁴ *Lunyu* 1.6: “子曰：‘弟子入則孝，出則弟，謹而信，汎愛衆，而親仁。行有餘力，則以學文。’”

is called upon to clarify what he means by the obscure term *ren*, and six times he gives profoundly different answers, with each answer dependent on the nature and character of his interlocutor. There can be no replication in the project of becoming uniquely human:

The Master said, "In striving to be consummate in your conduct, do not yield even to your teacher."¹⁵

Above, Waley and Slingerland have suggested that the very nature of the *Lunyu* itself is a combination of Confucius speaking for himself—but only as remembered and interpreted by others—and of disparate hands over generations reflecting on what Confucius might have meant in their own reconstructions of his teachings. From the very beginning, Confucius and his Confucianism have been under construction. Across the ensuing centuries, the aggregating interlinear commentary that has attached itself to each passage of the *Lunyu* is the remnant history of an interpretive appropriation that occurs with every reading. The text of the *Lunyu* is porous and protean, and is being reconstructed *pari passu* in a constantly changing context as readers and commentators engage each other critically across the centuries.

3. A Process Reading of the *Mengzi* 孟子 (Mencius)

The Cambridge rhetorician, I. A. Richards, in reflecting on a responsible reading of the companion Confucian classic—the *Mengzi*—at once clarifies and further complicates our problem. He expresses serious misgivings about the idea that analysis of the historical, theoretical, and conceptual aspects of the work can be relied upon to produce the full meaning of the text and thereby solve what he takes to be the problem of translation. He reinstates the affectivity of the text, and in doing so, seeks to balance the harmony of the whole with the feelings of the particular reader:

The problem seems to grow still more formidable as we realize that it concerns not only incommensurable concepts but also comparisons between concepts and items which may not be concepts at all. If we agree that most literary meanings are likely to combine at least four components ((1) Intention or purpose; (2) Feeling, or attitude to what is being spoken about;

¹⁵ *Lunyu* 15.36: “子曰：‘當仁不讓於師。’”

(3) Tone, or attitude to those spoken to; and (4) Sense, or reference to what is being spoken about), and if we confine the term ‘concept’ to the fourth of these component functions, we shall frequently suspect that our business with a passage concerns the first three functions much more than the fourth. . . . In place of a baffling and obscure concept, translation has in such extreme cases to deal with a relatively describable blend of intention, feeling, and tone. . . . [M]ovements of thought involving vague concepts can have a power and coherence which analysis would destroy.¹⁶

Richards wants to include in comparative studies generally, and in a reading of these Confucian canons specifically, the purposive and affective force of the text that invariably colors its more cognitive conceptual and theoretical aspects. Indeed, it is perhaps this subjective affectivity more than any cognitive dimension of the text that allows it to function as a heuristic for the self-cultivation of the individual reader. While Richards is keenly aware of the danger of overwriting the text with our own prejudices and forcing a structure upon it that has little or no relevance to its own content, what requires further reflection here, I think, is not only the inescapability of reinterpretation, but indeed, the desirability of it. Certainly what we might call the “perlocutionary” force of the text is integral to its coherence—its power to cause effects, to change the feelings of its readers, to create a mood that moves and even inspires them. The self-professed purpose of the text, after all, is not only to teach its readers, but to transform them (*jiaohua* 教化)—to grow them from small people (*xiaoren* 小人) into significant people (*junzi* 君子). The point, however, is that in this transformative project, the readers must not only be willing, but must be complicit—we are not merely passive readers, but instead have an authorial role as well. Thinking our way through the *Lunyu* is inseparable from feeling it concretely, where affect is an always particular, subjective form of feeling.

4. Zhu Xi 朱熹 and His “Proper Way of Reading a Text” (*dushufa* 讀書法)

Does my essay do any more than proclaim the obvious? Are not our best interpreters of the Confucian tradition well aware of the ongoing personalization and reconstruction of the Confucian canons? I think not. Indeed, I want to take

¹⁶ Richards, *Mencius on the Mind*, 87-88.

Daniel Gardner's celebrated work, *Chu Hsi [Zhu Xi]: Learning to be a Sage*, as a representative case in point. It is widely acknowledged that the enormous virtue of this study is to reinstate the centrality of self-cultivation as the prime directive in Zhu Xi's philosophical project. The question, however, is what does Gardner take to be the ultimate function of "self" in self-cultivation? To what extent is self-cultivation a creative undertaking that adds meaning to a living tradition?

In outlining Zhu Xi's exhortation on the "proper way of reading a text" (*dushufa* 讀書法), Gardner cites Zhu Xi as insisting that the reader come to the text with an "open mind" (*xuxin* 虛心). He warns against bringing unchecked emotions and desires to the text, and against importing preconceived ideas into the meaning of the text. In Zhu Xi's own words,

There is a proper way of reading a text. Before reading it you must scour and scrape the heart-and-mind until it is spotless. . . . In reading a text, you cannot overwrite it with your own ideas. You must get rid of your own thoughts, and read the text to discover what the ancients meant by it.¹⁷

At the same time that Zhu Xi seems to discourage a free reading of the text, he also insists that readers must strive to make the text their own:

Basically in reading a book one must first become thoroughly conversant with the text, and will only get what it means when the very words seem to come from one's own mouth, and having continued with real concentration, when the very ideas seem to come from one's own heart-and-mind.¹⁸

While Zhu Xi is adamant that we cannot force meaning on the text and "yank it to make it grow," still the understanding of the work must be a sustained collaboration between the text and the particular reader, where the uniqueness of the coherence of each particular is a factor in the meaning of the text:

In reading, one must appropriate the text intimately for oneself. One cannot simply look at the words, nor can one force its growth. . . . In reading,

¹⁷ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 11:177, 185: "讀書有箇法, 只是刮刮淨了那心後去看. . . . 看書, 不可將自己見硬參入去. 須是除了自己所見, 看他冊子上古人意思如何."

¹⁸ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 10:168: "大抵觀書先須熟讀, 使其言皆若出於吾之口, 繼以精思, 使其意皆若出於吾之心, 然後可以有得爾."

one cannot simply seek the coherence of the text from the paper on which it is written, but must look into one's own self and seek it there.¹⁹

While Zhu Xi states repeatedly that coherence (*li* 理) is importantly individual and particular as well as general, Gardner takes the neo-Confucian project as a familiar kind of objective idealism in which we are all striving to discover the same transcendental truth irrespective of our status as unique individuals, where our "relation" to the meaning of the text is wholly passive:

Chu's [Zhu's] *tu-shu-fa* [*dushufa*] thus placed a great deal of value on the autonomy of the individual in the reading process. But we must recognize that autonomy in the process did not by any means translate into subjectivity in the final understanding. For according to Chu, the truth in the text was the same for every reader. It was an objective truth, first expressed long ago by the revered sages.²⁰

5. Whitehead and Friendship

Whitehead uses friendship as his example of how relationality is intrinsic, constitutive, and productive—the characters of the friends are invested and grow in the connectivity we call friendship—and the only creativity is a situated co-creativity. The *Mengzi*, in describing a scholar's search for worthy friends, has a memorable reflection on how books such as the *Lunyu* become our "friends in history":

Finding that making friends with the best scholars in the world is still not enough, these exemplary local scholars go back to talk with the ancients. In reciting their poetry and reading their writings, how could these scholars not come to know the ancients as real people? Thus in discussing the world in which they lived their lives, the ancients become their "friends in history."²¹

The point here is that the character of *both* friends—the exemplary local scholars and equally, the books that provide them with "friends in history"—grow in the connectivity that is their friendship.

¹⁹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 11:181: "讀書，須要切己體驗。不可只作文字看，又不可助長。．．．讀書，不可只專就紙上求理義，須反來就自家身上推究。"

²⁰ Gardner, *Chu Hsi: Learning to Be a Sage*, 55-56.

²¹ *Mengzi* 5B.8: "以友天下之善士爲未足，又尚論古之人。頌其詩，讀其書，不知其人，可乎？是以論其世也。是尚友也。"

The received *Lunyu* begins with a passage that has been cited endlessly at occasions in which Confucian culture has come into contact with the indeterminacy of foreign appropriation:

To have friends coming from distant quarters—is this not a source of enjoyment?²²

“Friends” (*peng* 朋) here means *menxia* 門下: students of the same master, and probably originally refers to the many followers of Confucius who came from places beyond the boundaries of his home state of Lu. Whitehead’s reflection on how the greatest art arises from the miraculous balance that is achieved when the component details disclose themselves most fully in the totality of the achieved effect allows us to invest a different value in what has become a worn cliché. From the perspective of the *Lunyu* itself, “friends coming from distant quarters” might well be construed as a euphemism for the indeterminacy needed to challenge and reform what Whitehead describes as “an oppressive harmony” that can threaten the very survival of a living text—that is, any conservative orthodoxy that smothers novelty by perpetuating a single, ossified reading of the *Lunyu*.

While we might not want to claim that Toegye and Dasan and Sorai and the Boston Confucians are established Confucian orthodoxy, we can appreciate the degree of transformation and the exciting life they bring to the *Lunyu* and other Confucian texts by seeking to reconstruct them within the context of other distinct cultures and philosophical epochs.

6. A Self-Consciously Conservative Interpretation of the *Lunyu*

There is a final issue that needs to be addressed in these pages. A rather natural question to be asked is: In our attempt to get past earlier culturally reductive readings of the Chinese corpus, are we not in fact just substituting one Western philosophical reading of these texts with another? Are we not rescuing the Chinese tradition from an uncritical Cartesian and a calculated Christian reading only to overwrite it with our own pragmatic, process assumptions?

²² *Lunyu* 1.1: “有朋自遠方來，不亦樂乎?”

Encountering the unsummed richness of the original texts themselves, we as interpreters are always people of a specific place and time. Such an interface in itself is a formula for inescapable cultural reductionism. Certainly, our too hastily constructed interpretive strategies and overarching theories—"philosophical" or otherwise—when applied in the practice of cultural and textual translation, cannot help but put concrete detail at some considerable risk. When Robert Frost remarks that "what is lost in translation is the poetry," I think that as an artist he is quite properly concerned that translation is a literary transaction that at best makes different, and that most often, makes less.

Indeed, in order to maximize our efforts in translation, we first and foremost need a commitment to a Heideggerian *Destruction* in which we struggle to recover the situated, primordial meanings by "polishing" the key terminology. This process is "conservative" in the archaeological sense of recovering as much contextualizing detail as possible, and is "radical" as we pursue the root meanings within the soil of Chinese culture. In spite of our real interpretive limitations, to the extent that we can, we must struggle with imagination to allow a text that belongs to another cultural narrative to reveal its poetry—the unmediated, non-referential bottomlessness of its own detail and particularity. This being said, is such a resolute commitment to recovering the objective specificity of the text enough? Is it possible, or even desirable, to leave off our efforts with grasping as much of the original meaning as we can?

And can there ever be such a thing as purity in translation and cultural interpretation anyway? First, the image of Jorge Luis Borges's "Funes the Memorious" leaps to mind, raising the question of whether can we actually "think" particularity.²³ Again, to what extent and in what degree is it ever possible to escape our own facticity to read these texts with naïveté and innocence, free from our own cultural assumptions? Perhaps, instead of pretending to an impossible objectivity, we need a hermeneutical openness in the project of cultural interpretation. Surely the savvy interpreter is Bacon's bee who must mediate between the textual specificity of Bacon's ant, hopelessly lost in the inexhaustible details of phrase and meaning, and the always tenuous web of contextualizing generalizations woven by Bacon's

²³ In this story, Borges introduces a character who, with perfect memory of every detail of his day, requires fully 24 hours to remember 24 hours. Such completeness turns Greek abstraction on its head, precluding the possibility of rising above the detail to reflect and deliberate on one's experience.

spider. That is, beyond the necessary commitment to respecting the particularity of the text, we are in need of Gadamer's hermeneutical sensibilities that begin from an awareness of our own prejudgments, and that allows for both textual detail and interpretive generalizations in the ongoing and inevitable fusion of horizons.

First, we must allow that our own interests and values guide our choices in a palpable way, and enable us to see only what we would see. Henry Thoreau reflects on the collaborative nature of acquiring new knowledge in the human experience:

A man receives only what he is ready to receive, whether physically or intellectually or morally. . . . We hear and apprehend only what we already half know. . . . Every man thus *tracks himself* through life, in all his hearing and reading and observation and traveling. His observations make a chain. The phenomenon or fact that cannot in any wise be linked with the rest which he has observed, he does not observe.²⁴

In fact, it can be argued that "wisdom" emerges analogically through establishing and aggregating a pattern of truly productive correlations between what we know and what we would know. Such correlations are "productive" in that they increase meaning, and we actually achieve wisdom itself when we are able to optimize these meaningful correlations effectively in our life situations.

Saying the same thing in a different way, Alexander Pope in *An Essay on Man* asks: "What can we reason, but from what we know?" Adapting this question with license to our present task, we might allow that we can only know what we do not know by invoking what we do know. This means that cross-cultural understanding must proceed analogically with each tradition having to find within its own resources a vocabulary that enables it to restate in some always imperfect way the philosophical and cultural assets of the tradition that it would understand better.

Of course not all analogies are equally apposite, and as we know from our experience with Chinese philosophy, poorly chosen comparisons can be a persisting source of distortion and of cultural condescension. A heavy-handed and impositional "Christian," "Heideggarian," and yes, even "Pragmatic" or "Whiteheadian" reading of Chinese philosophy betrays the reader not once but twice by distorting both the Chinese tradition and the Western analogue in the

²⁴ Thoreau, *The Journal of Henry D. Thoreau*, vol. 13, 77.

comparison. Even so, we have no choice but to identify productive analogies that, with effort and imagination, can in the fullness of time be qualified and refined in such a way as to introduce culturally novel ideas into our own world to enrich our own ways of thinking and living.

And we need to be analogically retail and piece-meal rather than working in whole cloth. That is, when turning to the *Zhongyong* in which the human being is celebrated as co-creator with the heavens and the earth, we might find analogy with Whitehead in his concern to reinstate “creativity” as an important human value. At the same time, we might be keenly aware that when the same Whitehead invokes the primordial nature of God and the Eternal Objects that primordial nature of God sustains, this long shadow of Aristotelian metaphysics sets a real limit on the relevance of this dimension of Whitehead’s thought for classical Chinese process cosmology.

Further, analogies can be productive of both associations and contrasts, and we can learn much from both. Indeed, while Aristotelian teleology and his reliance upon logic as method might serve as a point of contrast with Chinese philosophy, his resistance to Platonic abstraction in promoting an aggregating practical wisdom does resonate productively with one of the central issues in classical Confucian moral philosophy: a commitment to the cultivation of excellent habits of the heart-and-mind. In this project of cultural translation, we must pick and choose our analogies carefully—but pick and choose we must.

And taking one further turn in the hermeneutical circle, such analogical explorations and appropriations are by no means passive. Going back to Frost, surely what is “*found* in translation” is also poetry. Try as we might, we cannot avoid in degree “making up” our interpretation and “making over” the text with it. But at the same time, one way or another, we are likely also making the text bigger in making it our own. To “appreciate” the text means not only to recognize its magnitude and complexity, but also to become creatively responsive to it, and in the process of doing so, to add our own value that “appreciates” the text further. Arthur Waley for example, as a translator of Tang poetry and Noh plays, became a prominent literary personality among the Bloomsbury group with such notables as T. S. Eliot, Virginia Woolf, Lytton Strachey, Roger Fry, and Bertrand Russell, because of his capacity to interpret premodern Asian culture for a world audience and elevate this new art to global status.

Indeed, the *Zhongyong* is made more meaningful because it is read and “translated” by Ezra Pound and by us too; reinforcing the premise that

creativity is always collateral, the process is itself recursive. Ezra Pound's idiosyncratic engagement with Chinese poetry presaged the novel form of free verse that marks our own contemporary Western poetic sensibility, and yes, it is this Western free verse that has more recently inspired a new generation of Chinese poets. Just as Chinese poets are inspired by a Western appropriation of their poetry, so we can also come to see our Whitehead and our Aristotle in a different and brighter light by coming to know the *Zhongyong* better. And so the circle turns.

■ Submitted: 2017.08.25 / Reviewed: 2017.11.01-2017.12.15 / Confirmed for publication: 2017.12.15

REFERENCES

- Ames, Roger T. and Henry Rosemont, Jr., trans. 1998. *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*. New York: Ballantine.
- Dewey, John. 1998. *The Essential Dewey*. Vol. 1. Edited by Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Gardner, Daniel K., trans. 1990. *Chu Hsi: Learning to Be a Sage*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. 1987. *Thinking Through Confucius*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- _____. 1998. *Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Jullien, François. 2004. *In Praise of Blandness: Proceeding from Chinese Thought and Aesthetics*. New York: Zone Books.
- Ni, Peimin. 2004. "Reading Zhongyong as a Gongfu Instruction: Comments on *Focusing the Familiar*." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 3.2: 189-203.
- Richards, I. A. 1932. *Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definition*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.
- Slingerland, Edward, trans. 2003. *Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Thoreau, Henry D. 1962. *The Journal of Henry D. Thoreau*, edited by Bradford Torrey and Francis H. Allen. 14 vols. New York: Dover.
- Waley, Arthur, trans. 1989. *The Analects of Confucius*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Whitehead, A. N. 1933. *Adventures of Ideas*. New York: Macmillan.
- Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1986. *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (A Classified Collection of the Conversations of Master Zhu). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

把文本變成自己的 ——恰當閱讀中國哲學之反思

安樂哲

中文摘要

如果要讀出中國文獻文本自己本身述說的意義，它是有個自己的語義闡釋環境的。這個語義闡釋環境，這就是《易經大傳》已鮮明清晰闡述的“過程宇宙論”。這樣存在的一個語義闡釋環境，也恰如《論語》總在繼續重建一樣，經歷日日新地解讀，始終一以貫之。它是這樣傳承，被不同時代文化環境的儒者（我們自己今天也在其中）持續保持其一慣性、權威性。

筆者指出，本文也對《論語》採取“過程哲學”解讀的立場，這樣可使其域境性特點、互系性、時宜性以及動態特點，作為奠定儒家宇宙觀的一以貫之諸特徵，得以突顯，占據中心位置。懷德海與杜威的“過程哲學”，在他們各自稱為的“錯置具體性謬誤”和“頂級哲學謬誤”文化遺產中，是受到威脅的。筆者所做的，正是圍繞不同時代對《論語》日日新具體性、一貫性的解讀過程，嘗試性地闡釋和提出孔子是一位過程哲學家這一觀點。

關鍵詞：闡釋域境，過程哲學，創作，論語

Yi I's Understanding of Human Beings as Viewed from Ibn Sina's Perspective

YOO Weon-Ki

Abstract

This paper attempts to view and evaluate Yi I's (Yulgok, 1536-1584) theory of human beings from Ibn Sina's (Avicenna, 980-1037) perspective. This is a new attempt to discover the possibility of a mutual understanding between Korean philosophy and Islamic philosophy, which has never been attempted before, either in Korea or elsewhere. As noted, Yi I was an eminent Neo-Confucian philosopher from Korea, whereas Ibn Sina was an eminent Islamic philosopher from Uzbekistan. At first glance, they hardly seem to have any direct connection; indeed, there is no evidence that they learned about each other. Nonetheless, it is still possible to compare their philosophies since both of them were, at least, deeply interested in the matter of understanding human beings.

As a typical though distinct Neo-Confucian scholar, in the investigation of human beings, Yi I primarily tried to set up an ontological basis for moral nature which is understood as naturally aiming to become a sage through self-cultivation. However, unlike many other Neo-Confucian scholars of his day, he presented a monistic view rather than a dualistic one in that he strongly emphasized the inseparability of *ri* (principle) from *gi* (material force). As noted, *ri* and *gi* are the components of human beings and so all properties or characteristics must stem from either or both of them. However, the Islamic philosopher Ibn Sina would object to Yi I's understanding of human beings, since he maintained that human souls were capable of being separated from their bodies at the time of death. In this paper, I shall examine his reason for this claim and compare it with Yi I's view. In doing this, I shall focus on discovering what sorts of logical inconsistencies or faults they had, if any, and whether we can provide any solutions to make up for them.

Keywords: Yi I (Yulgok), Ibn Sina (Avicenna), monism, dualism, human nature, Korean Neo-Confucianism, Islam

* YOO Weon-Ki is a professor in the Department of Philosophy and Ethics, College of Humanities and International Studies, Keimyung University, Korea (philosophia@kmu.ac.kr).

** This is a revised version of a paper which was originally read at the "2016 International Conference on Silk Road and Central Asia" hosted by Keimyung University, Korea, December 1-3, 2016.

1. Introduction

Contemporary research has shown that the Korean and Islamic traditions were aware of each other's existence as early as the 8th century and used to have quite a close relationship;¹ however, they became estranged in the early 15th century due to the political environment at the time.² Korea maintained occasional contact with the Muslim civilization for the next five hundred years or so without either side exerting much influence on the other, until their relationship finally resumed when Turkish troops came to stay in Korea after the Korean War in the 1950s. However, a formal and full-scale relationship between the two began in the 1970s when the Korean Central Mosque opened in Seoul.

During the long history between the two traditions, Islamic inventions such as the Islamic calendar, a number of astronomical instruments, and the pigment for ceramics were indirectly imported to Korea through China.³ However, it is quite surprising to see that despite such a long historical and cultural relationship, there was neither any distinct academic exchange in

¹ Such Arabic literature as the *Book of Roads and Kingdoms* (Kitāb al-Masālik wa'l-Mamālik, not to be confused with a book written in the mid-11th century by Abu Abdullah al-Bakri in Spain, which had the same title), written in 870 by Ibn Khordadbeh (820-912), and the *Notes on China and India* (Akhbārū'd Sin wa'l Hind), written by an Arabic merchant, Sulaymān, who recorded the lives of people in the mid-9th century and the early 10th century, first mentioned an earlier Korean kingdom, i.e. the Unified Silla. However, the *Wang ocheonchuguk jeon* 往五天竺國傳 (Record of a Journey to the Five Kingdoms of India), written in 727 by an eminent Buddhist monk, Hyecho (704-787), mentioned the name "Daesik" 大食 (Ta Shih), which originally referred to Arabs, or rather, to Muslims. For this, see Hwang, "Iseullam dongbang jeonpa-ui yuhyeong yeongu," 14. Baker claims that the first contact between Korea and Islam was in the 10th century, whereas Hwang notes that there is a different claim that Daesik was first mentioned rather in the *Goryeosa* 高麗史 (History of Goryeo) and the *Goryeosa jeoryo* 高麗史節要 (Essentials of Goryeo History) which were edited and published in Korea's Joseon dynasty in 1449 and 1452 respectively. Baker, "Islam Struggles for a Toehold in Korea," 26; and Hwang, "Iseullam dongbang jeonpa-ui yuhyeong yeongu," 15.

² Hwang states that when hundreds of Arabic merchants came to Goryeo for a trade, they received a hearty welcome, and were allowed to freely perform their traditional or religious ceremonies during their stay without any restriction. Hwang, "Iseullam dongbang jeonpa-ui yuhyeong yeongu," 16. According to Hwang, in the Goryeo dynasty (918-1392), the two traditions were still very close, and such an atmosphere continued until the beginning of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910). However, Joseon gradually came to have a strong tendency for a closed and conservative atmosphere, largely due to the development of Neo-Confucianism, and King Sejong eventually issued an edict banning alien cultures in 1427. Hwang, "Iseullam dongbang jeonpa-ui yuhyeong yeongu," 17.

³ Hwang, "Iseullam dongbang jeonpa-ui yuhyeong yeongu," 18-20.

general between the two traditions, nor any exchange of their philosophical ideas in particular. In this paper, it is not my intention to investigate whether there is any historical background or reason for such academic or philosophical indifference towards each other; I merely aim to show that there are some philosophical theories it is worthwhile to compare.

In doing this, I shall attempt to view and evaluate Yi I's 李珥 (Yulgok 栗谷, 1536-1584) theory of the human being from Ibn Sina's (known as the Latinized name "Avicenna," 980-1037) perspective. The comparison between the two philosophers is a new attempt to discover the possibility of a mutual understanding between Korean and Islamic philosophy, which has never been attempted before, either in Korea or elsewhere. At first glance, they hardly seem to have any direct connection; indeed, there is no evidence at all that they learned about, or had even heard of, each other. Nonetheless, it is still possible to compare their philosophies in that both of them were, at least, deeply interested in understanding human beings. This attempt is expected to be of some help in discovering the possibility of a mutual understanding between Korean and Islamic philosophy, and also to provide a motivation and a basis for further research into the two types of philosophy in comparison.

In what follows, I shall first show Yi I's theory of the composition of human beings and the characteristics of their psychophysical functions such as the mind, nature, and feelings, and then try to compare his view of human beings with Ibn Sina's. At the end of this discussion, we shall conclude that although both of them were deeply interested in human beings, they did not have much in common, and that they took different paths in their investigations because of differing priorities in their studies of human nature.

2. A Preliminary Account for a Theoretical Background of Yi I and Ibn Sina

Yi I was an eminent Neo-Confucian philosopher in the 16th century in Korea, whereas Ibn Sina was an eminent Islamic philosopher who lived through the 10th and 11th century in Iran (now Uzbekistan). Yi I was a follower of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), the founder of Neo-Confucianism, from China's Song Dynasty, but he had formulated his own ideas in many respects. He is known to have been one of the two distinguished Neo-Confucians of his time along with Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪,

1501-1570), but the former was arguably a more independent and original thinker than the latter.

The characteristics of the two Neo-Confucians can be clearly shown when we compare them even briefly with the two most distinguished Greek philosophers of the 4th century BCE, Plato (427-347 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE), both of whom influenced Ibn Sina to a large extent. Indeed, considering their philosophical ideas, the academic relationship between Yi Hwang and Yi I appears to be very similar to that between Plato and Aristotle in many respects.

In order to understand the views on human beings of the two philosophers who are from different traditions, it is necessary for us to focus on analyzing conceptual devices or ontological concepts such as *ri* 理 (principle) and *gi* 氣 (material force), form and matter, and soul and body.⁴ For, as the ancient Greeks generally believed the nature of a being, whether animate or inanimate, can be revealed by analyzing its components.⁵

2. 1. Plato's Dualism and Aristotle's Monism

As noted, both Plato and Aristotle explained the universe in terms of form and matter. In the *Republic*, Plato thinks that there are two separate worlds, the intelligible or invisible world and the sensible or visible world. The immaterial, unchanging, and eternal forms or ideas reside in the intelligible world, whereas the material, changing, and transient objects reside in the sensible world. The objects in the sensible world are considered to be the images or copies of the forms in the intelligible world. In contrast, in the *De Caelo*, Aristotle divides the world into two kinds, the superlunary world and the sublunary world, but in the *Physics* he makes it clear that he does not acknowledge the existence of the intelligible world occupied by immaterial forms, only that of the sensible world. Although he thus denies the existence of the residence of forms, he nonetheless uses not only the concept of matter, but also that of form when accounting for the existence of the sensible world. In other words, as opposed to Plato, who acknowledges the separate existence of form without matter residing in the intelligible world, Aristotle adopts the *hylomorphic* view that all the existents

⁴ Wong discusses the difficulties that are raised in comparing philosophy, see <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comparphil-chiwoes/>.

⁵ Guthrie, *The Greek Philosophers*, 24-26.

are composed of form and matter, though he prefers to use different terms, i.e. soul and body, to explain specifically living beings in the *De Anima*.

What is to be noted here is that the term form has different connotations in Plato and Aristotle. In Plato, the form is immaterial and thus unchanging since change is a property that belongs to matter only. Moreover, for him it is separable from matter and is capable of existing without it. Conversely, in Aristotle as a whole there can be neither matter without form nor form without matter, and so in the case of living beings there cannot be a body without a soul or a soul without a body.⁶ Although Aristotle thus claims a close and inseparable relationship between the soul and the body, he is in no way a materialist in the modern sense of the term; he is not a reductionist who claims that everything can be reduced and explained in terms of matter. Nonetheless, he is a monist in that he acknowledges one type of substance only, which is composed of form and matter.

2.2. Zhu Xi's Binary Position of Monism and Dualism

Now let us turn to the philosophical ideas presented by Yi Hwang and Yi I. In order to explain their view, we need first to give a brief account of Zhu Xi's philosophy since they were his faithful followers, though they had their own distinct ideas. According to Zhu Xi, all the myriad things in the universe are composed of *ri* and *gi*.⁷ *Ri* is a metaphysical and abstract concept that refers to the principle which controls and maintains whatever those myriad things are supposed to do, whereas *gi* is a physical or physiological concept that refers to the material force or energy which comprises them. *Ri* and *gi* are generally regarded as the two constituents of the things, and they can be neither mixed with nor separated from each other.⁸

However, strictly speaking, it appears inappropriate to consider *ri* to be mixed or separated since it is an abstract concept which does not occupy any space. *Ri* is exempt from all kinds of change, while *gi* is always subject

⁶ As noted, it is controversial that this hylomorphic view can be firmly maintained in spite of Aristotle's statement of active *nous* in *DA* III.5 which is said not to have a corresponding organ to perform its function.

⁷ Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 634; Zhu, *Huian xiansheng zhu wengong wenji* (hereafter *Wenji*), 49:1a: "In the universe there has never been any *gi* without *ri* or *ri* without *gi*." The translation of Zhu Xi's *Wenji* is from Chan, unless otherwise stated. I replaced "principle" and "material force" with "*ri*" and "*gi*," respectively, for the consistency of the terms used in this paper.

⁸ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 1:6, 1:9, 1:13.

to change. The talk of separation of one from the other is merely a linguistic expression to emphasize that neither *ri* nor *gi* alone is sufficient to explain all the myriad things.⁹ This line of illustration leads us to see that Zhu Xi is not a reductive materialist and his theory of *ri* and *gi* indeed looks very much like Aristotle's hylomorphic theory.

On the contrary, there are many other statements made by Zhu Xi himself that appear to commit him to be a dualist. He states as follows:

Ri has never been separated from *gi*. However, *ri* "exists before physical form [and is therefore without it]" whereas *gi* "exists after physical form [and is therefore with it]."¹⁰

Before heaven and earth existed, there was after all only *ri*. As there is this *ri*, therefore there are heaven and earth. If there were no *ri*, there would also be no heaven and earth, no man, no things, and in fact, no containing or sustaining (of things by heaven and earth) to speak of. As there is *ri*, there is therefore *gi* to operate everywhere and nourish and develop all things.¹¹

It is undeniable that Zhu Xi here makes a statement that *ri* exists prior to *gi*, which suggests that they are somehow separable from each other and can exist without presupposing each other's existence. These are surely dualistic statements. However, at this stage it is not important to decide whether there is any way of interpreting the above quotations to make Zhu Xi's overall position consistent. What is important is to note that he appears to be taking the binary position of monist as well as dualist.

2.3. Yi Hwang's Dualism and Yi I's Monism

Interestingly enough, the two distinguished Neo-Confucian scholars, Yi Hwang and Yi I, take different positions: the former as a dualist and the latter as a monist. As is well known, they initiated two significant debates on Neo-Confucian concepts and theories in 16th century Korea: the

⁹ Chan persuasively states that "he [Zhu Xi] is neither a monist nor a dualist, or he is both a monist and a dualist. Perhaps one may say that with respect to ultimate reality, he is a monist but with respect to phenomena he is a dualist. But since *ri* and *gi* are never separate, they do not exist independently of each other, much less in opposition. The fact is that any contrast of monism and dualism does not apply to his philosophy." Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 634.

¹⁰ Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 634; *Wenji*, 49:1a-b. See also Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 1:2, 1:11-14.

¹¹ Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 635; *Wenji*, 49:3a-b.

Four-Seven Debate on the moral characteristics of human feelings in terms of their origins, and the Human-Moral Mind Debate on the nature of the human mind. In addition, there is another debate in the 18th century, i.e. the Ho-Rak 湖洛 Debate on the question of whether human nature and non-human nature are the same. In the course of the Four-Seven Debate, Yi Hwang presents the so-called *rigi hobal* 理氣互發 theory which claims that both *ri* and *gi* can move. Since he ascribes the capacity for movement not only to *gi* but also to *ri* and concurrently he distinguishes them as two different entities, he must be regarded as a dualist.

In contrast, in the course of the Four-Seven Debate, Yi I explicitly objects to Yi Hwang's position. Dismissing the *rigi hobal* theory which claims the mutual movement of *ri* and *gi*, Yi I instead presents the *gibal riseung ildo* 氣發理乘一途 theory which only allows the movement of *gi*. This is described in the expression that "only *gi* can move and *ri* mounts it."¹² This theory is presented in order to avoid ascribing not only the capacity for movement but also any sort of movement to *ri*; it ascribes the capacity for movement only to *gi*. Now *ri* cannot move by itself; its seeming movement is in fact the movement of *gi*. In other words, *gi* is a vehicle that contains *ri* within itself. In this way, Yi I is able to maintain that if *ri* appears to move, it only looks that way because it is mounted on *gi*. He is a monist in that he accepts only one substance, *gi*. However, it does not immediately follow that he is a materialist. Like Aristotle and partly like Zhu Xi, he is not a materialist in the modern sense.

2. 4. Ibn Sina's Dualism

Let us now turn to Ibn Sina's view of human beings. There is no doubt that he was one of the most influential Islamic thinkers. "He received some of the best Islamic religious education," but mastered many other subjects including logic, mathematics, and philosophy by the age of eighteen largely by self-teaching.¹³ Through this education, he "forged a comprehensive philosophical system that owed a great deal to Aristotle, but his system

¹² Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 175; Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 10:2: "*Ri* is formless, and *gi* has form; therefore, (1) *ri* pervades, and *gi* delimits. *Ri* is non-active, and *gi* is active; therefore, (2) *gi* issues, and *ri* mounts it." The translation of *Yulgok jeonseo* is from Kalton, unless otherwise stated. I have replaced principle and material force with *ri* and *gi*, respectively.

¹³ Borchert, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 432.

cannot be strictly Aristotelian. In both his epistemology and his metaphysics, he adopted Neo-platonic doctrines but formulated them in his own special way. There were other Greek influences: Plato on his political philosophy; Galen on his psychology; the Stoics on his logic. Nearer home was the influence of Islamic theology and philosophy.”¹⁴ Ibn Sina’s philosophical system was so mixed up with various influences from diverse sources, but there is no doubt that his idea of the human composition still remained very close to Aristotle to a large extent.¹⁵

However, when it comes to the theory of the soul, in particular concerning its relationship with the body, Ibn Sina presents a very different view not only from Plato’s, but also from Aristotle’s. It is indeed unique and, to a certain extent, it looks inconsistent. Nonetheless, it is clear that he has a dualistic view of human beings. In the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, his view is summarized as follows:

The human rational soul is an individual, indivisible, and immaterial substance that does not exist as an individual prior to the body—Ibn Sina denied the theory of transmigration. Further, it is created with the body, not “imprinted” on it. The body is no more than the soul’s instrument, which the soul must use for perfecting itself through the attainment of theoretical knowledge, this involves complete control of the animal passions. . . . With the body’s corruption (death), the soul separates to exist eternally as an individual. . . . Ibn Sina denied bodily resurrection but insisted on the Soul’s individual immortality.¹⁶

Briefly speaking, his view is different from Aristotle’s monistic view since he believes that the human rational soul uses the body as an instrument, and regards it as an individual and immaterial substance which is separated from the body after death. However, his view is also different from Plato’s dualistic view, at least on two points: he does not accept the existence of the soul prior to the body and he denies the transmigration of souls.¹⁷ We

¹⁴ Borchert, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 432.

¹⁵ Hall primarily agrees on this point. He notes that “Helping to structure and support a very large part of Ibn Sina’s philosophy and science, psychological theory is really the spine of the system” and that his “theorizing is grounded in Aristotelianism,” but adds that as for some views on the soul “Neoplatonic and Muslim thought supplement or replace Aristotle.” Hall, “Intellect, Soul and Body in Ibn Sina,” 63. In relation to this view, see my discussion below.

¹⁶ Borchert, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 433-434. I have replaced “Avicenna” with his Islamic name “Ibn Sina” for consistency.

¹⁷ For an account of the transmigration of the soul, see Druart, “The Human Soul’s Individuation and Its Survival after the Body’s Death,” 265.

shall presently see his understanding of human beings more closely, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that this description clearly shows that he is a dualist who acknowledges two separate substances.

3. Yi I's Conception of Human Beings

Now let us turn to Yi I's view of human beings. As a typical though distinct Neo-Confucian scholar, Yi I is deeply interested in human beings and tries to set up an ontological basis for moral nature. He accepts Mencius's (c. 372-289 BCE) conception of human nature: human nature is conferred by Heaven at birth and although its moral nature is originally good, it can go wrong; subsequently, its goodness can be recovered and completed by self-cultivation. This is the basic idea of human nature that Yi I acknowledges without any objection. In this section, I shall begin by examining his account of the composition and classification of human beings, and then I shall turn to discuss his view of human nature in more detail.

3.1. The Composition of Human Beings

As for the relationship between *ri* and *gi*, Yi I says that "They are not a single thing, therefore they are one and yet two; they are not two things, therefore they are two and yet one."¹⁸ Indeed, this appears to be a dubious position. He emphasizes a non-separable relationship between *ri* and *gi*, but he does not say that they are one. He might have meant to say that they are two entities, though non-separable from each other. However, this is not what he meant, either. He adds the following explanation:

What does it mean when I say they are not a single thing? Although *ri* and *gi* cannot be separated from one another, in the midst of their marvelous unity *ri* is *ri* and *gi* is *gi*; they never become intermingled and therefore are not a single thing. What does it mean to say that they are not two things? Although one says *ri* is *ri* and *gi* is *gi*, they are interfused with no interstice, no anterior or posterior, no separating or conjoining; one does not perceive them as two [independent] things. Therefore, they are not two things. . . . *Ri* has no beginning, and therefore *gi* likewise has no beginning.¹⁹

¹⁸ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 126; Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 10:2a.

All the myriad things are believed to be composed of *ri* and *gi*, but *ri* is in general understood as something that neither occupies space nor acts on its own. Thus, the only way for it to act is, as mentioned earlier, mounting *gi*. *Ri* mounting or residing in *gi* is called nature. As noted, the term “nature” is an abstract concept. It refers to some essential property that things are born with. According to Yi I, all the myriad things, including human beings, have their own natures which are different from one another. He says that this is due to the difference not of *ri*, but of *gi*.

Indeed, *ri* is one, and that is all. In it, there is originally no differentiation into the partial and the fully correct, the penetrating and the blocked up, the clear and the turbid, the pure and the mixed. But *gi* on which it is mounted rises and falls and flies about unceasingly, becoming mixed and variegated with numerous differences. . . . Although *ri* is one, since it is mounted on *gi* it is differentiated innumerable ways.²⁰

Yi I says that *ri* is singular and that all the myriad things share the same *ri*. However, he adds that “Although one says it is the one *ri*, the nature of man is not the nature of other creatures, and the dog’s nature is not the nature of a cow.”²¹ Since beings are composed of *ri* and *gi*, and *ri* is the same for all beings, then the differentiation of beings cannot but be found in *gi*. For this reason, he comes to claim that *gi* can be clear or turbid, and pure or mixed, and that things can be differentiated in accordance with their degree of clarity or purity. This represents Yi I’s famous *ritong giguk* 理通氣局 theory. That is, since, although one *ri* prevails in all the myriad things, *gi* delimits, there can be various kinds of beings.²²

Yi I applies the same account to human beings. That is, they are composed of *ri* and *gi*, and the clarity or purity of *gi* can vary in different kinds of human beings.

Among human beings, there are sages. They alone have received perfectly penetrating and perfectly integral, perfectly clear and perfectly pure *gi*, and so they are at one with the character of Heaven and Earth. Therefore, the sage likewise has a fixed nature that does not change. . . . the sage is the norm for the ordinary man. That which is termed techniques of

¹⁹ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 126; Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 10:2a.

²⁰ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 126; Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 10:2a.

²¹ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 127; Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 10:3a.

²² Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 176; Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 10:26a.

self-cultivation are nothing more than a matter of following the norms that have already been formulated by the sages, that is all.²³

According to the passage, the term sages (*seongin* 聖人) refers to the people who have exercised and completed their inborn nature. In fact, it seems that they do not really have to make an effort to complete their nature since they already have “perfectly penetrating and perfectly integral, perfectly clear and perfectly pure *gi*,” which represents the character of Heaven and Earth, that is, the most desirable state which ordinary men should aim to achieve.

Other than sages, Yi I distinguishes three types of man, i.e. the worthy (*hyeonja* 賢者), the middle sort (*jungin* 中人), and the inferior (*bulchoja* 不肖者).²⁴ The worthy have relatively pure physical quality (*gijil* 氣質) although it is slightly mixed with turbidity. Thus, the worthy need some cultivation to regain the perfection of their original natures. On the other hand, the inferior refers to a group of people who have much turbid physical quality with little clarity in it. These people do not even know how to cultivate themselves and so they are easily inclined to fall into evil. The last type of man called the middle sort refers to a group of people between the worthy and the inferior. That is, their physical quality is worse than that of the worthy and better than that of the inferior. They do not necessarily have a tendency to fall into evil, but they often do because they cannot control themselves consistently.

3. 2. Yi I's View of Human Nature

Yi I is a Neo-Confucian who believes that human nature is good and that everybody has the capacity for completing their nature. Nowadays, his division of the four types of human beings in accordance with the degree of clarity and purity of *gi* seems rather arbitrary and will not be accepted. Although it is unclear why he divides them specifically into the four types, it is nevertheless clear that he tries hard to claim that human beings are capable of becoming sages by way of cultivation. Indeed, for Neo-Confucianism it is the basic idea that human beings should do their best to become sages. In other words, becoming a sage is the final aim of the human being. As seen, the term sages refers to the people who are in harmony with Heaven

²³ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 128; Yi, *Yulgok jeonso*, 10:3b.

²⁴ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 151; Yi, *Yulgok jeonso*, 10:14a-b.

and Earth, whereas the other kinds of people are those who aim to reach the standard of sages. Neo-Confucians including Yi I generally believe that human beings are born with good nature and will act accordingly. This might well be understood as suggesting that they will not agree with such a belief that “Once a villain, always a villain.” Indeed, Yi I strongly emphasizes that even villains are capable of rectifying their evil deeds, recovering their original nature, and becoming sages through cultivating themselves.

It is well known that in Neo-Confucianism human beings are explained in terms of three psychophysical terms, i.e. the mind, nature, and feelings, and that the mind is believed to command nature and feelings (*sim tong seong jeong* 心統性情).²⁵ The verb “command” that relates the mind to nature and feelings is a general translation of *tong* 統 and can be also translated as “comprehend.” Considering that, in general, the term nature refers to the state in which feelings are not yet aroused (*mibal* 未發) whereas the term feelings refers the state in which they are aroused (*ibal* 已發), it is clear that the mind is not any state or function other than nature and feelings; it is a different name referring to both states.

Following the tradition of Neo-Confucianism, Yi I accepts the view that the mind, nature, and feelings are divided into two types each.²⁶ That is, the mind is divided into the moral mind (*dosim* 道心) and the human mind (*insim* 人心); feelings into the Four Beginnings (*sadan* 四端) and the Seven Feelings (*chiljeong* 七情); and nature into the original nature (*bonyeon ji seong* 本然之性) and the physical nature (*gijil ji seong* 氣質之性). Among these, the moral mind, the Four feelings, and the original nature share the characteristics of *ri* which are qualitatively clear and pure and, as a result, morally good, whereas the human mind, the Seven Feelings, and the physical nature share the characteristics of *gi* which are qualitatively turbid and mixed and, as a result, can easily become evil, though originally good. Moreover, as for nature and feelings, Yi I argues that the Seven Feelings include the Four Beginnings and the physical nature includes the original nature. This is to say that the Four Beginnings refer to the good feelings of the Seven Feelings and that the original nature refers to the good part of the physical nature.

²⁵ However, in his *Insim dosim doseol* 人心道心圖說 (Diagrammatic Treatise on the Human Mind and the Moral Mind) Yi I adds deliberation (*ui* 意) to the list and says that “The mind commands nature, feelings, and deliberation” (*sim tong seong jeong ui* 心統性情意). Yoo, “Is Yulgok’s Theory of Mind Consistent?,” 154.

²⁶ For a more detailed analysis of these pairs, see Yoo, “Is Yulgok’s Theory of Mind Consistent?,” 154-156.

However, Yi I does not apply the same analysis to the mind. That is, he does not say that the moral mind refers to the good part of the human mind. He instead claims that the two types of the mind have mutually exclusive characteristics, and that they can be transformed into each other. I shall not go deeper into analyzing Yi I's conception of the characteristics of the two minds, but briefly summarize them. Now, according to him, both the moral mind and the human mind are composed of *ri* and *gi*, although *ri* usually characterizes the goodness of the moral mind and *gi* characterizes the evil of the human mind; their characteristics are not fixed, but interchangeable or transmutable. This view is based on the thesis that there is neither *ri* without *gi* nor *gi* without *ri*, but that *ri* and *gi* are always together as a composite, which might be understood as similar to the hylomorphic view of Aristotle. In consequence, a man beginning with the moral mind might end with the human mind, and a man beginning with the human mind might end with the moral mind. The moral mind and the human mind are thus mutually transformed into each other. In relation to this, Yi I says that the sage's mind and the ordinary man's mind are not basically different from each other, but actually the same.

The vital forces of the sage are the same as those of other men: when they are hungry, they desire to eat; when thirsty, to drink; when cold, they want clothing; when they itch, they want to scratch. They likewise are not free from such matters.²⁷

Although the sage also has desires and the human mind, the sage's human mind immediately corrects itself back to the right path and so, in the case of the sage, the human mind is not different from the moral mind. However, this is not true in the case of an ordinary man. Since the ordinary man's physical quality is not pure, the human mind is not firmly controlled by the moral mind and it devolves into evil.²⁸ Above all, Yi I's strong emphasis on the possibility of a mutual transformation between the moral mind and the human mind reflects his belief that every human being is capable of rectifying their wrong deeds and has the potential for becoming a sage by self-cultivation. In consequence, a man who was once a villain can become a sage at a later stage. The belief in the capacity for becoming a sage is shared by most Neo-Confucians, but his emphasis on mutual transformation

²⁷ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 153; Yi, *Yulgok jeonso*, 10:15b.

²⁸ Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate*, 153-154; Yi, *Yulgok jeonso*, 10:15b-16a.

is indeed unique. This view is based on his non-reductive monistic idea of the relationship between *ri* and *gi*. Yi I holds that *ri* is something that resides in *gi*, and that they are not to be identified with or reduced to each other, but this is in no way to say that *ri* is an entity which can exist on its own. In this sense, *ri* might be understood as a property or a function or a principle which cannot exist without *gi*, rather than an independent substance which can exist without it. Perhaps, the best way to interpret such a characterization is to view it as a sort of emergentism, which claims that the whole might have a distinct property which its constituent parts do not have when they exist as parts.

What is to be noted here is that Yi I's understanding of human beings focuses on explaining moral characteristics and setting up the possibility of becoming sages. Although we have not discussed it here, he also endeavors to show various ways to educate people in his works. Neo-Confucians do not advise people to achieve happiness or anything like that, but encourage them to complete their natures or to become sages. Indeed, to complete their natures or to become sages or even to be human beings refers to the same thing. It might be legitimate to conclude that the objective of Neo-Confucianism is to cultivate oneself and others to become human beings to be as such. Thus, it particularly emphasizes two points, i.e. the completion of human nature and the sage studies (*seonghak* 聖學) to educate people to become sages.

4. Ibn Sina's View of Human Beings in Comparison with Yi I's

Let us now have a look at Ibn Sina's view of human beings. He is said to have had difficulty in understanding Aristotle: he read Aristotle's *Metaphysics* forty times without properly understanding it until he came up with a short note written by Al Fārābī, which explained the subject-matter of the treatise. Although he might have fully understood Aristotle later, he was never fully Aristotelian. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that his views on many subjects such as metaphysics and epistemology stood on an Aristotelian basis. For example, his detailed account of soul faculties and his use of some other basic concepts and terms sound pretty much Aristotelian, but his basic idea of the relationship between soul and body is scarcely Aristotelian at all.

When it comes to the topic of the human soul, the basic challenge for Ibn Sina and other Islamic philosophers was to reconcile Aristotle's account, which is not unequivocally dualist in nature, with an account which not only conceives of the soul as being a separate self-standing substance, but also subscribes to the immateriality, incorruptibility, and immortality of individual souls.²⁹

As seen earlier, Ibn Sina's theory of the soul is unique in the sense that he acknowledges the existence of a soul which is independent of the body, but rejects its existence prior to the body and its transmigration to, or its reincarnation in, another body.³⁰ In other words, "the human soul originates from the body, yet does not die with it."³¹ This is unique because, although those who claim the dualistic view of the soul which is independent of the body generally accept its preexistence or reincarnation, he does not accept this common view. Nonetheless, he admits like most dualists that the soul and the body are not one, but two substances that are most likely separated from each other at the time of death. This dualistic view of soul and body is expounded in the "flying-man argument."³² According to the argument, since the flying man hanging in the air without any capacity for the five bodily senses is still capable of thinking, the very thinking subject must be immaterial.

Although the conclusion of the argument is controversial, Ibn Sina establishes that the intellect or the thinking self is immaterial. In the *Book of Salvation* (*Kitāb al-Najāt*), he introduces the external bodily senses, the internal

²⁹ Khalidi, *Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings*, xix-xx.

³⁰ *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, s.v. "Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (c. 980–1037): 7. Psychology," accessed January 25, 2018, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/avicenna/#H6>.

³¹ Druart, "The Human Soul's Individuation and Its Survival after the Body's Death," 260. Afnan states that Ibn Sina maintains that "The soul does not die with the body nor does it suffer corruption in any way." Afnan, *Avicenna: His Life and Works*, 92. For a detailed reference to this claim of Ibn Sina, see Druart, "The Human Soul's Individuation and Its Survival after the Body's Death," note 2.

³² This dualistic view which anticipates the Cartesian conception of "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think. Therefore, I am) presented in the 16th century is concisely summarized in Netton, *Encyclopedia of Islamic Civilisation and Religion*, 269: "It is the so-called 'flying man' argument or thought experiment found at the beginning of his *Fi'l-Nafs/De Anima* (*Treatise on the Soul*). If a person were created in a perfect state, but blind and suspended in the air but unable to perceive anything through his senses, would he be able to affirm the existence of his self? Suspended in such a state, he cannot affirm the existence of his body because he is not empirically aware of it, thus the argument may be seen as affirming the independence of the soul from the body, a form of dualism. But in that state he cannot doubt that his self exists because there is a subject that is thinking, thus the argument can be seen as an affirmation of the self-awareness of the soul and its substantiality. This argument does raise an objection, which may also be levelled at Descartes: how do we know that the knowing subject is the self?"

senses, and the intellect. The internal senses include such psychological faculties as common sense which receives sensory information from the external senses, representation which processes the images from sensory information, imagination which manipulates the images, estimation which evaluates the significance of the images, and recollection which stores, analyzes, and uses the images.³³ These internal senses lie between the external senses and the intellect. The external senses abstract forms from matter, the five psychological faculties preserve or manipulate abstracted forms, and the intellect completes the process of abstraction. The intellect has the characteristic of immateriality for, if not, all souls will be identical in essence, though in effect they are not.³⁴

As mentioned, Ibn Sina refutes the departure or separation of the soul from the body at the time of death, but acknowledges the control of the soul over the body. He here seems to have no interest in characterizing the properties of the body in detail, whereas, as seen, Yi I clearly states that human beings are varied in accordance with their degree of clarity and purity in *gi*. In contrast, for Ibn Sina the hierarchy of living beings depends on the sorts of souls or soul faculties that they have, rather than their material components. Living beings have the appropriate faculties by virtue of their souls. Ibn Sina suggests three types of souls: the vegetative soul, the perceptive soul, and the rational soul. Plants only have the vegetative soul to receive the basic nutrition for life; besides this soul, animals have the perceptive soul to operate the faculty of sense-perception; in addition to these two types of souls, human beings have the rational soul. Living beings are alive by means of actualizing their faculties.

Ibn Sina's *On the Soul* included in the *Book of Salvation* focuses on the rational soul of human beings rather than the soul of other beings. He divides the rational soul into a practical faculty and a theoretical faculty, but calls both of them "intellect."³⁵ Since the role of intellect is to abstract forms from matter and, finally, to achieve knowledge, it is thus natural that Ibn Sina in the *Book of Salvation* is concerned mainly with knowledge. He, in particular, emphasizes the significance of the Active Intellect. He describes its role as follows:

The same applies to the Active Intellect, from which emanates a power that flows to imagined things, which are potentially intelligible, rendering

³³ Khalidi, *Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings*, xxi and 32-36.

³⁴ Khalidi, *Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings*, xxii.

³⁵ Khalidi, *Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings*, 27.

them actually intelligible and rendering the potential intellect into an actual intellect. And just as the sun is itself perceived and is also a cause of rendering something potentially perceptible into something actually perceptible, so also this substance [i.e. the Active Intellect] is itself intelligible and is also a cause of rendering all the intelligibles, which are potentially intelligible, actually intelligible.³⁶

As the sun shines to reveal not only other things but also the sun itself to the viewer, the role of the Active Intellect is to reveal not only intelligibles but also the Active Intellect itself to the knower. In other words, as the sun allows what is potentially to be seen to be actually seen, the Active Intellect allows what is potentially to be known to be actually known. In this way, Ibn Sina tries to explain the process of attaining human knowledge and to define the roles of necessary faculties for it.

However, as Lee points out, he hardly seems to be interested in offering an account of human nature itself;³⁷ he instead tells us the kinds and functions of faculties, the soul's relationship to the body, and the process of achieving knowledge rather than the final aim of the soul faculties altogether, which will tell us the final aim of human beings. Unlike Ibn Sina, Aristotle was concerned with all those topics. In particular, his use of all the soul faculties to explain the happiness of human beings is indeed his central idea which is not found in Ibn Sina. However, Ibn Sina's disinterest in this idea seems to leave the impression that his theory of human beings remains incomplete. In other words, his treatment of human beings still requires something more to say about the ultimate purpose or end of human beings.

Indeed, Ibn Sina's view of human beings is different not only from Aristotle's, but also from Plato's. This is peculiar since the two Greek philosophers have opposite views on the composition of human beings. Since their characteristics are based on their composition, one inevitably has to be in favor of either one of them if one intends to discuss human beings. At an earlier stage, we have seen that the relationship between Plato and Aristotle was similar to Yi Hwang and Yi I in that one of them had a dualistic view of human beings, whereas the other had a monistic view. Since Ibn Sina refutes both Plato and Aristotle, he would also refute Yi Hwang and Yi I. Moreover, he would say more or less the same thing to Yi I as he would have said to Aristotle when he had refuted Aristotle's idea of hylomorphism in favor of the

³⁶ Khalidi, *Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings*, 57-58.

³⁷ Lee, "Avicenna-ui 'Jingongsok-ui ingan'," 302.

Neo-Platonic idea of the soul that survives the death of the body. As mentioned, it is legitimate to say that Yi I's understanding of the relationship between *ri* and *gi* is more or less the same as Aristotle's hylomorphic view of form and matter, or the soul and the body. However, Ibn Sina "holds with Aristotle that the soul is the form and the quiddity of the body which controls and gives it its particular character; but contrary to him asserts that it is a separate substance capable of existing independently of the body."³⁸ As noted, the claim for the separation of the soul from the body, or the survival of the soul after the death of the body, is the primary difference not only between Ibn Sina and Aristotle, but also between him and Yi I.

On the other hand, the second significant difference between Ibn Sina and Yi I is that the former thinks that what makes one living being different from another is their souls, whereas for the latter it is their bodily components. That is, for Ibn Sina the differing natures of the living species is due to their souls, whereas for Yi I it is due to the degree of cleanliness or turbidity of the matter that composes them. Ibn Sina's strong claim for the survival of the soul as well as the ascription of significance to the soul rather than the body might be due to the religious implications of the Islamic tradition. Yi I's ascription of significance to the material or bodily component is also due to his belief, though not religious, that the moral nature of human beings is not fixed, but can be cultivated through their consistent efforts. By this, he claims that even the villain can become a sage, depending on their will and efforts.

5. Concluding Remarks

I have chosen Yi I and Ibn Sina for comparison since they were known as the most influential thinkers in their respective traditions, i.e. Korean and Islamic. When I first began to study them, I expected that there would be much to discuss since I knew that Ibn Sina was largely influenced by Aristotle, who might well be compared with Yi I. However, the result was far from my expectations, presumably due to the lack of my prior knowledge of Ibn Sina.

A large number of philosophers have tried to understand the meaning of human life, but the question has been asked in different forms: what

³⁸ Afnan, *Avicenna: His Life and Works*, 89-90.

human beings are, what they are capable of, what they are composed of, what their final goal in life is, whether they have such a goal at all, and whether their nature is good or bad. All these questions are to inquire after human nature. We have seen that Yi I and Ibn Sina had different questions in mind. From our discussion so far, we have seen that although both of them were deeply interested in human beings, Yi I was rather inclined towards the analysis of the moral characteristics of human nature, whereas Ibn Sina was keen on showing the roles or functions of soul faculties. Moreover, Yi I tried to find a way to attain and complete human nature which he defined as originally good, whereas Ibn Sina was more concerned with the process of attaining knowledge of human beings. In addition, Yi I used the difference of the physical quality to explain the variation of living beings, whereas Ibn Sina used the psychological faculties of the soul as a criterion for distinguishing one living being from another.

In this paper, I have attempted to compare the two different traditions which have never communicated with each other before. At first glance, it might seem that if Ibn Sina and Yi I had met, they would have had nothing much to talk about since they had very different views. However, their shared earlier concern regarding human beings might be a good starting point for their conversation. They might have to begin with defining the terms they used in accounting for human beings, and then they might perceive the need to reconcile their distinct differences: Yi I's characterization of *ri* as inseparable from *gi* and Ibn Sina's characterization of the soul as independent of the body. In any case, their discussion of the subject would not have been meaningless. The comparison between the two different traditions has so far been incomprehensive and left many things unexamined. Nonetheless, I hope that this approach has shown a considerable and worthwhile motivation for further research.

REFERENCES

- Afnan, Soheil M. 1958. *Avicenna: His Life and Works*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Baker, Don. 2006. "Islam Struggles for a Toehold in Korea," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 10.1: 25-30.
- Borchert, Donald M., ed. 2006. *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Vol. I. Detroit: Thomson Gale.
- Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. 1969. *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Druart, Thérèse-Anne. 2000. "The Human Soul's Individuation and Its Survival after the Body's Death: Avicenna on the Casual Relation between Body and Soul." *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10.2: 259-273.
- Guthrie, William K. C. 1950. *The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle*. London: Methuen.
- Hall, Robert E. 2004. "Intellect, Soul and Body in Ibn Sīnā." In *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam*, edited by Jon McGinnis, 62-86. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Hwang, Eui-Gab. 2012. "Iseullam dongbang jeonpa-ui yuhyeong yeongu" 이슬람 동방 전파의 유형연구 (A Study on Types of Islamic Propagation to the East). *Hanguk iseullam hakhoe nonchong* (Journal of Korean Association of the Islamic Studies) 22.1: 1-23.
- Kalton, Michael C., et al., trans. 1994. *The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Khalidi, Muhammad A., ed. 2005. *Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, Jackyeong. 2007. "Avicenna-ui 'Jingongsok-ui ingan'" 아비첸나의 '진공속의 인간' (Avicenna's "Man in the Void"). *Cheollhak nonchong* (Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association) 47: 297-313.
- Netton, Ian Richard, ed. 2008. *Encyclopedia of Islamic Civilisation and Religion*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Wong, David. 2017. "Comparative Philosophy: Chinese and Western." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed January 25, 2018. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/comparphil-chiwe/>.
- Yi, I. 1992. *Yulgok jeonso* 栗谷全書 (Complete Works of Yulgok). Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press.
- Yoo, Weon-Ki. 2012. "Is Yulgok's Theory of Mind Consistent?" *Acta Koreana* 15.1: 147-162.
- Zhu, Xi. 2001a. *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (A Classified Collection of the Conversations of Master Zhu). Vol. 14-18 of *Zhuzi quanshu* 朱子全書 (Complete Works of Master Zhu). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.

- _____. 2001b. *Huian xiansheng zhu wengong wenji* 晦庵先生朱文公文集 (Collected Writings of Mister Huian, Zhu Wengong) Vol. 20-25 of *Zhuzi quanshu* 朱子全書 (Complete Works of Master Zhu). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.

從伊本西納的角度考察李珥 對人存在問題的理解

俞 原 基

中文摘要

本文將從伊本西納(Avicenna, 980-1037)的角度考察評價李珥(栗谷, 1536-1584)對人存在問題的理論。這是一種新的嘗試, 是爲了發現並提供韓國哲學與伊斯蘭哲學之間的相互理解的可能性。李珥是韓國著名的新儒學哲學家, 而伊本西納則是烏茲別克斯坦著名的伊斯蘭哲學家。乍看起來, 兩位學家之間沒有直接的聯繫, 而確實沒有任何證據顯示他們認識甚至聽說過對方。但是, 我們依然可以對他們的哲學進行比較, 因爲他們都至少對人存在的問題有濃厚的興趣。

作爲一個既典型又傑出的新儒學學家, 李珥對人存在問題表示興趣是爲了爲通過自我修養順理成章的成爲聖賢的目標而建立具有存在論基礎的道德本性。但是, 他與大多數同時代的儒學家不同, 即他的觀點接近於理氣一元論而不是二元論。就是說, 他反對理與氣分離。但是, 伊本西納應該反對他這種觀點, 因爲伊本西納主張靈魂在某種程度上區別於肉體。作者將校驗伊本西納的這種主張的根據, 並與李珥的根據及理論作以比較。通過這種比較, 我們可以印證兩種不同傳統的哲學至少有可比性, 不僅可以發現他們邏輯上是否存在不一致與謬誤, 還可以提供某種解決方案來補足他們的理論。

關鍵詞：李珥(栗谷), 伊本西納(Avicenna), 一元論, 二元論, 性, 韓國新儒學, 伊斯蘭

The Characteristics of the Earlier Philosophy of Han Won-jin: Major Issues in *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom*

LEE Hae-Im

Abstract

The major issues in *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom* 栗谷別集付籤 are as follows: firstly, the sameness of the Great Ultimate (*taiji* 太極) and human nature (*xing* 性); secondly, the sameness of the material force of heaven and earth (*tiandi zhi qi* 天地之氣) and the material force of father and mother (*fumu zhi qi* 父母之氣); thirdly, the pureness (*chunshan* 純善) of the mind; fourthly, the relation between moral perception (*zhi* 智) and sensory perception (*zhijue* 知覺) as essence (*benti* 本體) and its application (*zuoyong* 作用); and lastly, the sameness of subduing selfish desires (*keji* 克己) and returning to propriety (*fuli* 復禮). These issues stem from the matter of how to interpret two propositions: human nature is the combination of the principle and material force (*xing he liqi* 性合理氣) and the mind is material force (*xin shi qi* 心是氣). Han Won-jin regards the principle as the basis for moral standards and material force as value-neutral; the principle is the basis of good, and material force can appear as either good or evil in the perception process. In addition, ordinary people find it difficult to perceive properly. Thus, when the mind is trying to perceive morally, it has to rely on something. Han Won-jin tries to establish the basis of morality in the principle rather than in nature, since the effect of nature cannot be completely good. The principle as nature is not the source of moral feeling but the basis of norms. Thus, the perception of the mind cannot produce a moral response in itself, but turns into moral perception only when one's response is monitored and practiced based on certain norms.

Keywords: the Great Ultimate, nature, material force, moral perception, sensory perception, subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety

* LEE Hae-Im is a visiting researcher in the Institute of Humanities, Seoul National University, Korea (baboin77@snu.ac.kr).

** This work was supported by the Institute of Humanities, Seoul National University, Korea.

1. Setting Up the Problem

In his book *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom* 栗谷別集付籤 (Commentary on Supplementary Works of Yulgok) written in 1705, Han Won-jin 韓元震 (1682-1751) criticizes *Yulgok byeoljip* 栗谷別集 (Supplementary Works of Yulgok) which adopts the perspective of the Soron 少論 (Young Doctrine) scholars including Bak Se-chae 樸世采 (1631-1695). Taking into consideration the time of publication and the issues in *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom*, Han Won-jin can be presumed to have had a firmly established argument from the early years.¹ In this regard, *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom* and other early writings, such as *Sidongji seol* 示同志說 (Theory of Showing to Scholars) in 1705, and *Gyeongui gimunnok* 經義記聞錄 (Collections of the Meanings of the Classics) in 1717, serve as important research materials for understanding Han Won-jin's theory of the critical mind.²

Nevertheless, previous researchers did not pay much attention to Han Won-jin's earlier works such as *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom*, instead mainly focusing on analyzing Han's philosophy in comparison to that of Yi Gan 李柬 (1677-1727).³ Such an approach cannot fully elucidate Han's theory of the critical mind, which paved the way for the Ho School (Hohak 湖學). However, recently Kim Tae-neon came to appreciate the value of *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom* while carrying out research on the compilation of *Yulgok byeoljip*. His study unravels the strained relationship within the Yulgok 栗谷 School formed in the compilation of *Yulgok byeoljip*.⁴ However, Kim's study merely introduced the issues in *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom* without discussing the critical mind each issue commonly suggests.

¹ T. Kim, "'Jeongjeon' mandeulgi-ui han sarye, yulgok byeoljip-ui pyeonchan-gwa geu-e daehan bipandeul," 86-105.

² *Gyeongui gimunnok* was first published in 1741. The source material for this book was appraised by Gwon Sang-ha 權尙夏 in 1717 and the book was completed in 1722 by adding his own preface and epilogue. Thus, *Gyeongui gimunnok* can be classified as Han Won-jin's earlier work. Considering that the year of publication was 1741, this book can be considered to provide the grounds for the argument that "Han's critical mind theory made no big changes from beginning to end."

³ J. Yi, "Han Won-jin-gwa Yi Gan-ui nonjaeng-eseo chohyeonggiseong-ui seongnip munje," 1-20; K. Kim, "Oeam-gwa namdang-ui miballon-i ganneun dodeok cheolhaksang-ui baegyong," 77-102; Moon, "Oeam Yi Gan-gwa namdang Han Won-jin-ui innulseong dongi nonbyeon-e gwanhan yeongu," 195-234.

⁴ T. Kim, "'Jeongjeon' mandeulgi-ui han sarye, yulgok byeoljip-ui pyeonchan-gwa geu-e daehan bipandeul," 77-115.

The main issues in *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom* are five: the sameness of the Great Ultimate (*taiji* 太極) and human nature (*xing* 性); the sameness of material force of heaven and earth (*tiandi zhi qi* 天地之氣) and material force of father and mother (*fumu zhi qi* 父母之氣); the pureness (*chunshan* 純善) of the mind; the relation between moral perception (*zhi* 智) and sensory perception (*zhijue* 知覺) as essence (*benti* 本體) and its application (*zuoyong* 作用);⁵ and the sameness of subduing selfish desires (*keji* 克己) and returning to propriety (*fuli* 復禮). These issues arise from the problem of how to interpret two propositions: “nature is the combination of the principle and material force” (*xing he liqi* 性合理氣) and “the mind is material force” (*xin shi qi* 心是氣). The two propositions address the issues of whether the principle (*li* 理) is the foundation of moral standards, whether the principle transcends good and evil, whether material force (*qi* 氣) is value-neutral, and whether material force is a pure source or not.⁶ With a view to clarifying Han Won-jin’s standpoint, I will examine whether his theory maintains logical consistency and how this theory develops into a theoretical system.

2. Are the Great Ultimate and Human Nature the Same?⁷

The argument over the sameness of the Great Ultimate and human nature stems from the question of whether the Great Ultimate is the principle (*taiji ji li* 太極卽理) or whether the Great Ultimate is the combination of the principle and material force (*taiji he liqi* 太極合理氣).⁸

⁵ Han’s concept of moral perception is not perception toward objects but adequately treating emotions aroused from those objects according to norms. According to Han, the perception of sages is for the principle but the perception of ordinary people is for desire. Therefore, an ordinary person’s perception is likely to fail to preserve morality. Thus, ordinary people have to make every effort to improve their moral response ability.

⁶ From 1709 to 1747, Han Won-jin got involved in debates regarding this matter with the Nak School (Nakhak 洛學) scholars such as Yi Gan and Yi Jae. In this regard, *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom* is a valuable material in identifying the standpoint of Han Won-jin prior to the debate with the Nak School.

⁷ This is Han Won-jin’s refutation of the seven items (questions and answers numbered 9, 27, 28, 30, 36, 59, and 42) described in Song Ik-pil’s *Taegeuk mun* 太極問 (Questions about the Great Ultimate). Major discussion topics are the relationship between the Great Ultimate, the principle, and material force, and the relationship between original nature and physical nature.

⁸ In my opinion, nature has three levels in the philosophy of Han Won-jin; thus, it is difficult to translate *xing* 性 as nature. However, nature refers to the principle existing inside material force. Also, the principle itself is good-natured in spite of its existence in material force. Therefore, I chose nature as the translation for *xing*. Lee, “Han Won-jin-ui simseongnon yeongu,” 24-35.

The question was raised regarding the statement that “nature reaches accomplishment.”⁹ In my opinion, the Great Ultimate refers to the utmost degree of the principle. Nature was named after the principle existing in material force. However, since the principle is not originally external to material force, the Great Ultimate also merely exists in material force. Nature is the same as the Great Ultimate. I cannot understand why the Great Ultimate cannot be called nature. It means that the principle can be called the Great Ultimate and not nature before it is received in all creatures, while the principle can be called nature and not the Great Ultimate after it is received in all creatures. However, *Taijitu jie* 太極圖解 (Interpretation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate) states that “all creatures have the same nature and all creatures have the same Great Ultimate.” How can this not refer to nature and the Great Ultimate? We can say that the names of “nature” and “the Great Ultimate” refer to the same thing, but we cannot say that the essence of nature and the Great Ultimate are different.¹⁰

“The Great Ultimate refers to the utmost degree of the principle,” says Han Won-jin. Based on this statement, the Great Ultimate cannot be seen as the combination of the principle and material force. However, in the following discussion, Han Won-jin says “nature was named after the principle existing in material force. The Great Ultimate also merely exists in material force.” According to this statement, nature is the same as the Great Ultimate, and in that sense, the Great Ultimate as the principle cannot be separated from material force. This means that the Great Ultimate is the combination of the principle and material force. Han Won-jin’s statement that “the Great Ultimate is the utmost degree of the principle” emphasizes that the Great Ultimate as the principle combines with material force and serves as the foundation for good.

However, if the Great Ultimate cannot be nature, it should exist in a space separate from material force. This runs counter to the Yulgok School’s main thesis that “the principle and material force are not separate” (*liqi bu xiangli* 理氣不相離). In addition, if “the principle should be called nature and not the Great Ultimate after it is received in all creatures,” then the principle comes to combine with material force, and therefore it seems like an existence which cannot have its own intrinsic

⁹ I. Song, *Gubongjip*, 3:416.

¹⁰ Han, *Seubyu* 拾遺, 5:418, in *Namdangjip*: “問，至於成之者，方謂之性云云。按太極以理之極至而言者也。性以理在氣中而名者也。然理本無在氣外者，則太極亦存乎氣中而已矣。其實性與太極一物也。今曰太極不可謂之性者，未知何謂也。其意蓋以爲萬物未稟之前，只可謂之太極而不可謂之性也，萬物既稟之後，只可謂之性而不可謂之太極也。然太極圖解曰，萬物各一其性，而萬物一太極也。此豈非性與太極互稱之耶。謂性與太極之名所指不同則可矣，而謂性與太極之實，有所不同則不可矣。”

existence. That is, if we interpret the statement that “all creatures have the same nature and the same Great Ultimate” in reference to the statement that “after the principle is received in all creatures, it should be called nature and not the Great Ultimate,” we can say that even if all creatures have the same Great Ultimate, the Great Ultimate transforms itself according to the temperament of each creature. If we consider this interpretation in relation to good and evil, we can say that once the Great Ultimate as a metaphysical existence is restricted to material force, it loses its inherent characteristics and thus it is difficult to define it as the basis of good. In brief, according to *Taegeuk mun* 太極問 (Questions about the Great Ultimate), the principle merely exists in the form of material force and cannot in itself be the basis of the good.

Han Won-jin also does not deny that the present situation is dominated by material force. However, he strongly insists that the principle is the sole foundation of good.

I raised a question regarding the statement that “the five moral principles of nature are aroused by external things, and good and evil are distinguished.”¹¹ In my opinion, the principle is inherently good and does not have evil. Evil is brought about by material force and is not the nature of the principle. If we discuss good and evil when the principle exists in material force, this good is not the nature of the principle, since the good results from modification. Then, Mencius should not have espoused innate goodness but Buddhist emptiness (*kong* 空), which is quite contrary to the proper understanding of the principle. This theory is utterly wrong. Besides, to consider heaven and earth to have no physical nature (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性) is more erroneous. All creatures that have a temperament possess physical nature. The highness and brightness of the sky and the wideness and thickness of the land are magnificent temperament. How can physical nature not exist? Furthermore, the so-called physical nature is the same as the original nature existing within temperaments; it does not mean that there are two types of nature. If heaven and earth have only the original nature without physical nature, then does the original nature hang in mid-air independently? How is it possible? If one is to prove the existence of physical nature by citing Zhu Xi’s statement that “the nature of heaven and earth is the principle and it falls into *yin-yang* 陰陽 and the five agents (*wuxing* 五行),” this is a misunderstanding of Zhu Xi’s statement. The statement that “the nature of heaven and earth is the principle” only refers

¹¹ I. Song, *Gubongjip*, 3:417.

to the principle of heaven and earth, while the following statement refers to the temperament of heaven and earth.”¹²

Here, Han Won-jin says that “the principle is inherently good and does not have evil.” If the principle is not the basis of good, then the principle cannot provide any moral standards and is merely the basis or the state of all phenomena. This does not accord with Confucianism, which pursues the morality of humans and society; on the contrary, it supports the Buddhist view that sees phenomena as they are. Furthermore, if it is presumed that the principle only exists in a space separate from phenomena, the concept of nature is also divided into two: the principle as nature (heavenly nature) and physical nature (the combination of the principle and material force).

If original nature is separated from physical nature, this poses the same problem as the one which appears in the argument about the sameness of the Great Ultimate and nature. For instance, “the highness and brightness of the sky and the wideness and thickness of the land” describes the temperaments of the sky and the land. Not only the sky and land but all existences have temperaments. If the principle is included in the temperaments of the sky or land, the principle finally becomes physical nature. According to Han Won-jin, physical nature is the same as temperaments combined with the principle, namely original nature. If the principle is considered to have a temperament, it is inevitably influenced by that temperament.

Even if that is the case, the principle or original nature does not turn into material force. Material force experiences variation toward something fluid. If no rule governs the variations of material force, it results in disorder and confusion. Thus, Han understands Zhu Xi’s statement that “the nature of heaven and earth is the principle” as referring not to the principle existing in itself but the principle existing in temperament without losing its inherent characteristic. The inherent characteristic of the principle is good.

¹² Han, *Seubyu*, 5:418, in *Namdangjip*: “問: 五性感動而善惡分云云。按理本善無惡。惟惡則乃氣之所生而非理之本也。今日善惡皆理在氣中後說, 則是善亦非理之本, 而其善乃假也。然則孟子不當道性善, 而釋氏之空, 乃反知理也。其說之差甚矣。又以爲天地無氣質之性, 則其誤又甚矣。凡有氣質者, 莫不有氣質之性矣。天之高明, 地之博厚, 乃其氣質之盛者, 則安得無氣質之性也。且所謂氣質之性者, 只此本然之性墮在氣質中者也, 非有二性也。今日天地只有本然之性, 而無氣質之性, 則是於氣質之性之外, 別有本然之性而懸空獨立也。其可乎哉。其引朱子所謂天地之性是理也, 纔到陰陽五行處, 便有氣質之性者以證之, 則亦錯會朱子之言矣。所謂天地之性, 是理者, 專指天地之理而言也, 其下云云, 方兼說天地之氣質也。”

3. Are the Material Forces of Heaven and Earth and the Material Forces of Father and Mother the Same?¹³

The argument on the sameness of the material forces of heaven and earth and the material forces of father and mother stems from the question “how could evil people like Gu Sou 瞽叟 and Gun 鯀 give birth to sages like Shun 舜 and Yu 禹 and sages like Shun and Yu give birth to foolish children like Zhu 朱 and Jun 均?”¹⁴

Kim Jin-gang raised a question regarding “when a man and a woman become intimate, floating material force (*youqi* 遊氣) is added to them.”¹⁵ . . . In my opinion, the material force of heaven and earth fills up the space, so it penetrates everything. Thus, their material force flows in the bodies of humans and animals and enables them to give birth. All things preserved in the bodies of the parents are the material force of heaven and earth. What is already in the bodies of the parents is the material force of the father and mother. In fact, there is just one material force. The material force of heaven and earth does not exist outside of the material force of the father and mother. . . . Gu Sou giving birth to Shun and Gun giving birth to Yu is owed to the flow of extremely bright material force, whereas Yao giving birth to Zhu and Shun giving birth to Jun resulted from the flow of unclear material force. Ordinary people are all born from a mixture of bright and unclear material forces. Those who possess an extremely clear or extremely unclear material force of heaven and earth are few, while those who possess a mixture of clear and unclear material forces are many. Thus, there are many ordinary people but Shun, Yu, Zhu, and Jun cannot always exist.¹⁶

¹³ In *Yulgok byeoljip bucheom*, Han Won-jin refutes all 39 issues raised by Kim Jin-gang. Han criticizes Kim for discussing the material force of heaven and earth while presuming the original material force (*yuanki* 元氣) as either the inherent position or the inherent state. I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 31:230.

¹⁴ According to Kim Tae-neon, Yi I presents two main theses: 1) The true nature of humans can be revived when a rough and impure temperament is transformed into the pure temperament of one's true nature; and 2) This transformation is based on objective norms. The former is a development of the Nak School's position, and the latter is a development of the Ho School's position. Therefore, the discussions of the material force of heaven and earth and the material force of father and mother reveal the difference between the standpoints of the Ho School and the Nak School regarding Yi I's philosophy, rather than the confrontation between Han Won-jin and Yi I. See T. Kim, “‘Jeongjeon’ mandeulgi-ui han sarye, yulgok byeoljip-ui pyeonchan-gwa geu-e daehan bipandeul,” 99-105.

¹⁵ I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 31:230.

¹⁶ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:419-420, in *Namdangjip*: “問: 男女構精之際, 遊氣合於其間云云. . . . 按天地之氣, 逼塞空中, 無物不透, 故其氣常流通於人物軀殼之中而生出人物. 其父母軀殼中所存者, 皆天地之氣也. 既在父母軀殼中, 則又是父母之氣也. 其實一氣而已也. 非於父母之氣之外, 更有天地之氣也. . . . 瞽鯀之生舜禹, 適值天地至清之氣流通也, 堯舜之生朱均, 適值天地至濁之氣流

“The material force of heaven and earth spreads and gives birth to humans and animals. All things preserved in the bodies of the parents possess the material force of heaven and earth,” says Han Won-jin. This is a criticism of the argument that the material force of heaven and earth and the material force of father and mother are fundamentally different. If someone insists that the material force of heaven and earth is fundamentally different from the material force of father and mother, the intention is to define the material force of heaven and earth as the grounds for good and the material force of father and mother as the grounds for good and evil.

In a sense, it may seem reasonable to claim that the material force of heaven and earth is different from the material force of father and mother. For example, Gu Sou giving birth to Shun is compared to reaping totally unexpected outcomes. If evil parents did not give birth to evil children but good children, pure material force different from the material force of father and mother has to generate from the outside. Thus, the pure material force of heaven and earth is secured.

Furthermore, if Shun gave birth to a foolish son Jun, one would argue that the moment Jun was born, he did not meet the material force of heaven and earth; if this was not the case, the sage would have inherited unclear material force from his parents. This assumption eradicates the difference between sages and ordinary people by denying the status of sages who receive pure material force. From Han’s point of view, insisting that the material force of heaven and earth and the material force of father and mother are fundamentally different gives rise to such a problem.

Moreover, Han Won-jin says “since the material force of heaven and earth fills up the space, it penetrates everything.” If the material force of heaven and earth goes into the bodies of the parents, it becomes the material force of father and mother. One thing to note is that both the material force of heaven and earth and the material force of father and mother flow and move around, so good or evil do not have a fixed shape. This means that the material force of heaven and earth and the material force of father and mother all exist as potential grounds for good and evil. For example, if an evil person like Gu Sou meets the pure material force of heaven and earth when giving birth, then that person can give birth to a sagely son; if a sage like Shun meets the impure material force of

通也。中人之生，皆值天地清濁相雜之氣流通也。天地之氣至清至濁者常少，而清濁相雜者常多，故中人常多，而舜禹朱均，皆不常有也。”

heaven and earth when giving birth, then that person can give birth to a foolish son.

However, when it comes to Shun and Gu Sou, the good and evil of the material force of the father and mother have already been decided. Therefore, the good and evil of children depends on the material force of heaven and earth. Based on this logic, the material force of heaven and earth is defined as essential, while the material force of father and mother is supplementary. Furthermore, this logic raises the argument that the material force of heaven and earth exists as the source of the material force of father and mother. However, the material force of heaven and earth merely exists as the grounds for good and evil. The material force of heaven and earth does not have any content enabling its application to be the principle. The material force of heaven and earth is not the principle, but the external condition before and after giving birth which affects fetuses or the growth of individuals.

Therefore, even if the pure material force of father and mother creates a fetus, the disposition of a child can change according to the material force of heaven and earth which serves as an external condition. Han Won-jin claims that “the material force of heaven and earth is the same as the material force of father and mother,” since he believes that the material force, not being fixed but changing, is the phenomenon itself and thus cannot become the principle.

The Yulgok School scholars have long argued that material force should not remain as a mere phenomenon but should be regarded as the principle. For instance, Kim Jin-gang 金震剛 (1523-1581) and Bak Sun 朴淳 (1523-1589), the advocates of Yi I 李珥 (1537-1584), claim that material force can also be defined as the principle by placing the original material force at the top of the material force of heaven and earth.

Kim Jin-gang raised a question regarding the statement “the creation of heaven and earth results from the one original material force received [in all creatures].”¹⁷ . . . In my opinion, when the original material force is stuck confusion will arise, and when it flows heaven and earth are created. No original material force exists outside heaven and earth, and heaven and earth are created by receiving one material force. . . . If heaven and earth are regarded as one thing formed from the original material force, and birth and death take place in heaven and earth, how can it be different from

¹⁷ I Yi, *Yulgok jeonso*, 31:237.

the Buddhist claim that emptiness is vast and heaven and earth are one thing in the emptiness? Also, is the so-called original material force the same thing as the material force of *yin-yang*, or is it neither *yin* nor *yang*? If it is the material force of *yin-yang*, then heaven and earth are *yin-yang*. How can there be *yin-yang* outside of *yin-yang*? If it is neither *yin* nor *yang*, then material force is *yin* if it is not *yang* and vice versa. How can material force be neither *yin* nor *yang*? If there is birth in heaven and earth, then it is due to *yin-yang*; *yin-yang* marks the beginning. . . . In the past, I heard Bak Sun saying that calm material force is the beginning of *yin-yang*. Disregarding Bak's claim, Master Yi I said that "I have never seen such an odd saying in the classics. This saying is nothing but Bak's rough and shoddy prattle." How could Master Yi criticize him in one place and cite him in others? There must be an error in the record.¹⁸

"The original material force is outside heaven and earth, and heaven and earth are created by receiving one material force," says Han Won-jin. Here, heaven and earth refers to all creatures existing between heaven and earth. However, if heaven and earth come into being by receiving one material force from the original material force, a world beyond human perception can exist. Han Won-jin criticizes this kind of argument for following the Buddhist idea which defines *maya* as all creatures existing between heaven and earth. The world is the same as *yin-yang*; however, if the original material force created the world in its own image, there has to be another *yin-yang* outside of *yin-yang*. Moreover, the original material force exists neither as *yin* nor as *yang* but as material force. Based on this argument, not only a world which can be perceived by human senses but also a world beyond human perception can exist.

"Calm material force is the beginning of *yin-yang*," says Bak Sun. This argument defines the original material force as the principle. Together with Bak's argument, Han Won-jin wrote down Yi I's criticism that "I have never seen such an odd saying in the classics. This saying is nothing but Bak's rough and shoddy prattle."¹⁹ This record shows that such a discussion was

¹⁸ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:421-422, in *Namdangjip*: "問: 天地之生, 本稟元氣之一氣. . . . 按元氣圖則爲渾沌, 闢則爲天地. 非天地之外, 復有元氣, 而賦一氣爲天地. . . . 若以天地爲元氣中一物, 而生滅於其中, 則此與釋氏以虛空爲大, 而以天地爲虛空中一物者, 何以異哉. 且此所謂元氣者, 是陰陽之氣耶, 抑非陰非陽之氣耶, 以爲陰陽之氣, 則天地即陰陽, 陰陽之外, 豈更有陰陽耶. 以爲非陰非陽之氣, 則氣非陽即陰, 非陰即陽也. 又安有非陰非陽之氣耶. 天地有所稟而生, 則是陰陽有所稟而生, 而陰陽有始矣. . . . 竊嘗聞思庵樸相公以湛一之氣爲陰陽之始. 先生譏之曰, 如此怪語, 不曾見於經傳. 今此說殆不過爲思庵論議之粗粕緒餘耳. 先生豈肯斥之於彼而自爲於此乎. 其爲記錄之誤必矣. 又按此條自後天地度數以下自無病, 申之以爲後天地度數與先天地度數必齊者, 未可曉也. 以歲月言之, 則或今月大而來月小, 或去歲無閏而今歲有閏, 小者大之影也. 以此推之, 則先後天之度數, 亦安得無少異也. 然其大體則必相同也, 又按氣之不齊氣字, 恐物字之誤."

¹⁹ Yi I, *Yulgok jeonso*, 9:185.

rampant not only during the time of Yi I but also Han Won-jin's day. That is, presenting Yi I's criticism together with the question, "is the material force of heaven and earth fundamentally different from the material force of father and mother?" demonstrates that Yi did discuss this issue with Kim Jin-gang. Han Won-jin refutes the argument that "the original material force is as pure as the principle" by presenting Yi I's interpretation of the relationship between the original material force and the material force of heaven and earth.

4. Is the Mind Purely Clear Material Force?²⁰

Regardless of which of its two main sub-schools you ask, the Ho School or the Nak School, the Yulgok School asserts that "the mind is material force." One thing to note is that the two schools have different opinions about whether the mind can be purely clear material force or not. When referring to the previous part where Han Won-jin discusses the material force of heaven and earth and the material force of father and mother, the Ho School argues that apart from sages, the minds of everyone cannot be pure. This is represented well in the discussion about the sameness of the material force of the mind (*xinqi* 心氣) and the material force of the body (*shenqi* 身氣) with regard to vast-flowing material force (*haoran zhi qi* 浩然之氣).

A question was raised regarding the statement that "vast-flowing material force is the material force of the mind."²¹ In my opinion, regardless of being wise, foolish or stupid, everyone has acquired vast-flowing material force. When the material force of heaven and earth jumps up and down, it inevitably causes unclear and confusing things to mix, but its magnificent flow remains consistent. Thus, what has been preserved in humans is the same. When someone obtains the clear part of material force, one has vast-flowing material force; when someone obtains the unclear part of material force, one cannot obtain vast-flowing material force. This may not be reasonable. In addition, Zhu Xi said that vast material force is filled up in the body; however, these days it is believed that material force is in the mind, so this seems biased and invalid.²²

²⁰ In this part, Han Won-jin raises an objection to Yi I and Kim Jin-gang who support the claim that "vast-flowing material force is regarded as the material force of the mind and not as the material force of the body; the former is clear and the latter is firm and weak." I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 31:230.

²¹ I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 31:230.

²² Han, *Seubyu*, 5:420. in *Namdangjip*: "問: 浩氣心上氣也云云. 按人無智愚賢不肖, 而皆得浩氣. 蓋天地之氣升降飛揚者, 雖不能無濁駁之相雜, 其盛大流行之體, 則未嘗不同, 故其存乎人

Every individual was born with the material force of heaven and earth. This material force is not completely pure but is in fact also mixed with unclear and confusing things. Thus, some individuals are wise while others are foolish. If wise people obtain vast-flowing material force while those who are foolish do not, two questions are raised: “other than the material force of heaven and earth, does vast-flowing material force exist?” and “is it impossible for those who were not born with vast-flowing material force to become moral beings?”

Even if we assume that vast-flowing material force exists not as the material force of the body but as the material force of the mind, the above questions are still not readily answered. First of all, according to the *Mengzi* 孟子 (Mencius), vast-flowing material force is the material force filling up in the body. Therefore, vast-flowing material force should not be called the material force of the mind but the material force of the body. In addition, Mencius says “vast-flowing material force is formed by accumulating righteousness. Accumulating righteousness is not achieved in a single day.”²³ Vast-flowing material force does not possess integrity but exists only when one gains the qualification or background to become a moral being. It is difficult to say whether this qualification or background refers to a specific figure or to the grounds for good. For instance, if a white handkerchief is embroidered with splendid flowers, the handkerchief should be regarded as the background which embraces splendid flowers and not as the splendid flowers. Therefore, it can be suggested that the attempt to consider the material force of the mind as more moral than the material force of the body ignores the fact that nothing can go in the wrong direction by leaning to good.

The mind as material force is value-neutral. This can be identified from Han Won-jin’s discussion on the human mind (*renxin* 人心) and the moral mind (*daoxin* 道心).

A question was raised regarding the statement that “the four virtues of origination, flourishing, advantageousness, and firmness (*yuan heng li zhen* 元亨利貞) are nature.”²⁴ Sin Yu answered that “nature also deviates from destiny.” In my opinion, this answer itself is reasonable. But Sin Yu’s theory is unreasonable. Nature deviating from destiny and going against the constant principle is paired with the mind of vicious man. There are good

者，亦猶是焉。今曰得氣之清者有浩氣，則其得氣之濁者，似未能得浩氣也。竊恐未安。且朱子以浩氣爲體之充，而今只以爲心上氣，則亦恐偏枯。”

²³ *Mengzi* 2A.2.

²⁴ I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 31:232.

and evil in the human mind. How can it deviate from destiny and go against the constant principle? The human mind is in contrast to the moral mind; the moral mind accords with the principle while the human mind goes against the principle. Nonetheless, the human mind is both good and evil. Its evil part goes against the principle, but can its good part also go against the principle?²⁵

The four virtues of origination, flourishing, advantageousness, and firmness become nature; when humans receive them, these virtues become benevolence, righteousness, rituals, and wisdom (*ren yi li zhi* 仁義禮智). In the Yulgok School, human nature is the combination of the principle and material force. Here, material force is the mind. Thus, nature is the principle existing within one's mind. The principle within one's mind does not exert any influence; the principle is not able to expose its goodness. Whether material force is good or evil determines one's characteristics in the present situation. Whether the mind is good or evil depends on whether it conforms to the constant principle, not on whether the mind is good or evil. If the human mind is evil, it stands in contrast to a good mind or the moral mind. The human mind does not abide by moral standards.

However, if someone asks whether the mind is good or evil before it produces any response, people would say that the mind is neither good nor evil. Then, the human mind cannot be regarded as evil. Here, the human mind is value-neutral. If the human mind is evil, its response is prone to violate moral standards. The mind which has not produced any response is neither good nor evil.

If the mind is neither good nor evil, how can humans become moral beings? When inferring from the discussion surrounding the human mind and the moral mind, good or evil is decided according to whether to abide by moral standards or not. Then, what has the human mind got to do with moral behaviors which are shown when encountering external objects? Accepting moral standards and responding properly are so important that there seems no reason to distress oneself over the question of "what is the nature of the human mind?"

However, some questions can be raised: "how can we accept moral standards as behavioral norms?" and "what are the standards based on?" If

²⁵ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:421, in *Namdangjip*: "問: 元亨利貞, 天之性也云云. 申愈曰: 天亦迫於氣數云云. 按此答本自正當, 申說反誤. 天之迫於氣數, 反於常理者, 只可與人情之不善者作對也. 人心則有善有惡, 安得以迫於氣數, 反於常理者當之也, 人心與道心對言, 而道心爲循理, 故以人心爲反常. 然人心兼善惡, 惡者固反常, 善者亦可謂反常耶."

the establishment of moral standards is closely related to the response system of the mind and all humans share this response system, we can assume the universality of moral standards. Han Won-jin interprets this as “essence” (*jingshuang* 精爽) and “empty spirit” (*xuling* 虛靈).

In my opinion, humans become wise, foolish, or virtuous depending on purity and impurity, and the light and darkness of their mind. If the mind preserves clean material force, there is no difference in this mind. How can smart, foolish, and virtuous be classified? Also, how can a person who has received extremely unclear material force without a bit of clear material force not have a mind? Even if the material force received in humans is completely unclear, the essence of material force becomes the mind; therefore, it can also be empty spirit. However, this essence is the essence of unclear material force; therefore, it falls behind the essence of clean material force.²⁶

“Humans become wise, foolish, or virtuous depending on purity and impurity, and the light and darkness of the mind” (*qing zhuo ming an* 清濁明暗), says Han Won-jin. Wisdom (*zhi* 智), stupidity (*yu* 愚), virtuousness (*xian* 賢), and unworthiness (*buxiao* 不肖) result from the different response abilities of the mind. For example, if someone is in a situation where s/he has to make a moral judgment, the person is regarded as either smart (wisdom), stupid (stupidity), capable (virtuousness), or incompetent (unworthiness) depending on the judgment. If everyone was born with outstanding response ability, everyone would have the mind of a sage. However, this is virtually impossible. Thus, the response abilities of humans are different.

If response abilities are different, how can humans secure sameness? Han Won-jin says “even if the material force received in humans is completely unclear, the essence of material force becomes the mind; therefore, it can also be empty spirit.” This means that unlike other existences, the human mind consists of the most transparent material force. The characteristic of the most transparent material force is spirituality since it is empty, and therefore any being can accept it and make responses unconsciously. The levels of propriety of this response differ according to wisdom, stupidity, virtuousness, and unworthiness.

²⁶ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:422, in *Namdangjip*: “按人之所以智愚賢不肖者，只在於心之清濁明暗耳。若果清氣存者皆為心，則是心無不同矣。安得有智愚賢不肖之分也。且稟氣至濁而無一分清氣者，不可謂有心耶。蓋人之稟氣，雖有全濁者，而其氣之精爽為心，故亦能虛靈。但其精爽，自是濁氣之精爽，故其明不如清氣之精爽為心者也。”

In comparison to the minds of animals, the human mind responds to not only moral relationships but to all circumstances. The ability to form a relationship with everything enables good relationships to expand and bad relationships to improve. Han Won-jin thinks that sameness can be secured in the sense that the minds of humans differ according to individual dispositions but, unlike animals, the human mind can form a relationship with other subjects.

Once all creatures are generated, they become humans when receiving proper flowing material force; they become objects when receiving biased obstructed material force. An object which receives the biased obstructed material force does not obtain the whole principle and its nature also becomes biased and obstructed in accordance with its disposition. (When it comes to the principle within material force, it is still the whole complete principle and exists as it is.) Plants and trees have no perception. Birds and beasts have perception, and may occasionally develop one aspect but cannot expand to the entire scope since they are restricted by their shape and material force. Humans acquire proper flowing material force. Thus, the mind retains the highest level of empty spirit and has sturdiness, obedience, and the five constant virtues (*jianshun wuchang* 健順五常). When they expand those virtues, they can take part in heaven and earth. To assist enlightenment and nurture is one's own duty. This ability distinguishes humans from other creatures.²⁷

“Humans are different from animals in the sense that they obtained proper flowing material force,” says Han Won-jin. This does not mean that the mind is good but that the mind has the response ability to form a complete morality system, like the moral rules governing the Five Human Relations. Judging from Han's claim that “animals have also obtained the whole principle but their nature is biased and obstructed according to dispositions,” some creatures are unable to accept proper flowing material force since their mind is not totally empty, and as a result, when they encounter a certain situation they sometimes cannot produce any response. For example, tigers and wolves only form father-son relationships, and bees and ants only form sovereign-subject relationships, which shows that animals are unable to form complete relationships

²⁷ Han, *Namdangjip*, 29:137: “萬物既生，則得其氣之正且通者爲人，得其氣之偏且塞者爲物。物得其偏且塞者，故理之全體，雖莫不得之，而隨其氣質，性亦偏塞。（就氣中單指其理，則渾然全體，未嘗不自若。）草木則全無知覺。禽獸則雖有知覺而或通一路，終爲形氣之所拘，而不能充其全體之大。人則得其正且通者，故其心最爲虛靈，而健順五常之德，無不備焉。充其至而能參天地。贊化育者，皆已分事也。此人物之所以殊也。”

like humans. This response ability of the mind is perception. Animals also have perception, but only the perception of humans can respond to all situations. Therefore, humans can engage not only in the moral rules governing the Five Human Relations but also in all circumstances.

5. Is Sensory Perception Comparable to Moral Perception?²⁸

Han Won-jin criticizes the argument that “sensory perception should not be assimilated to moral perception.” By citing *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Rites), Han Won-jin proves his standpoint that “sensory perception is assimilated to moral perception by encompassing all emotions.”²⁹

When fellow students were engaged in discussion, they talked about the variation of material force in the beginning.³⁰ . . . Sin Yu claimed that sensory perception should not be likened to moral perception. According to ancient records, this seems not to be the case. *Liji* asks, “what is human nature? It is joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and desire.” The seven types of emotion can be obtained without learning. The emotions are sometimes expressed as benevolence, at other times as righteousness or rituals. Sensory perception produces joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and desire; these are what moral perception causes. The perception of the mind is not outside of the seven feelings (*qiqing* 七情) and the seven feelings are not outside of the effect of moral perception. If that is the case, how can sensory perception not be assigned to moral perception? Thus, Master Cheng said that “moral perception is sensory perception.” Master Zhu said that “sensory perception is the effect of moral perception.” Is this wrong? If the effect of moral perception cannot encompass all seven feelings, this

²⁸ In this part, Han Won-jin raises an objection toward Yi I and Kim Jin-gang’s argument: “moral perception and sensory perception are not in the relationship of a thing and its function.” I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 31:246.

²⁹ In my opinion, perception not only encompasses emotions such as the four beginnings and seven feelings but also consciousness. Consciousness observes whether the emotion which has arisen from a certain situation is appropriate or not. Han Won-jin clearly sets moral perception and sensory perception in the relationship of the essence and its function. Thus, sensory perception means the ability to make moral judgments. However, when considering Han’s claim that the essence of perception is temperament, moral perception does not coincide with moral judgment. Even if moral perception is not moral judgment, people with a good inherent temperament may make good moral judgments, but those without may have difficulties doing so. This is why proper response can be generated only when the perception of all men, excluding sages, is based on the principle. In addition, perception is in the relationship of the essence and its function, in the sense that sensory perception must potentially realize moral perception. Lee, “Han Wonjin-ui simseongnon yeongu,” 68-81.

³⁰ I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 31:245-246.

is not right. No classics describe human emotion more specifically than *Liji*. How can it not discuss the effect of moral perception? When there is nature, there is definitely emotion. Choosing one emotion out of seven and attaching it to moral perception cannot be correct. In addition, assigning one more emotion outside the seven feelings and regarding it as the effect of moral perception is also not correct. Is it unclear that the effect of moral perception encompasses the seven feelings without deviation? When it comes to the effect of moral perception, if we discuss its completeness it indicates the profound effect of the mind; if we discuss it incompletely it indicates a clue of either right or wrong. . . . Learners should widen the eye of the mind and not spoil two by insisting one, and should avoid failing to learn anything due to a narrow view.³¹

In this part, Han Won-jin classifies all the feelings of humans into seven types: joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and desire. He also says that all seven feelings can be obtained without learning, which implies that feelings are a spontaneous moral response, such as the innate moral sense (*liangzhi liangneng* 良知良能) evoked in human relations.³² However, Han Won-jin does not claim that ordinary people cannot produce a spontaneous moral response; instead, he argues that ordinary people cannot properly produce one of the seven feelings in a perilous situation. The human mind, the clearest one among all material forces, produces a spiritual and divine response, but the minds of ordinary people consist of unclear indolent material force.³³ Thus, they find it difficult to derive a pure moral response when facing a perilous situation.

Based on Han's saying that "sometimes it is expressed as benevolence and at other times as righteousness or rituals," the four beginnings (*siduan* 四端) can be included in the seven feelings and the seven feelings can be summarized into the four beginnings. This does not mean that the four beginnings are the same as good feelings, but that they are the same as the ability to realize the virtues of benevolence and righteousness. For example,

³¹ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:424-425, in *Namdangjip*: "齋中諸友相與講論曰，當初氣化云云。 . . . 至於論知覺，則以爲不當屬之於智。揆以古訓，似不如是。記曰：何謂人情。喜怒哀懼愛惡欲。七者不學而能。七者之情，或發於仁，或發於義，或發於禮，而若其知所以喜怒哀懼愛惡欲者，乃智之發也。心之知覺，不外乎七者之情，七者之情，又不外乎智之用，則知覺之當屬於智，豈不較然乎，故程子曰，智者知也，朱子又每言知覺智之用，此果皆非耶。若曰智之用，不能包七情，則又不然。經傳之言人情者，莫詳於禮記。豈獨不言智之用乎。有性必有是情。若於七者之中，分一以屬智，固不可也。又於七者之外，別立一情，以爲智之用，亦不可也。然則智之用，包七情而不外者，不亦明乎。蓋智之用，專言之則專一心之妙用，偏言之則主是非之一端也。 . . . 學者於此，正當大著心眼，不可執一而廢二，窺偏而昧全也。"

³² Mengzi 7A.5.

³³ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:424, in *Namdangjip*.

the distress of the mind upon seeing a child falling into a well can be classified as in the same category as compassion (*ceyin zhi xin* 惻隱之心), one of the four beginnings; that is, the situation provides the condition where human nature can be completed by virtues. This means that the response of the startled and distressed mind cannot exist without a specific situation like the one where a child is falling into a well, and that if a person is in the same situation, despite differences in time or space the same response will be produced. For example, when someone sees a child falling into a well at any time or any place, the person is bound to feel compassion, not anger.

However, if Han argues that “sensory perception is the effect of moral perception,” all feelings become regarded as the virtue of moral perception. Furthermore, if Master Cheng states that “moral perception is sensory perception,” the logic that moral perception and sensory perception are in the relationship of a thing and its function breaks down. Thus, even if benevolence and righteousness exist inside humans, they cannot be expressed completely due to the sensory perception of the mind. Moreover, the human mind, which has the four beginnings narrowed down from the seven feelings, has no other choice but to go down to the minimum level of moral perception. The feelings cannot encompass the entire scope but merely show one aspect of the mind of right and wrong or the mind of compassion, shame, and respect. Therefore, the mind of right and wrong should be replaced with feelings which embrace all seven feelings.

Han Won-jin suggests that human nature is subordinate to the perceptual response of the mind and all sensory perceptions are narrowed down to like and dislike (*haowu* 好惡).

Some people think that the four beginnings are the four beginnings and the seven feelings are the seven feelings, but this is wrong. If human nature was aroused to become emotion, then that emotion should be good. How can emotion be good at times and evil at others? When the mind is exposed, material force starts to take effect. Thus, when the principle is aroused by clear material force, the innate goodness becomes valid since the principle is not concealed. This creates harmony. When the principle is aroused by unclear material force, the innate goodness cannot become valid since it is concealed by material force. This cannot create harmony. Evil things at the center of emotions are the fault of material force, not the fault of the principle. However, if the principle already exists in material force, it becomes under the influence of material force. If material force is good, the principle is also good; if material force is evil, the principle is also evil. Thus, we cannot say that only material force is evil or that only the

principle is good. However, since material force is not the nature of the principle, if one is evaluating the principle in no relation to material force, the former is always extremely good as a whole. The four beginnings and the seven feelings are the same feeling. All are produced when the principle joins the aroused material force and retain both good and evil.³⁴

Han Won-jin opposes defining the four beginnings and the seven feelings as two different feelings: the former only retains the possibility of good and the latter retains the possibility of both good and evil. On the surface, this seems aimed at the Toegye 退溪 School, but in actuality it is a criticism of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings Theory of the Nak School which was influenced by Kim Jin-gang.

Within the Yulgok School, nature is a combination of the principle and material force. In addition, it is suggested by both the Ho School and Nak School that the exposure of nature follows the process where material force is aroused and then the principle rides it (*qifa licheng* 氣發理乘). Thus, if the principle rides clear material force and is expressed, it does not lose its inherent character of goodness. However, if the principle rides unclear material force, it loses its inherent character. This is not the fault of the principle but of material force. If everyone had clear material force, the four beginnings could still exist within the good mind.

However, Han Won-jin insists that excluding sages, everyone has received unclear indolent material force. Thus, humans cannot produce purely good emotions toward an external stimulus from the start. Moreover, the four beginnings and the seven feelings are included in the same category of feeling (*qing* 情).

In *Gyeongui gimunnok*, Han Won-jin asserts that sensory perception can be reduced to the minimum units: like and dislike.

What is described in this chapter is the same as the discussions in *Mengzi*'s chapter on the four beginnings and the "Yueji" 樂記 (Record of Music) chapter of *Liji*, but the meaning is more detailed. "Affection" (*qinai* 親愛) and "sympathy" (*aijin* 哀矜) in this chapter and "compassion" in *Mengzi* are the beginning of benevolence; "disdain" (*jiane* 賤惡), "arrogance" (*aoduo* 敖惰), and "the feelings of shame and hate" (*xinwu zhi xin* 羞惡之心)

³⁴ Han, *Namdangjip*, 29:138: "或以爲四端自四端, 七情自七情, 其亦謬矣. 性發爲情, 則宜其情之無不善, 而或善或惡何也. 已發之際, 氣始用事, 故理之乘清氣而發者, 不爲氣撓而直遂其本然之善, 所謂和也, 理之乘濁氣而發者, 爲氣所撓而不能直遂其本然之善, 不可謂之和也. 情之惡, 氣使之然, 非理之罪也. 然是理既在是氣, 則隨其氣而自爲一理, 氣善則理善, 氣惡則理惡, 不可謂氣獨惡而理獨不惡也. 但非理之本然也, 故不雜乎氣, 單指其理, 則理之全體, 未嘗不渾然至善也, 四七一情, 則皆是氣發理乘而皆兼善惡也."

are the beginning of righteousness; “reverence” (*weijing* 畏敬) and “the feeling of respect” (*gongjing zhi xin* 恭敬之心) are the beginning of rituals, and “to like something while recognizing its ugliness and to dislike something while recognizing its beauty,” and “the feelings of approval and disapproval” (*shifei zhi xin* 是非之心) are the beginning of wisdom. Affection, compassion, and recognizing something’s beauty belong to like; evil, reverence, and recognizing something’s ugliness belong to dislike. Like and dislike embraces the four beginnings. Liking is the expression of benevolence and disliking is the expression of righteousness. Benevolence and righteousness embrace and divide human nature. Like and dislike also converge into sensory perception. Moral perception is the virtue which helps concentrate one’s whole mind. Thus, the meanings of the classics passed down by sages can be clearly understood.³⁵

From here, I will examine how Han Won-jin brings the seven feelings, the four beginnings, and like and dislike together under the category of sensory perception, and whether his theory is logically valid. Han considers that affection and sympathy in the “Yueji” and feeling for somebody such as compassion in *Mengzi* are the same; disdain and arrogance are the same as the feelings of shame and hate; reverence is the same as the feeling of respect; liking something while recognizing its ugliness and disliking something while recognizing its beauty are the same as the feelings of approval and disapproval. Here, affection, sympathy, reverence, and recognizing something is beautiful are the minds which have a liking for something. In contrast, disdain, arrogance, and recognizing something is ugly are the minds which have a dislike for something. The four beginnings and the seven feelings are classified into two categories according to whether a person accepts or rejects the object. Accepting something is based on the emotion of liking and rejecting something is based on the emotion of disliking. In that sense, the four beginnings can be called like and dislike.

It is defensible that the four beginnings and the seven feelings can be summarized into like and dislike. However, a question can be raised toward Han Won-jin’s assertion that “like and dislike can converge into sensory perception.” Like is the expression of benevolence and dislike is the expression of righteousness. This proves that like and dislike correspond to benevolence

³⁵ Han, *Gyeongui gimunnok* 1:26a-26b: “此章之指與孟子四端章禮經樂記之說同，而其意尤密。親愛哀矜惻隱之心，仁之端也；賤惡放情羞惡之心，義之端也；畏敬恭敬之心，禮之端也；好而知其惡惡而知其美是非之心，智之端也。親愛哀矜畏敬知其美，屬好；賤惡放情知其惡，屬惡。好惡統四端，而好者仁之發，惡者義之發，則仁義所以分統人性也。好惡又統於知，則智之所以又專一心之德也，聖賢傳受灼可見矣。”

and righteousness. Benevolence and righteousness, being presented as leading virtues, are spontaneous from the perspective of *Mengzi*. According to Han Won-jin, the chief virtue is not benevolence but moral perception. When like and dislike are connected to the ethical issue of moral perception, like and dislike should correspond to good and evil: liking is good and disliking is evil. Thus, like and dislike can be regarded as the mind which distinguishes good and evil although it is difficult to say that Han Won-jin assumes this mind.

The minds of ordinary people cannot clearly distinguish which object to like and which object to dislike. This is why humans have to possess the standards which allow them to distinguish when trying to become a moral being. "Moral perception is the virtue which helps concentrate one's whole mind," says Han. It is difficult to stick to a consistent moral principle when it comes to the likes and dislikes which belong to sensory perception. Therefore, the mind can generate moral perception by conforming to moral principle and not sensory perception. By identifying the differences between sensory perception which equates to like and dislike, and moral perception which includes like and dislike and the principle, Han Won-jin demonstrates that the virtue of moral perception that enables humans to like good and dislike evil can be completed by virtue of the sensory perception of humans securing moral standards.

6. Are "Subduing Selfish Desires" and "Returning to Propriety" One Thing?³⁶

Han Won-jin does not agree with the assertion that "a person has to return to propriety after subduing selfish desires." "If Zhu Xi had said 'when a person has overcome one's own selfish desires, selflessness has been achieved,' Confucius would have asked 'you should have said subduing selfish desires is benevolence (*keji wei ren* 克己爲仁). Why did you mention returning to propriety?'"³⁷ That assertion means that moral human nature is realized only when practicing propriety after overcoming selfish desires.

³⁶ In this part, Han Won-jin criticizes the interpretation "subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety" in *Songja daejeon* 宋子大全 (Complete Works of Master Song). Song Si-yeol regards subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety as two different things. In contrast, Han Won-jin asserts that overcoming selfish desires is to distinguish between the law of nature and human desire, so subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety are the same thing.

³⁷ S. Song, *Songja daejeon*, 130:424.

Therefore, from Song Si-yeol's 宋時烈 (1607-1689) perspective, subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety are two different things.

In my opinion, managing and arranging are the same as pulling up a sprout to help them grow. Master Cheng and Master Zhu were always cautious about them. This discussion is not wrong. Also, it may not be reasonable that Master Song taught others to return to propriety after subduing selfish desires. The principle and human desires are inversely related, so subduing desire and returning to propriety are the same thing. If a person subdues desires but does not return to the principle, it is not right. When comparing this to cleaning a mirror, a mirror naturally restores its cleanliness when dirt is wiped off. There is no separate process of restoring cleanliness after wiping off dust.³⁸

In this passage, Han Won-jin claims that “subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety is the same thing.” If, as Song Si-yeol argues, subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety are two different things, we can reach the conclusion that some people cannot conform to propriety even after overcoming their selfish desires. Thus, subduing selfish desires cannot be defined as the state of completely overcoming desires. Han also refers to Song's statement: “if someone is led to evil by excess or insufficiency, it is fine. However, it is incorrect to say that excess and insufficiency are evil.”³⁹ In relation to this statement, Han suggests that even though excess and insufficiency do not conform to the rituals, they cannot be regarded as evil. Instead, they have to be adjusted according to rituals, i.e. the standard for adequacy. From Song's viewpoint, humans have a limited ability to access what is good and what is evil, and the task of observing one's mind has a higher priority than the task of maintaining standards. Then, humans can realize that their ability to distinguish is inadequate and with this realization come to accept the rituals.

Criticizing Song Si-yeol's standpoint, Han Won-jin argues that “Zhu Xi said that the law of the universe is merely good and evil. When a person deviates from good, the person goes right into evil. There is no need to add any other way in the middle. Moderation is good. When there is excess or insufficiency, it deviates from good. When deviating from good, how can

³⁸ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:426, in *Namdangjip*: “按措置安排，正指揠苗助長之病。程朱諸先生未嘗不以為戒。此說恐未為病。又按尤菴先生以為克己之後，又有復禮之功，則竊恐未安。天理人欲，相為消長，故克之與復，只是一事。若曰人欲雖已克去，而天理猶未復，則恐未然也。譬如磨鏡，其垢既盡則其明自返矣。豈於磨垢之後，更有返明之事乎。”

³⁹ S. Song, *Songja daejeon*, 130:424.

that not be evil?”⁴⁰ Han states that there is no third value which exists separately from good and evil. If it is not the principle, it is human desire; if it is not human desire, it is the principle. Excess and insufficiency are also evil desires. The criterion for good and evil is clear. If it fits right to moral standards, it is good. If it diverges slightly from moral standards, it is evil. When selfish desires are overcome, moral standards are consequently established in the mind before facing a certain situation. That way, humans can distinguish whether one's response is based in human desire or not.

Han Won-jin's discussion on “subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety” is ultimately regarding the proper method of cultivating one's mind. He states that subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety should be unified in order to put greater emphasis on external moral standards rather than the moral nature of the mind. Even though moral nature does exist in the human mind, since the mind is material force and there is a higher probability of being led to evil than to good, moral nature cannot exert any influence. This has been proven through the fact that the seven feelings are summarized into the four beginnings and the four beginnings into the sensory perception of like and dislike. Therefore, whether moral nature is realized or not depends on whether moral standards are accommodated.

There are merely three ways of controlling one's mind: *qiongli* 窮理, *cunyang* 存養, and *lixing* 力行. The so-called *qiongli* is thoroughly investigating the principles of objects. For example, if the principle inside an object has reached the utmost level and perception has been exhausted, a person knows what to pursue and what to discard because of the ability to distinguish between the principle and human desires. The so-called *cunyang* is being watchful and fearful in places where one cannot be seen or heard. When a person tries to remove confusion and not be biased by brightening one's mind, the root of the mind is established and the foundation becomes stronger. The so-called *lixing* is trying one's best to be intimate in the father-son relationship, trying one's best to be loyal in the sovereign-subject relationship, trying one's best in the husband-wife relationships, and trying one's best to fulfill faith in friendships. If a person is able to remove human desires according to the principle upon making remarks or doing something, the person can do right things, be similar to sages, and share one's virtue with heaven and earth.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Han, *Seubyu*, 5:426, in *Namdangjip*.

⁴¹ Han, *Namdangjip*, 29:140: “其所以治之者，不過曰窮理存養力行三者而已矣。所謂窮理者，即事即物，窮至其理，使其理之在物者，無不各詣其極，而知之在我者，亦無不隨其所詣而極焉，則其於天理人慾之分，無不瞭然而知所趨舍矣。所謂存養者，戒慎恐懼乎不睹不聞，常令此心炯然

“The ways of controlling one’s mind are *qiongli*, *cunyang*, and *lixing*,” says Han Won-jin. *Qiongli* is the accommodation and application of moral standards. Han defines *qiongli* as “investigating the principles of objects to the end.” Let us assume a situation where you meet your friend. The virtue of loyalty will be realized within the relationship with the friend. However, you do not have a clear idea regarding how to realize loyalty. You may not even know why you have to realize loyalty. If the response of the mind is similar to sensory perception such as like and dislike, revealing the moral mind right at the moment when facing the opponent is difficult to accomplish.

Then, how can we reveal the moral mind in such a situation? “Investigating the principles of the objects to the end” offers an answer to this question. First of all, when you meet your friend, you should observe what changes have been brought about in your mind. You should think about whether it is the feeling of love or of hate. Also, you should think whether the feeling has arisen for the realization of moral standards or for the pursuit of personal interests. That way, you can grasp your true mind toward your friend. If the mind accords with morality, you should preserve that mind and nurture it. In contrast, if your mind has calculated interests, you should get rid of that mind immediately. Therefore, *qiongli* is primarily accommodating moral standards and secondarily controlling your mind in accordance with those moral standards.

Sorting out good feelings, preserving and nurturing them indicates preserving the organized mind and nurturing it. You are the only person who knows your mind toward others. Also, you alone know whether that mind accords with moral standards or not. Whether you become a moral being or not depends solely on your will. You have to be sincere about norms and treat others sincerely. This is why Han Won-jin defines sorting out good feelings, preserving and nurturing them as “being watchful and fearful in places where one cannot be seen or heard.” The good virtue is realized only when the perceived response is sincere about moral standards and the person treats others sincerely.

Lastly, strenuous effort should be put into relationships with others. Human relations are mainly divided into five types. These are the so-called moral rules governing the Five Human Relations. The sensory perception of humans is also exposed as the response of like and dislike. Animals differ

而無少昏昧，寂然而無所偏倚，則中體立而根本深厚矣。所謂力行者，在父子則當盡其親，在君臣則當盡其義，處夫婦則必極其別，處朋友則必極其信。至於一言之發一事之爲，無不循天理而絕人慾，則其心極其正，其身極其修，而可以與聖人同其化，與天地合其德矣。”

from humans in this sense. The perceived response of animals is limited to one or two things. Thus, they cannot establish a complete moral community or moral nature. Humans have to strenuously try to match the feelings of like and dislike which are expressed in human relationships to moral standards. This is where strenuous effort is devoted.

Thus, even though the three concepts—*qiongli*, *cunyang*, and *lixing*—can be discussed separately, if one is left out, a moral human being or a moral society cannot be achieved; the three concepts constitute a series of processes. This argument basically supports the claim that “subduing selfish desires and returning to propriety” is one task and not two.

7. Concluding Remarks

Han Won-jin advocates “moral perception.” In moral perception, morality produces norms such as rituals while perception is the effect of the mind producing like and dislike. Norms cannot force humans into a moral life, and when perception is influenced by private interests, one ends up distanced from good and pursuing evil. Thus, “morality” and “perception” are two contradictory concepts.

Then, can the human mind respond properly? In other words, can it gain moral perception? The perception of humans evidently pursues private interests. However, human perception is not designed to head toward evil since, according to Han Won-jin, it has the characteristics of empty spirit. Here, empty spirit refers to the characteristics of the mind which can realize the virtues, such as benevolence, righteousness, rituals, and wisdom; owing to this, humans are distinguished from animals. In other words, humans possess empty spirit as the possibility of fully realizing the moral rules which govern the Five Human Relations. Thus, humans form proper relationships with other beings. This is the good effect of perception. However, due to different dispositions, perception may need moderation. Therefore, ordinary people need to prepare to produce the adequate response of the mind. This is accommodating norms and practicing good by observing perception. In Han Won-jin’s philosophy, moral perception is not innately perfect; it is the acquired ability of the mind to respond morally.

REFERENCES

- Han, Won-jin 韓元震. 1722. *Gyeongui gimunnok* 經義記聞錄 (Collections of the Meaning of the Classics) Accessed February 3, 2018. http://yoksa.aks.ac.kr/jsp/aa/ImageView.jsp?aa10up=kh2_je_a_vsu_30003_000&aa10no=kh2_je_a_vsu_30003_001&aa15no=&aa20no=&pageno=&imgnum=JE_A_30003_001_000271&imgsize=.
- _____. 1998. *Namdangjip* 南塘集 (Works of Namdang). Vol. 201-202 of *Hanguk munjip chonggan* 韓國文集叢刊 (Korean Literary Collection in Classical Chinese), edited by the Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics. Seoul: Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics.
- Kim, Ki Hyun. 2004. "Oeam-gwa namdang-ui miballon-i ganneun dodeok cheolhaksang-ui baegyong" 외암과 남당의 미발론이 갖는 도덕철학상의 배경 (A Study on Moral Philosophical Foundation of Oeam and Namdang's *Weifa* 未發 Theories). *Dongyang cheolhak yeongu* (Journal of Eastern Philosophy) 39: 77-102.
- Kim, Tae-neon. 2014. "'Jeongjeon' mandeulgi-ui han sarye, yulgok byeoljip-ui pyeonchan-gwa geu-e daehan bipandeul" '正典' 만들기의 한 사례, 『栗谷別集』의 편찬과 그에 대한 비판들 (A Case of Making Canon: Compilation of the Supplementary Works of Yulgok and its Critics). *Minjok munhwa* (Journal of Korean Classics) 43: 77-115.
- Lee, Hae-Im. 2016. "Han Won-jin-ui simseongnon yeongu" 한원진의 심성론 연구 (The Study on Han Won-jin's Theory of the Heart-Mind). PhD Diss. Seoul National University.
- Moon, Suk-yoon. 2002. "Oeam Yi Gan-gwa namdang Han Won-jin-ui inmulseong dongi nonbyeon-e gwanhan yeongu" 외암 이간과 남당 한원진의 인물성동 이논변에 관한 연구 (A Study on the Debate between Yi Gan and Han Won-jin regarding the Sameness and Difference between Human Nature and Animal Nature). *THE DONG BANG HAK CHI* (The Journal of Korean Studies) 118: 195-234.
- Song, Ik-pil 宋翼弼. 1989. *Gubongjip* 龜峯集 (Works of Gubong). Vol. 42 of *Hanguk munjip chonggan* 韓國文集叢刊 (Korean Literary Collection in Classical Chinese), edited by the Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics. Seoul: Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics.
- Song, Si-yeol 宋時烈. 1989. *Songja daejeon* 宋子大全 (Complete Works of Master Song). Vol. 108-116 of *Hanguk munjip chonggan* 韓國文集叢刊 (Korean Literary Collection in Classical Chinese), edited by the Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics. Seoul: Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics.
- Yi, I 李珥. 1989. *Yulgok jeonso* 栗谷全書 (Complete Works of Yulgok). Vol. 44-45 of *Hanguk munjip chonggan* 韓國文集叢刊 (Korean Literary Collection in Classical Chinese), edited by the Institute for the Translation of Korean

Classics. Seoul: Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics.

- Yi, Jongwoo. 2007. "Han Won-jin-gwa Yi Gan-ui nonjaeng-eseo chohyeonggiseong-ui seongnip munje" 한원진과 이간의 논쟁에서 超形氣性的 성립문제 (A Study on Existence of Corporal Transcendent Nature in the Controversy between Han Won-jin and Yi Gan). *Cheolhak* (Korean Journal of Philosophy) 93: 1-20.

《栗谷別集付籤》主要爭點中所含 韓元震初年哲學之特徵

李海任

中文摘要

《栗谷別集付籤》的核心論點為：1、太極與性之同異問題，2、天地之氣與父母之氣之同異問題，3、心之純善問題，4、智與知之體用問題，5、克己與復禮之同異問題等，這些爭點源於如何解釋湖學與洛學所共有的“性合理氣”與“心是氣”問題。韓元震將理規定為道德規範之根據，而將氣規定為價值中立之物。理乃善之根據，氣作為心的知覺作用，既可顯現為善亦可顯現為惡，且除聖人之外的普通人（凡人）難以產生正確的知覺作用，所以如欲使心的知覺作用產生道德反應，必須依賴於他者。韓元震以理而非性來確保道德反應，這是因為性之作用作為氣之顯現而無法保障必為純善。在此，作為性的理並非善的四端之發源處，而成為了規範的根據。職是之故，在韓元震初年哲學中，心的知覺作用（知）自身並不能產生道德反應，唯有依據規範（窮理），約束自身反應（存養），努力實踐（力行）才能通過道德知覺（智）來完成。

關鍵詞：太極，性，天地之氣，父母之氣，智，知覺，克己復禮

How to Interpret Mencius' Concept of "Xing" 性?: The Debate in Western Sinology and Its Current Significance

HAN Zhenhua

Abstract

Two ardent debates over the Mencian theory of human nature were launched by sinologists in the late nineteenth century, a period of missionary sinology, and in the late twentieth century, a period of professional sinology. In the first debate, James Legge articulates the value of the Mencian theory of human nature from Bishop Butler's view of conscience. He interprets Mencius' "goodness of human nature" as "human nature towards good." However, Davelle Sheffield criticizes that Mencius and Legge both deny the grace of God. The second debate focuses on the divergence between Roger T. Ames' culturalism and Irene Bloom's theory of common human nature. Such divergence is deeply rooted in both sides' differing attitudes towards democracy and human rights. Despite different strategies and tactics, the two debates are closely related to each other in terms of their core concepts, which can be traced back to the Catholic churches' different understandings of Mencius' conception of human nature over 400 years ago.

Keywords: Mencius, theory of human nature, conscience, the grace of God, process philosophy, sociobiology

* HAN Zhenhua is an associate professor in the School of Chinese Language and Literature, and Dean of Chinese Language and Literature Department, Beijing Foreign Studies University, China (hanzhenhua@bfsu.edu.cn).

** This paper was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

*** An earlier version of this paper was presented in Chinese at the International Symposium on Four Books (Renmin University, 2012), and in English at the 8th Annual Meeting of The Comparative & Continental Philosophy Circle (Fudan University, 2013). A Chinese language version of this paper has been published as "Cong zongjiao biannan dao zhexue lunzheng: Xifang hanxuejie weirao Mengzi 'xingshan' shuo de liangchang lunzhan," 從宗教辯難到哲學論爭——西方漢學界圍繞孟子“性善”說的兩場論戰, *Zhongshan daxue xuebao* (Journal of Sun Yat-sen University) 52.6 (2012).

1. Introduction

Developing a mutual understanding of the prevalent thoughts of two different cultures requires an analogy process, or *geyi* 格義 in Chinese. *Ge* 格 means to compare and to match, and *yi* 義 indicates the meaning carried by a term or concept. So literally *geyi* means “matching the meanings.” Originally, it was the practice of Chinese Buddhism to borrow phrases from Taoist and other philosophical texts in order to explain Buddhist ideas, thereby making them more accessible to Chinese readers. It is “a method or exercise to compare and match the perceptions and conceptions” in two different cultures so as to understand them.¹ In modern hermeneutics, it is a process of interpretation: interpreting concepts developed in one culture system by using familiar concepts from another culture system. The object of such interpretation is to clarify distinctions, but its process is to seek similarities: in Liangkang Ni’s words, “Commonness is where it starts from and distinction is what it aims to arrive at.”² In terms of similarities and differences between different cultural systems and ideas, we can make the following juxtaposition: relativism (emphasizing “differences”) and universalism (emphasizing “similarities”).

While this is true as a neutral description, understanding activities in daily life or academic thinking is not just knowledge-related. It is also intertwined with one’s value, beliefs, and emotions, and only in this way can “understanding” go beyond “knowledge” and carry real “significance.” These dimensions should be considered when studying the interpretation of classic philosophical thoughts. It should also be taken into consideration when exploring idea collisions and the consequent ideological debates in the history of China-West cultural exchanges. In this paper, such multi-dimensional views will also be taken into account as I discuss Western sinologists’ debates on Mencius’ (c. 372-289 BCE) theory of human nature.

Western sinology has a history of over four hundred years: it originated when Jesuits came to China at the end of the sixteenth century and created missionary sinology, composed of a mixture of truth and fallacy. Professional sinology was not officially formed until the turn of the twentieth century, and today professional sinology is developing extensively. During the course

¹ Tang, *Lixue, foxue, xuanxue*, 284.

² Ni, “Jiaohu wenhua lijie zhong de ‘geyi’ xianxiang,” 22.

of 400 years, the translation and study of *Mengzi* 孟子 (Mencius) has always been one of the main subjects. At the end of the twentieth century, Western sinologists raised two wide-ranging debates over the understanding of key concepts in *Mengzi*. Though superficially representing different interpretations and understandings of *knowledge*, these two debates, at their core, were disputes on *values* and *beliefs*. I shall, in the following sections, uncover them layer by layer.

2. Human Nature, Conscience, and Moral Agency: James Legge's Accommodation of Bishop Butler to *Mengzi*

To talk about the debate at the end of the nineteenth century, I will start from James Legge's (1815-1897) translation strategy for *Mengzi*. Legge was a missionary in the London Missionary Society and worked as the President of Ying Wa College for nearly 30 years (1839-1867). As a missionary, he was the first one to study and translate Chinese classics carefully and comprehensively. His translation of eight classics of Confucianism and three classics of Taoism are still regarded as standard versions by Western sinologists and readers. He was also the first one to win the Prix Stanislas Julien (1875). After returning to England in 1876, he worked as a sinology professor in the University of Oxford until he died in 1897.

As a protestant missionary in China, Legge translated Chinese classics mainly to serve his missionary goal. However, he recognized the value of China's ancient civilization and believed that Confucianism, unlike other Eastern religions such as Buddhism (atheism) and Brahmanism (pantheism), was no rival of Christianity. Despite his firm belief, it was hard to explain to Western people.

During the time Legge stayed in China, there were continuous frictions and conflicts between China and Western countries after the First Opium War (1839-1842), also known as "The First Anglo-Chinese War" or "Trade War" among Westerners. At that time, industrialized Britain opened the gates of China with ships and cannons and China was forced to integrate into the world trading system in a "semi-feudal and semi-colonial" way. Following a boom in economic trade was the introduction of Western culture, Christianity in particular. Compared with the hardships that the earliest missionaries such as the Jesuit, Dominicans, Franciscans, and other Catholic

Churches endured when they came to China 150 years earlier, the missionary affairs after the Opium War were under institutional protection as clearly indicated in the Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing (1842), which stated that “Christianity and Catholicism are essentially of goodness and for goodness. From now on, the missionaries in China and their missionary affairs shall all be protected.” After this treaty, the Sino-British Tianjin Treaty (1858), the Sino-French Tianjin Treaty (1858), and the Sino-French Beijing Treaty (1860) all amplified such protection. Recognizing the great disparity between the respective strengths of China and the West, Legge prudently defended the value of Confucian classics as well as the translation works to which he had paid his lifetime’s efforts. In terms of translating *Mengzi*, he argued in favor of Mencian thought by drawing support from the Christian traditions.

2. 1. Finding Similarities between Butler’s and Mencius’ Theories

Legge’s translation of *Mengzi* was first published in 1861 as the second volume of *The Chinese Classics*. After revision, Legge published *The Life and Works of Mencius* as recommended reading for general readers in 1875. In the 121-page-long “Prolegomena” (Introduction to *Mengzi*), Legge introduced readers to how the position of *Mengzi* changed in history, how Zhao Qi 趙岐 (d. 201) of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220) and others interpreted it, and Mencius’ life, thoughts, and influence. Legge spoke highly of him despite his discontent with Mencius’ racial discrimination, lack of humility, and neglect of original sin. He claimed that Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Demosthenes, and other great men of the West were Mencius’ contemporaries; when placed among them, he could look them in the face and did not need to hide a diminished head.³

Amongst quite a few contrasts between Mencian and Christian doctrines, the most crucial one might be that Mencius contends that “human nature is good” while the Christian orthodox insists on “original sin.” “Good human nature” is the prerequisite and basis for Mencian thought; likewise, “original sin” is the premise and starting point of Christian doctrines. How could he ease the sharp conflict between them so that more Westerners would accept and value Mencian ideology? Legge thought of Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752), an influential eighteenth-century British theologian. Some of his thoughts were quite similar to Mencius; by using Butler’s theory of human

³ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 16.

nature and emphasizing its similarity with Mencius, he could legitimate Mencius to some extent.

Bishop Butler was a theologian and apologist of the Church of England. In his *Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel* (1726), he took the first three sermons to emphasize the supreme importance of "conscience" in humanity and advocate the concept of moral agency. Butler viewed human nature as a holistic system which can be divided into three levels: the lowest contains passion and affection; the middle is comprised of self-love which leads to private good, and benevolence which leads to public good; and the top is conscience (or reflection) which enables people to recognize, define, and judge whether a certain behavior is rightful, good, or just. With such reflection, people are able to distinguish between and approve or disapprove of their own behaviors. "Our nature, *i. e.* constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears, that its nature, *i. e.* constitution or system, is adapted to measure time."⁴ "From his make, constitution, or nature, he is, in the strictest and most proper sense, a law to himself. He hath the rule of right within: what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it."⁵ That is to say, in doing so, everyone becomes a "moral agent" of his own; when he is not virtuous, he is violating the law of his own nature.

In Bishop Butler's opinion, human nature is good; virtue is based on and complies with human nature. "Man is born to virtue, that it consists in following nature, and that vice is more contrary to this nature than tortures or death."⁶ Sometimes Butler regarded conscience as the voice of God; but he never relied on theological authority in terms of what he asserted as the supremacy, universality, and reliability of conscience. He believed that as secular knowledge, conscience is self-sufficient. Such a claim was obviously directed at Thomas Hobbes' (1588-1679) egocentrism.

Mencius held the view that man is a rational and moral being with intuitive ability (*liangneng* 良能) and intuitive knowledge (*liangzhi* 良知). His theories of "four sprouts/germs" (*siduan* 四端),⁷ "four virtues" (*side* 四德), and his criticism of self-abandonment (*zibao ziqi* 自暴自棄, *zishi* 自失, *zizei* 自賊) can find their counterparts in Butler's philosophy. The way

⁴ Butler, *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel*, 17.

⁵ Butler, *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel*, 60.

⁶ Butler, *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel*, 15.

⁷ Particularly, "the heart of compassion" (*ceyin zhi xin* 惻隱之心) which is the sprout or germ of benevolence (*ren* 仁), and "the heart of approving and disapproving" (*shifei zhi xin* 是非之心) which is the sprout or germ of knowledge.

Mencius deprecated Yang Zhu 楊朱 was very similar to the way Butler criticized Hobbes. Legge, having realized such great similarities between Butler and Mencius, used Butler's theory to support Mencius. What is more, as Mencius far predated Butler, Legge went so far as to claim that Mencius outdid Butler in his foresight, saying that "Butler certainly was not indebted to him for the views which he advocated; but it seems to me that Mencius had left him nothing to *discover*." In addition, Legge comments "to no moral teacher of Greece or Rome can we appeal for so grand an illustration of the averment as we find in Mencius."⁸ Finally, he concludes by saying that "up to this point I fail to perceive anything in Mencius' view of human nature that is contrary to the teachings of our Christian Scriptures, and that may not be employed with advantage by the missionary in preaching the Gospel to the Chinese. It is far from covering what we know to be the whole duty of man, yet it is defective rather than erroneous."⁹

Legge repeatedly cited Butler's and Mencius' opinions and emphasized their similarities. He did so in the prolegomena of his translation of *Mengzi*. He also clearly argued, in his paper "Confucianism in Relation to Christianity," which he submitted to the 1877 Shanghai Missionary Conference, that he, unlike many other missionaries, did not consider Mencius' opinion on the goodness of human nature "to conflict with Christianity." Rather, he said that "Mencius maintains the goodness of human nature, in the same way as Bishop Butler maintains it in his well-known Sermons."¹⁰ He further pointed out in *The Religions of China* (1880) that "[i]n fact, that philosopher (Mencius), born rather more than two thousand years before Bishop Butler, developed a theory of human nature in which he anticipated every important point insisted on by the Christian prelate."¹¹ All these records vouch for Legge's preference and respect for Mencius.

2.2. Legge and Bishop Butler's Self-Contradictions

Though he spared no effort to praise the Mencian theory of human nature, Legge did not forget God. He continued to insist on the perspective of original sin and held that human nature can never be compatible with Christ's divine nature: "However we may strive after our ideal, we do not succeed

⁸ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 64.

⁹ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 66-67.

¹⁰ Legge, *Confucianism in Relation to Christianity*, 7.

¹¹ Legge, *The Religions of China*, 103.

in reaching it. The more we grow in the knowledge of Christ, and see in Him the glory of humanity in its true estate, the greater do we feel our own distance to be from it, and that of ourselves we cannot attain it." In contrast, Mencius lacked the awareness of original sin. He asserted that Yao, Shun, and Confucius had achieved perfection. However, the assertion that "At seventy, I would follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right" (*Lunyu* 論語 2.4) broke Mencius' conception of Confucius' perfection: "it proves to be but a brilliant and unsubstantial phantasm of our philosopher's own imagining."¹² Mencius even agreed that "All men are capable of becoming a Yao or a Shun" (*Mengzi* 6B.2), which, in Legge's opinion, was a total exaggeration. In this regard, "Butler had an immense advantage over Mencius, arising from his knowledge of the truths of Revelation."¹³ In brief, "[Mencius] said very little of what we owe to God. There is no glow of natural piety in his pages," and "Mencius' ideal of human nature does not embrace duty to God."¹⁴

In such ways, Legge explained his opinions quite paradoxically. On the one hand, he confirmed Butler's and Christianity's absolute superiority in Revelation; on the other hand, he respected the Mencian theory of innate goodness a lot more. This contradiction later became the ammunition with which missionaries criticized and attacked Legge.

As for Butler, he tended to defend revealed religion through Deism (the latter was somewhat secular) and to eliminate the antagonism between the natural and the revealed, which pervaded among Deists. However, although his ultimate concern was Revelation whereby he attempted to prove that it was revealed truth that endowed Deism with legitimacy, the reasoning method he applied popularized deistic thinking. Consequently, the theory of revealed truth was impacted and excluded instead. "[Butler's] argumentation just made people believe that the faith of Revelation in Christianity has not been refuted because of its transcending-reason content. But the necessity of accepting the Revelation claimed by it was not thus proved; and even when Butler pointed out that natural religion needed confirmation from the authority of Revelation, what he required was merely some kind of practical reliability."¹⁵

The result was a twofold loss: Deism was declined as Butler expected, yet revealed religion was unexpectedly impacted as well. If we see this, we

¹² Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 68.

¹³ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 70.

¹⁴ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 71.

¹⁵ Pannenberg, *Jindai deguo xinjiao shenxue wentishi*, 35-36.

can understand why Butler's *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed* (1736),¹⁶ in which he supported revealed religion and opposed natural religion, led to later generations' comprehensive doubt and negation of Christianity.

3. The Objection of Late-Nineteenth-Century Protestant Missionaries

Legge's accommodation of Bishop Butler's theories on *Mengzi* triggered criticism from other missionaries. At the end of the nineteenth century, the missionaries in China launched a debate on the Mencian theory of human nature and Legge's practice of accommodation. The debate was laid out in Hu Weiqing's paper "Zhongxi renxinglun de chongtu: jindai lai hua chuanjiaoshi yu mengzi xingshanlun" 中西人性論的衝突: 近代來華傳教士與孟子性善論 (Conflict between Chinese and Western Theories of Human Nature: Missionaries in Modern China and Mencius' Innate Goodness in Human Beings). However, Hu focused only on the debate itself and did not take the relevant historical context into consideration. Thus, I shall supplement the debate in this regard.

3.1. Divergences of Faith: Innate Goodness or Divine Grace

In this debate, the biggest objection raised against Legge was from D. Z. Sheffield (1841-1913), a missionary who was 26 years younger than Legge and a member of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. He advocated that "Christianity comes to China, not as a supplement to Confucianism, but as a substitution for Confucianism. It is a structure that needs nothing from Confucianism, either for foundation or ornament." After meticulous comparison, he reached the view that "Confucianism is essentially in conflict with Christianity in its teachings with regard to man's nature at birth." Legge countered that putting them together was no different from mixing honey with poison: honey makes poison sweet but cannot counteract its toxicity. Therefore, "[T]ruth mixed with error makes it acceptable to the understanding, but does not prevent its evil influence in the heart."¹⁷

¹⁶ The last eight volumes of the book was interpreted by Alfred G. Jones (1846-1905) and dictated into Chinese by Zhang Zhaotang in 1898. It was entitled as *Zhengzhen mijue* 證真秘訣 (Secret of Witness to the Truth).

¹⁷ Sheffield, "A Discussion of the Confucian Doctrine Concerning Man's Nature at Birth," 22-23.

Sheffield's doubts on Legge converged into one question: whether the goodness of human nature in *Mengzi* is in an ideal sense (i.e. it ought to be) or in an actual sense (i.e. it actually is). Legge argued that "[Mencius] is speaking of our nature in its ideal, and not as it actually is, —as we may ascertain from the study of it that it ought to be, and not as it is made to become."¹⁸ Said the other way around, "human nature is good" refers to a kind of tendency. Sheffield, by quoting Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) interpretations, maintained that human nature in Mencian theory was not "ought to be" but "born with." He claimed, "There is nothing in either text or commentary to show that man's nature is not regarded as inherently and essentially good."¹⁹ Thus, Mencius' conception of the "goodness in human beings" was identified as "goodness" in the sense of Aristotle's "essence." To explain how Legge's translation was influenced by his own prejudice, Sheffield picked out two key mistakes in Legge's translation and replaced them with his own interpretation. I will compare their versions with D. C. Lau's.

- (1) *Nairuo qiqing, ze keyi weishan yi, nai suowei shan ye.* 乃若其情，則可以爲善矣，乃所謂善也。 (*Mengzi* 6A.6)

Legge's translation: From the feeling proper to it, [we see] that it is constituted for the practice of what is good. This is what I mean by saying that [the nature] is good.²⁰

Sheffield's translation: As to its emotions, it may be regarded as good. This is what I mean by saying that the nature is good.²¹

D. C. Lau's translation: As far as what is genuinely in him is concerned, a man is capable of becoming good. That is what I mean by good.²²

- (2) *Renxing zhi shan ye, you shui zhi jiuxia ye. Ren wuyou bushan, shui wuyou byxia.* 人性之善也，猶水之就下也。人無有不善，水無有不下。 (*Mengzi* 6A.2)

Legge's translation: The [tendency of] man's nature to goodness is like the [tendency of] water to flow downwards. There are none but have [this tendency to] goodness, [just as] water flows downwards.²³

¹⁸ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 58.

¹⁹ Sheffield, "A Discussion of the Confucian Doctrine Concerning Man's Nature at Birth," 18.

²⁰ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 311.

²¹ Sheffield, "A Discussion of the Confucian Doctrine Concerning Man's Nature at Birth," 17.

²² Lau, *Mencius*, 163.

²³ Legge, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, 307.

Sheffield's translation: The goodness of man's nature is like the flowing down of water; there is no man who is not good, there is no water that does not flow down.²⁴

D. C. Lau's translation: Human nature is good just as water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is no water that does not flow downwards.²⁵

In the first example, without considering their misunderstanding of *qing* 情 (actual condition), Legge thought that man's feelings are constituted "for" good practice, while Sheffield held that man's emotions are the external manifestations of his inherent nature, and therefore if one's emotions are good, one's nature must be "intrinsically" good. In the second example, their opinions are even more distinct: Legge considered man's good nature to be a kind of "tendency" while Sheffield maintained that the goodness of man's nature is "essence." If such goodness is essence, human nature could not contain evil factors, thereby rendering Mencian theory as antagonistic to the Christian concepts of original sin and corruption. It was such a possible ideological heresy that Sheffield criticized.

Within a Chinese context, choosing between "ought to be" and "made to become" is usually not a serious problem. Sheffield's "essence" and Legge's "tendency" can be perfectly united in the relationship of *ti* 體 (thing-in-itself) and *yong* 用 (function). It is common in Chinese logic to discuss "made to become" by using "ought to be" and vice versa. But within a Christian context, such a distinction has vital importance.

As articulated before, to demonstrate the similarities between Mencius and Bishop Butler, Legge used abundant textual evidence. To a certain degree, his argument and interpretation could stand. But Sheffield, instead of focusing on the differences and similarities between Mencius and Bishop Butler, pointed out that Legge neglected some possible consequences of Mencian theory. If we over-stress goodness and neglect original sin, and agree that "All men are capable of becoming a Yao or a Shun (or perfect man)," we would deny the grace of God, without which Christianity would be redundant. To avoid this risk, Sheffield gave great importance and priority to revealed religion, supported Christianity, and denied Mencius. From this position of apology, Sheffield's argument and interpretation are also proper.

²⁴ Sheffield, "A Discussion of the Confucian Doctrine Concerning Man's Nature at Birth," 17-22.

²⁵ Lau, *Mencius*, 160.

Now let us expand the range of the question. The debate on whether human nature is good or evil existed not just among ancient Chinese people or in Chinese ideology, but also in the European context (or even in the history of Christian thought). In fact, "[I]t is the different views on man's free will and the ability to achieve moral perfection that led to fierce theological controversies, sectarian divisions, religion reforms in Christian history and the rise of modern humanism."²⁶ As Mencius talked about "conscience" (*liangxin* 良心 and *liangzhi*) and "innate capacity" (*liangneng*), so did European thinkers. The Stoic School, Apostle Paul, Thomas Aquinas, Bishop Butler, and Immanuel Kant all discussed "conscience" ("synendesis" in Greek, "conscientia" in Latin, "conscience" in French and English, and "Gewissen" in German).²⁷ Human nature was a key topic when Chinese and Western thought met and clashed. Taking into consideration the history of European religious ideology, it seems that the debate on the Mencian theory of human nature among missionaries in China was merely an extension of the debate on Bishop Butler's Deism among European ideologists. Studying these debates can help us to find the similarities and differences between Chinese and Western thought.

3.2. The Origin of the Debate among Early Missionaries: The Differences Between Jesuits and Dominicans

In fact, it was not at the end of the nineteenth century that missionaries started their debate: it was four hundred years ago, when the first group of missionaries developed different understandings of the Mencian theory of human nature.

At the end of the sixteenth century, Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) wrote *Tianzhu shiyi* 天主實義 (The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) in Chinese.²⁸ In this book, Ricci initiated an encounter between Chinese culture and Western Christianity through the dialogue between a Western scholar and a Chinese scholar. He quoted Mencius' statement that "the nature of human is different from that of cattle or dog" to illustrate that whether human nature

²⁶ Zhang, "Jidujiao he rujia sixiang chuantong zhong de renxing wenti zaisi," 1.

²⁷ A brief introduction on this topic can be found in Kern, "Ouzhou zhexue zhong de liangxin guannian."

²⁸ It was included in the *Siku quanshu* 四庫全書 (Complete Library of the Four Treasuries), whose bibliography comments that "Its theme is to propagate Christianity among Chinese people. Since Confucianism cannot be depreciated, it emphasizes that early Chinese thought and religion centered on belief in a supreme deity, just like Christian belief in God. It attacks Buddhist concepts of Heaven and Hell by saying that they were borrowed from Christianity."

is good or bad has nothing to do with the forever-good principle/reason (*li* 理) of Heaven and that one's nature is different from the principle of Heaven. After that, Ricci began to advocate what was similar to the Chinese idea of "good nature and evil desire" (*xingshan qing'e* 性善情惡):

The origin of human nature (*xing*) and dispositions (*qing*) were all given by the Lord. Since they are mainly based on discipline/reason (*li*), they are loveable and originally good without evil. As for their application/function (*yong*), the key is the agent (human) himself. The agent can do loveable things; the agent can also do detestable things—the agent can behave differently. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the application of human nature is good or not, and the reason lies in one's dispositions. The functioning of human nature, if without illness, would be thoroughly consistent with the discipline/reason and so be good. However, the dispositions, acting as hands and feet of human nature, can fall ill from time to time. Thus we should not indulge ourselves into desires, and neglect the direction of discipline/reason. . . . If one's dispositions fall ill, their functioning will violate discipline/reason, and what they like and dislike, approve and disapprove, would hardly be right and accord with their origin. But still, the origin of human nature is good; this would not change even with all the illness of dispositions. Human nature could help us to follow discipline and preserve its innate capacity (*liangneng*). In this way we could diagnose and remedy the illness.²⁹

It is notable that Ricci did not directly advocate "original sin" here; instead, he seemed to be in agreement with Mencian theory. However, after careful scrutiny of the text, we would find that Ricci's "human nature and dispositions are given by the Lord" was actually a Christian doctrine; his "human nature and dispositions fall ill" was a metaphor for the corruption of man and "without illness" indicated the state before original sin; his "reason" (*li* 理) was God's "light of reason," which would be consistently good. Ricci's attempt to introduce Christianity to Chinese intellectuals by using Confucian classics or through highlighting the similarities between Confucianism and Christianity revealed his method of "accommodation" when preaching Christianity. As for those contents of *Mengzi* which were contrary to Christian doctrines, Ricci declared them incorrect by quoting other examples in the same text. For example, on Mencius' "There are three forms of unfilial conduct of which the worst is to have no descendant," Ricci maintained that "I think it is not advancing for Chinese people to consider

²⁹ Zhu, *Limadou zhongwen zhuyiji*, 73.

him who has no descendants unfilial.” He cited the difference between Mencius’ “seeking in oneself” and “seeking in the outside world” to argue that whether one is filial or not has nothing to do with whether he has a descendant or not.³⁰ In fact, it was not filial piety that Ricci did not agree on; it was “having no descendant” being listed on top of the unfilial, which would strike the priority of worshipping God. In a word, Ricci did have a standard when it came to accepting or rejecting Confucian ideas: he accepted what was in line with Christian doctrines and rejected what was not.

The Dominican Domingo Fernández Navarrete (1618-1686) adopted a preaching method opposite to Ricci’s. In his *Tratados historicos, politicos, ethicos, y religiosos de la monarchia de China*,³¹ he vehemently opposed the Jesuits’ accommodation and assimilation method. He held that Chinese thought, including Mencius’, was not compatible with Christian beliefs at all. Navarrete disapproved of the Jesuits searching for and tracing Christianity in ancient Chinese classics. He maintained that Confucius was an atheist who did not mention Christian revelation at all. He also tried, based on *Mengzi*, to prove that Mencius knew nothing about God. As representatives of Jesuits and Dominicans, Ricci and Navarrete paved different ways for later Catholic societies to conduct their missionary objectives: Jesuits chose a circuitous route by accommodating original Confucian literature, while Catholic societies such as the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Missions Etrangères de Paris stressed that Confucianism was essentially independent from Christianity. Therefore, there was no need to use original Confucianism to preach Christianity and it was merely a waste of time and energy for the Jesuits to adopt such a method.

In conclusion, seen from a historical perspective, the debate among Legge, Sheffield, and other missionaries at the end of the nineteenth century was an extension of early Catholic societies’ arguments on how to understand the Mencian theory of human nature.

4. Debate among American Sinologists in the Late Twentieth Century

At the end of the twentieth century, American sinologists launched another debate; Roger T. Ames, Irene Bloom, and other professional sinologists came into the spotlight. Their debate was highly relevant to the one in the late nineteenth century. Readers can get details on the debate in Yang Zebo’s

³⁰ Zhu, *Limadou zhongwen zhuyiji*, 90-91.

³¹ This book was published in Madrid in 1676.

paper,³² in which Professor Yang expatiated the new debate and proposed his own opinion based on his “moral state of the mind.” Hereby I would give a brief introduction to the debate and put greater effort into revealing the immanent correlation and the essence of the two debates.

4. 1. Roger T. Ames: *Xing* is Not Nature

In his long paper “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature” (1967), Angus C. Graham (1919-1991) pointed out that according to the “Nurture of Life” school, the “*xing*” of a living thing is understood to be the way in which it develops from birth to death when uninjured and adequately nourished.³³ Mencius would agree on and supplement this definition. He claimed that by cultivating *qi*, one dies old and by cultivating morality, one becomes a saint, and the two match perfectly well and develop synchronously. Inspired by Graham’s insights, Ames published “The Mencian Conception of *Ren xing*: Does It Mean ‘Human Nature’?” in 1991. He held that the English term “nature” leans more towards essence and thus fails to capture the sense of the “ongoing process” in *xing*.³⁴ If “*ren xing*” was translated to “human nature,” some implications would be brought into Chinese ideology that would alienate, rather than help to understand Chinese ideology. He also suggested understanding *xing* as an achievement concept:

What is most important about *xing* occurs as a consequence of cultivation and growth . . . For Mencius, an undeveloped human being—someone who is resolutely uneducated and uncultured—is not in any important sense “human.” *Xing* is the signature of participatory and contributory membership in a culturally informed community. To be without culture is to be less than human, for a “human being” who acts like an animal is not figuratively, but literally, a beast. There is a qualitative distinction between the kinds of people who constitute our society, ranging from “humans” who are not human at all to the sagacious who in their example redefine and improve upon humanity itself. This notion of *xing* then insists that some humans are considerably more “human” than others.³⁵

With textual proof, Ames supported his ideas very well, but overemphasizing the contextual difference between Chinese “*xing*” and English “nature”

³² Yang, “‘Xing’ de kunhuo: yi xifang zhexue yanjiu ruxue suo yu kunnan de yige lizheng.”

³³ Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” 215-271.

³⁴ Ames, “Mengzi yu yige jingguo teshu jiagong de youguan ‘ren de benxing’ de gainian.”

³⁵ Ames, “The Mencian Conception of *Ren xing*,” 163-164.

blocked him from seeing the similarities between them. Ames limited Mencius' *ren xing* within ontological contexts as a process or an event and used John Dewey's words to explain Mencius. He claimed that "[i]t aims not to make Mencius become Dewey, nor to interpret Mencius in a 'Dewey way,' but to stimulate us to think about Mencius from a different aspect."³⁶ However, his exclusive position blinded him on some other important aspects of Mencian thoughts. Moreover, emphasizing the cultural achievements of *xing* would inevitably lead to an affirmation of elitism. In fact, Ames did over-compliment classical Confucianism and the Chinese traditional institution.

4. 2. Irene Bloom: Biological Significance of "xing"

Ames' statement of the process meaning of *xing* did not provoke a counterview, but his statement of the cultural achievement of *xing* did. Irene Bloom, in her "Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (*jen-hsing*)," "Human Nature and Biological Nature in *Mencius*," and "Biology and Culture in the Mencian View of Human Nature" advocated the "common humanity" in Mencian theory and cited Western theories on sociobiology to state that Mencius' *ren xing* was the common humanity in a sociobiological sense.

It needs to be emphasized that Bloom's "biological sense or biology" did not mean the natural science that studies biological structure, function, origin, and laws of development, but sociobiology, which studies all social behavior and has been an important point of progress in Western evolutionary biology and the modern synthetic theory of evolution in the past few decades. The birth of sociobiology was marked by Professor Edward O. Wilson of Harvard University when he published *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* in 1975. In this book, Wilson defined human nature as the law of inheritance in spiritual development and stated that such a law has an impact on cultural evolution. Wilson's opinion exerted great influence on Bloom and other sinologists.

Sociobiology emphasizes that human, as a "biotype," has the common law of inheritance. Mencius' *xing* was exactly a common and universal humanity, which can be proved by the frequent usage of "All men have. . ." (*ren jie you* 人皆有. . .) in *Mengzi*. Thus, Bloom reaffirmed at the end of her "Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (*jen-hsing*)" that:

However one may choose to interpret Mencius' statement in 7A:4 that "All things are complete in us" (*wan-wu chieh pei yü wo i* 萬物皆備於我矣),

³⁶ Ames, "Mengzi yu yige jingguo teshu jiagong de youguan 'ren de benxing' de gainian," 321.

it must be apparent that the moral imagination that yields this awareness is of a sort that tends more to the connectedness among living things than to their distinctness. In respect to human beings, Mencius never denies that people develop differently, but the burden of his argument is that recognition of diversity must never be allowed to obscure the common humanity that human beings share because in the end, as in the beginning, it is what is shared that is most profound.³⁷

In the debate, Ames' student James Behuniak Jr. enriched and extended Ames' thoughts in *Mencius on Becoming Human*. Donald J. Munro, in contrast, stood on Bloom's side and declared, in his "Mencius and an Ethics of the New Century,"³⁸ "The Biological Basis of Confucian Ethics,"³⁹ and a few other papers that Wilson's theory of sociobiology is an unignorable theory in the twenty-first century and can well prove the Mencian theory of human nature. In his opinion, Mencius' argument on common humanity, empirical method of proof, emphasis on emotions, emphasis on blood ties and kinship among families and relatives, and assessment of the heart and mind are all within the scope of sociobiology. So long as the thoughts of *tian* 天 (heaven) are sublated and replaced by a sociobiological perspective, Mencius ethical thoughts can shine again in the new century.

In a Chinese context, theories of any kind of biology, when combined with Mencian human nature, would be considered incompatible or as variants of Darwinism. However, Bloom adopted sociobiological perspectives not just for epistemological convenience but for deeper meaning. She held that Mencian thoughts on human nature were conceived in a series of debates in which "Mencius was 'compelled' to engage." Likewise, Bloom was "compelled" to debate with Ames. Then, what was the essence of their debate?

4. 3. Different Values: Universalistic Freedom, Human Rights versus Relativism and Communitarianism

Bloom disagreed with Ames partly because they had opposing academic standpoints: Bloom was with universalism and sociobiology while Ames was with culturalism. However, their debate was not just about philosophy, but about human rights and the politics of the 1990s. In the post-Cold War era,

³⁷ Bloom, "Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (*jen-hsing*)," 45.

³⁸ This paper is included in Chan, *Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations*, 305-315; and Munro, *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century*, 61-70.

³⁹ This paper is included in Munro, *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century*, 47-60.

the cold relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union still overshadowed international relations and ideologies, with the focus on issues such as "conflict of civilizations," democracy, and human rights. Meanwhile, as Western economic growth slowed down, Asia's rapid and sustained economic growth and practice of democracy had become a new background against which Eastern and Western cultures, politics, and economy encountered each other. Chinese political scholars and Western sinologists cast their attention to questions such as whether democracy and human rights are universalistic or relativistic, and whether traditional Confucianism, including Mencian thought, are compatible with modern freedom, democracy, and human rights.

Ames was not satisfied with the model of Western liberal democracy; instead, he thought that China should develop a model that followed Chinese traditional communitarian democracy. The conception of human nature is an important foundation of human rights and political constitution. Compared with the essential and transcendental views on human nature that prevail in the West, Chinese classical Confucians considered human nature as a process and individual cultural event. Ames thought that Westerners' understandings of human nature laid the foundation for Western liberal democracy while Chinese classical Confucians' understandings indicated a different democracy: communitarian democracy, based on which elite governance prevailed in traditional Chinese societies. However, such viewpoints indulged the theories of Chinese or Asian uniqueness, which describe the differences between China and the West and try to explain the differences from the perspectives of philosophy, tradition, and customs. However, it did not figure out a clear and reliable plan that could replace liberal democracy. Because of the strong sense of contextualism and cultural conservatism, Ames' thoughts were considered as cultural relativism and a sort of academic laziness.

Ames and Bloom's dispute began at a dialogue on human rights in the Annual Conference on China Studies in 1991.⁴⁰ Bloom tended to seek similarities between Mencian thought and Western human rights on the premise of universalism; because sociobiology contains the perspective of universalism, Bloom considered it a "tenon" joint with Mencian thought.

The German sinologist Heiner Roetz was also on Bloom's side in terms of democracy and human rights. In order to illustrate how *Mengzi* was accepted and interpreted in China, Japan, Europe, and America, Roetz co-hosted a

⁴⁰ Bloom, "Human Nature and Biological Nature in *Mencius*," 22; and Bloom, "Zai *Mengzi* zhong ren de benxing yu shengwuxue de benxing," 227.

program, *Das Buch Mengzi im Kontext der Menschenrechtsfrage: Marksteine der Rezeption des Textes in China, Japan und im Western*, with Prof. Wolfgang Ommerborn, a colleague of his at Ruhr University Bochum, and Prof. Gregor Paul in Karlsruhe University. Roetz stressed that much of Mencian thought was relevant to the current discussions on human rights, like the individual values demonstrated in “every man has in him that which is exalted” (*renren you gui yu jizhe* 人人有貴於己者), the high valuation of human life, the prerequisite of self and above all the moral autonomy, benevolent government, the justification of resistance against tyranny and even killing the tyrant, and the doctrine of the people (*min* 民) as the basis of a state. Roetz and his companions disagreed with Ames’ idea that “[C]onfucianism is all about ‘self in relations’” and denoted the Confucian conception of self as the concept of social individualism. They also disagreed with Ames and Rosemont’s cultural relativism and pragmatism. They suggested that Confucianism, especially the Mencian theory of morality, be understood from a historical perspective as well as the perspective of the universalism of human rights. In this respect, Irene Bloom was their homologue.

Topics on democracy and human rights often relate to universalism and particularism/relativism in studies of intellectual history. Despite the risk of over-simplifying, we can roughly categorize Roetz and Bloom as the representatives of universalism and Ames and Rosemont as representatives of relativism. Bloom and Ames’ debate—whether the Mencian theory of *ren xing* is cultural or biological, was actually the extension of their disagreement on the issues of democracy and human rights. In other words, what lay behind their debate on human nature was actually differences between universalistic liberal democracy, human rights, and relative communitarian democracy.

5. Conclusion

The debates at the end of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries focused on very similar points: Legge interpreted the Mencian idea that “[t]he goodness of man’s nature is like the flowing down of water” as a kind of “tendency,” which is similar to the notion of process philosophy. Sheffield’s articulation that “human nature is good” was a form of essentialism. However, as he feared that Mencian theory would shock the theory of God’s grace, he unreservedly criticized it.

One hundred years later, Roger Ames, taking an anti-essentialism position, argued that Mencian theory is not essentialism and can provide

theoretical support for communitarian democracy in China or even in Asia and the whole world. From James Legge's prudent defense of Mencian theory to Ames' argumentation from the perspective of process philosophy and John Dewey's "The Democracy of the Dead," and from Sheffield's criticism of Mencian thought to Irene Bloom's affirmation, Western sinologists' attitudes towards Confucianism experienced profound changes.

Though China and the West are geographically different, they still share many similarities and commonalities. Accepting *Mengzi* is not just regarded as an expansion of Western knowledge, or as Edward Said (1935-2003) said, as the result of the projection of western "Orientalism": it is also the result of cultural exchange between China and the West in modern times. Cultural exchange has shortened the geographical distance between China and the West, blending their thoughts together and making them a constructive force in each other's ideological and cultural development. Today, such exchange is getting closer and more frequent than ever before. Western sinology and China's study of ancient civilization are enjoying greater consensus and interactions. They are gradually becoming two important parts of the whole "China Studies." In this sense, Western sinologists' studies on *Mengzi* and the debates focusing on the Mencian theory of human nature are not irrelevant to China. Such studies and debates enable Chinese scholars to expand their vision and enrich their understanding and research on Western learning as well as their understanding of Mencius and his thoughts. In addition, by learning from Western sinologists' central issues of their times, we can improve our theoretical reflection and research methodology.

REFERENCES

- Ames, Roger. 1991. "The Mencian Conception of *Ren xing*: Does It Mean 'Human Nature'?" In *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham*, edited by Henry Rosemont, 143-175. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- . 2005. "Mengzi yu yige jingguo teshu jiagong de youguan 'ren de benxing' de gainian" 孟子與一個經過特殊加工的有關“人的本性”的概念 (Mencius and a Process Notion of Human nature). In *Mengzi xinxing zhi xue* 孟子心性之學 (Mencius' Learning of Mental-Nature), edited by James Behuniak and Roger Ames, 305-331. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.
- Behuniak, James. 2004. *Mencius on Becoming Human*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Bloom, Irene. 1994. "Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (*jen-hsing*).” *Philosophy East and West* 44.1: 19-53.
- . 1997. "Human Nature and Biological Nature in *Mencius*.” *Philosophy East and West* 47. 1: 21-32.
- . 2002. "Biology and Culture in the Mencian View of Human Nature.” In *Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations*, edited by Alan K. L. Chan, 91-102. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- . 2005. "Zai Mengzi zhong ren de benxing yu shengwuxue de benxing" 在孟子中人的本性與生物學的本性 (Human Nature and Biological Nature in *Mencius*). In *Mengzi xinxing zhi xue* 孟子心性之學 (Mencius' Learning of Mental-Nature), edited by James Behuniak and Roger Ames, 225-242. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.
- Butler, Joseph. 1827. *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel*. Cambridge: Hilliard and Brown.
- Chan, Alan K. L., ed. 2002. *Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Graham, Angus. 1967. "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature.” *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* 6: 215-274.
- Kern, Iso 耿寧. 1997. "Ouzhou zhexue zhong de liangxin guannian" 歐洲哲學中的良心觀念 (The Concept of Conscience in European Philosophy), translated by Sun Heping and proofread by Sun Zhouxing. *Zhejiang daxue xuebao* 4: 23-29.
- Lau, D. C. 1970. *Mencius*. London: Penguin Books.
- Legge, James. 1875. *The Life and Works of Mencius*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- . 1877. *Confucianism in Relation to Christianity: A Paper Read before the Missionary Conference in Shanghai*. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh; London: Trübner.

- _____. 1880. *The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism Described and Compared with Christianity*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Munro, Donald J. 2005. *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Ni, Liangkang 倪梁康. 1998. "Jiaohu wenhua lijie zhong de 'geyi' xianxiang: yige jiaohu wenhuashi de he xianxiangxue de fenxi" 交互文化理解中的“格義”現象：一個交互文化史的和現象學的分析 ("Geyi" in Understanding Interactive Culture: An Analysis on the History of Interactive Culture and Phenomenology). *Zhejiang xuekan* (Zhejiang Academic Journal) 2: 22-28.
- Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 2010. *Jindai deguo xinjiao shenxue wentishi: cong shilaiermahe dao bate he dilixi* 近代德國新教神學問題史：從施賴爾馬赫到巴特和蒂利希 (Problemgeschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie in Deutschland: von Schleiermacher bis zu Barth und Tillich). Translated by Qiuling Li. Hong Kong: Daofeng shushe.
- Sheffield, D. Z. 1878. "A Discussion of the Confucian Doctrine Concerning Man's Nature at Birth." *The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* 9: 11-23.
- Tang, Yongtong 湯用彤. 1991. *Lixue, foxue, xuanxue* 理學, 佛學, 玄學 (Neo-Confucianism, Buddhism, and Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe.
- Wilson, Edward O. 1975. *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Yang, Zebo 楊澤波. 2007. "'Xing' de kunhuo: yi xifang zhexue yanjiu ruoxue suo yu kunnan de yige lizheng" "性"的困惑：以西方哲學研究儒學所遇困難的一個例證 (The Confusion of Nature: An Example of the Difficulties Faced by Western Sinologists When Studying Confucianism). *Zhongguo xueshu* (China Scholarship) 24: 248-269.
- Zhang, Qingxiong 張慶熊. "Jidujiao he rujia sixiang chuantong zhong de renxing wenti zaisi" 基督教和儒家思想傳統中的人性問題再思 (Rethinking on Human Nature in Christianity and Confucianism). Unpublished manuscript, Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica.
- Zhu, Weizheng 朱維鈞, ed. 2001. *Limadou zhongwen zhuyiji* 利瑪竇中文著譯集 (Collections of Matteo Ricci's Chinese Works). Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe.

如何詮釋孟子的“性”概念 ——西方漢學界的兩場論戰及其當下意義

韓 振 華

中文摘要

19世紀末的傳教士漢學時代和20世紀末的專業漢學時代，漢學家們圍繞《孟子》的人性論展開了兩場針鋒相對的論爭。在第一場論爭中，理雅各借道巴特勒主教的良心論來說明孟子性善論的價值，並將孟子的“性善”解釋成“性向善”，但謝衛樓卻抨擊孟子和理雅各雙雙否棄了上帝恩典。第二場論爭的焦點在於安樂哲的文化主義與華霽仁的共同人性論之間的分歧，而產生這種分歧的深層原因則是辯論雙方對於民主和人權的不同態度。兩場論爭儘管表現形態各異，但論爭的核心觀念卻高度相關，在理論脈絡上可以追溯至四百多年前天主教各修會理解《孟子》人性論的不同態度。

關鍵詞：孟子，性善論，良心，上帝恩典，過程哲學，社會生物學

聖人聞而知之何以可能？

盛 夏

中文提要

聞而知之是以聖人爲物件的認知，其對應的知識種類並不僅僅是一種外在客觀知識，而是具有成就聖人人格和變革社會的雙重作用。孔子認爲這種知識需要由“聞”來獲得，但是聞而知之的聞與日常生活中見聞之聞是不一樣的，見聞之聞容易被外物和私欲所遮蔽，而聞而知之的聞卻與天道相關，通過“聞一道”具有化部分爲整體、去偽成真和化育天下的作用。孔子以問禮和聞樂爲例爲我們展示了聞而知之的認知形式，首先通過問使自己和物件達到“空空如也”的狀態，然後聽聞遠處天道在此處的迴響，這是避免主客分離的局限而使我們能直接獲知聖人知識的根本；其次以玉振之音來領會“聽一命”，即通過天命來反復條理終始，使萬物聚集成爲一個有序的整體，也就是萬物“如在”左右的狀態而實現成己、成物的目的。“聞一道”和“聽一命”以無爲而成、不言而信的方式完成了對自身和社會的改造，所以，聞而知之不僅具有交互主體性，而且還蘊含巨大的社會實踐能力。

關鍵詞：聞而知之，聞一道，聽一命，問禮，聞樂

* 盛夏：廈門大學哲學系中國哲學專業博士研究生(shengxiazys@126.com)

一、序論

聞而知之並非儒家主流學說中核心的認知方式，通常在儒學背景中比較強調心的認知作用。因為心所代表的理性功能使人一方面在向外獲取客觀知識的時候有更大的確定性，能解決人爲自然立法何以可能的問題；另一方面在向內的思維過程中有得以體現人本身價值的道德知識，實現人爲自己立法何以可能的問題。這樣通過心知使人與自然達到互相平衡的狀態，使人在自然和道德世界中都能具有合法性以及主宰性，這就是理性思維的巨大作用。但是，耳目之官由於容易被氣稟物欲所影響而不能彰顯人的獨特價值，容易被外部事物所奴役，如果任由耳目之官主宰人，那麼就會喪失屬於人自身的道德空間甚至威脅到人的自然生命的存在。所以，從儒家學派創立以來，孟子就明確區分了大體和小體的概念，重視心之官對耳目之官的主宰，並且在修養方法上強調對耳目之官的約束，後來，在宋明理學中出現“德性所知不萌於見聞”的說法，將見聞之知放到道德知識的對立面。

二、聞

在早期儒家學說的形成過程中，聞而知之卻不是我們後來所理解的見聞之知那樣，是低層次的、初級的，每個人甚至動植物都具有的自然感覺能力，而是屬於聖人這種具有最高智慧和德性人格所具有的認知方式，或者說是在“下學而上達”過程中達到聖人境界的不二法門。在出土的郭店簡和馬王堆帛書中的《五行》篇明確記載了“聞而知之，聖也”、“見而知之，智也”等，這些零碎的記載並不能使我們瞭解其內涵。這不禁讓我們發問，人如何通過“聞”的方式，達到聖人境界？也就是聞而知之何以可能的問題。由於出土文獻的局限性，並沒有給出一個符合邏輯的說明，而在傳世儒家文獻中對於聞而知之的使用出現在《孟子》最後一段關於“道統”的描述中：

孟子曰：“由堯舜至於湯，五百有餘歲，若禹、皋陶，則見而知之。若湯，則聞而知之。由湯至於文王，五百有餘歲，若伊尹、萊朱，則見而知之；若文王，則聞而知之。由文王至於孔子，五百有餘歲，若太公望、散宜生，則見而知之；若孔子，則聞而知之。由孔子而來至於今，百有餘歲，去聖人之世若此其未遠也。近聖人之居若此其甚也，然而無有乎爾，則亦無有乎爾！”¹

¹ 《孟子》，〈盡心下〉。

從中我們可以知道，第一，聞而知之是認知主體對不與自身處於同一場域聖人的領會，見而知之是與認知主體對共同在場聖人的瞭解，也就是說聞而知之“聞”的間距遠遠大於見而知之“見”的距離。第二，聞而知之的認知主體是聖人，見而知之的認知主體是智者，所以，聞而知之比見而知之的認知方式更高明，而且認知效果也比見而知之好，並不會受到時空、文化和環境的影響。第三，聞而知之的聖人通常是一個文明和時代的開創者，見而知之的智者只是直接落實和承繼聖人的事業，² 所以聞而知之具有開創性，而見而知之具有模仿性。第四，聞而知之的聖人間雖然間隔遙遠，但其所創造的文明之間具有深層的本質相關性，並不是全然分離和無關的，而是有一以貫之的連續性。孟子曰：“舜生於諸馮，遷於負夏，卒於鳴條，東夷之人也。文王生於岐周，卒於畢郢，西夷之人也。地之相去也，千有餘里；世之相後也，千有餘歲。得志行乎中國，若合符節。先聖後聖，其揆一也。”³ 朱熹詮釋到聖人之間雖有先後遠近之不同，但是他們開創文明的基礎卻是相同的。⁴

從《孟子》，〈盡心下〉的敘述中我們可以瞭解到聞而知之是專屬聖人的認知方式，並且在認識上是以此區別於其他人的重要標誌，但是為何“聞”比“見”更為可貴呢？這一點如果從生活經驗出發是很難理解的，我們一般認為聞和見是接受外部事物的兩種感官管道，並沒有高低貴賤的分別，如果要區分，也是認為見而知之比聞而知之更可信，更能引起他人的認同。原因在於，見而知之由於是認知主體與認知物件同處周圍世界，這種認識更容易使同處周圍世界的人產生信任感，這種局限於一時一地或一個群體的確信是很難接受跳出周圍世界，在更為普遍的角度和長時間綿延歷史的檢驗。這種偏信雖然在日常生活中經常使用，並沒有帶來任何認識和實踐上的不適，甚至成為實現生活目標的重要保障。但是，聖人所傳之道可能是從當下世界一個明顯的問題的思考開始，但是又不僅僅局限於當時社會的需要，而是有更為幽深和長遠的考慮，遠遠超出了周圍世界所能承載的範圍，所以，要理解聖人之道就必須有出離周圍世界到達更為幽遠地方的能力，而這種能力是屬於聞而知之的。但是，如果在感官直覺的角度理解“聞”，其與見而知之一樣是屬於周圍世界的認知方式，從周圍世界的角度來看，聞比見更難找到這個認知客體，而由於聞所需要的聲音比見所需要的形象更為隱秘和無形，所以聞比見更具特殊性，甚至幻覺或虛假的成分居多，使人們很難相信僅僅從一個人聽聞而獲得的知識，正所謂“眼見為實，耳聽為虛”。然而，在宗教生活中具有很高修養的人，甚至教主，都是從異於常人的獨特體驗中獲得宗教體驗，這種體驗成為了立教或傳教的基

2 李景林，〈孔子“聞道”說新解〉，頁46。

3 《孟子》，〈離婁下〉。

4 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，頁270。

礎，而且儒家學說的創立者——孔子，雖然不被當時大多數人和執政者理解和接受，但是其仍然表現出“天命在我”極大的自信，曾子引述孔子的話，說到“自反而縮，雖千萬人，吾往矣”。⁵ 這種獨特的體驗如何能生發出對普羅大眾普遍適用的宗教呢？這種獨特的體驗並非聖人私人世俗情感和自身現實利益的考量，而是“反求諸己”或者“求其放心”，這種通過從自我特殊性體驗到更為普遍真理的過程就是根本性的現身，這種根本現身有別於客觀現象的確信，而是根植於人性的根本性存在，其可以突破時空的限制而與更為遙遠的聖人取得本質的相關性，這種看似特殊性的體驗卻蘊含著對人和世界普遍的關懷，其真實性的等級已經超越了在周圍世界中通過外在客觀確證的方式所能獲得真理的程度。更為重要的是，這種以自身特殊體驗所領會到的根本性的現身，蘊含了任何人通過自身個人性而獲得真理的可能，並不局限於教主或者傳道者所呈現的具體方式，任何人雖然切入真理的方式各異，但是卻能共同達到唯一的根本性存在，這種方式無疑具有更大的普遍性和自由性，完全摒棄了一般宗教帶給我們的壓迫和蒙昧之感。

在早期儒家的語境中，聖人借助見聞之聞的隱秘性、無形和特殊性來表達自身學說的超越性和唯一性，然而我們卻不能在見聞這種周圍世界的感官自覺的層次來理解，這種隱喻式的表達使聞而知之的“聞”脫離了見聞之“聞”虛假和幻覺的成分，而保留了其出離周圍世界的傾向和隱秘、無形的方式。這種既超越又借重感官之聞的隱喻方式，容易造成思維的跳躍和引起神秘的感覺，這無疑增加了理解的難度。但是，聞而知之的具體內涵是什麼，仍然是晦暗不明的。所以，對於聞而知之的瞭解就需要從儒家早期文獻的相互印證中推論出來，借由聖來理解“聞”這種獨特的認知方式就顯得尤為重要了，因為聖在字形上就是從口耳的，從出土的帛書中有“聰也者，聖之藏於耳也”的記載，表明聖人之所以為聖人是與聽覺有關的。⁶

通過孟子的敘述，我們可以知道聞而知之是對聖人的真切認知，這種認知可以穿越時空的限制，讓距離我們久遠的聖人如同在我們面前呈現一樣。並且以聞而知之的方式理解聖人得到的並不僅僅是一種描述性的客觀知識，而是具有一種能直接提升自身境界和改造社會的力量。不僅使自己能達到聖人格，而且會實現社會由天下無道到天下有道的轉變，這無疑表明了聞而知之在獲取最高的德性知識和充沛的踐行能量上都有重要的作用。那麼，孔子在獲知聖人知識的過程中是如何聞而知之的呢？第一，通過口耳相傳的方式聽聞文獻。孔子經常向博學多聞的人請教關於聖人的禮樂知識，例如孔子問禮於周代“守藏室之官”的老聃，而得知周代的禮樂制度；孔子請教少昊的後代郯國國君——郯子，從而獲知有關少昊時期的禮樂知識。這些都是直接接觸到聖人禮樂的具體內容，也就是直接的聽聞、學

⁵ 《孟子》，〈公孫丑上〉。

⁶ 李景林，〈聽—中國哲學證顯本體之方式〉，頁158。

習而得知聖人。第二，通過聽聞聖人之樂而體會到聖人，有別於前者直接具體的獲知，聽聞音樂是一種抽象的間接認識方式，例如孔子聞韶樂而知舜帝，聞武樂而知武王，彈《文王操》而知文王等等：

子在齊聞韶，三月不知肉味，曰：“不圖爲樂之至於斯也。”⁷

子謂韶，“盡美矣，又盡善也。”謂武，“盡美矣，未盡善也。”⁸

孔子學琴於師襄子。襄子曰：“吾雖以擊磬爲官，然能於琴，今子於琴已習，可以益矣。”孔子曰：“丘未得其數也。”有間，曰：“已習其數，可以益矣。”孔子曰：“丘未得其志也。”有間，曰：“已習其志，可以益矣。”孔子曰：“丘未得其爲人也。”有間，曰：“孔子有所謬然思焉，有所睨然高望而遠眺。”曰：“丘迫得其爲人矣，近黠而黑，頎然長，曠如望羊，奄有四方，非文王其孰能爲此。”師襄子避席葉拱而對曰：“君子聖人也，其傳曰《文王操》。”⁹

孔子以聽聞音、曲此種極端抽象的表現形式使聖人如在自己左右而知道聖人之爲人。但是，我們知道，無論是口耳相傳還是聽聖人之樂，都不能準確領會有關聖人的全部知識。因爲，首先，口耳相傳的文獻具有極大的不確定性，其中很容易因爲個人偏好參雜虛假的和遺失重要的東西，而且長時間經過多人轉述所保留下來的關於聖人的記述，絕大多數或者重要核心部分已經被遺忘和遮蔽了，只有少部分存在和一些零碎化的堆砌，這些文獻已經“不足徵”，但是孔子之聞卻能化部分爲整體，去假成真，以一覽無餘的姿態獲知聖人。其次，聖人之樂是通過音、曲這種抽象的形式來表達自己，但是隨著聖人離世時間的拉長，那麼樂曲這種形式就會流於空洞，使人很難再通過此來得知聖人真切的狀態，但是孔子聞樂卻能透過抽象的形式，而深入到聖人之爲人，實現由僵死的抽象到鮮活的具體，從“不在”到“如在”的轉變。最後，常人一般在以口耳相傳和聞聖人樂的過程中，只是呈現出一個粗淺的影像，這樣一種空洞的感覺，還無法觸動人達到聖人境界，更遑論能以此變革社會了，然而孔子聽聞之後不僅能使自己與聖人呼應而成爲聖人，而且也能得到變革現實社會而遵從聖人禮樂制度的方法，所以孔子自信的說“誰能出不由戶？何莫由斯道也？”¹⁰這不是一個簡單的知行合一的問題，而是含有突破一己之身而爲社會立法的根本性功能。所以，我們可以知道，孔子以“聞”而知聖人，首先需要強調的是聞而知之之“聞”與見聞之“聞”的形式是不同的，而不僅僅是強調聞的內容廣泛、聲音大小和手段正確與否。

⁷ 《論語》，〈述而〉。

⁸ 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

⁹ 《孔子家語》，〈辯樂解〉。

¹⁰ 《論語》，〈雍也〉。

三、聞與天道

那麼聞而知之的聞與見聞之聞不同之處在什麼地方呢？出土的《五行》篇有“聞而知之，聖也，聖人知天道也”、“聰則聞君子道。道者，天道也”的記載，我們可以推知聞而知之的“聞”與天道密切相關，或者可以說天道就是聞的形式，而非聞的內容。通過天道而聞，可以確保有僅僅以耳目之官來聞所不具備的條件或形式，所以“聞一道”¹¹就不是一個具體的行為，而是聞而知之過程中達到確證知識的同一性規律，也就是以聞使道降臨，而道又是聞的內在性規定，天道確保了聞的真實性和完整性，在這種聞的形式下，我們才能有由部分推知整體、並且做出準確的事實和價值判斷的可能。“聞一道”所表達的同一性強調了“A是A”這種同義反復所要首先明確的，並不是在存在物中選擇性的排斥其它而固執類取，這會導致“同而不和”，而是包容性的同一，也就是“和而不同”，使各個不同達到和同的保證在於天道，既然包容性的原因在於天道，那麼其是排除了一切存在物的影響，故能成為所有事物的根基。“聞一道”是聖人聞而知之的方式，而天道在儒家思想中具有極高的地位，從“天命之謂性”可以看出是其賦予了世界的存在和價值，也是萬物和人得以存在的來源和基礎。

天道在人身上的呈現方式與聲音有關，孔子就提到“朝聞道，夕可死矣”¹²，明確表明道在生死和朝夕的急迫中是以聽覺性降臨於自身而真切感受到“斯文在茲”，但是在日常生活中我們卻首先將道預設於事物之中，這種視覺性道的呈現總是處於自身之外，泛泛而談而不知要害。那麼，“聞一道”有何特點呢？首先，“聞一道”的聲音傳遞距離比在感官中以耳朵所能接受到的聲音距離要遠。¹³前者可能與主體不處於一個時空範圍，能聞卻不能看見，而後者一定是與主體當前身處的特定情境相關，能聽到就一定會見到發聲物體。這種相對於度量上的遠來說，本質上的隔離使我們很難用見聞之聞來領會天道；其次，“聞一道”的速度是很快、效率很高的。“聞一道”在朝夕之間就可以完成，並且孔子以“可死矣”來表明，人的最高生命價

¹¹ “聞一道”和“聽一命”（見後文），使用間隔符是為了避免聞道和聽命將天道或天命當成聽聞的對象，聞或聽也不是認知主體獲得天道、天命的手段。而是首先強調聞或聽本身所具有的認知形式，聞或聽的過程就是天道和天命的體現，也就是說聞和道、聽和命是同一律的同義反復，在“聞一道”和“聽一命”中就自然獲得認知真實性和完整性的基礎。

¹² 《論語》，〈里仁〉。

¹³ 孔子對一個地方政治情況的瞭解，首先不是通過從他人處獲得資訊，而是有“聞政”的工夫，聞政的物件和主體是處於一個時空的，只是由陌生變為熟悉，看似不符合聞而知之的遠距離之說，但是我們仔細分析，“聞政”的標準或關鍵是溫、良、恭、儉、讓，這些道德是來源於聖人的，需要通過天道而聞，才可能從接觸到的有限知識推知這個地方整體的政治情況，並且做出準確的價值和事實判斷，而不是來源於這個天下無道社會的經驗觀察和總結，所以，“聞政”的基礎在聞而知之。子禽問於子貢曰：“夫子至於是邦也，必聞其政，求之與？抑與之與？”子貢曰：“夫子溫、良、恭、儉、讓以得之。夫子之求之也，其諸異乎人之求之與？”（《論語》，〈學而〉）

值已經窮盡，並不需要再用更多的時間來確認和提高。當然，“聞一道”並不必然導致死亡，而是表明其可以觸及“生”的極限而能完全把握生命的終極價值。這種朝夕之瞬間是天道傳遞的節點，以瞬間跨越時空的局限和揭開遮蔽之幕。相對於日常生活來說，我們是盡可能希望有更多的時間和精力，去傾聽更好、更多的聲音，來提高我們的認知水準和生命價值；第三，在“聞一道”中傳播的管道和接受的主體將被消融。這種消融是一種主客合一或者天人合一的狀態，而非天道對人的泯滅和戕害，在“聞一道”的一朝一夕之間，“聞一道”的主體通過生死一瞬消融在天道之中，實現了絕對的自由。這集中體現了在“聞一道”中天道不是通過見聞來領會的，而是天道已經以瞬間之勢從遠及近而且以整體面貌處於我們周圍，在潛移默化中改變了我們，使人與天道同調。可以看出“聞一道”的過程消除了主體的差異性和天道傳播過程中的局限性，從而確保了“聞一道”主體的普遍性，傳播方式的高效性和天道本身的純粹性。

在理解通過聽聞而與天道同調時，我們不能用對存在者的認識方式，因為認識存在者一定要假定一個客觀存在物，主體通過各種方式與之交流來得到知識。這樣一來主客兩端必定共處一個時空內，而無法完成超越性的跨越。天道並非一個客觀存在物，也就是說直接從蒼蒼之天並不能瞭解天道，再者，我們也無法以拾級而上的方式窮盡天下一切存在事物而理解天道的存在，孔子說“太宰知我乎！吾少也賤，故多能鄙事。君子多乎哉？不多也”¹⁴，太宰認為孔子是因為多知多能而被稱為聖人，但是孔子卻認為比聖人次之的君子都不以此樹立其品格，那麼聖人之所以為聖人，首先就不是對日常生活事物具有廣泛的認知和極強的處理能力。子貢說：“夫子之不可及也，猶天之不可階而升也。”¹⁵從中我們可以知道天道並不是未被發現之物或者存在於未被發現之地，可以通過不斷反復的認識和不懈的努力而達到，而是需要由質的瞬間轉變才能把握。那麼天道以何種方式存在呢？《中庸》講“天命之謂性”，《周易》，〈乾·彖〉說“大哉乾元，萬物資始，乃統天”，表明天道已經創生於天地萬物之中，無所不在，但是天地萬物並不同於天道，而是天地萬物之間普遍的聯繫，因為這種普遍聯繫而使萬物得以始終存在在世界之中。那麼，這種聯繫就並非可以從存在物之間推論而來，而是存在物得以存在的根源或基礎，同時這種聯繫是能超越存在物以及不同環境的局限而與萬物共處的節點。稱其為基礎資料表明是萬物源始性的開端，但是源始的發端並非處於一個至高點，在一個時刻，一勞永逸的生發出來，而是處處存在，未嘗停息，而處處時時的作用就使源頭轉化為一個一個的節點並與源頭相呼應，所以其能穿越具體局限和造作從開端傳遞到此處而能確保其純粹性和普遍性，以實現“聞一道”中主客合一或天人一體的自由。

¹⁴ 《論語》，〈子罕〉。

¹⁵ 《論語》，〈子張〉。

天道的運行並非始於現在，而是早已發生，這種先在性同時具有永恆性，使處於現在的人不能不遵循它的命令，正所謂“不言而信”。順從天道也是堯舜這樣的聖王之所以成為聖王的根本原因，“唯天為大，唯堯則之”，¹⁶堯曰：“咨！爾舜！天之曆數在爾躬。四海困窮，天祿永終。”舜亦以命禹。¹⁷也就是說，對現在產生影響的不僅是可以看見的屬於我們周圍的人和事物，而且也包括看不見而且久遠的天道，後者往往起著根本性的作用。遵循天道雖說只屬於聖王個人之事，但是卻可以產生最廣泛的優良效果。當然，孔子的思想學說也是遵循天道而來：

子曰：“予欲無言。”子貢曰：“子如不言，則小子何述焉？”子曰：“天何言哉？四時行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉？”¹⁸

子曰：“法語之言，能無從乎？改之為貴。巽與之言，能無說乎？繹之為貴。說而不繹，從而不改，吾末如之何也已矣。”¹⁹

不僅孔子認為自己的學說來源於天道，而且當時也有人認為孔子是代天發聲，²⁰如果只通過言辭來把握孔子思想必然“不得其門而入”，所以孔子之“無言”是想刺激弟子在下學的同時能上達天道，這樣才能把握儒家學說的整體，否則局限於部分和言辭等外在表象，必然導致聖人“不可及”的結果。所以，“無言”並非是不言不聞，而是跳出日常經驗中所言、所聞的具體內容，而體會上天之言和聽聞天言的獨特性，上天已經為世界立法，萬事萬物的本質性已經被賦予，當我們在瞬間向上天叩問，那麼上天的迴響從心底生發出來，不由自主的推動自身去遵循和踐行。但是這種瞬間得到的觸動並非是局限於一個事物，而是從永恆性而來，這就使上天之言如風一樣吹進人心，上天的風教故能在瞬間領會到天下萬物的豐富性和完整性。這種以瞬間體會永恆的天道，就是聆聽法語之言和巽與之言的過程，既然天道以聽覺性的方式從自身心中生發出來，這種親密性使天道能跳過時空的阻隔而能在自身得到的迴響，以此來指導我們的言行或實踐，必然具有彰顯天道價值的意義，正所謂“人能弘道，非道弘人”，²¹那麼由問到答的過程就是自問自答，這種自身的確證具有真理性和根本性。

可以看出，聖人“述而不作”之述，不同於“小子何述”之述是通過保存下來的文獻或事物來敘述和繼承，而是通過天道而述。聖人以天道的隱秘性對社會立法，也就是通過“無言”、“無為”的方式對現實和未來社會能產生

¹⁶ 《論語》，〈泰伯〉。

¹⁷ 《論語》，〈堯曰〉。

¹⁸ 《論語》，〈陽貨〉。

¹⁹ 《論語》，〈子罕〉。

²⁰ 儀封人請見，曰：“君子之至於斯也，吾未嘗不得見也。”從者見之。出曰：“二三子何患於喪乎？天下之無道也久矣，天將以夫子為木鐸。”（《論語》，〈八佾〉）

²¹ 《論語》，〈衛靈公〉。

深遠的影響。所以聖人之述是在承繼天道基礎上具有創造性和立法權的，其首先拋開具體事物和言語的影響直接領會永恆性的天道，這種永恆性不僅能繼承每個時代的優良文化，而且還可以通過創造和變化來應和天道，使其能在現在和未來延續。由於聖人聞的範圍之廣、來源之幽深、影響之深遠，和現實社會以經驗、見聞或有限的思維來行事和言說的常人形成鮮明的對比，所以，聞而知之的過程就會有一種強烈的孤獨感，孔子經常發出“人莫我知也夫”的感歎，這種感歎並非僅僅是孔子悲觀情緒的表現，而是表明天道並非能通過言行來使大家知道，“遁世不見知而不悔，唯聖者能之。”²²但是，孔子的弟子卻總想通過言行來學習聖人之道，然而無一成功者，反而抱怨孔子對其有所隱瞞，²³甚至顏回在早期也發出“仰之彌高，鑽之彌堅。瞻之在前，忽焉在後”²⁴的感歎，當“退而省其私”，不僅以“不違”完全掌握了孔子的學說，而且能“亦足以發”，²⁵也就是具備了能“舉一反三”、“聞一以知十”的能力。“退而省其私”就是通過“聞”切近天道能與孔子產生共鳴，由部分、自己擴展到整體、社會，所以，聞而知之就不是完全私人修養的體現，而是以幽遠的方式產生“不言而信”、“無爲而成”的社會效應。

四、問禮——空空如也——迴響

孔子以知禮爲例爲我們闡明了如何“聞一道”。子曰：“夏禮，吾能言之，杞不足徵也；殷禮，吾能言之，宋不足徵也。文獻不足故也。足，則吾能徵之矣。”²⁶夏、商兩代已經滅亡很久了，如果需要瞭解兩個朝代的禮法典章，按常理是可以在各個以其宗法爲主的後代封國直接通過感觀和理性去推知，正如我們現在瞭解古代的狀況就是通過出土文物和傳世文獻來瞭解的。但是孔子認爲對於禮制的認識首先要與天道聯繫起來，不能僅憑外在形式來認識，正所謂玉帛和鐘鼓並不能代表禮樂之本。²⁷因爲天道變化，杞國和宋國已經不是天道的承受者了，不能以他們的文化來推測因受天道而建國的夏代和商代的禮，即使其之間在禮儀的具體內容上有很大的相似性，孔子仍無法僅僅從他們的文化來印證夏商之禮的實情。我們可以探知，孔子知道夏商之禮的方法，首先就不是從流傳到後世的傳說和文獻來推知的，而是通過“聞一道”的方式獲知夏商之禮的根基和整體。孔子以“聞”知道因時間久遠和時代局限所遮蔽的天道和禮法之源頭，自然就能以此

²² 《中庸》。

²³ 子曰：“二三子以我爲隱乎？吾無隱乎爾。吾無行而不與二三子者，是丘也。”（《論語》，〈述而〉）

²⁴ 《論語》，〈子罕〉。

²⁵ 子曰：“吾與回言終日，不違，如愚。退而省其私，亦足以發，回也不愚。”（《論語》，〈爲政〉）

²⁶ 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

²⁷ 子曰：“禮云禮云，玉帛云乎哉？樂云樂云，鐘鼓云乎哉？”（《論語》，〈陽貨〉）

聞到未來還未呈現的禮樂制度，“殷因於夏禮，所損益，可知也；周因於殷禮，所損益，可知也。其或繼周者，雖百世，可知也。”²⁸ 孔子損益的標準並非依於現實狀況的需要，而是以天道為出發點。領會天道的關鍵是“聞”，以“聞”的方式使過去已經被遺忘的、因為現在錯綜複雜的情況而被遮蔽的，以及不可預測的未來能夠貫穿起來。這種深長的內在時間意識可以增強源頭的聲音、隱退現在的雜亂和預感未來發展的關節點，從而實現繼承性的創造，孟子就說到“君子創業垂統，為可繼也。”²⁹ 因其聽聞源頭而能準確繼承，因其聽聞節點而能變化創新。繼承性創新就是接續天道，以至於能在萬事萬物之間能避免各個具體事物和時代局限性的影響或役使而輕鬆掌握他們的規律，使自己在其中獲得自由。

那麼，學禮如何從“見”變為“聞”，從禮的具體形式深入到本質性的存在？孔子認為需要通過“問”來實現“觀禮”到“聞禮”的轉變，那麼，問如何讓人從視覺轉變為聽覺的角度？觀禮是禮的具體形式已經完全展現在眼前，禮自然是完美自在的客觀存在，然而物我相隔離的關係，使人很難跨越而切入禮的內容和本質，常給人以手足無措之感。當人們期待通過重複模仿其外在形式，以外觀的相似來使他人相信自己已經掌握了禮的方法，無疑是把自己物化為機器，不僅喪失了人的本性，而且所學到的禮的外在形式也遮蔽了禮的本質。“問”往往從自己特殊的理解出發，並且通過“問”來懸置或隱藏了自己已有的理解和期待達到的目的，而向自身以外的更為豐富的事物敞開，以獲得在更為普遍的背景下正確的知識。雖然“問”並沒有被直接給予答案，但是問已經蘊含了真理的基調，並且是獲得真理的基礎，孔子經常以“大哉問”、“善哉問”來稱讚弟子的悟性，孔子以子夏“禮後乎？”的發問使自己獲得啟發和知識，並斷定子夏具備了掌握《詩經》真諦的品質，³⁰ 所以孔子說“不憤不啓，不悱不發”，³¹ 由憤、悱帶來的困惑或疑問成為了掌握孔子之道的基礎。而問所具有的懸置和開啟功能使人從周圍世界的陷溺中解脫出來，從自身的特殊性出發獲得更為普遍的真理的管道，問以內容的無形而具備啟蒙和開啟真理的功能，而形式上的懸置有一種超越的動力，使人從表面的視覺性的存在轉變為更為幽遠的聽覺性的存在，也就是獲得了聞而知之的形式：

子入太廟，每事問。或曰：“孰謂鄒人之子知禮乎？入太廟，每事問。”
子聞之，曰：“是禮也。”³²

²⁸ 《論語》，〈為政〉。

²⁹ 《孟子》，〈梁惠王下〉。

³⁰ 子夏問曰：“‘巧笑倩兮，美目盼兮，素以爲絢兮。’何謂也？”子曰：“繪事後素。”曰：“禮後乎？”子曰：“起予者商也！始可與言詩已矣。”（《論語》，〈八佾〉）

³¹ 《論語》，〈述而〉。

³² 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

孔子知禮已經為當時的世人所知，但是孔子入太廟，不是參觀禮，也不是宣揚禮，而是問禮。太廟是一個關於禮儀的“博物館”和“研究院”，是最有利於以直觀的方式瞭解禮的地方。如果說孔子是來學習禮的，那麼應該如饑似渴的去尋找答案而直接模仿和記憶，即便是問也是因為不懂而問，孔子顯然不是因為不懂而問，也不是因為不知禮而去太廟尋求一個答案；如果是作為一個對禮知道很多的學者，那麼他應該在此處弘揚禮儀，用各種手段來解答他人的疑惑而讓更多人掌握和理解禮儀，而使其傳承下去。孔子反而避開了“答”這種直觀獲取或直接傳播禮儀知識的有利途徑，選擇通過“問”來“聞禮”。孔子的“問”跟平常以期望直接獲取“答”為目的的問有何不同呢？首先，平常的問總是指向一個有待瞭解的事物，具有明確目的性，這種目的性往往與切身利益相關；其次，問的主體具有一種獲得性期待，如果沒有達到問的目的，那麼發問主體會陷入迷茫；最後，在發問中並沒有明確的手段幫助我們必然達到真理，而是通過後來經驗來不斷驗證，那就是說，知識是可錯的，手段並不能直接確保我們得知真理。這樣發問完全被期待的目的事物所控制，人的獲得性期待變成對於命運的祈禱，人的認識不能當下確證而完全由之後的經驗來承擔，整個過程就是外物主宰人的過程。然而在現實中我們總會偏執的追求客觀性，以為通過外在客觀性可以使我們達成不可置疑的共識或者迫使他人拋棄其主觀意見而承認和服從我們所謂的客觀現實，其實這是一種禁錮思想和奴役他人的方式。孔子為我們展現的“問”就完全不同，第一，孔子通過“每事問”的方式擱置了問的目的性期待，也就是說“每事問”並非是孔子個人想要完全佔有關於禮的知識，而是通過問使我們擱置了人對所有具體事物的意向性，那麼也就切斷了事物能反過來利用人對客觀事物的意向性而控制我們思維的可能；其次，孔子雖然在當時是公認的學識淵博的禮儀學者，但是卻以“問”來使自己“無知”，也就是問也指向自己，同樣懸隔了自己的“前見”，³³即便這樣的“前見”在眾人看來是真實和完備的；第三，通過問的懸隔作用使我們能真正把握“問”本身，也就是說，常人的“問”在對發問物件的期待和自我的私人利益是否滿足中而被遮蔽和肢解，孔子通過“問”本身，直接深入每事與我共存的根基，跳過以上種種障礙，首先聽聞天道這種根基性存在在此處的迴響，迴響成為禮制傳送和變化的關節點而與天道源頭互相呼應，實現創造性的傳承。“問”本身揭示了因禮儀內容的繁複和各個不同情境之間被遮蔽的根本，而問之迴響就能使人從源頭直接領會並傳送到現在。以此定能在禮制社會中自由遊走而不至於擔心陷入迷途，也能使自己在禮壞樂崩的動亂社會中創造性的重塑禮樂制度，所以，孔子做出了“是禮也”的斷言，並且也表示出在以損益為基礎上恢復禮樂制度的自信。

33 伽達默爾，《詮釋學 I：真理與方法——哲學詮釋學的基本特徵》，頁384。

孔子認為通過“問—聞”不僅使自己獲益，而且還能喚醒每個人心中應有的人格價值。子曰：“吾有知乎哉？無知也。有鄙夫問於我，空空如也。我叩其兩端而竭焉。”³⁴ 鄙夫在孔子的語境中是小人，難以與聖人、君子同調，子曰：“鄙夫可與事君也與哉？其未得之也，患得之；既得之，患失之。苟患失之，無所不至矣。”³⁵ 但是，孔子卻通過“叩—問”的方式，使鄙夫聽到天道在自身的迴響，讓他能源源不斷的獲得知識。鄙夫問於孔子，但是孔子並非將其自己所知道的知識直接賦予他，因為鄙夫與孔子的人格並不處於一個水準上，因其之間的隔閡或不理解而會影響到真理的傳遞，如果貿然用強制手段直接賦予，很有可能與鄙夫發生衝突，在孔子的角度來說容易引發“殺無道以就有道”的悖論，以鄙夫的視角會引起小人的反感而導致“多數人暴政”的悲劇，所以孔子以“無知”自稱。通常情況下，鄙夫發問的狀態很容易被被問者所回答的具體內容和自己因何發問的切身利益而肢解，但是孔子通過抓住問本身“空空如也”的狀態，只要輕輕一叩響，那麼鄙夫身上被遮蔽的天道就會被喚醒。天道在鄙夫內心深處因“空空如也”的寂靜而使其自身感覺到經輕輕“叩—問”所帶來的巨大的震動，徹底改造了鄙夫之前的小人人格，直接由小人的無知變為具有真知的人。這種轉變就是通過“問—聞”來實現的，因為“聞”以“不疾而速，不行而至”快速、高效的將天道整體瞬間在此時此地展現，這種轉變是潛移默化和不自知的。所以，“空空如也”的“叩—問”並非給人帶來空洞、單調的東西，其多樣性如同天生萬物一樣豐富。需要指出的是，鄙夫實現這種轉變完全是基於自身，而不是依靠聖人孔子的智慧，孔子在這個過程中反而沒有慷慨、善意的解答他的疑惑，只是順勢利用鄙夫因一次疑惑而詢問孔子這一偶然事件，抓住“問”本身而輕輕一叩，使鄙夫聽到了天道的迴響，所以孔子說“無為而治”和“民無能名焉”是最有效和最具價值的政治治理模式。但是，這也表明了孔子“以能問於不能”的交友工夫，“仁以為己任”的君子交友的目的是在“任重道遠”的征途上能“以友輔仁”。所以，為了達到仁的目的，君子交友的方式有三種，第一，“無友不如己者”，³⁶ 也就是向道德和學問水準比自己高的聖人、智者學習，通過耳濡目染、言傳身教的方式來提高自己；第二，君子之間互相“切磋琢磨”，共同進步，也就是孔子所說的“三人行，必有我師焉：擇其善者而從之，其不善者而改之。”³⁷ 善於向身邊的同仁學習，而其欠缺處正是自己需要戒慎的；而最高級的，且不易被理解的方式就是曾子所說的，“以能問於不能，以多問於寡；有若無，實若虛，犯而不校——昔者吾友嘗從事於斯矣。”³⁸ 通過問使被問者和提問者由之前的不平等或隔閡變為

³⁴ 《論語》，〈子罕〉。

³⁵ 《論語》，〈陽貨〉。

³⁶ 《論語》，〈學而〉。

³⁷ 《論語》，〈述而〉。

³⁸ 《論語》，〈泰伯〉。

平等和交融，消除了真理傳遞的障礙，如同自己向自己傳遞知識一樣高效和迅速，雖然歷代注釋者都認為曾子說的是顏淵，但是從上面的分析中表明孔子也有相同的能力。朱熹詮釋到“惟知義理之無窮，不見物我之有間，故能如此”，³⁹然而孔子和顏子之所以能知義理之無窮，消除物我間隔，是因為借用“空空如也”的狀態，以“叩—問”而聽到天道的迴響而探尋到共同的整體性的根本，這種迴響不僅使自己和鄙夫共同獲得源源不斷的知識，也有喚醒無知者從而使其回應天道的作用。

五、聞樂——聚集——如在

孔子在描述自己“五十而知天命”之後的生存狀態時，強調了“六十而耳順”、“七十而從心所欲不逾矩”。從中我們可以看出，孔子在五十歲知天命之後，無論是對外物，還是從內心來講，就完全處於“聽—命”的自由狀態，“聽—命”與“聞—道”一樣，給人以一種自然而然的釋然之感，完全沒有了之前“志於學”、“立於禮”和害怕被外物所誘惑的緊張狀態。關於“聽—命”的自由性和愉悅感，我們可以從孔子聞樂的體驗來理解，子在齊聞韶，三月不知肉味，曰：“不圖為樂之至於斯也。”⁴⁰韶樂是上古聖王舜帝之樂，集中體現了天命的存在狀態。孔子因“聽—命”，所以無論是對於內心還是外物，古今還是未來都能順應天命的變化，所以有一種自然的愉悅。這種愉悅不同於情感上的快樂，情感的快樂容易被外物和私欲破壞，成為一種偶發性的情感，而“聽—命”的愉悅是“浴乎沂，風乎舞雩，詠而歸”⁴¹所體現出來的人與自然互相響應的自由和閒適。所以，“孔顏之樂”的來源集中於天命的降臨，而不是現實物質需要的滿足，“發憤忘食，樂以忘憂，不知老之將至”，⁴²孔子以“聽—命”而“忘食”、“忘憂”和“不知老”來表明對現實社會的超越而領會到“新命”不斷降臨的人生狀態。

這種因“聽—命”而具有自然和樂之感，並非只是最後曇花一現式的境界展示，而是有一種貫穿始終，條分縷析的作用。

子語魯大師樂，曰：“樂其可知也：始作，翕如也；從之，純如也，皦如也，繹如也，以成。”⁴³

³⁹ 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，頁100。

⁴⁰ 《論語》，〈述而〉。

⁴¹ 《論語》，〈先進〉。

⁴² 《論語》，〈述而〉。

⁴³ 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

樂分爲始、從和成三步，樂的開始是混沌的，五音六律、清濁高下都有萌發之意；但是在開始之後，其之間將會互相融合且互爲條理，形成一個清明有序的整體，使之能滌蕩人心；因其能包容而能澄明萬物，所以能永恆的延續下去，以成就感化天下的目的。也就是說，樂的作用並非局限於一次、一時、一物，樂之成具有廣泛的敞開性，孟子在談到聖人時說：“集大成也者，金聲而玉振之也。金聲也者，始條理也；玉振之也者，終條理也。始條理者，智之事也；終條理者，聖之事也。”⁴⁴但是，玉振之終並非終止之義，而是通過玉音綜合眾多金聲之美，以一定的條理聚集天下萬物，以成就至善之性。玉振的作用就是達到“盡善盡美”，金聲雖美，高亢明亮具有警示的作用，但只能囿於一時一事之處，超出界限就失去範導作用或因在量上累積成爲噪音而對人有所損害，玉音以其幽深隱秘故能探究根本，有貫通各個美音、小善而成就至善、大德的能力，這不僅能匡正各個美音，而且能使其和諧一致，達到化育天下的終極目的。所以，玉振之終不代表聲音的終結，而是具有脫離此時的金聲而囊括其他事物，以條理始終達到和諧一致的作用，這個過程具有反復終始的聚集功能。帛書《五行》就說到“君子之爲善也，有與始有與終”、“君子之爲德也，有與始無與終”，因爲德比善更有突破人的局限而有天道永恆性的意味，所以德具有更高的道德價值，“知德者鮮矣”⁴⁵、“善，人道也；德，天道也”。⁴⁶所以，孔子“聽一命”之德並不是意志消沉而隨波逐流，也不是面對生命消逝而消極對待，而是以聽聞玉音之和觸動自己的生命在隱秘處不斷地聚集能量，使自己能承擔起不斷降臨的天命。

孔子通過聞樂以貫穿始終的方式反復應乎天命，“子與人歌而善，必使反之，而後和之。”⁴⁷孔子與人唱歌時，偶然因一個音節觸動了善心，如同金聲一樣鏗鏘有力但轉瞬即逝，對此善念孔子並非急於保存下來。因爲單獨主觀的善念並不能保證產生善的廣泛效應，如果固執之就會有因爲隨著背景變化產生惡的可能。而是應該再次聽聞，以玉音之和去把握善念，這樣才能觸發到更多的善和聽到純粹至善天命的迴響，以此取得普遍的社會效應。也就是說，玉音在反復終始中既有敞開性，故能包容萬物；也有聚集性，故能使天下形成一個有序的整體。玉音之和在《周易》中非常貼近“中孚”卦的意思，中孚因“柔在內而剛得中，說而巽，孚乃化邦也”，⁴⁸九二之爻虛中有實，“鳴鶴在陰，其子和之”、“其子和之，中心願也”。⁴⁹子和如同玉音，雖然鳴鶴之金聲被六三和六四兩陰爻壓制而不能傳遞至周圍世界爲他人所知，但是因爲其中心至誠，如果人同樣以至誠之玉音來應和，必能經由

44 《孟子》，〈萬章下〉。

45 《論語》，〈衛靈公〉。

46 郭店簡《五行》。

47 《論語》，〈述而〉。

48 《周易》，〈中孚·彖〉。

49 《周易》，〈中孚·彖〉。

天命而能聽聞，子曰：“君子居其室，出其言善，則千裏之外應之，況其邇者乎？”⁵⁰ 這個過程如同風一樣無形無影，從天而至但是卻能發育萬物，“隨風，巽。君子以申命行事”⁵¹ “聽一命”的同時也將天命帶到我們的周圍世界，這就是“誠者，天之道”⁵² 的內涵。人心之至誠上達天命，自然也能感應萬物“應天化邦”，而至誠之言雖然音量小而且相隔遙遠，但是卻能聽聞和應和。玉音因其看似幽深、隱秘和空虛，但能以上天的智慧集聚天下事物，正所謂“淡而不厭，簡而文，溫而理”。⁵³ 孔子在評價顏淵時認為其能“聞一以知十”，⁵⁴ 其原因在於顏淵“聞”的工夫並不是見聞之聞，而是以“聞一道”和“聽一命”的終始反復中聚集成為整體，所以，要想領會天道整體的傳送，必須通過“聞”來實現。⁵⁵

樂使人沉醉於歌曲所營造的氛圍中，也就是說，使人能出離現處的周圍世界到另一個周圍世界中，雖然另一個周圍世界是一種理念的存在，但是更能帶給人真切的感覺。不僅如此，聖王之樂或玉音以其無形和幽遠的傳遞方式，使其不僅能跨越不同時空和事物之間的隔閡而容納萬事萬物普遍的本質相關性，而且能夠使其足以在一個時刻內聚集起來，使人真切的感受到天命所賦予我們的豐富內涵，這種周圍世界的顯現所帶給人的內容，不同於日常生活中周圍世界的存在方式。聖人之樂和玉音以其反復終始的趨勢而能不斷容納和聚集，其恆久而常新的品質使其能不斷突破局限而在更為廣泛或普遍的背景下聯通萬物，從人的時間意識上來說就會體會到從本質性的源頭處生生不息，並不斷賦予未來事物以“新命”的動力，這種本質性源頭的開啟和“新命”的不斷降臨貫通了時空的間距，使人在聽聞中能實現過去和未來主體間的交融或貫通，從而能真正尋找到人存在的本性，體會到天命在我的強烈責任感，“天生德於予，其桓魋其如予何？”⁵⁶ 也會感到自己契合於天命的樂感，“樂天知命，故不憂”⁵⁷ 那麼，“聽一命”是如何跳出“小我”而與天地萬物一體的呢？人在“聽一命”之後，其言行可以突破現實情境的種種局限，而直接以天命行事，天命以其整體性和源始性定能夠在此時彙聚一個真實的場景，從而使人的言行能真誠的流露出來。

50 《周易》，〈繫辭上〉。

51 《周易》，〈巽·象〉。

52 《中庸》。

53 《中庸》。

54 子謂子貢曰：“女與回也孰愈？”對曰：“賜也何敢望回？回也聞一以知十，賜也聞一以知二。”子曰：“弗如也；吾與女弗如也。”（《論語》，〈公冶長〉）

55 李景林，〈聽—中國哲學證顯本體之方式〉，頁161。

56 《論語》，〈述而〉。

57 《周易》，〈繫辭上〉。

子曰：“非其鬼而祭之，諂也。”⁵⁸

祭如在，祭神如神在。子曰：“吾不與祭，如不祭。”⁵⁹

至誠之道，可以前知。……故至誠如神。⁶⁰

根據馮友蘭的論述，祭祀在中國文化中稱已經逝去的爲鬼，對未來的預測爲神，而祭祀經常將鬼神融爲一體，馮友蘭稱這個過程爲“以鬼爲神”。⁶¹ 孔子認爲通過祭祀能將人從見聞的經驗世界中抽離出來，這種抽離並不是把人從現實帶向幻境，而是對自身真實狀況的喚醒。這種真誠性在“親人之喪”表現的最爲強烈，曾在轉述孔子的話說到“人未有自致者也，必也親喪乎！”⁶² “自致”就是反身而誠的狀態，而祭祀就是通過“自致”對自身真實無妄狀態的喚醒，⁶³ 這就是儒家重視“三年之喪”和祭祀之禮的原因，表明了鬼與神對自身存在有著密切的聯繫。如果“非其鬼而祭之”或者只保有祭禮的形式而自己不真心誠意的去參與，都是欺騙他人和欺騙自己的行爲，忽視了人應有存在狀態而喪失了祭禮的根本內涵。祭祀之禮就是以聽聞使過去和未來在此處聚集，也就是代表未來的神向曾經的源頭回溯，表示過去的鬼向未來的時空暗示，過去與未來交互而感通天命整體。“聞”以其反復終始的作用，讓天命不斷分別從源頭和未來向現在聚集，這就是“知遠之近，知風之自”的過程，聚集是無形的，卻是至誠的，會導致現在出現全新的變化，也就是“知微之顯”，天命在現實的隱微處不斷的彰顯、生長，自然而然的實現對現實社會的改造。過去和未來的相向而行使現在在其雙重傳遞中更具豐富性和可能性，“其受命也如響，無有遠近幽深，遂知來物”，⁶⁴ 也能使人跳出現實社會的局限而達到聽從天命而實現自由。所以，人在至誠狀態下並非是空無一物或者單調的，而是跳出主觀、客觀和傳遞方式的種種局限，涵蓋天下整體的一種共現，⁶⁵ “洋洋乎，如在其上，如在其左右”，⁶⁶ “如在”並不是一種不真實的想像，而是人置身於天命狀態下萬物真實聚集於我周圍的生命情態。反而，對於日常生活中所認定爲真實的當下卻是貧瘠的、偶然的和充斥虛假的地方，一方面，由於長時間的禮崩樂壞陷入天下無道，遮蔽了天命之源頭，使人們遺忘了如何返回的道路，另一方面，天下有道的設想被推入遙遠的未來，人們的努力和期待雖然真誠和熱切，

⁵⁸ 《論語》，〈爲政〉。

⁵⁹ 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

⁶⁰ 《中庸》。

⁶¹ 馮友蘭，《新理學》，頁198。

⁶² 《論語》，〈子張〉。

⁶³ 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，頁178。“尹氏曰：‘親喪固所自盡也，於此不用其誠，惡乎用其誠。’”

⁶⁴ 《周易》，〈繫辭上〉。

⁶⁵ 李紀祥，〈孔廟的形上學議題——孔子的“祭如在”與朱子的“祭聖賢之可能”〉。

⁶⁶ 《中庸》。

但是畢竟是空洞的藍圖，如此，當下的現實社會因為過去和未來的相離而被解體，如此貧瘠的荒野使人們的努力和期待成為無源之水。

六、結論

聞而知之的聞本來就有一種反復聚集的意味，使曾在的源頭或根本不斷的揭示出來，而一般的聞總是對已經存在過的東西的聽聞。時間的流逝讓曾經存在者凸顯出來，而源頭或根本卻逐漸隱退，久而久之被人遺忘。這就使我們醉心於通過曾在者的種種行為指導現實生活，或者以此推論出我們的未來，反過來打著客觀規律和理當如此的旗號來限制我們的言行，這無疑是對人生存價值的剝奪，以及對於自由、道德和人性的泯滅。孔子認為這種聞是不自知的敗壞仁義，“夫聞也者，色取仁而行違，居之不疑。”⁶⁷ 聞而知之的聞卻是通過“問”而具備“聞一道”的空間，聽到從天命源頭傳遞過來的迴響，並且與過去和未來天命變化的關節點互相呼應，使天道從始至終一以貫之。

聞樂則如同玉音反復終始的方式，讓天命在此處聚集，這種反復同於對過去曾在者的模仿、繼承，或者以現實情況出發的期望和規劃，而是對天命在此的一種創造性轉化，以跳出現實社會的局限而與時空距離很遠的過去和未來的天命承載者互相借重，以此達到改造世界的目的。美玉之美在於其玉音，所以我們要時常通過聽聞玉音來體會“聞”的獨特作用，子貢曰：“有美玉於斯，韞匱而藏諸？求善賈而沽諸？”子曰：“沽之哉！沽之哉！我待賈者也。”⁶⁸ 孔子在此以商業交換行為來比喻玉音比玉色更有普遍的價值，玉音雖然不容易被發現，較為幽遠和隱秘，但是卻能夠超出自己和當下環境的局限而影響到更多人，即便長時間被歷史和人們所遺忘，但是只要一經叩響就能起到貫穿往來聚集人心的社會公共效用，玉色雖然更容易被人看見和稱讚，但是卻終究是藏於寶盒裡被人把玩的器物罷了。所以，聞而知之凸顯了“聞”在成聖、成君子當中不可替代的作用。

聞而知之也表明了當處於現實社會的絕望中，如何實現人的價值重構，從而承擔起人類文化的命運和未來社會發展的責任。這種擔當意識是非常幽深悠遠的志向，不同於我們日常生活中的可以言說的志向。所以，聖人之志是通過“聞”而得到的，不同於對一件事物的執著與固執，而“聞”所帶來的開啟作用，也能增加切入聖人之境的可能，這種可能性出於人性的根基和人的自由，而非現實的具體條件和情況。聖人之志雖然包容天下，但是卻是獨知的，輕易不訴諸於語言來表達，當然為了鼓勵信眾的原因除外，比如當“子畏於匡”時，孔子自己是堅信天命在我的，但是為了鼓勵同在生死困境中但因為

⁶⁷ 《論語》，〈顏淵〉。

⁶⁸ 《論語》，〈子罕〉。

未到聖人境界而陷入迷茫的弟子，說出了“文王既沒，文不在茲乎？天之將喪斯文也，後死者不得與於斯文也；天之未喪斯文也，匡人其如予何？”⁶⁹

■ 投稿日：2017.06.09 / 審查日：2017.07.07-2017.07.31 / 刊載決定日：2017.08.12

⁶⁹ 《論語》，〈子罕〉。

參考文獻

- 馮友蘭,《新理學》,北京:三聯書店,2007。
- 海德格爾,《哲學論稿:從本有而來》,孫周興譯,北京:商務印書館,2012。
- 伽達默爾,《詮釋學 I:真理與方法——哲學詮釋學的基本特徵》,洪漢鼎譯,北京:商務印書館,2010。
- 李紀祥,《宋明理學與東亞儒學》,桂林:廣西師範大學出版社,2010。
- ,〈孔廟的形上學議題——孔子的“祭如在”與朱子的“祭聖賢之可能”〉,佛光大學歷史系研討會發表論文,2004。
- 李景林,〈孔子“聞道”說新解〉,《哲學研究》,2014年第6期。
- ,〈聽—中國哲學證顯本體之方式〉,《本體詮釋學》第二輯,北京:北京大學出版社,2002。
- 龐 樸,《竹帛〈五行〉篇校注及研究》,臺北:萬卷樓圖書,2000。
- 朱 熹,《四書章句集注》,北京:中華書局,2011。

How Is It Possible for the Sage to Know by Listening?

SHENG Xia

Abstract

To know by listening is the sage's way of perceiving external things. This knowledge not only includes objective knowledge of external things, but also contributes to developing the sagely personality and renewing the society. Confucius thinks that this knowledge needs to be acquired by listening; however, this listening is differentiated from listening in daily life, which is easily affected by objects and desires. Listening for knowledge is associated with the Way of Heaven. Through understanding the Way by listening, each part achieves the whole, the false is eliminated and the true is retained, and the world is transformed to be better. The perceiving model of listening for knowledge is revealed by Confucius's asking rite and listening to music. First, put oneself and other objects in the empty state by asking and listen to the Way of Heaven echoing here from far distance. Through this process, we can directly acquire the knowledge of the sage without any distinction between subject and object. Second, with reliance on the sound of Jade, understand the Mandate of Heaven, which arranges myriad things in an orderly manner. That is to say, as if everything exists in our right and left sides, we should fulfill the nature of ourselves and preserve that of myriad things. Listening to the Way and listening to the Mandate can transform us and societies. Listening for knowledge not only has inter-subjectivity but also retains social practical ability.

Keywords: to know by listening, listening to the Way, listening to the Mandate, asking rite, listening to music

中韓朱子學發展模式的比較

鄧慶平

中文提要

中韓朱子學之間的比較研究存在兩種模式：一是韓國朱子學與作為本源朱子學的朱熹及其弟子所創立學問之間的縱向比較，二是韓國朱子學與同時期的中國朱子學之間的橫向比較。在第二種比較的意義上，一方面考察中國宋元明清朱子學發展的不同階段以及相應的義理展開過程；另一方面考察韓國朱子學從引進到二十世紀初朝鮮王朝滅亡之間的發展歷程以及相應的義理論爭。可以看出，中國朱子學的發展模式可以稱為多元思想資源並存格局中的三起三落式，韓國朱子學則是單一思想資源下的一起一落式。這一發展模式上的差異，需要綜合政治環境、思想文化背景、以身體道的推動力量、學術思想成果以及學派立場等多方面因素，才可以得到恰當理解。

關鍵詞：朱子學，中國朱子學，韓國朱子學，發展模式，三起三落，一起一落，比較研究

* 鄧慶平：南昌大學江右哲學研究中心兼職研究員，江西師範大學馬克思主義學院教授 (gutensky@hotmail.com)

** 基金項目：本文為2014年度國家社科重大項目“朱子門人後學研究”(編號14ZDB008)與江西省社科規劃2014年度項目“現代韓國朱子學研究”(14ZX06)的成果。

一、引論

朱熹(1130—1200)，中國南宋時期著名的理學大師，其及門人共同創立的朱子學逐漸成為南宋後期、元、明、清時期中國的主流思想，對中國社會歷史發展影響巨大。而且，自元代高麗儒家學者安珦(1243—1306)在出使元朝時購回許多朱熹的書，朱子學被傳入朝鮮半島。經歷代朝鮮學者的努力，朱子學逐漸成為朝鮮半島的主流學術，對韓民族的價值觀念、生活方式、文化傳統等的形成具有廣泛而深刻影響。朱子學集中討論性理問題，在韓國歷史上的朱子學常被稱為性理學。在東亞朱子學的視野下，韓國性理學可以被歸結為朱子後學的範疇。自14世紀至19世紀韓國性理學的發展歷程，與同一時期中國朱子學的發展歷程呈現出許多不同之處，呈現出兩種發展模式。這兩種發展模式的存在，既彰顯了朱子學後續發展的多種可能，也體現了朱子學與社會歷史實際相結合的不同方式，證明朱子學具有適應不同歷史文化傳統的普適性價值。就中國朱子學研究者而言，韓國朱子學的存在與發展，構成了中國朱子學的重要“他者”，對於理解朱子學本身的理論性格具有重要啟發。

二、中韓朱子學關係的定位——從強調一體到重視多元

自朱子學成為現代學術研究範式下的重要對象開始，除了中國朱子學之外，韓國朱子學也是學界研究的重要對象。特別是隨著中韓文化學術交流日益頻繁，中國學者對韓國儒學的重視程度也日益增強，對韓國朱子學的研究也逐漸增多，取得了許多重要的成果。代表性的學者有大陸的張立文、李甦平、陳來以及臺灣的李明輝、林月惠、楊祖漢等。這些研究大略有三大類：一是關於韓國朱子學家或命題的個案研究，如張立文對李退溪的研究；二是關於韓國儒學的整體描述，如李甦平的《韓國儒學史》；三是對中韓朱子學的比較研究，這是所有中國學者研究韓國朱子學時必然會遇到的問題，代表性成果的有張立文對朱子與退溪的比較、陳來對中日韓儒學的比較，以及李明輝以“四端七情”為核心對中韓朱子學的比較、楊祖漢從當代儒學的觀點看韓國儒學的重要論爭、林月惠以“羅欽順與韓國朱子學”的關係為核心的比較等。在這些成果當中，我們可以看到許多細致精微的討論，但專門的朱子學史研究還比較缺乏，既沒有專門的中國朱子學發展歷史的研究，韓國朱子學發展歷史的描述也多是在儒學史的論域中，從總體上就中韓朱子學發展模式的不同還很少集中討論。這種狀況的造成，也

許有人會說是由於中國學者對韓國朱子學的個案研究還不夠完整，故無法整體比較。但一方面中國學界已經出現了幾種韓國儒學史的整體性著作，對韓國重要朱子學者的個案研究專著也不少，應該說對韓國朱子學的研究已經具有一定規模；另一方面對於中國學者來說，在進行韓國儒學研究時必然帶有中韓文化整體比較的視野，因此，整體比較是完全必要的。造成目前中韓朱子學的整體比較研究缺乏的一個重要原因，在於中國學者在進行這種比較研究時對中韓朱子學關係的定位上。

目前韓國朱子學與中國朱子學的關係通常被定位為一體多元的結構。如朱人求認為：“‘東亞朱子學’是‘一體多元’的朱子學，‘一體’指朱子學說本身，‘多元’指朱子學在東亞的不同的發展形態。”¹ 陳來也認為：“用‘一體和多元’來觀察東亞朱子學的橫向面貌，目前較為大家所接受，就是說東亞朱子學在體系上內在的是一體的，而中國朱子學、韓國朱子學等不同國家地區的朱子學又有自己關注的問題，形成朱子學的多元面貌。另外也可以看出，16世紀的朝鮮半島朱子學與12世紀以後的中國朱子學相比，在理學的話語、概念、問題意識方面，哲學的普遍性討論是主體，而附加其上的具體性、脈絡性、地域性的因素是次要的。”²

從根本上來說，這種定位是在朱子學這個論域中做出的。由於朱子學的源頭在中國，故更多強調以中華文化即朱子學為體，而中、韓、日朱子學被視為此體的多元化發展與具體呈現之一。但細究起來，這個表述存有一定問題，一方面認為中華文化、朱子學為體，此體即是中國朱子學，另一方面又認為中國朱子學依然是朱子學的多元化發展與具體體現之一。如果中國朱子學是朱子學的多元發展與具體體現之一，又如何可以成為統攝其他具體表現的“體”？即便是如陳來所說“東亞朱子學在體系上內在的是一體的，而中國朱子學、韓國朱子學等不同國家地區的朱子學又有自己關注的問題，形成朱子學的多元面貌。”³ 這裏的“體”是指東亞朱子學的內在統一體系，但這一具有內在統一體系的東亞朱子學無疑是抽象意義上的朱子學，與中韓朱子學之間的關係是本體與具體表現之間的關係，分處於不同邏輯層次。然而，這裏作為抽象意義上的“東亞朱子學”，在概念上又包含了並非抽象意義上的具體“東亞”概念。這樣一來，如果“東亞朱子學”具有內在的統一性，那麼其他非東亞地區如越南等地的朱子學是否就不屬於這一統一體系之中。照我們的理解，作為中、韓、日朱子學多元發展與具體體現之基礎的那個“體”，應該是朱子及其門人創立的朱子學，這個朱子學可以稱為“本源朱子學”，⁴ 這個“本源朱子學”是從源頭的意義上作為韓日以及此後中國朱

1 朱人求，〈東亞朱子學的新課題〉，頁5。

2 陳來，〈中韓朱子學比較研究的意義〉。

3 陳來，〈中韓朱子學比較研究的意義〉。

4 此一“本源朱子學”的概念與韓國學者鄭仁在的“本源朱子學”是不同的，鄭仁在將朱子學傳入韓國後的發展情況，區分為“本源朱子學”（比較符合朱子的學問）和“修正朱子學”（與朱子學說有一定差異的學問），並將栗谷視為“修正朱子學”，而將退溪視為“本源朱子學”。

子學共同的“體”。作為朱子學多元發展與具體體現之一的中國朱子學，更多的是指本源朱子學之後的與韓、日朱子學同樣屬於朱子後學的部分。也就是說，對於中韓朱子學的比較這一命題來說，存在兩種意義上的比較，一是韓國朱子學與朱熹及門人所創立的“本源朱子學”之間的縱向比較關係，這一比較突出的是朱子學自身的一種發展脈絡，可以看出朱子學在傳入朝鮮之後的一貫與創新之處；另一個是同樣相對於本源朱子學而言的朱子後學之間的橫向比較，即處於同一歷史期間的中國朱子學與韓國朱子學之間的橫向比較，這樣的比較突出的是朱子學在不同地區的不同發展軌跡，可以看出中韓朱子學之間的異質性。目前的中韓朱子學比較研究較多的是在第一個方面，因此，陳來才會特意指出：“16世紀的朝鮮半島朱子學與12世紀以後的中國朱子學相比，在理學的話語、概念、問題意識方面，哲學的普遍性討論是主體，而附加其上的具體性、脈絡性、地域性的因素是次要的。”⁵林月惠在《異曲同調：朱子學與朝鮮性理學》的“前言”中也自述：“事實上，本書所探討的朱子學與朝鮮性理學，主要集中在朱子思想與十六世紀朝鮮性理學者的對比研究上。”⁶李甦平《韓國儒學史》的“緒論”在韓儒學比較的意義上將韓國儒學的品格定位為“重氣、重情、重實”，⁷其具體敘述時所言的中國儒學基本就是朱熹。但對於中韓朱子學來說，既有一體的事實，又存在多元的差異，這裏的一體更多的是指縱向意義上的，是指構成中韓日等朱子學發展史共同源頭的，由朱子及門人所創立的本源朱子學；而多元則是橫向意義上的中韓日等各國朱子學的特殊發展歷程及其理論成果。⁸對於中韓朱子學的比較研究而言，除了進行縱向比較，即與本源朱子學做比較之外，橫向比較更能凸顯中韓文化的差異性，在強調多元文化交流的今天顯得尤其重要。而這在以往研究當中重視不夠。本文的重心即在橫向比較方面。要進行這個方面的比較，就必須突破抽象朱子學的視野，在朱子學發展史以及東亞朱子學的坐標當中，將朱子學放在相應的整個文化傳統當中來看待，對造成中韓朱子學不同發展歷程的“具體性、脈絡性、地域性的因素”要引起足夠重視，這樣才可能完整理解中韓朱子學的差異。

這裏再就本文的題目作幾點說明。“中國朱子學”自然包括朱熹及門人所創立的本源朱子學，也包括此後的朱子後學，而“韓國朱子學”則是自本源朱子學傳入朝鮮半島之後逐漸形成的本土化朱子學；從時間跨度上來

⁵ 陳來，〈中韓朱子學比較研究的意義〉。

⁶ 林月惠，《異曲同調：朱子學與朝鮮性理學》，頁2。

⁷ 李甦平，《韓國儒學史》，頁2-21。

⁸ 這裡的一體與多元是在中韓比較的意義上來使用，這一對概念同樣還可以在中國朱子學和韓國朱子學內部使用。在中國朱子學內部，自朱熹以後，作為一個完整學派的朱子學逐漸分化衍生出多元格局，如朱子經學體系當中的每一部經都有一個相應獨立的傳承體系。在韓國朱子學內部，本源朱子學作為共同的理論源頭與思想資源，而退溪學和栗谷學即構成韓國朱子學多元格局當中最重要之二元。概括起來講，一體是在尊朱的共同立場上說的，多元是指不同朱子學者在還原朱熹本意的意義上所呈現出來的學術思想的多樣化具體差異。

說，中國朱子學主要包括從朱熹到1912年清亡，韓國朱子學是從高麗末朱子學傳入韓國直到1910年朝鮮王朝滅亡。因為無論中國還是韓國，此後朱子學在現代的存在形態發生重大變化，為討論方便，本文暫不做討論。謂“發展模式”是在比較意義上提出，一個是本源朱子學在中國的繼續存在與發展，也即中國朱子後學的發展軌跡；一個是本源朱子學在韓國被接受、吸收與創新，逐漸實現韓國化的過程。這兩種存在與發展軌跡構成了朱子學的兩種不同發展模式。

三、中韓朱子學的各自展開

要理解中韓朱子學的不同發展模式，勢必需要梳理中韓朱子學各自的發展線索與邏輯展開。這裏從縱向歷史與橫向論爭兩個角度來闡述。

1、中國朱子學的發展歷史

雖然中國朱子學長期處於官學地位，但其具體發展總是受到具體政治環境與制度變化的影響。因此，對於中國朱子學的發展歷史，最常見的做法是按朝代來區分，這樣的區分既方便敘述，又能體現朱子學發展的階段性特征。

(1)宋代朱子學

主要是指朱子及其門人所創立的朱子學以及南宋後期的朱子後學，此時朱子學者主要是朱子及其一傳、二傳、三傳門人，這種師承關係大體反映出朱子學發展的不同階段。一傳弟子留有姓名的就達494名之多，大部分在13世紀20年代左右之前相繼離世，如黃榦(1152-1221)、陳淳(1159-1223)等。這一代人參與朱熹生前的學術思想創建活動，經歷了慶元黨禁時期朱子學被打壓，也迎來朱子學的逐漸解禁。朱子二傳時間上限定於此後，一直到1279年宋亡之前，人數也近百人。這一時期朱子學派的成員當中，除了那些師承線索顯著的再傳之外，還有與朱子門人交往較多且對朱子學的生存與發展做出重要貢獻的其他朱子學者，他們當中不僅有人活躍於政治核心領域，如真德秀等，在民間基層也同樣有不少以講學著述為志業的朱子學者，如饒魯(其生卒年有一種說法為1193-1264)、何基(1188-1269)等。這一時期朱子學一方面逐漸獲得國家政權認可，朱子學的政治哲學部分得到重視與發展，以宋理宗時期(1224-1264)最為明顯；另一方面朱子後學的講學著述活動也非常頻繁，成果較多。朱子三傳則主要是活躍於宋元之際的一些朱子學者，也有五六十位，其中有著作傳世的就有十幾位，如車若水、王應麟、王柏、文天祥、馬端臨、熊禾、陳普、黃仲元等。因為處於社會

動蕩、政權更替的時期，朱子學的存在形態出現了一些新的變化，如逐漸向北方傳播、影響金元統治、朱陸合流更加明顯與開啟元代朱子學等。這一時期是朱子學發展史的第一個興盛期。

(2) 元代朱子學

這一時期朱子學的一些內在矛盾尚處於潛藏階段，相比於此前與此後，元代朱子學的理論創新並不多。對於元代統治者來說，他們對朱子學的接受過程經歷一個從初識到推尊的過程。元代朱子學最突出的一件事，便是1314年正式將朱子四書作為科舉考試的標準，標志著朱子學正式成為官學，這對朱子學的發展具有深遠影響。此時的朱子學者包括朱子四傳、五傳等，以及其他非明確師承線索中的朱子學者，如胡炳文、劉因、許衡、吳澄等。朱子學在元代的發展呈現出較明顯的南北差異。大致來說，北學尚道德踐履，南學精於義理考辨。最早將朱子學傳到北方的是趙復，許衡就是趙復的弟子，北學以許衡為代表，南學以吳澄為代表。此時朱陸合流的趨勢更加明顯，這在吳澄身上就表現得非常明顯。吳澄一方面堅持朱子學立場，試圖對朱子學的經注體系進行補充，另一方面也吸收陸九淵的心學思想，在心性修養理論方面具有一定的心學傾向。

(3) 明代朱子學

整個明代依然將朱子學定為科舉標準，是為官學。就明代學術思想的發展軌跡，明代朱子學大概可以分為前期與中後期兩個階段。雖然與宋元朱子學相比，明初朱子學派的師承線索不是特別明晰，但此時朱子學依然是學術的主流，著名朱子學者有曹端、薛瑄、吳與弼、胡居仁等。他們在南北學風相互激蕩的格局下，在尊崇朱子學的前提下所關注問題側重點有不同，但都對朱子學進行了不同程度的體認和闡發，圍繞太極動靜、理氣先後與心性修養等問題對朱子學進行修正和突破，在朱子學發展史上具有重要地位。總體來說，“一是重視實然宇宙論探討，強調實然之‘氣’，凸顯下學的躬行踐履工夫，發展成為明代氣學；二是重視主體心性的探討，凸顯‘心’的本體地位，表現為上達工夫，形成了新的學術取向，發展成為明代心學”。⁹也就是說，此時是朱子學發展史上第二個興盛期，也是朱子學向“陽明心學”轉型的過渡階段，具有承前啟後的作用。明中後期陽明學逐漸風靡天下，多數精英知識分子紛紛成為陽明學者，朱子學式微。“明代中期以後，朱子學在中國再未出現有生命力的哲學家，雖然朱子學從明代到清代仍然維持著正統學術地位，但作為有生命力的哲學形態在中國已經日趨沒落。”¹⁰此時在朱子學史上的重要學者，即被視為“朱學後勁”的羅欽順，“他在面對當時風靡天下的心學思潮，通過自身數十年的努力，從內外兩方面著手，在朱子學的立

⁹ 郭鋒航，《明初朱子學研究》，頁1。

¹⁰ 陳來，〈中韓朱子學比較研究的意義〉。

場上力圖進一步完善朱子學體系。從朱學內部來看，羅欽順在繼承之前朱子學者立場的基礎上，圍繞朱學思想義理方面存在的問題如理氣爲二物、察識涵養何者爲先等，力圖多方面深刻且細致地消解朱學的內在矛盾，實現朱子學體系的內在邏輯一致性，這既表現在對朱熹學問思想的質疑上，也表現在對朱子後學的品評上；從朱學外部來看，他積極批判並揭示心學、佛學等異端，極力維護朱子學的儒學正統地位。也就是說，他的學術努力旨在通過消除朱子學命題體系的內在矛盾和判別異端之學，建立一個內部融貫的理學命題體系。”¹¹ 可惜的是，羅欽順對朱子學的這種詮釋在中國朱子學史上並未受到重視與進一步深入展開，相反卻得到韓國性理學者的強烈關注與討論，成爲韓國性理學論爭當中的重要中國資源。此外，朱子學者還通過辯駁陽明的“朱陸早同晚異”論批判陽明學，申明朱子學立場，如陳建等。

(4) 清代朱子學

明亡後，當時知識分子多認爲動搖了明朝幾百年根基的禍首就是陽明心學，清初學術界幾乎全力在檢討陽明心學，一時間，經世致用成爲學者的治學宗旨，崇實黜虛成爲學者追求的目標。清初學界一反陸王、尤其是王學末流空虛之弊，風習崇實，出現了由王返朱的跡象。顧炎武、陸隴其等人的思想都不同程度地反映了這種跡象。朱子學依然成爲清代的官學，重要的朱子學家還有陸世儀、李光地、張履祥、李顥、張伯行等。就朱子學義理本身來說，此時學者的朱學立場有所弱化，如李光地雖主程朱，但對程朱理學和陸王心學持比較客觀、公允的態度。另外，清代朱子學對朱子小學特別重視，如張伯行等人。此時可以被視爲朱子學的第三個興盛期。但是就清代整個學術界來說，對朱學的批評自清開國以來一直不斷。再加上此時朱子學者多沉迷於廟堂，其中一些學者虛偽喜黨爭，使得不斷強化思想控制的清代統治者在意識形態方面保留朱子學統治地位的同時，亦厭棄了朱子學，轉而倡導經學，漢學應運遂成顯學。其間，雖然朱子學者也曾抗爭，但終究挽救不了頹運。隨著學術形態逐漸轉向漢學以及今文經學的興起，在清代中後期，朱子學的理論研究更爲沉寂。朱子學由榮而衰的命運，可以說就是清代政治的一個縮影，是歷史的必然。因此，清代朱子學對朱子學本身並沒有帶來多少變化，無論在理論上還是實踐上，朱子學並沒有開出多少新局面。

2、中國朱子學的義理展開

就中國朱子學來說，自朱熹及門人共同創立朱子學之後，南宋末、元、明、清均出現了不少朱子學者。中國朱子學自南宋末年成爲科舉考試標準開始，元、明、清均獨據科場，於是我們常稱之爲官學。但此一官學的概

¹¹ 鄧慶平，〈歸於至一——論羅欽順完善朱學體系的努力〉，頁436-437。

念與韓國朱子學的官學地位存有差異，無論是對社會的控制面，還是對學術思想的控制力，中國朱子學都要弱於同期的韓國。就思想發展來說，中國朱子學長期處於朱陸合流的整體趨勢當中，本源朱子學重視注釋經典的經學研究方式自南宋末期之後逐漸式微，心性修養實踐成為朱子學者努力的重心，在朱子學義理詮釋方面的推進也多是基於此一工夫實踐，故而對朱子學當中的心性修養理論有所強調。在朱學義理詮釋方面，元明清朱子學者就太極能否動靜、理氣為二物還是一物、理氣有無先後等問題，對朱子學當中存在的不同講法有所討論。但整體上來看，其討論的深入程度遠不及同期的韓國性理學，其主體依然是停留在朱子學本身的討論範圍，雖然略有向心學、氣學偏出的趨向，但並未貫徹到底。具體如：元吳澄一方面完善朱子經注體系，另一方面通過對心的強調推進朱陸合流；明代早期吳與弼、胡居仁、曹端、薛瑄等朱子學者多注重心性道德的日常踐履，並對太極動靜、理氣聚散與先後等問題提出自己的看法，然而“有明學術，從前習熟先儒之成說，未嘗反身理會，推見至隱，所謂‘此亦一述朱，彼亦一述朱’耳。高忠憲云：‘薛敬軒、呂涇野《語錄》中，皆無甚透悟’。”¹² 胡居仁“思想屬於程朱一系，廣泛論說了程朱理學的主要問題，尤其對理氣、心理、主敬、窮理、仁體等問題的論說，有某些獨到的見解。當然，對於這些問題所作討論的深度和廣度，未必都能夠與程朱相並列。”¹³ 曹端其學以躬行實踐為務，而以存養性理為大端，在太極之動靜、理氣聚散等問題上有所推進。在明中期雖然羅欽順對朱子學的理氣二元、人心道心等有所批判，特別強調理氣一物與氣的本原地位，對朱子學有所推進，但此時整個社會的學術思想主流轉向陽明心學，羅欽順的這些思想並未受到其他學者重視。明末清初由於對陽明學的批判而為朱子學的復興提供契機，但由於政治與學術思想自身的原因，清代科舉雖然以朱子學為標準，但清代學術重心在回歸漢學，而非朱子學，故清初朱子學者除在朱子小學方面有所重視之外，義理討論並未出現較大進展。

3、韓國朱子學的發展歷史

由於韓國朱子學的主體在朝鮮時代，這裏可以借鑒的是關於朝鮮時代儒學的分期。如韓國學者玄相允在《朝鮮儒學史》中分為：李朝初期的儒學，至治主義的儒學，性理學為中心的儒學，禮學為中心的儒學，黨爭時代的儒學，陽明學的流入及其排斥為主題的儒學，經濟學派的出現、湖洛學派的分裂、以性理學的再生為點綴的儒學。這裏基於各個時代的主要學術亮點來分期，其中不全是朱子學。此外還有韓國學者李丙燾在《韓國儒學史略》將朝鮮時代儒學分為三期：第一期過渡期儒學，第二期士禍期儒學，第

¹² 黃宗羲，《明儒學案》，頁179。

¹³ 楊柱才，《胡敬齋思想研究》，頁101。

三期學派及黨派分裂時代之儒學。這裏突出的是政治環境與學術思想的緊密關聯，學術思想本身的發展邏輯並不清楚。中國學者也主要是在儒學史的體系中對韓國朱子學的發展進行分期。李甦平在《韓國儒學史》中有關朱子學的發展歷史是放在第二章高麗儒學、第三章朝鮮前期儒學、第四章朝鮮後期儒學與第五章近代儒學當中，以一般的王朝更替與歷史發展為標準。林月惠對韓國朱子學的發展歷史有過專門敘述。我們認為韓國朱子學的發展歷史包括以下發展階段：

(1) 傳入與初步消化理解時期(麗末鮮初，約14-15世紀)

這裏指高麗末期朱子學首次傳入朝鮮半島，並迅速占據學術與政治上的主導地位。其中既包括典籍傳入、人才培養，也包括制度重建、崇儒斥佛。比較重要的事件有1290年安珦(1243-1306)從元都帶回《朱子全書》，後有白頤正(1260-1340)、權溥(1262-1346)、李齊賢(1287-1367)、李穡(1328-1396)、金九容(1337-1392)、鄭夢周(11337-1392)、李崇仁(1347-1392)以及朝鮮初期李穡的門人鄭道傳(1342-1398)、權近(1352-1409)、吉再(1353-1419)等重要人物；在制度方面，1367年在李穡的建議下，高麗於1367年始行科舉，朱子學正式成為官學，鄭道傳支持李成桂為王，成為朝鮮王朝的第一功臣，全盤設計朝鮮建國的所有體制，確立以儒教治國與排斥佛教的理念，自此朱子學在朝鮮成為官學，在知識分子階層影響越來大。

(2) 義理詮釋走向成熟時期(16世紀)

經歷前期的消化吸收，朝鮮學者對朱子學的理論研究走向深入，韓國朱子學逐漸形成自己特有的問題體系，在義理詮釋上出現深化與分化。從徐敬德(號花潭，1489-1546)開“氣論”之先，李彥迪(號晦齋，1491-1553)與孫叔噉(號忘齋)、曹漢輔(號忘機堂)有無極太極之論辯，開韓國朱子學義理論爭之先河，到李滉(號退溪、陶翁，1501-1570)與李珥(號栗谷、石潭、愚齋，1536-1584)這兩個朝鮮朱子學代表性人物出現後，圍繞四端七情、理氣動靜等論爭，陸續出現了一大批思辨水平極高的朱子學者。朝鮮性理學可以說在朱子學核心義理的詮釋方面，不僅努力窮盡本源朱子學的諸多邏輯可能，其辨析精微也遠超出同時明朝朱子學者，標誌著韓國朱子學理論走向成熟。無論是朱子學的理論研究興趣，還是取得的理論成就，都堪稱本源朱子學之後的第二個高峰。

(3) 以禮學為核心的朱子學全面社會化時期(17世紀)

我們知道，儒學一直具有強烈的實踐性，在朱子學當中，最能體現其實踐性的有兩個方面，一個偏重個人德性成就的工夫論，另一個是偏重社會秩序建設的禮學。韓國朱子學在義理詮釋上獲得充分展開的同時，朱子

學當中的禮學資源也得到士人的充分重視，相繼出現一批研究朱子禮學的名家，其中以金長生(號沙溪，1548—1631，著有《家禮輯覽》與《喪禮備要》)與鄭述(號寒岡，1543—1620，著有《五先生禮說分類》)為代表。而且，這一時期，以《朱子家禮》為核心，借助作為朱子學信徒的兩班逐步在地化趨勢，朱子學當中的禮學資源不僅流行於士大夫階層，在普通韓國人的日常生活方面(冠、婚、喪、祭)也逐漸得到忠實而全面落實，韓國逐漸成為禮儀之邦。也許從義理詮釋上說，“韓國的儒學家對中國儒學的‘禮儀’體系僅僅是原封不動的吸收和再現，並沒有形成具有韓國特色的內容”，¹⁴但正是這種面向社會各階層的禮學化，朱子學真正成為高麗以來塑造韓民族的行為方式、生活方式與民族性格的最重要文化資源，影響至今。

(4) 衛正斥邪時期(18—19世紀)

經過朱子學學者長期論爭，朱子學的義理詮釋漸至高峰；經過以身體道階層的社會推廣，朱子學中的禮學社會化得到全面落實，這兩個方面的發展都可以說是朱子學本身的理論本性所致。此後18、19世紀韓國朱子學的發展是在與其他異端的鬥爭中被推動。這裏的異端不僅有傳統的佛教，也有朝鮮前期一直被壓抑批判的“陽明學”，還有受清代實證學風影響的“實學”和來自西方的科學技術與天主教，這些思潮的存在自然直接與一直作為正統的朱子學產生衝突，因此，這個時期的韓國朱子學主要表現為衛正斥邪。例如李恒老(號華西，1792—1868)以朱子理氣論為基礎對天主教的天主觀念進行批判，認為朱子學以理為主，而天主教的天主以氣為主。這在理論的嚴密性上是不夠的。正如有學者認為，在理論創造性上，可以說韓國朱子學發展至此，已是強弩之末，反映的只是朱子學為應對當時的時代狀況與要求而做出自我防禦的痛苦掙扎。¹⁵此時韓國朱子學逐步走向衰微。

4、韓國朱子學的義理展開

韓國朱子學的橫向展開是指韓國朱子學在義理上對本源朱子學的邏輯推進，也是韓國朱子學的理論貢獻。朝鮮性理學家以異常認真嚴謹的學術態度對待朱子學，因此無論是朱子學文獻考辨，還是義理詮釋都非常出色，特別是學者之間的往復論辯，最終形成了韓國朱子學內部的多元格局。重要的哲學論辯主要有：太極論爭、主理主氣論爭、四七理氣論爭、人心道心論爭、人物性同異論爭、心說論爭。這些論爭主要集中在理氣心性論方面，屬於朱子學本體論範疇，哲學的思辨性極強，一直是朝鮮性理學的核心主題，歷代朝鮮精英知識分子幾乎都卷入其中而成為性理學家，他們對朱子學本體論的邏輯可能性，殫精竭思，辨析入微，形成典型的哲學論爭，

¹⁴ 李相益，〈中國儒學的韓國收容與開展〉，頁745。

¹⁵ 崔根德，〈韓國儒學思想研究〉，頁257。

往復論辯，留下了異常豐富的書信文集，其呈現的思辨圖景令人歎為觀止。其哲學思辨水平遠超出同一時期的中國朱子學者，以致有學者認為朱子學的重心已經轉向朝鮮半島。¹⁶而這種轉向與其說是朱子學自身邏輯展開的結果，還不如說是朱子學在韓國實現本土化的結果。

這些論爭都是在朱子學的論域展開，都是以回歸朱子本意為宗旨。而這些之所以能夠成為哲學論爭的議題，其原因不僅僅在於韓國學者對於朱子學的理解與解釋水平問題，更在於朱子學乃是朱熹與其五百餘弟子共同創立，時間長達六七十年，¹⁷留下的著述異常豐富，因而在言說與義理本身存在一些內在不能自洽的地方，這些地方經過反覆的論爭逐漸被彰顯出來，形成如在本體論意義上的主理與主氣兩大派，這種彰顯成為韓國性理學所取得的主要理論成就。

簡單地講，帶著官學身份的朱子學進入韓國後，順應麗末鮮初排斥佛教重建國家制度文明的需求，迅速得到上層知識分子的認同與接受，在朝鮮王朝五百餘年的歷史發展過程當中一直居於主流與正統的獨尊地位，知識分子一方面在義理詮釋上以論爭的形式深化與彰顯朱子學的內在邏輯可能，取得了朱子學創立後的最主要理論成就，另一方面積極向社會底層民眾全面推廣與落實朱子學圍繞日常生活方式的禮學文化，全面塑造韓民族的生活方式與民族性格，使得朱子學真正實現韓國化，韓國朱子學也成為韓國傳統文化的核心部分。

另外，中韓朱子學在各自發展過程中存在交流互動，這種交流互動在長期歷史中是以中國向韓國輸入為主。因此，韓國朱子學在發展過程中存在一個受中國朱子學發展所影響的問題，如羅欽順在韓國性理學論爭中所引起的熱烈反響。但是，需要指出的是，韓國性理學經過五百餘年的充分論辯，其取得的朱子學研究成果達到了極高的水平，與現代哲學研究視野下的中國朱子學研究有許多相似之處，值得現代中國朱子學研究者重視。“總的說來，朝鮮朝時代的朱子學家，如李退溪、李栗谷，對朱子有深刻的理解，對朱子哲學的某些矛盾有深入的認識，並提出了進一步解決的積極方法，揭示出某些在朱子哲學中隱含的、未得到充分發展的邏輯環節。”¹⁸就中國朱子學來說，朱子學內部隱含的未得到充分發展的邏輯環節，一直到20世紀，現代學術研究興起後，借鑒於西方哲學研究的範式，方才將之充分展現出來。這當中最重要者如牟宗三等。牟宗三借鑒康德等西方哲學思想資源，對朱子學進行了細緻入微的分析，揭示出朱子哲學理氣二元論結構，並提出朱子之理只存有而不運動的結論。這樣的辨析與理解在朝鮮性理學者的辨析

¹⁶ 陳來，〈中韓朱子學比較研究的意義〉。

¹⁷ 這個講法主要基於朱子學派的形成過程得出的，參考了朱熹開始授徒與其門人離世時間而定，即自朱熹20歲開始授徒，至朱熹主要門人大約在朱熹71歲去世後的二十年左右也多已離世。

¹⁸ 陳來，〈中韓朱子學比較研究的意義〉。

當中早有類似的觀點，如四端七情的討論中，退溪認為：“四端乃理發而氣隨之，七情乃氣發而理乘之”，而栗谷則認為理不能動，四端七情均為“氣發”，其反覆論辯所達到的水平與現代哲學研究視野下的朱子學研究大家有許多共通之處，因此，牟宗三的弟子楊祖漢就認為：“栗谷對朱子學的理解，與中國當代牟宗三對朱子哲學的論釋，大體上是一致的。”¹⁹ 韓國朱子學的這些義理辨析成就，在今後的中國朱子學研究當中值得充分借鑒。

綜上所述，中國朱子學發展模式可以歸結為多元思想資源並存格局當中的“三起三落”。朱熹及其門人是朱子學的創立時期，是第一起；隨後到元代朱子學定為科舉考試標準時期，這一時期朱子學理論成果不大，是為一落；此後明早中期陽明學出現之前，是朱子學發展的第二個起；此後隨著陽明學的興盛，朱子學進入第二個低落時期；明末清初，隨著陽明後學的被批判，朱子學伴隨著漢學的復興而逐漸回到思想界主流正統地位，是為朱子學發展的第三起；清代中後期漢學的重興意味著朱子學的第三落。韓國朱子學的發展模式為單一思想資源當中的“一起一落”。所謂一起是指傳入朝鮮半島之後，韓國學者在推尊朱熹的前提下，一方面從理論上深入辨析朱子學相關概念與命題，在性理學內部形成不斷論辯的不同學派；一方面則將朱子禮學向民間社會進一步推廣與落實，重塑韓民族的日常生活方式。所謂一落是指近代以來包括佛學、陽明學與西方文化等異端衝擊下，韓國朱子學的逐漸衰微與轉型。

四、兩種發展模式的比較分析

任何一種學術思想傳統，都是在特定社會歷史與學術思想環境當中產生與發展，由某一特定群體推動與落實，並取得特定理論成果，具有特定理論立場，並對社會歷史發揮特定影響的學術思想史現象。為了深入理解中韓朱子學的不同發展歷程，更好理解中韓朱子學的這兩個不同發展模式，我們不僅需要在朱子學領域內描述朱子學在中韓分別展開演化的過程，更需要綜合各自政治環境、學術思想背景、以身體道的推動力量、學術思想成果以及學派立場等方面一一進行分析。

1、從朱子學所處的政治環境來說：

朱子學的產生與發展都受到當時政治社會狀況的影響。中國朱子學自12世紀後期形成以來，歷經宋元、元明以及明清之間的朝代更替以及一系列政治環境的劇烈變革，再加上商品經濟的新發展，朱子學的發展呈現一些特

¹⁹ 楊祖漢，〈李栗谷對朱子哲學的詮釋〉，頁67。

殊的朝代特色。而韓國朱子學自高麗末期傳入之後，其主要的發展都處於朝鮮王朝時期，沒有大的改朝換代，政治環境雖也有變化如士禍、黨爭乃至倭亂等，但總體上政治制度與社會結構變化不大，比如李氏王朝以兩班爲首的、包括中人、平民與賤民四個界限清晰的階層爲主的社會階層結構與身份等級制度一直非常嚴苛，官職制度基本上都遵循1469年所頒布的《經國大典》的規定，因此，相對於中國朱子學來說，韓國朱子學所處的社會結構與政治環境在整個朝鮮王朝時期基本未變，相對穩定單一。這種嚴苛的社會階層結構和相對穩定的政治環境，與講求等級名分的朱子學一經接觸便日益緊密結合，逐漸在理論與實踐兩方面展現出良性而深入的長期互動。

2、就朱子學發展的學術思想環境來說：

其所面臨的其他學術思想資源的複雜程度對朱子學的發展具有重要影響。中國朱子學自形成之初，從儒學內部來說，就處於與張栻的湖湘學、陸九淵的江西之學、呂祖謙的浙東之學、陳亮與葉適的事功學派等學派的長期互動之中，從儒學之外來說，就處於儒釋道長期以來的三教衝突與合流的進程之中，這是中國朱子學生長的起點。到元代，一方面沿續著儒釋道的三教合流，另一方面朱子學又處於朱陸和會、理學心學互動的進程中，這一格局大體上一直伴隨此後朱子學的存在與發展；朱子學內在的潛在矛盾沒有得到充分彰顯，反而形成一種根源於學派間互動而導致其生命力逐漸衰退的發展模式，具體表現爲程朱理學、陸王心學相互興替乃至宋學漢學相互興替的發展模式。這樣的結果便是，朱子學雖然一直作爲科舉的標準，但其在學術思想領域並非一直居於絕對的主流。對於韓國朱子學來說，朱子學進入韓國時正是朱子學在中國被定爲官學的元朝，到明代，朱子學也被定爲官學，在慕華與事大心理的推動下，朱子學進入到韓國後就扮演著排斥佛教的功能，並逐漸獲得文化與思想正統的地位，而且陸王心學始終在韓國受到批判與排擠，遠不能構成朱子學的對立面，朱子學在五百多年的歷史上居於獨尊的地位。因此朱子學在韓國的發展，就走上一條在義理上圍繞特定論題而促使朱子學本身的潛在矛盾逐漸顯現化、在社會實踐上圍繞《朱子家禮》而逐步實現朱子學的禮學化社會實踐的發展模式，這樣的結果便是朱子學在韓國社會居於絕對的主流。

3、就朱子學的以身體道階層來說：

這一階層的成員穩定性、影響力以及生活方式等對朱子學的發展具有直接影響。在宋末以後，具有明確師生傳承線索的朱子學派逐漸衰微，再加上朝代更替與政治環境變化等影響，作爲朱子學文化的承載者，士大夫階層的流動性很大，朱子學的存在與維繫更多的是依賴於作爲個體的接受朱

子學影響的知識分子。這些朱子學者既有位居高位的上層士大夫，也有民間的知識分子，除了元代與明代早期之外，朱子學者之間的相互學術聯繫不多，較少以學派的形式活躍於當時的學術思想界。在韓國，長期存在的兩班(凡有資格仕官身份者，都被列入“兩班”之列)是朱子學的忠實信徒。他們是專業的讀書人，是朱子學的以身體道階層，是朱子學穩定的繼承者、主導者、傳播者。在朝鮮嚴格的身份制度下，這個朝鮮社會的統治階層具有成員穩定、社會影響力強的特點，他們以科舉考試作為目標，都接受朱子學的影響，這使得兩班身份除了最初的政治身份外，後來逐漸具有更多的文化內涵；由於後來分化為在京與在地兩類，故上可達王即社會最高層，下可至奴僕即社會最底層，社會影響面極廣，²⁰ 其中在地兩班人數居多，以家族聚居的形式居住穩定²¹；同時由於出仕機會較少，²² 使得他們大多數人在仕途之外的讀書講學、心性修養、社會教化等方面實現自我價值，這既促進朱子學義理論爭深化，又推動朱子學的社會落實，最終加強了朱子學對社會政治、經濟、文化的全方面控制，通過推廣《朱子家禮》等對社會各階層生活方式實現全面培養與塑造。

4、從學術思想立場的堅定與忠誠性來看：

由於中國朱子學一直處於學派互動當中，對一般讀書人來說，往往面對多種學術思想資源，例如宋明理學家多有出入佛老的經歷，即便是重視心性修養也易滑向注重主體性的心學。知識分子的朱子學立場在明中期以後更加弱化，這也是後來中國學術思想的主流不斷變換的重要原因。相反在韓國，由於身份等級觀念，朱子學之外的學術思想很難構成對朱子學的衝擊，佛教受到排擠，道教幾乎沒有，故知識分子面對的學術思想資源比較單一，自幼接觸朱子學之後，接觸其他學術思想的機會不多。他們的朱子學立場異常堅定與忠誠，故對陽明心學的批評與拒斥更嚴厲，朱子小學與家禮的社會落實更徹底且更緊密。

²⁰ 據現存首爾大學奎章閣所藏中的慶尚道大邱的戶籍大賬對人口的記載，1609年大邱的總人口為13913人，其中兩班為1027人(7.4%)，兩班的奴婢為5992人(43.1%)，常民為6894(49.5%)人，可見兩班的直接影響面就超過人口一半以上。潘暢和、何方，〈論古代朝鮮的“兩班”及其文化特點〉，頁4。

²¹ 兩班在地化的過程中形成了在地兩班的世居地。這些世居地大部分由同族集居而成。這種同族集居而成的同族聚居地，在16世紀的朝鮮農村迅速興起並廣泛、長期存在。日本在朝鮮的總督府於1930年出於殖民統治的需要，調查了朝鮮最著名的1685個兩班同族聚居地的形成時間，結果表明12.3%在500年以上，38.8%在500—300年之間，20.8%在300—100年之間，1.4%不到百年，27.296%時間不明，而且這些同族聚居地在1431—1630年間形成的居多。這就是說，在地兩班的形成過程同時也是他們的世居地的同族聚居地形成的過程。潘暢和、何方，〈論古代朝鮮的“兩班”及其文化特點〉，頁3。

²² 朝鮮是比中國和日本官吏少得驚人的國家，朝鮮王朝末期，除京城以外，統治朝鮮八道的官吏還不到一千。潘暢和、何方，〈論古代朝鮮的“兩班”及其文化特點〉，頁4。

5、從學術思想成就來說：

正如上面所提4的，自15、16世紀，韓國朱子學經過長期集中而深入的反覆論爭，其在朱子學義理詮釋方面取得了豐富的理論成就，而相應的同期中國朱子學在義理詮釋方面則突破不多，相對比較貧乏。

6、就朱子學的社會影響來說：

朱子學在中國經歷了一個由南向北的流傳，同時也經歷了由私學向官學的地位上升，但此官學主要體現於科舉考試當中；與此同時，另一方面也存在一個由知識分子向民間推廣落實的過程，但此推廣與落實主要是朱子學義理而非禮學，且一直未能成為所有社會成員的專一信仰。在韓國，朱子學作為一種當時最先進的思想文化，在對抗韓國佛教等異端的同時，也自一傳入就受上層知識分子的認可、接受以及逐漸消化，不僅作為科舉的標準，還居於學術思想的正統主流，而且同時以禮學化的形式不斷向民間拓展與落實，具體參與韓民眾生活樣式與民族性格的塑造過程，成為韓國文化傳統當中最重要的組成部分。

以上分析告訴我們，中韓朱子學的不同發展模式體現在不同環境(包括社會政治環境與學術思想環境兩方面)、主體、思想格局、理論成果以及社會影響等多方面。

五、結論

總的來說，歷經朝代更替的中國朱子學長期處於多種學術思想流派的互動當中，自朱子與其門人創立朱子學之後，朱子學創立時期的經學研究模式逐漸衰微，朱子後學的主要任務轉變為一方面是以個體道德實踐的形式踐行朱子學，另一方面是受到其他學派影響的情況下積極理解與捍衛朱子學的立場，對於朱子學義理的內部矛盾有所涉及但未能深入，對朱子學的邊界有所突破但並未走遠，對於朱子禮學的社會落實一直不能全面實現。這構成本源朱子學之後元明清朱子學的基本存在與發展模式。而對於韓國朱子學來說，長期處於相對統一穩定的政治環境之中，在相對持續穩定的兩班階層的推動下，朱子學獲得絕對獨尊的地位，故其走上的一條一方面朱子學義理的內在矛盾以反覆論爭的形式逐漸顯現，另一方面以《朱子家禮》為核心向社會全面落實的發展道路。在尊重“他者”差異性的前提下，通過比較的視野詳細剖析“他者”，進而確定中韓朱子學的不同發展模式，有助於我們更好地理解朱子學本身，對思考中國儒學的未來命運也將具有一定啟發。當然，無論是就中文學界還是我個人而言，中韓朱子學比較研究都是一個有待深入的領域。

參考文獻

- 陳 來,《東亞儒學九論》,北京:三聯書店,2008。
- ,〈中韓朱子學比較研究的意義〉,《中國社會科學報》,2014年第570期。
- 崔根德,《韓國儒學思想研究》,北京:科學技術文獻出版社,1998。
- 崔英辰,《韓國儒學思想研究》,邢麗菊譯,北京:東方出版社,2008。
- 鄧慶平,〈歸於至一——論羅欽順完善朱學體系的努力〉,陳來、朱漢民編,《傳承與開拓——朱子學新論》,上海:華東師範大學出版社,2014。
- 郭鋒航,《明初朱子學研究》,陝西師範大學博士學位論文,2012。
- 黃宗羲,《明儒學案》,北京:中華書局,1985。
- 李昶平,《韓國儒學史》,北京:人民出版社,2009。
- 李相益,〈中國儒學的韓國收容與開展〉,《首屆韓中人文論壇論文集》,2014年12月5日。
- 林月惠,《異曲同調:朱子學與朝鮮性理學》,臺北:國立臺灣大學出版中心,2010。
- 潘暢和、何方,〈論古代朝鮮的“兩班”及其文化特點〉,《東疆學刊》,2010年第3期。
- 楊柱才,〈胡敬齋思想研究〉,《中國哲學史》,2008年第3期。
- 楊祖漢,〈李栗谷對朱子哲學的詮釋〉,《延邊大學學報(哲學社會科學版)》,1995年第1期。
- 尹絲淳,《韓國儒學史——韓國儒學的特性》,邢麗菊、唐豔譯,北京:人民出版社,2017。
- 朱人求,〈東亞朱子學的新課題〉,《福州大學學報(哲學社會科學版)》,2004年第2期。

A Comparative Study of the Development Patterns of Zhuzixue in China and Korea

DENG Qingping

Abstract

In regard to Zhuzixue 朱子學 (Study of Master Zhu) in China and South Korea, there are two main comparative approaches: one is the comparison between Zhuzixue developed in Korea and Zhuzixue formulated by Zhu Xi and his disciples. The other is the comparison between Zhuzixue in Korea and China during the same time period. These two kinds of comparison are conducive to examining how Zhuzixue showed different development patterns during the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties of China. In addition, these comparisons can elucidate how Zhuzixue evolved in Korea from its introduction to the fall of the Joseon Dynasty in the early twentieth century. The development patterns of Zhuzixue in China and Korea follow different paths: China has experienced three ups and downs in multilateral academic streams while Korea has experienced one up and down in a unilateral academic stream. These differences can be clearly explained only when we consider the two nations' differences in various aspects, such as political environments, ideological and cultural backgrounds, and academic achievements.

Keywords: Zhuzixue, Zhuzixue in China, Zhuzixue in Korea, three ups and downs, one up and down, development pattern, comparative study

嚴復的科學思想與會通觀

韓 成 求

中文提要

嚴復是近代中國著名的啟蒙思想家，是向西方尋找真理的先進人物之一。他曾提出重視科學、發展科學的思想，同時，他對科學與哲學的關係有著獨特的見解。他的思想淵源主要來自西方，但同時他對中國傳統思想有一定的了解。

嚴復認為面對民族存亡之危機，人的自覺是最重要的，但中國傳統思想中的一些觀念始終困擾著人們的整個思想和意識，如果不改變這種觀念，就不能營救中華民族和國家的未來。所以他首先要將中國的思想與文化從傳統形而上學與玄學的束縛中盡快解放出來，並且運用科學方法和經驗知識，一方面進行中國傳統思想近代化，另一方面服膺於社會現實的要求。

嚴復向傳統“天道”觀念進行新的解釋。他通過傳統天道觀念的重釋，建造以西方科學為基礎的本體論思想，而且以理性原則會通科學和其它領域之知識。他的“天”是“自然而然”的天，但他所謂“自然而然”的含義是模糊的、多重的。所以他設定兩種天道、人道關係。他一方面根據“天演之道”，主張“任天為治”，這樣天道和人道是貫通的。但另一方面，他主張“以人持天”，這樣，天道和人道是對立的。任天為治，是要肯定進化法則的普遍性，以此提醒中國人直視民族危機；而以人持天則要強調人治之功，是要肯定人類道德的重要性，以此給中國以救亡和民族復興的希望。

嚴復是最早將科學作為一種價值體系來接受的中國人。他翻譯赫胥黎《天演論》和宣揚社會達爾文主義，從內容上為科學主義的產生奠定了重要基礎。嚴復展示了自己整個思想的一個中心宗旨，即以理性原則會通科學和其它領域之知識，亦即將“思議”與“不可思議”會通為一。他的思想雖然包含著經驗主義的不可知論的傾向，但他在晚清對中國科學主義產生的推動力則是不容忽視的，而且還久遠地發生著影響。

關鍵詞：天道觀，科學主義，形而上學，本體論，天演論，不可思議，會通

* 韓成求：首爾教育大學校倫理教育課講師(wait41@hanmail.net)

一、序論

嚴復是近代中國著名的啟蒙思想家，是向西方尋找真理的先進人物之一。他曾提出重視科學、發展科學的思想，同時，他對科學與哲學的關係有著獨特的見解。

他的思想淵源主要來自西方，他的突出功績是從事西學的翻譯和中西學術的比較工作。19世紀90年代中，嚴復在天津《直報》上發表一批文章，力陳中西學術之迥異。他說：中學“厭制藝則治故詞，惡試律例為古今體；鄙摺卷者，則急碑版篆隸之遊；薄講章者，則標漢學考據之赤幟。於是此追秦漢，彼尚八家，……諸如此倫，不可殫述。然吾得一言以蔽之，曰：‘無用’”、“學者學所以修己治人之方，以佐國家化民成俗而已。於是侈陳禮樂，廣說性理……吾又得一言以蔽之，曰：‘無實’”。¹而西學格致則恰恰相反：“西學格致，一理之明，一法之立，必驗之物物事事而皆然，而後定為不易。……不敢絲毫主張，不得稍行武斷，必勤必耐，必公必虛，而後有以造其至精之域，踐其至實之途。”²他在這一段論述中扼要地揭示了幾千年中國文化之無用與無實，而他對西學格致精義的揭示和贊述，又反映出嚴復對其所代表的科學實證精神的深刻認識。嚴復敏銳地看到了西學格致所代表的西方科學文化的內在實質。因此，他決心以西方科學方法與精神改革中國傳統學術文化與人們的思維方式。

嚴復認為面對民族存亡之危機，人的自覺是最重要的，但中國傳統思想中的一些觀念始終困擾著人們的整個思想和意識，如果不改變這種觀念，就不能營救中華民族和國家的未來。因此嚴復與康有為一樣，首先向傳統“天道”觀念進行新的解釋。

本文探討嚴復對傳統天道觀念的改造過程，嘗試解釋他如何建造以西方科學為基礎的本體論思想，如何以理性原則會通科學和其它領域之知識。

二、傳統天道觀念的重釋

傳統儒家認為“天”是宇宙的最高主宰，天下萬物莫逃於天之下，人與萬物都要受到天的規定，由此儒家建立了一個關於世界本原和倫理原則的基本理論，即天道觀。儒家天道觀是以“天”為根據、以陰陽五行為理論框

¹ 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁44。

² 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁45。

架、以倫理綱常為根本原則對自然與社會進行解釋和規定的一種學說。儒家天道觀有重名教輕自然的特點，表現出了一種道德中心主義的傾向。人們格物是為了致知，即知天理。知天理後才能正心誠意，完善道德。只有完善道德才能合乎天意，達到自然和社會的和諧。自然和社會不和諧的主要原因是天災和人禍，儒家天道觀認為道德的缺失和倫常的混亂是兩者發生的根源。

中國傳統思想中，“天不變，道亦不變”的觀念，幾千年以來根深蒂固地支配著中國人的思維。這一觀念認為，陰陽五行的運行規律及其所體現的天意不變，道便永遠不會改變。現實政治的敗壞並非道的敗壞，不過是意味著政治家的失道而已。這裏所謂“天”、“道”都包含著“形而上學”的意味。

嚴復首先嚴格分開“天”與“道”，對其涵義下了明確的規定。他認為，“開國世殊，質文遞變，天演之事，進化日新，然其中亦自有其不變者。”³所謂“不變者”，就是“道”。但是不變之道的內容，不只是“君仁臣忠，父慈子孝，兄友弟敬，夫義婦貞”等“綱紀”，而嚴復把“道”的範圍稍微擴大一些。他對此具體說明：

天變地變，所不變者，獨道而已。雖然，道固有其不變者，又非俗儒之所謂道也。請言不變之道：有實而無夫處者宇，有長而無本剝者宙；三角所區，必齊兩矩；五點布位，定一割錐，此自無始來不變者也。兩間內質，無有成虧；六合中力，不經增減，此自造物來不變者也。……能自存者資長養於外物，能遺種者必愛護其所生。必為我自由，而後有以厚生進化；必兼愛克己，而後有所和群利安，此自有生物生人來不變者也。此所以為不變之道也。若夫君臣之相治，刑禮之為防，政俗之所成，文字之所教，吾儒所號為治道人道，尊天柱而立地維者，皆譬諸夏葛冬裘，因時為制，目為不變，去道遠矣！第變者甚漸極微，固習拘虛，未由得覺，遂忘其變，信為恆然；更不能與時推移，進而彌上；甚且生今反古，則古昔而稱先王，有若古之治斷非後世之治所可及者，而不知其非事實也。⁴

他明確指出他所謂之“不變之道”，“非俗儒之所謂道”，而包括宇宙間平衡的物理力量、幾何公理、進化法則等在內的公理性的東西。傳統思想中所謂的有關“君臣”、“刑禮”、“政俗”、“文教”等，對他看來“去道遠矣”。

但如果說“道”是不變的話，現實生活的變革可能性根本不存在。因此，他進而主張，“天下有萬世不變之道，而無百年不變之法。”⁵“法”沒有一時不變的，但“法”不是隨時變，而是隨著“天”的變化而變。那麼，“天”是什麼呢？他指出，天即是“自然之機，必至之勢”，而“順天者存，逆天者亡。”⁶他在《群學肄言》案語中，將“天”字，分析為三個不同的形態：“中國所謂天

3 嚴復，《讀經當積極提倡》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁332。

4 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁50-51。

5 嚴復，《擬上皇帝書》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁63。

6 嚴復，《〈原富〉按語·八十》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁896。

字，乃名學所謂歧義之名，最病思理，而起爭端。以神理言之上帝，以形下言之蒼昊，至於無所爲作而有因果之形氣，雖有因果而不可得言之適偶，西文各有異字，而中國常語，皆謂之天。”又說：“他（郭侍郎一引者）所謂‘順天者存，逆天者亡’的‘天’字是‘無所爲作而有因果之形氣，雖有因果而不可得言之適偶’的第三義。‘天地氣機，一發不可復遏。士大夫自怙其私，求抑遏天地已發之機，未有能勝者也。’中的‘天’的意思。‘天演’的‘天’字也是這個意思。”⁷

嚴復強調這種“天”的不斷運行、不可逆轉之性，而且將宇宙發展的規律命名爲“運會”。他以“運會”來描述世變之急迫性，同時根據“運會”說補充傳統中國的聖人觀。他寫道：

嗚呼！觀今日之世變，蓋自秦以來未有若斯之亟也。夫世之變也，莫知其所由然，強而名之曰運會。運會既成，雖聖人無所爲力，蓋聖人亦運會中之一物。既爲其中之一物，謂能取運會而轉移之，無是理也。彼聖人者，特知運會之所由趨，而逆睹其流極。唯知其所由趨，故後天而奉天時；唯逆睹其流極，故先天而天不違。於是裁成輔相，而置天下於至安。後之人從而觀其成功，遂若聖人真能轉移運會也者，而不知聖人之初無有事也。⁸

即聖人不是無所不爲的人，聖人也是運會中的一物。他主要先知運會的取向而輔助天的運行，以便使天下太平無事。這種觀點在《天演論》自序中更加發揮，嚴復對“運會”和“天”進行物質性的解釋。他認爲宇宙之中，無論自然現象、社會現象，都是物質演變的自然結果。“太宇之內，質力相推，非質無以見力，非力無以呈質。”他用《易經》中的觀點來解釋說：“凡力皆乾也，凡質皆坤也。奈端動之例三：其一曰靜者不自動，動者不自止，動路必直，速率必均。此所謂曠古之慮。自其例出，而後天學明，人事利者也。而易則曰：乾其靜也專，其動也直。”⁹嚴復用西方天文學知識和公理論來重新規定中國傳統的“天”與“道”的觀念，這與康有爲思想的出發點相差不遠。

從此出發，嚴復重新解釋傳統天人關係，提出“人定勝天”的觀點，強調人的主觀能動性。他指出，中國與西方的天人觀的差異是“中國委天數，西人恃人力。”¹⁰他認爲，中西天人觀的原意本來是一致的，即明善復初或修身事帝。但中國傾向於天災人事各不相涉之事理，西人則以安生利用爲處理天人關係之極則。嚴復說：“夫中國以學爲明善復初，而西人以學爲修身事帝，意本同也。惟西人謂修身事帝，必將安生利用爲基，故凡遇中土早乾水溢，饑餓流亡，在吾人以爲天災流行，何關人事，而自彼而論，則事事皆

7 嚴復，《〈群學肄言〉按語·一》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁921。

8 嚴復，《論世變之亟》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁1。

9 嚴復，《天演論·自序》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1320。

10 嚴復，《論世變之亟》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁3。

我人謀之不臧，甚且謂吾罪當伐，而吾民之可吊，而我尚傲然弗屑也，可不謂大哀也哉！”¹¹ 他從中國傳統思想中找出“以法勝天”、“人定勝天”的觀點，積極主張以“恃人力”為基礎進行中國傳統社會的改革。

嚴復一方面推崇西學的有用性，但另一方面提出“修古而更新”，批評“中學必廢”的主張。嚴復認為，國粹與西學是相輔相成的關係，“西學不興，其（國粹）為存也隱；西學大興，其為存也章。蓋中學之真之發現，與西學之新之輸入，有比例為消長者焉。”¹² 根據這一想法，嚴復批判而改造傳統中西觀念中的“中體西用”、“西學中源”等觀點。中國近代思想史脈絡中，“中體西用”思想除了作為引進西用的理論外，也是防護加強中體的利器。“中體西用”論者都強調中體的不變性，至於在用的層面則可接受西方文化。當然這是意味著引進西方文化止於用的層面，而非在體的層面全面接受西方文化。對於這種典型的“中體西用”理論，嚴復並不同意。他認為中西學的差異，就“如其種人之面目然，不可強謂似也”，而且“一體”有“一用”，“中學有中學之體用，西學有西學之體用”，“分之則兩立”。至於“中體西用”論就好比“以牛為體，以馬為用”，“合之則兩亡”。

嚴復在《與〈外交報〉主人論教育書》裏引用江蘇無錫一位舉人袁可桴的話，對傳統體用觀進行辯駁。他說：

善夫金匱袁可桴孝廉之言曰：“體用者，即一物而言之也。有牛之體，則有負重之用；有馬之體，則有致遠之用。未聞以牛為體，以馬為用者也。中西學之為異也，如其種人之面目然，不可強謂似也。”故中學有中學之體用，西學有西學之體用，分之則並立，合之則兩亡。議者必欲合之而以為一物。且一體而一用之，斯其文義違舛，固已名之不可言矣，烏望言之而可行乎？¹³

他認為任何事物，都各自有“體”有“用”，不可分離，也不可強合。接著，他以“西政”與“西藝”的關係來說明體用關係：

其曰政本而藝末也，愈所謂顛倒錯亂者矣。且其所謂藝者，非指科學乎？名、數、質、力，四者皆科學也。其通理公例，經緯萬端，而西政之善者，即本斯而立。故赫胥黎氏有言：“西國之政，尚未能悉准科學而出之也。使其能之，其致治且不止此。”中國之政，所以日形其絀，不足爭存者，亦坐不本科學，而與通理公例違行故耳。是故以科學為藝，則西藝實西政之本。設謂藝非科學，則政藝二者，乃並出於科學，若左右手然，未聞左右之相為本末也。且西藝又何可來乎？無論天文地質之奧殫，略舉偏端，則醫藥通乎治功，農礦所以相養，下泊舟車兵冶，一一皆富強之實資，邇者中國亦嘗儀襲而取之矣，而其所以無效者，正坐為之政者，於其藝學一無所通，不通而欲執其本，此國財之所以糜，而民生之所以病也。¹⁴

¹¹ 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁49。

¹² 嚴復，《〈英文漢詁〉厄言》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁156。

¹³ 嚴復，《與〈外交報〉主人書》，《嚴復集》第三冊，頁558-559。

¹⁴ 嚴復，《與〈外交報〉主人書》，《嚴復集》第三冊，頁559。

嚴復的這種觀點，就傳統的“體用”觀念來說，的確有道理。因為他的“以牛爲體，以馬爲用”的說法包含著“文化有機體論”的色彩，如果從“文化有機體論”的觀點來考察“中體西用”論，則“中體西用”論確實不可能存在。因為一旦將文化視爲一個有機體，只要在用的範疇上接受西學，則中體也必然發生改變，不可能有體不變而用可變的狀況存在。傳統“中體西用”的意味，不是在強調西方的科學勝於中國的科學，而是在強調中國的道德比西方的科學有價值。而當西學被尋求作爲“用”時，並不能如“中體西用”理論原來所要求的去輔助中學，反而會驅逐中學。他以爲：中學被視爲體，乃是因爲它本身具有功用，當西學愈被接受爲生活與力量的實用工具時，儒學亦愈將喪失其作爲“體”的地位。

接著，嚴復批評“西學中源”說，認爲這是與事實不符合的虛構的想法。因此他明確指出，西學所說的“理”，“雖中國所舊有，而其學則中國所本無。”“中國所本無者，西學也，則西學爲當務之急明矣。”¹⁵ 中國所謂“學”，“自晚周秦漢以來，大經不離言詞文字而已。求其仰觀俯察，近取諸身，遠取諸物，如西人所謂學於自然者，不多遺也。”¹⁶ 那麼，成爲真正的“學”，該具備什麼條件呢？他對於“西學”與“學”的性質有一段精彩的說明：

夫西學辦人事耳，非鬼神之事也。既爲人事，則無論智愚之民，其日用常行，皆有以暗合道妙；其仰觀俯察，亦皆宜略見端倪。第不知即物窮理，則由之而不知其道；不求至乎其極，則知矣而不得其通。語焉不詳，擇焉不精，散見錯出，皆非成體之學而已矣。今夫學之爲言，探賾索隱，合異離同，道通爲一之事也。是故西人舉一端而號之曰“學”者，至不苟之事也。必其部居群分，層累枝葉，確乎可證，渙然大同，無一語遊移；無一事違反；藏之於心則成理，施之於事則爲術；首尾賅備，因應厘然，夫而後得謂之爲“學”。¹⁷

從“西學”的標準衡量“中學”的話，“中學”不能稱爲“學”，而“吾所有者，以彼法觀之，特閱歷知解積而存焉，如散錢，如委積。”

三、科學精神與科學方法

嚴復通過中西文化的研究比較，抓住了中西學術文化的差異。他認爲，中國傳統文化與西方近代文化是兩個不同的文化系統，中國若要擺脫面臨的危機，先查好西方精神的根本命脈所在，然後汲取有用的因素。他說：

¹⁵ 嚴復，《與梁啟超書·二》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁518。

¹⁶ 嚴復，《〈陽明先生集要三種〉序》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁237。

¹⁷ 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁52。

今之稱西人者，曰彼善會計而已，又曰彼擅機巧而已。不知吾今茲之所見所聞，如汽機兵械之倫，皆其形下之粗跡，即所謂天算格致之最精，亦其能事之見端，而非命脈之所在。其命脈云何？苟扼要而談，不外於學術則黜偽而崇真，於刑政則屈私以爲公而已。斯二者，與中國理道初無異也。顧彼行之而常通，吾行之而常病者，則自由不自由異耳。¹⁸

這裏所謂“真”正是公正的科學之“真”。嚴復認爲，“黜偽而崇真”、“屈私以爲公”的學術精神，在一個社會裏，學術與文化之通與不通的關鍵性觀念。但這種精神在社會上的暢通，除了其社會風氣之自由或不自由之外，¹⁹更重要的是科學精神在社會上的合理運用。有人主張，中國人把其智力主要集中在於“虛”方面的研究上，而西方人把其聰明主要運用在“實”方面的研究上，這就是中西學術文化不同的最關鍵的一點。但對於這種說法，嚴復堅決反對。他說：

或曰：中國之智慮運於虛，西洋之聰明寄於實，此其說不然。自不佞觀之，中國虛矣，彼西洋尤虛；西洋實矣，而中國尤實，異者不在虛實之間也。夫西洋之於學，自明以前，與中土亦相埒耳。至於晚近，言學則先物理而後文詞，重達用而薄藻飾。且其教子弟也，尤必使自竭其耳目，自致其心思，貴自得而賤因人，喜善疑而慎信古。其名數諸學，則藉以教致思窮理之術；其力質諸學，則假以導觀物察變之方，而其本事，則筌蹄之於魚兔而已矣。故赫胥黎曰：“讀書得智，是第二手事，唯能以宇宙爲我簡編，民物爲我文字者，斯真學耳。”此西洋教民要術也。而回觀中國則何如？夫朱子以即物窮理釋格物致知，是也；至以讀書窮理言之，風斯在下矣。²⁰

嚴復特別強調“物理”與“達用”的重要性，以及教學上“自得”與“善疑”、“窮理”與“觀察”的重要功用。依此看，嚴復對西方近代學術的命脈，以及中國傳統文化的要害把握得極爲明確。因此他頗爲肯定以“黜偽而崇真”爲“命脈”的西方“格致之學”在社會文化的發展和改革途徑中具有的先導性。嚴復在不少地方強調格致之學的優先地位，指出：“格致之學不先，偏僻之情未去，束教拘虛，生心害政，固無往而不誤人家國者也。”²¹西方格致之學，“非迂塗也，一言救亡，則將舍是而不可。”“富強之基，本諸格致。不本格致，將無所往而不荒虛。”²²格致之學的這種優先性，不僅僅從“器”的層次上說的，格致之學已經提升爲“道”的層次，能決定社會的安危和改革的方向。這表明“科學”之範圍已經由自然科學擴展到社會科學的領域，但總體上來說，嚴復的思想中自然科學仍然具有更爲本源的意義。

¹⁸ 嚴復，《論世變之亟》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁2。

¹⁹ 嚴復從中國與西方“自由”觀念的差異說明中西學術、文化、風氣之不同。嚴復，《論世變之亟》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁3。

²⁰ 嚴復，《原強修訂稿》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁29。

²¹ 嚴復，《原強》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁6。

²² 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁46。

對嚴復來說，格致之學的優先性，主要通過內含於其中的方法論原則而得到體現。可以說，在同時代的人物當中，嚴復最先系統地闡明了科學方法論，最早接觸到西方科學的本質。從而使近代中國思想界對科學技術的認識，不再僅僅與堅船利炮和洋務實業等“器物”相聯繫，而且開始涉及到人們以何種方式來把握必然之理與因果關係。這種科學方法論融進近代中國人的思想中，促進了中國思想的理性化進程。嚴復分析近代科學昌盛、近代西方社會富強的根源時，特別推崇培根方法論的意義。他指出：“二百年學運昌明，則又不得不以柏庚（培根）氏之摧陷廓清之功為稱首。學問之士，倡其新理，事功之士，竊之為術，而大有功焉。”²³ 培根曾撰《新工具》，書中他對思辨的、獨斷的思維方式進行激烈批評。他批評傳統思辨的、獨斷的思維方式時立論的根據是經驗論方法。培根所倡導的經驗論方法，在嚴復看來，就是近代格致之學的根基。

嚴復將培根視為近代科學方法論的奠基者，但從近代科學方法的演變看，有值得注意之點。伽利略在培根以前已對近代科學的方法作了較為系統的論述，而這種論述又在相當程度上表現為對伽利略自己及其同時代人科學研究過程的總結和概括，他對實驗、演繹系統、以及理想化方法的重視，已涉及了近代科學方法本質的方面。相形之下，培根則首先是一位哲學家，他對科學方法的闡釋，往往以其經驗論為出發點，其方法論主要表現為一種哲學的概括。在近代科學史上，對科學研究方法產生更直接制約作用的，是伽利略。相對於伽利略對科學家共同體的切實影響，培根的工作更多地表現為哲學的啟蒙。以此為背景考察嚴復對培根作用的評價，顯然頗有意味。當嚴復將培根視為近代科學昌明的源頭時，他所涉及和關注的，與其說是科學發展的內在之緣，不如說是科學的社會啟蒙意義。

嚴復認為，擺脫當今中國面臨的總體危機，而進入到富強的道路，首先要將中國的思想與文化從傳統形而上學與玄學的束縛中盡快解放出來。並且運用科學方法和經驗知識，一方面進行中國傳統思想近代化，另一方面服膺於社會現實的要求。他頗為重視經驗知識在中國社會發展與改革進程中的重要作用，因此，他積極肯定經驗知識的正確性及其有效性，為科學方法的提倡和確立奠定了前提。嚴復反對不顧事實，單憑虛設進行議論的學風，認為光靠主觀臆想產生不了近代科學，“牽涉傳會，強物性之自然，以就吾心之臆造，此所以為言理之大藪，而吾國數千年格物窮理之學，所以無可言也。”²⁴ 不對事實考察、檢驗和證實，將於事無補。因此，嚴復對傳統主觀主義的認識論進行經驗論的批判，實際上對於所謂的“古文詞”、“古今體”、“碑版篆隸”、“漢學考據”等“無用”之學的抨擊。他認為中國傳統學術在科舉取士制度的限制內一直堅持尊孔讀經，重視倫理道德和性理的研究，

23 嚴復，《原強修訂稿》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁29。

24 嚴復，《孫譯〈化學導源〉序》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁290。

這不適合於中國“救弱救貧”的目標。所謂的修身養性、空談性理“以佐國家化民成俗”之說實際上是“無實”的學說。²⁵他接著說：

在學術上，中國人“師心自用”的習慣，幾千年來已經成為輕視“印證”、排斥“考證”的一種“心習”，這所謂“中國人士，經三千年之文教，其心習之成至多，習矣而未嘗一考其理之誠妄。”²⁶

因此，嚴復提出改變傳統“心習”，培養“尚實心習”的主張。

自不佞言，氣質困難變也，亦變其心習而已。欲變吾人心習，則一事最宜勤治：物理科學是已。……一切物理科學，使教之學之得其術，則人人尚實心習成矣。烏呼？使神州黃人而但尚實，則其種之榮華，其國之盛大，雖聚五洲之壓力以沮吾之進步，亦不能矣。……惟此一學，可轉變吾人之心習，而挽救吾數千年學界之流弊者，非妄語矣。夫物理科學，其於開濬心靈，有陶煉特別心能之功既如此，而於增廣知識，其關於衛生保種，大進實業又如彼。²⁷

嚴復頗為重視“心習”對社會環境、學術風土的負面影響。他在介紹科學的基本精神和本質的同時，強調科學具有改變這種“心習”的能力。上面所指的“物理科學”包括數學、邏輯、物理、化學、動植、天文、地質、生理、心理等學科。在這裏面，既有抽象科學，又有具體科學；既有自然科學，又有社會科學。它們都注重事實，並把觀察、實驗、比較等列為主要方法。嚴復看來“物理科學”，“不獨於吾國為變化士民心習所不可無，抑且為富強本計所必需”。²⁸他認為，“故中國此後教育，在在宜著意科學，使學者之心慮沈潛，浸漬於因果實證之間，庶他日學成，有療病起弱之實力，能破舊學之拘攣，而其干圖新也審，則真中國之幸福矣！”²⁹嚴復希望通過西方近代科學方法的嚴格訓練，中國人能夠漸漸培養起“崇真”、“尚實”的科學精神，“得其增益智慧、變化心習之大果”，³⁰則中國就大有希望。由尚虛走向尚實的這種心習的改變，與民族的發展、國家的強盛聯繫在一起，作為救亡圖強的思想觀念層面的前提，獲得了超越實證研究的普遍意義。

嚴復對科學精神的如上推崇，如果不與近代的科學方法聯繫在一起，他所期待的學術上、社會上的改革，很可能無可指望了。因此，他從傳統格致思想的改造開始確立近代意義的方法論。眾所周知，在中國傳統“格物致知”論中，“物”的範圍，即“格”的對象，主要指的是讀書、考據等聖人之言行之範圍內的東西。“蓋吾國所謂學，自晚周秦漢以來，大經不離言詞文字而

²⁵ 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁43-44。

²⁶ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·三三》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1050。

²⁷ 嚴復，《論今日教育應以物理科學為當務之急》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁282，284。

²⁸ 嚴復，《論今日教育應以物理科學為當務之急》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁283。

²⁹ 嚴復，《與〈外交報〉主人書》，《嚴復集》第三冊，頁565。

³⁰ 嚴復，《論今日教育應以物理科學為當務之急》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁283。

已。求其仰觀俯察，近取諸身，遠取諸物，如西人所謂學於自然者，不多違也。”³¹ 嚴復認為，在西方也存在過把書本和聖人之言作為獲取知識的傾向，但近代思想家很快發現這種知識的局限性，因此號召人們從書本走向自然，讀無字之書。嚴復同意這些看法，因此他引用培根和赫胥黎的話批評中國以書本為知識對象的傳統求知方法：

吾人為學窮理，志求登峰造極，第一要知讀無字之書。培根言：“凡其事其物為兩間之所有者，其理即為學者之所宜窮。所以無大小，無貴賤，無穢淨，知窮其理，皆資妙道。”此佛所謂牆壁瓦礫，皆說無上乘法也。赫胥黎言：“能觀物觀心者，讀大地原本書；徒向書冊記載中求者，為讀第二手書矣。”讀第二手書者，不獨因人作計，終當後人；且人心見解不同，常常有誤，而我信之，從而誤矣，此格物家所最忌者。而政治道德家，因不自用心而為古人所蒙，經顛倒拂亂而後悟者，不知凡幾。³²

這裏很明確，以書本為知識來源的做法，不僅不能獲得可靠有用的知識，而且由於書本主觀性太強，可能容易導致謬誤。接著，嚴復解釋“學於自然”的意思：

善為學者……學於言詞文字，以收前人之所已得者矣，乃學於自然。自然何？內之身心，外之事變，精察微驗，而所得或超於向者言詞文字外也。則思想日精，而人群相為生養之樂利，乃由吾之新知而益備焉。此天演之所以進化，而世所以無退轉之文明也。知者，人心之所同具也；理者，必物對待而後形焉者也。是故吾心之所覺，必證諸物之見象，而後得其符。³³

“學”或“知識”的目的，就在於把握“自然公例”上面。嚴復以為，“夫科學者，舉凡宇宙之所有，與人心之所得思，莫不標之以為學。”³⁴；“凡學必有其因果公例，可以數往知來者，乃稱科學。”³⁵；“科學所明者公例，公例必無時而不誠。”³⁶ 這三句話，充分表明科學與公例之關係以及科學研究的新對象。

“公例”（或“公理”），具有普遍性，只要不是臆造的，則依據它判斷事物，應該可以得出正確的結論。對“公例”的追求，是人類在學術文化發展的道路上進行的最高任務。如果人欲有所知，必有賴於“公例”的確立，否則“不知會通、心無公例”，³⁷ 人的存在與禽獸沒有差別。那麼，如何得出“公

31 嚴復，《〈陽明先生集要三種〉序》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁237。

32 嚴復，《西學門徑功用》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁93。

33 嚴復，《〈陽明先生集要三種〉序》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁238。

34 嚴復，《〈普通百科新大詞典〉序》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁277。

35 嚴復，《〈群學肄言〉譯餘贅語》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁125。

36 嚴復，《譯斯氏〈計學〉例言》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁100。

37 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·二十四》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1045。

例”，確立“公例”呢？這不能單憑一時的感悟便能做到，必須運用“內籀之術”，因為“公例無往不由內籀”，³⁸惟有運用“內籀”才有可能求得“公例”。科學直接“以物觀物”，任何“公例”的確立，都產生於“觀物”之後。而哲學則難免“以我觀物”，所謂“以我觀物”，是指在“觀物”之前，“先大心先擴目”，也就是說預先確立一個視角，以之作爲觀察分析事物的方法論原則。就求事物之“故”（所以然）而論，“科哲諸學皆事此者”，³⁹哲學不同於科學，不在於哲學不求事物之“故”，而在於哲學所求之物之“故”，較之科學所求之物之“故”，層次更高更抽象。因為科學所確立的“公例”，只是對一類事物之所以然的概括，而“哲學謂之提挈歸公之物德”，⁴⁰它所確立的“理”，是對各類事物的本質的會通，揭示了事物所以存在的普遍根據。

原書：“何謂自然公例？曰自然公例者，最易最簡之法門，得此而宇宙萬化相隨發現者也。或爲之稍變其詞曰：自然公例非他，乃極少數之公論，得此而一切世界之常然，皆可執外籀而推知之”。
復按：此段所指之自然公例，即道家所謂道，儒先所謂理，《易》之太極，釋子所謂不二法門；必居於最易最簡之數，乃足當之。後段所言，即《老子》爲道日損，《大易》稱易知簡能，道通爲一者也。⁴¹

“內籀之術”，簡單來講，也就是確立“公例”的方法，“內籀者，觀化察變，見其會通，是爲公例者也。”⁴²“公例”的確立，按照嚴復的解釋，以類別事物開始，而以會通事物結束，表現爲由分析到歸納的過程。他說：

始於能析，能析則知其分，知其分則全無所類者，曲有所類。此猶化學之分物質而列之原行也，曲而得類，而後有以行其會通，或取大同而遺其小異，常、寓之德既判，而公例立矣。⁴³

嚴復特別重視“實測”（觀察）與“內籀”（歸納）方法的互相結合。所謂實測內籀，也就是在即物實測（觀察與實驗）的基礎上，通過內籀（歸納）概括出一般的公例（科學定律及一般原理），最後又將公例放到實驗過程中加以驗證，使之成爲定理。這表明一切科學的認識都必須經歷由具體到一般的歸納過程，一切公例（公理）都必須以經驗的觀察、實驗和印證爲基礎。嚴復還指出，實測內籀法既可用於自然科學研究，也可用於社會科學研究，如他在《政治講義》中論述了用科學方法研究政治學，抽取所謂的“政治之公例”和“國家之真理”。他指出：“吾將取古今歷史所有之邦國，爲之類別而區

³⁸ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·二十四》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1045。

³⁹ 嚴復，《〈老子〉評語·十四章》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1081。

⁴⁰ 嚴復，《〈老子〉評語·十章》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1079。

⁴¹ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·三十六》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1051。

⁴² 嚴復，《譯斯氏〈計學〉例言》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁98。

⁴³ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·二十五》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1046。

分；吾將察其政府之機關，而各著其功用；吾將觀其演進之階級，而考其治亂盛衰之所由；最後，吾乃觀其會通，而籀為政治之公例。諸公視此，吾黨豈有絲毫之成心，惟祛其成心，故國家之真理可以見。”⁴⁴

嚴復頗為重視在確立“公例”過程中歸納方法之有效性和優先性，但這不意味著排斥或貶低演繹方法（外籀）之作用。“外籀”一方面是仿照“公例”判斷（類別）事物的方法，更主要的是依據公理推論未知的方法。嚴復以為歸納方法和演繹方法都是認識事物過程中的重要思維方法，“及觀西人名學，則見其於格物致知之事，有內籀之術焉，有外籀之術焉。內籀云者，察其曲而知其全者也，執其微以會其通者也。外籀云者，據公理以斷衆事者也，設定數以逆未然者也。……二者即物窮理之最要塗術也。”⁴⁵因此內籀、外籀之術“相為表裏，絕非二途。”⁴⁶這充分說明嚴復不但不贊成絕對地割裂歸納、演繹方法，而且主張將兩種方法並用。但是，由於堅持自己的經驗論立場，他更看重歸納方法的作用。這與嚴復留學英國而崇尚培根、穆勒的歸納方法，以及其科學理念中批判中國傳統學術的“黜偽”內容不無關係。

當嚴復反觀中國傳統思維方法時，認為中國傳統思維方法存在很大的缺陷，特別不滿當時尚有重大影響的程朱理學和陸王心學主觀臆測的弊端。中國哲學方法的短處，亦不在於不重視演繹，或演繹法不得當，而在於其推論“所本者大抵心成之說，持之似有故，言之似有理”，然“立根於臆造，而非實測之所會通”。此吾國“舊學之所以多無補。”⁴⁷他說：

舊學之所以多無補者，其外籀非不為也，為之又未嘗不如法也，第其所本者大抵心成之說，持之似有故，言之似成理，婁姝者以古訓而嚴之，初何嘗取其公例而一考其所推概者之誠妄乎？此學術之所以多誣，而國計民生之所以病也。……無他，其例之立根於臆造，而非實測之所會通故也。⁴⁸

嚴復批評中國舊學中存在著“心成之說”和“立根於臆造”的弊病，一再強調演繹推理所依據的前提、公例必須先通過實測會通（概括）而成，所以，他不贊同純粹的演繹方法。在《名學淺說》中，嚴復再次說到：“吾國向來為學，偏於外籀，而內籀能事極微，……故曰：生今為學，內籀之術，乃更重也。”⁴⁹

嚴復還極力強調科學的實驗方法，認為實驗是科學發展的基礎，是“印證”科學認識的標準。他在分析古代和近代科學認識成效之所以不同時，指

⁴⁴ 嚴復，《政治講義》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1248。

⁴⁵ 嚴復，《〈天演論〉按語》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1319-1320。

⁴⁶ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·三十四》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1050。

⁴⁷ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·二十七》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1047。

⁴⁸ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·二十七》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1047。

⁴⁹ 耶方斯，《論內籀術》，《名學淺說》，頁57。

出了實驗印證的重要性。他說：“古人所標之例，所以見破後人者，正坐闕於印證之故。而三百年來科學公例，所由在在見極不可復搖者，非必理想之過古與人也，亦嚴於印證之故也。”⁵⁰這裏，他十分強調科學之所以成其為科學，就在於它得到了實驗事實的印證。而且認為只有通過反復多次的“試驗”“印證”，才可能得到正確的科學認識。他說：“試驗愈固，理愈堅確。”⁵¹不僅如此，在嚴復看來，實驗事實還是保證歸納法和演繹法得以正確運用的根本條件，從而也是拓展認識領域及獲取對自然的新知識的根本保證。

嚴復對中國學術的貢獻極大，他以為中國貧弱的原因，乃是由於科學不發達，因此嚴復乃注重科學方法和科學的訓練。嚴復是第一位自覺地介紹英國經驗論方法者。他說：“有用之效，微之富強，富強之基，本諸格致。不本格致，將所無往而不虛荒。”⁵²所謂格致，並非程朱之格物致知，而是作為科學方法的格致之意。依嚴復說，這則又特指培根所發展出來的經驗論和歸納法。二法相配合，則：“西學格致，……一理之明、一法之立，必驗之物物事事而皆然，而後定之為不易。”⁵³他要求不要迷信前人的定論，不要靠主觀臆想虛造，以科學態度研究社會歷史，研究自然科學。嚴復介紹經驗主義和科學方法，重視實驗與公理，排斥良知和成見。這種學問態度是從他對西學至為深刻的感受中得來的。這與其他維新派人物相比，顯然是頗為難得的全面和深刻的科學認識。並且他從方法與理論的層次上研究科學，表明他已經完全擺脫了洋務時期的器物科學觀。

四、本體論與“會通為一”

嚴復是在近代中國系統輸入西方科學思想與社會學說的第一人，從十九世紀末戊戌變法時起到二十世紀初，對西方科學思想傳入中國起過關鍵的作用，影響了近代中國思想文化發展的進程。他對科學方法的推崇一直延續到晚年，這在關注“不可知”的問題與宗教的理解上也表現出來。

嚴復認為“氣”作為“物”之本原，但這一事實只解決了“物”之本質是什麼這一問題，並未解決“氣”自身的本質是什麼？他首先把事物內在結構規定為“質”與“力”的對立統一之後，對於“力質本體”的特徵有所描述：

世界一切六如，變幻起滅，獨有一物，不增不減，不生不滅，以其長存，故稱自在。此在西文謂之Persistence，或曰Eternity，或曰Conservation，力質本體，恒住真因，乃有此德。⁵⁴

⁵⁰ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·二十七》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1047。

⁵¹ 嚴復，《西學門徑功用》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁94。

⁵² 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁43。

⁵³ 嚴復，《救亡決論》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁45。

但是，這種描述，只能看作他對於宇宙終極本體的一種合乎邏輯的理論把握，而不應視為他對於宇宙終極本體是否存在的說明。實際上，對於宇宙終極本體是否存在這個問題，嚴復從未作過明確的肯定或否定的回答。他只是一再強調：“大抵宇宙究竟，與其元始，同於不可思議。”則對“萬物本體”這個問題，人們不必再追問下去，因為“不可思議云者，謂不可名理論證也”，⁵⁵ 它不可能通過名理形式追究清楚。為什麼？他論證道：宇宙究極本體既然意味著“無對待”，那麼從認識的作用只能發現“對待之理”，⁵⁶ 認識的有效性只能“盡於對待之域”來講，理性認識“於無對待不可思議耳。”⁵⁷ “形氣之物，無非對待。非對待，則不可思議。”⁵⁸

就本體論的意義而言，對待之物主要與經驗界相聯繫，而無對者則是一種超驗的對象，這樣，對待與無對的分界，便表現為經驗界與超驗界的對峙：經驗界是可知的（可以思議的）領域，超驗界則超出了人的認識能力（不可思議）。不過，與邏輯實證主義強調形而上學命題無意義，因而主張拒斥形而上學不同，嚴復以為，超經驗的無對之域雖然不可思議，但並非沒有意義。他將本體論上的不可知論作為普遍的方法論來強調，認為它也是處理一切幽冥難明之事，必須堅持運用的基本原則：“人生閱歷，實有許多不可純以科學通者，更不取將幽冥之端，一概抹殺。迷信者言其必如是，固差，不迷信者言其必不如是，亦無證據。故哲學大師，如赫胥黎、斯賓塞諸公，皆於此事謂之Unknowable，而自稱為Agnostic。蓋人生智識，至此而窮，不得不置其事於不論不議之列，而各行心之所安而已。”⁵⁹ 這一態度嚴復在解釋對赫胥黎和斯賓塞的觀點時更為明確。他雖然同意赫胥黎、斯賓塞對不可知的定義，但在其重要性和方法論的意義上，不同於兩人。赫胥黎創造“不可知論”（Agnosticism）一詞，用於指稱那些鄙棄傳統的基督教有神論但同時又宣稱不相信無神論，即超越有神論和無神論，將諸如有無上帝之類的問題置於不論不議之列。⁶⁰ 斯賓塞在某種程度上說與赫胥黎一樣，也是一位不可知論者。但與赫胥黎不同，他肯定世上一切複雜、異種、有組織的事物皆來自“不可知”，“不可知”是科學與宗教之源。但對不可知的終極實在，人類沒有能力進行推理或說明。因此，斯賓塞就果斷地把注意力轉到“可知”的王國了。然而，對嚴復來說，斯賓塞的“不可知”則是釋迦牟尼的涅槃、吠檀多不二論的婆羅門、甚或程朱理學的“理”（“總天地萬物之理”），這些都是

54 嚴復，《譯〈群己權界論〉自序》，《嚴復集》第一冊，頁133。

55 嚴復，《天演論·論一·能實》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1360。

56 嚴復說過“論理者，以對待而後形者也。”嚴復，《〈陽明先生集要三種〉序》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁238。

57 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1036。

58 嚴復，《〈老子〉評語·二章》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1076。

59 嚴復，《與諸兒書·三》，《嚴復集》第三冊，頁825。

60 馮友蘭，《從赫胥黎到嚴復》，《三松堂全集》第十二卷，頁604。

基本上同樣性質的。嚴復說：“世人不知，以謂佛道若究竟滅絕空無，則亦有無足慕。而智者則知，由無常以入長存，由煩惱而歸極樂。”⁶¹ 嚴復認為“不可思議”的觀念會產生終極安逸與安慰的心情。嚴復樂觀地認為“思議”與“不可思議”之間的衝突是可以解決的。他相信針對科學與宗教，人們不必“總著一邊”，而可以做出“平衡判斷”。

嚴復是用“不可思議”來表徵不可知的。在嚴復在《天演論·佛法》案語中，對“不可思議”解釋說：

談理見極時，乃必至不可思議之一境，既不可謂謬，而理又難知，此則真佛書所謂“不可思議”。……佛所稱涅槃，即其不可思議之一。他如理學中不可思議之理，亦多有之。如天地元始，造化真宰，萬物本體是已。至於物理之不可思議，則如字如宙。……他如萬物質點、動靜真殊、力之本始、神思起訖之倫，雖在聖智，皆不能言，此皆真實不可思議者……。涅槃可指之義如此。第其所以稱“不可思議”者，非必謂其理之幽渺難知也。其不可思議，即在寂不真寂，滅不真滅二語。世界何物，乃為非有非非有耶？譬之有人，真死矣，而不可謂死，此非天下之違反，而至難著思者耶！故曰“不可思議”也。此不徒佛道為然，理見極時，莫不如是。蓋天下事理，如木之分條，水之分派，求解則追溯本源。故理之可解者，在通眾異為一同，更進則此所謂同，又成為異，而與他異通於大同。當其可通，皆為可解。如是漸進，至於諸理會歸最上之一理，孤立無對，既無不冒，自無與通。無與通則不可解，不可解者，不可思議也。⁶²

嚴復所了解的“不可思議”即“不可解”，這好像與哲學中作為形而上學對象的觀念或問題頗為相近。嚴復在評點《老子》的時候也是用“不可思議”來形容“道”的存在。⁶³ 嚴復認為，人們在“不可思議”中為人生的痛苦尋找安慰，盡管外在世界在進化，“不可知”仍然是人類生老病死等種種憂患中，心靈上的唯一寄托。這一觀點，與嚴復對待宗教與神秘主義的態度，基本上一致的。他對“神秘主義”的觀點不是盲目性的、迷信性的，而是根據科學立場的。1918年3月，嚴復讀完《靈學叢志》中的一些部分之後寫給侯毅的信中指出：

每有極異之事，庸愚人轉目為固然，口耳相傳，亦不問證據之充分與否，此最誤事。故治靈學，必與經過科學教育，於此等事極不輕信者為之，乃有進步。復生平未聞一鬼、未遇一狐，不但按神志怪，一以謬悠視之。即有先輩所談，亦反復於心，以為難信。於《叢志》鬼神諸論，什九能為駁議，惟於事實，則瞠視舉舌，不能復置喙耳。⁶⁴

這說明他仍然重視證據、講究客觀對象和事實的。拿不出證據就不信；有證據，而不能知其所以然，則主張繼續探討研究，而不能視為當

61 嚴復，《天演論·論十·佛法》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1380。

62 嚴復，《天演論·論十·佛法》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1380—1381。

63 嚴復，《〈老子〉評語·一章》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1075。

64 嚴復，《與侯毅書·二》，《嚴復集》第三冊，頁722—723。

然。人們探討、研究對象時，必須遵循科學原理，以科學方法求之。從此看到，嚴復的觀點與科學不矛盾，相反，正說明嚴復對鬼神志怪之類，即通常所說的“迷信”持反對態度，而對於當時西方流行的“靈學”，則持極為謹慎的態度，希望通過“科學”的方法，由受過“科學教育”的人來加以研究。

嚴復曾有信給《靈學叢志》主辦人之一俞復，在討論同樣的問題時說：

神秘一事，是自有人類未行解決問題。往者宗教興盛，常俗視聽，以為固然。然而誕妄迷信，亦與俱深，惑世誣民，遂為詬病。三百年科學肇開，事嚴佐證；又知主觀多妄，耳目難憑；由是歷史所傳都歸神話。則摧陷廓清之功，不可誣也。然而世間之大，現象之多，實有發生非科學公例所能作解者。何得以不合吾例，攔然遂指為虛？此數十年來神秘所以漸成專科。而研討之人，皆於科哲至深。觀察精密之士，大抵以三條發問：一、大力常住，則一切動法，力為之先；今則見動不知力主。二、光浪發生，恆由化合；今則神光煥發，不識由來。三、聲浪由於震顫；今則但有聲浪，而不知顫者為何。凡此皆以問諸科學者也。其他則事見於遠，同時可知；變起後來，預言先決，以問哲學心理之家。年來著作孔多，而明白解決，尚所未見。⁶⁵

這裏借用的科學理論雖然是膚淺的，但嚴復處理“神秘”問題的態度是極為科學的。早期的嚴復是篤守理性之分際的，於六合之外，主張存而不論。他以為：“問上帝有無，實問宇宙第一原因。……雖不設，可也”。又謂天地元始、造化主宰、萬物本體、佛說涅槃等等，均不可思議，“雖在聖智，皆不能言。”⁶⁶嚴復在一些地方的論述中似乎不再是不可知論，積極地主張“此事研究，為人人所贊成”。但事實上其基本態度並沒有改變。他仍然相信理性與科學具有其限度，不能以其不合乎科學公例，即遽指其為虛妄。反之，也不能在尚未證明其為實事或尚不能解說其理由之前，即貿然迷信之。科學與理性之功，一在摧破此等迷信，一則在以更嚴密的方法、更理性的態度，探問其奧秘。嚴復在晚年談到有關科學、迷信等問題時，既強調科學“摧陷廓清”的功績，也強調人類在很多方面都還存在著未知的領域，對於這些未知的領域，不能自命為“科學”而輕率斥人為“迷信”，而應進行客觀的研究、平衡的判斷，慎重地對待這一方面的問題。

這種想法很可能與他的學問宗旨有密切關係。嚴復雖然反對憑空推理，重視經驗主義立場，但他並不拒絕宋明理學“會通為一”的想法。他用“道通為一”的概念來表達經驗知識的“名言之域”可以與超越經驗的“超名言之域”會通為一，而其關係有如枝與幹、流與源。他指出：

窮理致知之事，其公例皆會通之詞，無專指者。惟其所會通愈廣，則其例亦愈尊。理如水木然，由條尋枝，循枝赴幹，彙歸流派，萃於一源；至於一源，大道乃見。道通為一，此之謂也。⁶⁷

65 嚴復，《與俞復書》，《嚴復集》第三冊，頁725。

66 嚴復，《天演論·論十·佛法》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1381。

67 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語》，《嚴復集》第四冊，頁1042。

格物窮理之事，必道通爲一，而後有以包括群言。故雖枝葉扶疏，派流糾繚，而循條討本，則未有不歸於一極者。⁶⁸

嚴復的“會通爲一”的想法直接影響到他對學術與宗教之間的關係的把握。嚴復在《讀經當積極提倡》一文中，對科學亦有積極評價：“今日科學，自是以誠成物之事，吾國欲求進步，固屬不可拋荒”，⁶⁹科學是中國進步所不可缺少的。然而，這種“學”，“發端於不可知可知之分”，⁷⁰昨日之“迷信”成爲今天之“科學”，而今天之“科學”，在明日很可能變爲“迷信”。不可知的領域隨著科學的進步而縮小，科學的地盤隨著不可知領域的揭密而擴大。嚴復說：

蓋社會之有宗教，即緣世間有物，必非智慮所得通，故夫天演日進無疆，生人智慮所通，其範圍誠以日廣，即以日廣之故，而悟所不可知者之彌多，是以西哲嘗云：“宗教起點，即在科學盡處。”而斯賓塞爾亦云：“宗教主體在知識範圍之外。”此孔門性與天道所以不可得聞，而子入太廟之所以每事問，而世間一切宗教，無分垢淨，其權威皆從信起，不由知入；設從知入，即無宗教。然則所謂“可使由，而不可使知”，民之於宗教也又如此。⁷¹

又說：

宗教、學術二者必相衝突。雖然，學術日隆，所必日消者特迷信耳，而真宗教則儼然不動。然宗教必與人道相終始者也。蓋學術任何進步，而世間必有不可知者存。不可知長存，則宗教終不廢。學術之所以窮，即宗教之所由起，宗教可以日玄而無由廢。⁷²

這樣一來，嚴復展示了自己整個思想的一個中心宗旨，即以理性原則會通科學和其它領域之知識，亦即將“思議”與“不可思議”整合爲一。然而他的不可知論觀點以經驗主義、實證主義爲基礎的，因此他對經驗的合理性和可能性沒有妥當的解決之前，這種觀點有可能隨時受到其他理論的攻擊。

嚴復是最早將科學作爲一種價值體系來接受的中國人。他經過中西學對比，認爲西學“於學術則黜僞而崇真，於刑政則屈私以爲公而已”，從而美國學者郭穎頤在《中國現代思想中的唯科學主義》一文中，肯定爲正是嚴復“奠定了新時代思想家們把現代科學作爲一種價值體系而接受的基礎”。嚴復的思想雖然包含著不可知論的傾向，但他在晚清對中國科學主義產生的推動力則是不容忽視的，而且還久遠地發生著影響。他翻譯赫胥黎《天演論》和宣揚社會達爾文主義，從內容上爲科學主義的產生奠定了重要基礎。

⁶⁸ 嚴復，《〈原富〉按語·四十二》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁875。

⁶⁹ 嚴復，《讀經當積極提倡》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁331。

⁷⁰ 嚴復，《〈穆勒名學〉按語·十二》，《嚴復集》第五冊，頁1036。

⁷¹ 嚴復，《“民可使由之不可使知之”講義》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁327—328。

⁷² 嚴復，《天演進化論》，《嚴復集》第二冊，頁319。

五、結論

嚴復認為面對民族存亡之危機，人的自覺是最重要的，但中國傳統思想中的一些觀念始終困擾著人們的整個思想和意識，如果不改變這種觀念，就不能營救中華民族和國家的未來。所以他首先要把中國的思想與文化從傳統形而上學與玄學的束縛中盡快解放出來，並且運用科學方法和經驗知識，一方面進行中國傳統思想近代化，另一方面服膺於社會現實的要求。他頗為重視經驗知識在中國社會發展與改革進程中的重要作用，因此，他積極肯定經驗知識的正確性及其有效性，為科學方法的提倡和確立奠定了前提。

從這一立場出發，嚴復首先向傳統“天道”觀念進行新的解釋。他通過傳統天道觀念的重釋，建造以西方科學為基礎的本體論思想，而且以理性原則會通科學和其它領域之知識。

嚴復的“天”是“自然而然”的天，但他所謂“自然而然”的含義是模糊的、多重的。所以他設定兩種天道、人道關係。首先，他根據“天演之道”，主張“任天為治”，這樣天道和人道是貫通的。但另一方面，他主張“以人持天”，這樣，天道和人道是對立的。任天為治，是要肯定進化法則的普遍性，以此提醒中國人直面看清民族危機；而以人持天則要強調人治之功，是要肯定人類道德的重要性，以此給中國以救亡和民族復興的希望。

■ 投稿日：2017.05.01 / 審查日：2017.05.16-2017.06.21 / 刊載決定日：2017.07.14

參考文獻

- 馮友蘭,《三松堂全集》,鄭州:河南人民出版社,2000。
- 郭穎頤,《中國現代思想中的唯科學主義(1900-1950)》,雷頤譯,江蘇:江蘇人民出版社,2005。
- 李約瑟,《中國古代科學》,李彥譯,上海:上海書店出版社,2001。
- 王中江,《進化主義在中國》,北京:首都師範大學出版社,2002。
- 嚴復,《嚴復集》,王栻主編,北京:中華書局,1986。
- 耶方斯,《名學淺說》,嚴復譯,上海:商務印書館,1959。

Yan Fu's Scientific Thought and Mutual Understanding

HAN Sung Gu

Abstract

Yan Fu is a famous enlightenment thinker of modern China. Being ahead of his time, Yan studied Western science to find the truth. He emphasized science and advocated the development of scientific thought. At the same time, he had a unique view on the relationship between science and philosophy. His thought came mainly from the West, but he also possessed a deep understanding of Chinese traditional ideas.

In the crisis of the destruction of the nation, Yan Fu emphasized the self-consciousness. However, some of the traditional Chinese ideas were closely associated with the collective consciousness of the Chinese people. He held that if these ideas are not changed the future of the Chinese people would be bleak. Therefore, he suggested that Chinese ideology and culture should be liberated from the bondage of traditional metaphysics. He also urged that Chinese people should modernize their traditional thought and respond to social demands by using scientific method and experiential knowledge.

Yan Fu is the first Chinese to accept science as a value system. He translated Thomas Henry Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* (*Tianyan lun* 天演論) and promoted the theory of social evolution (*shehui jinhua lun* 社會進化論). Through this work, he provided the theoretical basis for the emergence of "scientism." He promoted mutual understanding of scientific knowledge and the knowledge of other disciplines, and pursued compatibility of the "comprehensible" (*siyi* 思議) and the "incomprehensible" (*buke siyi* 不可思議). Although his thought contained an element of agnosticism (*bukezhi lun* 不可知論), he exerted a great influence on the birth of Chinese Scientism in the late Qing dynasty.

Keywords: scientism, ontology, evolution and ethics, incomprehensible, metaphysics, mutual understanding

從“回到康有爲”到“回到牟宗三” ——“大陸新儒家”政治儒學之反思

文碧方·李想

中文提要

二十一世紀以來，當代中國哲學界出現了一股解構啟蒙、否定現代價值的思潮，以蔣慶、陳明爲主角的“大陸新儒家”即是這方面的代表。蔣慶認爲，民主、自由等現代性價值是劣質的普世價值，中國的王道政治則爲優質的普世價值，故提出了一套他所認定的儒家王道政治的構想。“大陸新儒家”最近幾年的口號是“回到康有爲”，陳明認爲，必須超越革命敘事和啟蒙規劃，回到康有爲國家建構與國族建構的問題、思路和立場上來，現代國家建構與國族建構優先於任何現代性價值，必須放在價值排序的首位。較之於當代“大陸新儒家”，“當代新儒家”則更能接受科學、民主等現代價值，牟宗三所提出的“良知坎陷說”，是基於其對中西文化的深刻理解所作的順暢中國文化生命的工作，絕非“大陸新儒家”所批評的一味接受西方的價值、無視中國的傳統文化。因此，與其“回到康有爲”，罔顧現代性價值，則莫若“回到牟宗三”來理解和消化他的成果。

關鍵詞：蔣慶，陳明，“政治儒學”，牟宗三，“良知坎陷”

* 文碧方：武漢大學哲學學院教授、中國哲學教研室主任(wbfwd@163.com)

李 想：武漢大學哲學學院2016級國學專業博士研究生(bzxh1990@163.com)

一、引言

一百年前，一場轟轟烈烈的反傳統擁抱西方現代價值的啟蒙運動曾席捲中國大地；¹一百年後的今天，當代中國哲學界所思考的問題仍然與這場稱之為“新文化運動”的中國啟蒙運動息息相關。思想史學者許紀霖曾把當代中國思想的發展歷程區分為三個階段：

改革開放以後的中國思想界，可以分為八十年代、九十年代與2000年以來三個階段。八十年代是“啟蒙時代”，九十年代是一個“啟蒙後時代”，所謂later enlightenment，而2000年以來則是一個“後啟蒙時代”，這個“後”是“post enlightenment”的意思。²

許紀霖認為，作為“啟蒙時代”的八十年代，所繼承的完全是百年前那場新文化運動的價值追求，標舉人的理性和人的解放，猛烈地抨擊傳統，追求現代性的普世價值和普世目標；作為“啟蒙後時代”的九十年代，由於市場經濟的出現，八十年代的啟蒙陣營逐漸分裂為文化保守主義、新古典自由主義、新左派等不同的派別，但仍是啟蒙的延續；進入二十一世紀後，一個全新的“後啟蒙時代”來臨，人們不僅認為啟蒙已經過時，而且從三個不同的方向，即國家主義、古典主義和多元現代性來解構啟蒙，於是國家主義、古典主義和多元現代性成了當今中國的顯學。這三股思潮之間儘管彼此有所不同，但它們又相互交叉扭結在一起，它們不僅視啟蒙所追求的普世價值與普世目標迂腐而又荒謬，喪失了中國的主體性，而且皆以中國崛起為核心訴求，主張與強調中國特色、中國本位、中國立場的現代性，從而呈現出從被動抵抗型轉向積極崛起型的民族主義，從文化民族主義轉向政治的國家主義，從關注現代性的內部關係轉向民族國家的外部關係。³許紀霖作為專研現當代思想史的學者，他對當代中國思想界的這一觀察無疑是敏銳而又貼近現實的觀察。

¹ 趙林曾將晚清到民國初期的啟蒙運動分為三期，即洋務運動、戊戌變法和新文化運動時期，它們的特色分別是：洋務運動時期持“中體西用”的立場，只在器物層面學習西方以達到富國強兵，以李鴻章、張之洞為代表；戊戌變法是“中西會通”的時期，要學習西方的憲政體制以改良政治，以康有為、梁啟超、嚴復為代表；新文化運動則主張“全盤西化”，要全盤引進西方的經濟、政治、文化體系以實現國民性的徹底改造，以陳獨秀、胡適為代表。“如果說戊戌變法把中國的啟蒙運動從器物層面推進到政治層面，那麼新文化運動則進一步把中國的啟蒙運動推進到更加深刻的思想文化層面。中國文化啟蒙歷程在經歷了‘中體西用’和‘中西會通’兩個階段的發展之後，終於在新文化運動中提出了激進的‘全盤西化’主張。”趙林，〈近世中國文化啟蒙歷程之反思〉，頁35-43。

² 許紀霖，〈啟蒙如何雖死猶生？〉，頁16。

³ 許紀霖，〈啟蒙如何雖死猶生？〉，頁16-19。

二、“復古更化”

在當代中國哲學界，如果問誰堪爲國家主義、古典主義和多元現代性的代表，毫無疑問，人們會不約而同地想到近些年來頻頻發聲和亮相的“大陸新儒家”。2004年7月，大陸的學者蔣慶、陳明、盛洪、康曉光等在貴陽陽明精舍就“儒學的當代命運”進行會講，於是，2005年時方克立將這一批意欲將儒學政治化、宗教化的大陸新生代儒家學者稱之爲“大陸新儒家”。下面我們就這批人中的主角蔣慶的理論主張作一說明和討論，蔣慶在2003年出版的《政治儒學》中宣稱：

我認爲當代新儒家“本內聖心性之學開新外王”的路向已走不通。此走不通有兩點：一是儒家內聖心性之學只解決個體生命意義的安立問題，不解決社會制度的建構問題；二是當代新儒家把儒家的外王事業理解爲開出由西方文化所揭櫫的科學和民主（所謂“新外王”），如此則儒學不能依其固有之理路開出具有中國文化特色的政治禮法制度，即儒家式的外王大業。夫如是，當代新儒家有“變相西化”之嫌，當代儒學則有淪爲“西學附庸”之虞。若依當代新儒家“儒學第三期發展說”儒學果能開出科學和民主，則儒學必喪失其自性而不成其爲儒學矣，何發展之有！⁴

蔣慶在此所謂的當代新儒家，是指以牟宗三、唐君毅爲代表的港臺新儒家，他提出政治儒學的目的就是爲了同當代新儒家區分開來。按照蔣慶的看法，儒學有“心性儒學”和“政治儒學”之分，當代新儒家所注重的只是心性儒學，他則要注重政治儒學；當代新儒家不僅未能開出新外王，而且其要開出的外王也只是西方所倡導的科學與民主，故當代新儒家的外王學實際上是一種變相西化，是西學的附庸。爲了與當代新儒家那種已喪失儒家本性、只是西學附庸的外王學區別開來，因此，他宣稱：“當代儒學必須轉向，即必須從‘心性儒學’轉向‘政治儒學’，因‘政治儒學’是儒家特有之‘外王儒學’、‘制度儒學’、‘實踐儒學’、‘希望儒學’，中國今後具有中國文化特色之政治禮法制度當由‘政治儒學’重構，而非由‘心性儒學’開出。”⁵

蔣慶何以認定當代新儒家要開出科學和民主（尤其是民主）就是變相西化？蔣慶認爲：“政治的西化是一切西化的核心。吾人須知，政治不同於經濟、法律、教育等領域可以相對獨立，政治最直接地關涉到人的宗教信仰、價值理念、道德意識和文化認同，即直接關涉到人類文化的深層價值。如果某一政治形態改變，即意味著某一人類文化的深層價值改變；某一人類文化的深層價值改變，即意味著某一文化滅亡。故極而言之，政治形態亡則文化亡！”⁶在蔣慶看來，政治形態與文化的深層價值息息相通、關聯甚深，政

4 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁1-2。

5 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁2。

6 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁2。

治形態變則文化的深層價值亦變，政治形態亡則文化亦亡；當代新儒家既然接受西方的民主作為政治形態，那麼就意味著放棄中華文化的深層價值、放棄中國文化的本位；當代新儒家這一政治的西化，在實踐中可能會導致中國文化的滅亡：

我們可以說新儒家是“五四”的產兒，完全認同“五四”提出的精神方向。亦正是在這一點上，我們可以說新儒家與中國的自由主義和馬列主義沒有本質的區別，都以一種西方的標準（科學民主）作為中國文化的發展方向。我曾經說過新儒家是一種“變相的西化論”即是此意。牟宗三的“儒學開出科學民主說”就是這種“變相西化論”的典型代表。⁷

依蔣慶之見，科學民主是西方的標準，中國文化絕不能以這種西方的標準作為發展方向。可見，對蔣慶來說，科學、民主等現代性的價值都是負面的東西，都是會導致中國文化滅亡的因素。

蔣慶提出“當代儒學面臨的任務就不是與西方文化結合，而是與西方文化分離。”⁸ 他的政治儒學就是要從西方現代性的迷失中超拔出來回歸與重建中國性，聲稱：

中國政治文化的重建問題就不再是“全盤西化”的問題，而是現代中國“復古更化”的問題。所謂現代中國的“復古更化”，就是用儒家的政治智慧和指導原則來轉化中國的政治現實，在中國建立起源自天道性理的合法的政治秩序，使中國政治文化的重建建立在中國自己文化傳統的基礎上，而不是一味用西方的政治文化來化解中國的政治傳統，使中國的政治文化喪失其本位性。要做到這一點，非政治儒學莫屬！⁹

這表明蔣慶力圖通過其政治儒學走出一條與西方文化相分離的“復古更化”之路，即在現代中國建立源自天道性理的合法的政治秩序，從而實現中國自己文化傳統的復歸。並且，蔣慶聲稱他的政治儒學與歷史上那種政治化儒學完全不同，其政治儒學秉持對崇高價值理想與未來大同希望的終極關懷，有批判現實體制與批判自身的功能，而政治化儒學則與現實政治秩序完全一體化，維護現存體制和統治者利益：

從中國歷史來看，漢以後……，儒學在很大程度上已異化為純粹為君主制服務的政治意識形態，即政治化的儒學成了儒學的主流，政治儒學的傳統已近於衰竭。¹⁰

7 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁286。

8 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁285。

9 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁39-40。

10 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁112。

可見，蔣慶的政治儒學所要實行的“復古更化”也並非簡單地返回傳統政治社會制度。那麼，蔣慶政治儒學所要實行的“復古更化”，亦即要重建的“源自天道性理的合法的政治秩序”究竟爲何？那就是：立儒教爲國教，在此基礎上建立起本“天地人”三重合法性的三院制：

儒學作爲一種博大純正的學問，有自己的外王理想，儒學的外王理想與民主雖不相衝突，但亦不完全一致，如儒學的王道理想爲“參通天地人天下歸往”，“天下歸往”與民主的含義相近，而“參通天地人”則是儒學所獨特的外王理想，即要求最高掌權者具有完成人與宇宙和諧的生命責任，要求建立的制度同時體現天道(神聖)的合法性、民意(人心)的合法性與歷史(文化)的合法性而實現政治秩序三重合法性的制衡與和諧(民主在中國只有一重合法性)。¹¹

王道政治在“治道”的憲政制度安排上實行議會制，行政系統由議會產生，對議會負責。議會實行三院制，每一院分別代表一重合法性。三院可分爲“通儒院”“庶民院”“國體院”，“通儒院”代表超越神聖的合法性，“庶民院”代表人心民意的合法性，“國體院”代表歷史文化的合法性。¹²

蔣慶依據公羊家“參通天地人爲王”和董仲舒的《春秋繁露·王道通三》，認爲政治權力必須同時具有天地人三重合法性才爲之合法，天指超越神聖的合法性；地指歷史文化的合法性；人指人心民意的合法性。他所主張的三院制就是以天地人三重合法性爲依據，故“通儒院”代表超越神聖的合法性，“庶民院”代表人心民意的合法性，“國體院”代表歷史文化的合法性。“通儒院”議員由推舉與委派產生，其議長由儒教公推之大儒擔任；“庶民院”的議長、議員按西方民主政治議會產生的規則與程式選舉產生。“國體院”的議長由孔子後裔衍聖公世襲，議員則由兩類人組成：一類是歷史上吾國歷代聖王、聖賢、君主、事功名人、文化名人、國家忠烈等的後裔，一類是當前之大學國史教授、國家退休高級行政官員、司法官員、外交官員、社會賢達以及道教界、佛教界、回教界、喇嘛教界、基督教界人士。三院各有實權，法案必須三院同時通過才能頒行，最高行政長官也必須由三院一致同意才能產生。蔣慶認爲，只有他上述所論及的中國王道政治才是真正的、優質的普世價值，而西方的自由、民主、人權等一切現代價值通通都是劣質的普世價值。

三、“回到康有爲”

近年來，隨著中國經濟的高速發展、中國國家實力的提升，以“中國崛起”爲訴求，即要求實現中國特色、中國本位、中國立場的現代性的呼聲日

¹¹ 蔣慶，《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》，頁56。

¹² 蔣慶，《再論政治儒學》，頁23。

益強烈，然而，中國的崛起、國力的增強，既沒有形成對國家的向心力和凝聚力，也沒有贏得國際上應有的信賴和尊重，疆獨、藏獨、港獨、台獨、東海爭端、南海爭端日趨嚴重，可以說，無論中國的內部秩序還是外部秩序都面臨著越來越嚴峻的局面與挑戰。正是在此背景下，“大陸新儒家”又有了新的進展，從蔣慶的“政治儒學”發展到了“新康有為主義”階段，這一階段主要以陳明、曾亦、唐文明和干春松等人為代表。¹³

作為“新康有為主義”或“康黨”的陳明、曾亦、唐文明和干春松等人，儘管他們有著大致相似的問題意識與問題指向，但尚未形成系統的理论與方案。下面主要來看陳明是怎麼“回到康有為”的。陳明認為，“回到康有為”就是回到康有為的問題、思路和立場，即是國家建構與國族建構的問題，亦即他所謂的“如何完成中華民族意識的塑造，以及中國現代國家形態的建構。”¹⁴他宣稱：

在康有為處理的中國——這個由滿族經武力征服而成的清帝國在維持其疆域規模、族群結構的前提下如何實現其向現代共和國過渡轉型的問題面前，左派、右派的論述顯得疲弱無力。¹⁵

在陳明看來，革命敘事和啟蒙規劃這左右兩派都是“五四”的產物，所採取的都是西方中心論的普遍主義方法論，故必須拋棄左派那種階級建國和右派那種個人建國的方案，回到康有為的問題與訴求。

陳明所謂康有為國家建構與國族建構的問題與訴求：

即是在晚清變局中，在確保疆域不分裂、族群不瓦解的前提下，去進行中國現代國家形態的尋找和再造；對外有效應對列強的挑戰，對內有效回應國民的正當需求。政治認同和文化認同，這就意味著正義而有效的制度，統一而和諧的文化。這是康有為的追求，也是我們今天仍未解決的問題。¹⁶

簡而言之，即“保國、保種、保教”。¹⁷作為“新康有為主義”者的陳明的問題與訴求則是：

現代國家形態建構是指把中國這個由滿清奠定的疆域之上的人群整合為一個和諧、強大的政治共同體，這就是我說的國家建構問題。國族建構則是將構成共和國的眾多族群整合塑造成為具有相同政治認同、享有相同公共道德的國族即中華民族。¹⁸

¹³ 當然，蔣慶仍是他們的精神領袖，因為他的“政治儒學”不僅對康有為的公羊學傳統有所繼承和發展，而且他也聲稱“回到康有為”使得“大陸新儒家”更為成熟。

¹⁴ 曾亦、郭曉東，《何謂普世？誰之價值？——當代儒家論普世價值》，頁150。

¹⁵ 甘陽、唐文明、陳明等，《康有為與制度化儒學》，頁24。

¹⁶ 李明輝、陳明等，《首屆兩岸新儒家會講》，頁17-18。

¹⁷ 甘陽、唐文明、陳明等，《康有為與制度化儒學》，頁25。

¹⁸ 陳明，《公民宗教：儒家文化復興的新視角》，“儒家網”2015年3月24日，<http://www.rujiazg.com/article/id/4994/>。

於是，在陳明看來，現代國家建構與國族建構才是第一位的、重中之重的問題與訴求；爲了國家民族的保全與維持，國家民族的富強優先於任何價值，必須放在價值排序的首位，公平、正義、自由、民主以及憲政等現代性的普世價值都是次要的，他甚至宣稱：“個人本位、程式決定不能接受。”¹⁹可見，對他來說，在國家建構與國族建構的問題面前，現代性的那些普世價值可以說是微不足道的。

在當代中國哲學界與思想界，以上所論及的“大陸新儒家”蔣慶與陳明的觀點並非學界的主流看法，故遭到了來自學界各方面的批評和抨擊，暫且不論左右各派的批評，在此僅就兩位專研中國哲學與思想的學者黃玉順、葛兆光對其所作的批判作一介紹與說明。黃玉順稱：

這裏我不得不說：至少就政治儒學而論，比起20世紀的現代新儒家來，當今的大陸新儒家整體上是退步了。大陸新儒家致力於政治儒學的有一大批人，其思想觀點的差距甚大。其中存在著一些極其危險的政治傾向，特別是個別人不僅宣導威權主義，甚至主張專制主義、極權主義，反對自由、平等、民主等現代文明價值，不禁讓人想起魯迅的說法——“幫忙與幫閒”，實則是幫兇。其中有些人是“真睡著了”，有些人則是“裝睡著了”。我特別想指出這樣一股危險的思潮：以狹隘民族主義的“中西對抗”來掩蓋“古今之變”的人類文明走向，借“反西方”之名，行“反現代”之實，用“文化”來拒絕“文明”。這些都是當前“儒學復興”中最值得警惕的傾向。²⁰

按照黃玉順的看法，“大陸新儒家”所幹的事總結起來無非就是兩件，一件是“創教”，一件是“干政”。²¹“創教”就是將傳統的儒學改造成當代中國的“國教”；“干政”就是建構和標榜他們自以爲是的政治儒學。在黃玉順看來，“大陸新儒家”的“創教”與“干政”存在著極其危險的政治傾向，他們不接受和反對自由、平等、民主等現代政治文明的基本價值，實際上他們是以“中西對抗”掩蓋“古今之變”、以“反西方”之名行“反現代”之實、用“文化”拒絕“文明”、逆人類文明之走向而行，甚至可能會淪爲專制主義、極權主義鼓吹手和幫兇。

葛兆光曾以“異想天開”爲題對“大陸新儒家”的政治訴求予以猛烈抨擊。按照葛兆光的看法，“大陸新儒家”主要表現在以下兩點：一是他們以“拒斥西方，排斥異端”爲口號，以國家主義、民族主義爲標榜，宣稱承認普世價值不僅有害，而且是“自我夷狄化”；二是不再“坐而論道”，而是要直接“干政”“擡起袖子”干預政治、設計制度、改造社會，力圖建立一個內外上下、井然有序、等級森嚴、政教合一的“儒教國”。因此，在葛兆光看來，自近代以來，當中國的社會結構、政治制度、生活方式都發生了巨大變化的情

19 甘陽、唐文明、陳明等，〈康有爲與制度化儒學〉，頁25。

20 黃玉順，〈也論“大陸新儒家”——回應李明輝先生〉，頁50。

21 黃玉順，〈也論“大陸新儒家”——回應李明輝先生〉，頁50。

況下，“大陸新儒家”卻與民族主義或國家主義聯手向政治權力與意識形態看齊，完全拒斥儒家之外的各種其他資源，不僅在今天的中國排斥自由、民主與平等等現代文明價值，而且試圖恢復傳統時代中國的家庭、社會與國家，回到傳統時代的結構、秩序和習俗，即政治方面的君主制和科舉制，教育方面的書院制，至於社會制度方面則是宗族和家庭，這完全是“異想天開”、“借屍還魂”、“曲學阿世”和“時代錯位的囈語。”²²

四、“回到牟宗三”

毫無疑問，較之於當代“大陸新儒家”，“當代新儒家”牟宗三、唐君毅、徐復觀和張君勱等有著更為開放的胸襟和廣闊的視野，他們不僅對中國傳統文化特別是儒家文化有著全面深刻的理解與把握，而且對如何消化和吸收現代文明的價值有著深入的思考和清醒的認識。他們在發掘中國傳統文化資源的基礎上，力圖使中國文化與科學民主等現代價值之間彼此協調、相互促進、共同完善。在這一方面，牟宗三做出了最為突出的貢獻，牟宗三稱：

哲學不只是純哲學，如通文化發展而觀之，則中國哲學必須能配合近代化而且能促進近代化始能適應未來，此正是儒家傳統所自發地要求者。²³

“中國文化”乃是以儒家作主流所決定的那個文化生命的方向以及文化生命的形態，所以我們講中國文化的現代意義，也即是在講這個文化生命的方向與形態的現代意義、現代使命。²⁴

在牟宗三看來，以儒家為主流的中國哲學與文化其自身有一種自發的配合、促進與實現近代化、現代化適應未來的要求，這既是中國文化的現代使命與責任，也是中國文化生命的內在要求與目的。牟宗三稱：

中國文化的現代意義，亦即其本身的現代化，首先即是要求新外王。……中國文化發展至今，仍是個活生生的文化，……現代化雖先發自於西方，但是只要它一旦出現，它就沒有地方性；只要它是個真理，它就有普遍性；只要有普遍性，任何一個民族都當該承認它。中國的老名詞是王道、藏天下於天下，新名詞則是開放的社會、民主政治，所以，這是個共同的理想。故而民主政治雖先發自於西方，但我們也應該根據我們生命的要求，把它實現出來，這就是新外王的中心工作。²⁵

22 葛兆光，〈異想天開：近年來大陸新儒學的政治訴求〉，“儒家網”2017年7月1日，<http://www.rujiazg.com/article/id/11598/?from=singlemesssage&isappinstalled=0>。

23 牟宗三，《訪韓答問錄》，《牟宗三先生全集》第23冊，頁220。

24 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁21。

25 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁23—24。

依牟宗三之見，中國文化的現代意義就是實現現代化、實現新外王、實現民主政治，現代化、民主政治雖源自於西方，但作為真理、作為普遍性的東西、作為普世價值，則不再有東、西之分，拒絕真理、拒絕普世價值的文化無疑是死的文化、是古董，中國文化至今之所以仍活生生的存在、生長，就在於從不拒絕真理、從不拒絕普遍性的東西，這既是發自中國文化之生命的內在要求與理想，也是中國文化亙古亙今、可大可久之所在：

現代化並不是要抹掉老傳統，而是如何能與西方文化取得協調。先消極地取得協調，再進一步積極地把老傳統中的精神開展出來，將其義理恰當地講出來，使這老傳統與西方文化相接頭。相接頭非謂同一於西方文化（這是不可能的），而是先選擇、消化西方文化，再來和東方文化相接頭。這無形中可使東方老傳統重新達到新的、進一步的境地，得到重新發揚。重新發揚也不是比附、歪曲、改變其本義，而是使這東方老傳統的本質的意義能保存、維持下去，並且光大、弘揚起來。²⁶

牟宗三指出，現代化並不是置老傳統不顧，而是先消極地與西方文化取得協調，然後再積極地將老傳統的義理、精神開發出來；老傳統與西方文化的相接也是有所選擇有所批判的相接，並不是完全照搬複製西方的一切；通過對西方文化的相接、選擇、消化和協調，這樣我們對自己的老傳統就會有一個嶄新而深刻的理解，從而老傳統的本質意義才能真正發揚光大。可見，牟宗三既對傳統文化和現代價值兩者都有著深刻的理解與把握，同時還對傳統文化與現代價值相結合的現實性與緊迫性有著極為清醒的認識。

在牟宗三的思想系統中，牟宗三並不像蔣慶那樣將儒學作心性儒學和政治儒學之類的區分，在他看來兩者根本就無法區分開來，假如一定要做這樣的區分的話，可以說，牟宗三不僅注重“心性儒學”，同時也相當重視“政治儒學”，他的“外王三書”，《歷史哲學》、《道德的理想主義》和《政道與治道》可以說所論及的正是政治儒學，顯然牟宗三並非像蔣慶所說的只講心性儒學。牟宗三稱：

儒家學術第三期的發展，所應負的責任即是要開這個時代所需要的外王。……儒家的理性主義在今天這個時代，要求新的外王，才能充分地表現。今天這個時代所要求的新外王，即是科學與民主政治。事實上，中國以前所要求的事功，亦只在民主政治的形態下，才能夠充分的實現，才能夠充分的被正視。²⁷

牟宗三認為，儒家的理性主義之所以要求實現民主政治，是因為只有在民主政治下，一切“事功”才能被正視、才能真正實現，儒家在當代所擔負

26 牟宗三，《訪韓答問錄》，《牟宗三先生全集》第23冊，頁217。

27 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁14-17。

的使命與責任就是開展出新外王——科學與民主政治。牟宗三把“外王”亦即所謂的“政治儒學”視之為當代儒學的使命與責任，可見，他是何等地重視“外王”亦即所謂的“政治儒學”。然而，牟宗三講“外王”決不是純粹地、孤立地去講“外王”、講所謂的“政治儒學”，他稱：

我們必須講通中國文化與民主科學兩者之道理，以求其內在之貫通，有機之統一。此即是落到中國文化生命之根裏，去尋求去成就民主與科學。故無論從道理上或從中國文化上，皆要求我們對於理性之兩種表現有一種貫通的說明。²⁸

牟宗三在此強調講“外王”講“政治儒學”，必須要落到中國文化生命之根裏來講“外王”講“政治儒學”，一定要從中國文化與民主科學的內在貫通與有機統一的基礎上來講“外王”講“政治儒學”。

究竟如何才能從中國文化生命之根處、從中國文化與民主科學的內在貫通有機統一來開展出“新外王”？牟宗三是從對中國文化與近現代文明的本質與內核的考察入手，來探討今天這個時代所要求的“新外王”的，牟宗三稱：

（民主政治、事功、科學等）這一套即是西方自文藝復興以後所創造出的近代文明。整個這一套的內容中間有個共同的基本精神，我們可以用一個名詞來說明，即是co-ordination，可以翻譯作“對列之局”，這就是現代化最本質的意義。²⁹

由對待關係而成一“對列之局”（co-ordination）。是以架構表現便以“對列之局”來規定。而架構表現中之“理性”也頓時即失去其人格中德性即具體地說的實踐理性之意義而轉為非道德意義的“觀解理性”或“理論理性”，因此也是屬於知性層上的（運用表現不屬於知性層）。民主政治與科學正好是這知性層上的“理性之架構表現”之所成就。³⁰

牟宗三通過對西方近現代文明的考察後認為，在民主政治、事功、科學等近現代西方文明中有一種共同的精神，這一種共同的精神即“對列之局”，亦即“理性之架構表現”，作為“觀解理性”或“理論理性”體現的“對列之局”、“架構表現”正是現代化最本質的意義。依牟宗三之見，只有在“理論理性”或“觀解理性”的“對列之局”或“架構表現”中，才能開展和成就民主政治與科學。較之西方文化的“理性之架構表現”，牟宗三認為中國文化生命的特色是：

“理性之運用表現”，則偏重在表現。表現是據體以成用或承體之起用，這是在具體生活中牽連著“事”說的。而這種運用表現中的“理性”當然是指實踐理性，然而卻不是抽象地說，而是在生活中具體地

28 牟宗三，《人文講習錄》，《牟宗三先生全集》第28冊，頁137。

29 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁25-26。

30 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁58。

說。所以這裏所謂理性當該就是人格中的德性，而其運用表現就是此德性之感召，或德性之智慧妙用。……關聯著文化問題說，運用表現可從三方面來瞭解：一、從人格方面說，聖賢人格之感召是理性之運用表現。……二、從政治方面說，則理性之運用表現便是儒家德化的治道。……三、從知識方面說，則理性之作用表現便要道德心靈之“智”一面收攝於仁而成爲道心之觀照或寂照，此則爲智的直覺形態，而非知性形態。³¹

凡是運用表現都是“攝所歸能”，“攝物歸心”。這二者皆在免去對立：它或者把對象收進自己的主體裏面來，或者把自己投到對象裏面去，成爲徹上徹下的絕對。內收則全物在心，外投則全心在物，其實一也。³²

依牟宗三之見，中國文化以“理性之運用表現”爲其本質特徵，此理性之運用表現是道德主體（良知）的直接表現，或將對象收進自己的主體裏面來，或把自己投到對象裏面去，去除對立成其絕對，使主客關係成爲“隸屬關係”，此理性即實踐理性亦即人格中的德性，故其表現爲聖賢德性人格之感召、儒家德化之治道、德性之智慧妙用。

正因爲牟宗三通過對中西文化的本質與內核的考察深刻地認識到：只有“理性之運用表現”的中國文化之所以開展不出科學和民主政治，就在於缺乏“理性之架構表現”，如何從運用表現轉出架構表現，才是中國出現科學和民主政治的關鍵之所在。於是，他提出他那著名的“良知坎陷說”：

只順良知走，便不能出現科學與民主政體。但科學與民主又爲良知之道德理性所要求。³³ 它要求一個與它本性相違反的事物。此即是一個矛盾，逆其自己的矛盾。要把這個矛盾解消而貫通起來，故須要求一種辯證法的瞭解。此其意義即普通所謂相反相成，也即是辯證法所謂對立統一。道德理性要滿足良知之要求科學民主，便不能一味順良知之本性而爲運用的表現，它還要相應科學民主之本性而爲架構的表現。它要滿足此要求而實現此種表現，則吾人之心用便不能不從良知之形態暫作自我之否定，而轉爲知性形態、對列之局。不能一味順著良知之本性往下滾，不能只是攝所歸能、攝物歸心。因若此便成爲無對。必須讓開一步，把“所”與“物”推出去，凸顯出來，與自己成一主賓對列之局，才能轉出理性之架構表現。此即要與自己逆、要自我坎陷，不可一味順。……所以今天必須開出架構表現的國家政治法律與邏輯數學科學，以充實發揚道德理性之光。³⁴

31 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁52-55。

32 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁58。

33 “凡真美善皆爲道德理性所要求，所意欲。科學代表知識，也是‘真’之一種。道德理性雖曰實踐理性，意在指導吾人之行爲，其直接作用在成聖賢人格，然誠心求知是一種行爲，故亦當爲道德理性所要求，所決定。……科學還是知識方面的事，至於民主政治則是屬於客觀實踐方面的，其與道德理性的關係當更顯明。蓋民主政體之出現是人之在政治生活方面自覺地決定其方向，即由此線索，我們可以把它聯繫於道德理性上。”牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁63-65。

34 牟宗三，《人文講習錄》，《牟宗三先生全集》第28冊，頁140-141。

按照牟宗三的看法，科學和民主政治這一“新外王”內容是不能從“內聖”直接推出的，必須經過道德主體亦即良知的自我否定、自我坎陷，由“理性之運用表現”轉成“理性之架構表現”，由智性直觀形態轉成知性的形態，由無對轉為有對，由曲通代替直通，只有經過這樣一個辯證地曲折發展，才能開出科學和民主政治這一“新外王”。

五、結論

牟宗三在“內聖外王”的思想架構下所提出的這一“良知坎陷說”，一方面，將道德與知識、政治分屬不同的層面，使其各有分際、各有原則、不可化約，另一方面，在道德價值的基礎上肯定和確立了知識與政治的獨立意義與必要性。“政道、事功與科學，亦必為其所肯定而要求其實現。反之，政道、事功與科學，亦必統攝於心性之實學，而不能背離此本源。”³⁵ 牟宗三的“良知坎陷說”可謂立足於儒學核心價值的立場上所作的一種創造性的現代轉化，不僅尋找到了一種中國文化特別是儒家文化與現代價值相結合的方式，而且堅持了自身的文化本性避免了傳統的斷裂，從而為我們在追求科學與民主的過程中，避免“泛科學主義”、“泛政治主義”提供了一種價值方向和最後的保證。有鑒於此，我們完全可以說，牟宗三所提出的“良知坎陷說”，是一種在對中國文化與現代價值的全面深刻理解的基礎上所作的順暢中國文化生命的工作，絕非“大陸新儒家”所批評的一味接受西方的價值、無視中國的傳統文化。因此，與其“復古更化”、“回到康有為”，罔顧現代普世價值，則莫若重新理解、消化和吸收牟宗三為代表的新儒家的成果。

■ 投稿日：2017.08.11 / 審查日：2017.11.03-2017.11.15 / 刊載決定日：2017.11.21

³⁵ 牟宗三，《政道與治道》，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁38。

參考文獻

- 甘 陽、唐文明、陳明等,〈康有爲與制度化儒學〉,《開放時代》,2014年第5期。
- 黃玉順,〈也論“大陸新儒家”——回應李明輝先生〉,《探索與爭鳴》,2016年第4期。
- 蔣 慶,《政治儒學:當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》,北京:三聯書店,2003。
- ,《再論政治儒學》,上海:華東師範大學出版社,2014。
- 李明輝、陳明等,〈首屆兩岸新儒家會講〉,《天府新論》,2016年第2期。
- 牟宗三,《牟宗三先生全集》,臺北:聯經出版,2003。
- 許紀霖,〈啟蒙如何雖死猶生?〉,《啟蒙的遺產與反思》,許紀霖編,南京:江蘇人民出版社,2010。
- 曾 亦、郭曉東編,《何謂普世?誰之價值?——當代儒家論普世價值》,上海:華東師範大學出版社,2013。
- 趙 林,〈近世中國文化啟蒙歷程之反思〉,《社會科學戰線》,2013年第5期。

From “Return to Kang Youwei” to “Back to Mou Zongsan”: A Study on the Political Confucianism of Mainland New Confucianism

WEN Bifang · LI Xiang

Abstract

Since the beginning of the new millennium, in Chinese philosophy circles, there has been a trend towards deconstructing the enlightenment legacy and denying the legitimacy of modern universal values. This trend is associated in particular with Jiang Qing and Chen Ming, two prominent representatives of so-called Mainland New Confucianism. Jiang Qing criticizes such values of modernity as democracy and freedom for being negative universal values. He maintains that the superior universal value is political rule according to the ancient notion of the Kingly Way, based on which he proposes a set of formulations. In more recent years, Chen Ming's slogan has been the call to return to Kang Youwei. Chen insists that it is necessary to transcend the narrative of revolution and the vision of the enlightenment, to return to Kang Youwei's concept of national and state construction. In Chen's opinion, the construction of the modern state and nation takes precedence over any values and should be ranked first; modern universal values such as fairness, justice, freedom, democracy, and constitutionalism are of secondary importance, or even trivial. On the other hand, contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholars such as Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan are much more willing to accept modern values like science and democracy. They try to harmonize Chinese culture and modern values to get them to advance each other by drawing on the resources of Chinese traditional culture. In this respect, Mou Zongsan proposes what he calls the “self-negation of innate moral consciousness,” in order to sustain Chinese culture. This does not mean that he upholds Western values blindly and ignores traditional Chinese culture, as Mainland New Confucian critics accuse him. Therefore, it is better to re-understand, digest, and absorb the achievements obtained by Contemporary Neo-Confucians such as Mou Zongsan, rather than to return to Kang Youwei blindly and ignore modern universal values.

Keywords: Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, political Confucianism, Mou Zongsan, self-negation of innate moral consciousness

存在心理學與儒家

田 炳 述

中文提要

亞伯拉罕·馬斯洛是人本主義心理學(Humanistic Psychology)的主要創建者之一。現代人持有很多精神上的問題，他認為價值觀的喪失是這個時代的最終痼疾，而且目前的情況比歷史上任何時代都要危險，所以主張我們人類只有通過自己的努力，即達到自我實現來改變這種情況。他又說美國人已經認識到，政治的民主和經濟的繁榮在他們身上並沒有解決任何基本的價值問題。除非轉向內部，轉向自己，否則就沒有價值觀念的棲息地。馬斯洛在《存在心理學探索》主要反對傳統行為主義的機械論和環境決定論，強調人是主動的，能創造的，實現完美人格。他認為人作為一個有機整體。他把連結社會至宇宙，實現自我並且擴充自我為終極目標的學問稱謂“存在心理學”，這正是符合儒家一向追求的終極目標。馬斯洛關注的是什麼是有道德的生活？什麼樣的人是道德的人？怎樣才能把人教育成期望和喜歡過有道德的生活的人？怎樣才能把兒童培養成道德高尚的成人？等等問題他認為提出這樣的問題。他認為對心理學來說，這是革命性的轉折。他經由存在認知，至於事實和價值的融合，要建立科學的倫理學。可是他所謂的科學觀察經驗得到的，只是觀察幾個充分成熟的人來達成結論。總體上來看，缺乏具體的方法，僅止於一種宣言而已。若他看到儒家“存天理，去人欲”，“涵養省察”，“致良知”等的種種工夫方法，他的“存在心理學”更會完整的、扎實的。反過來說，儒家對心理學的發展將會做出莫大的貢獻。

關鍵詞：亞伯拉罕·馬斯洛，存在心理學，儒家，科學的倫理學，價值觀

* 田炳述：建國大學校講師(jbsul@hanmail.net)

** 本文係由十一屆當代新儒學國際學術會議(2015年10月22-25日)發表的論文修整而成。

一、序言

亞伯拉罕·馬斯洛(1908—1970)是美國社會心理學家、人格理論家和比較心理學家、人本主義心理學(Humanistic Psychology)的主要創建者之一。他批判美國心理學，或者更廣泛地說，西方心理學以種族中心主義的方式假定，人的需要、畏懼和興趣必然永遠是知覺的決定因素。依據古典弗洛伊德主義的觀點，認知必定是永遠被激發的他同時也批判“功能心理學(Functional Psychology)”傾向於“有效性”和“實用價值”的觀點來考慮一切能力。現代人持有很多精神上的問題，他認為價值觀的喪失是這個時代的最終痼疾，而且目前的情況比歷史上任何時代都要危險，所以主張我們人類只有通過自己的努力，即達到自我實現來改變這種情況。他又說美國人已經認識到，政治的民主和經濟的繁榮在他們身上並沒有解決任何基本的價值問題。除非轉向內部，轉向自我，否則就沒有價值觀念的棲息地。

馬斯洛收錄了他自己1954年到1960年間發表的14篇重要演講稿、論文，經作者本人認真修訂和擴展，彙成此書，稱為《存在心理學探索》(Toward a Psychology of Being, 1968)。他主要反對傳統行為主義的機械論和環境決定論，強調人是主動的，能創造的，實現完美人格。他認為人作為一個有機整體。他把連結社會至宇宙，實現自我並且擴充自我為終極目標的學問稱為“存在心理學”這正是符合儒家一向追求的終極目標。

二、為己之學與人本主義心理學

西方心理學的發展，自從1879年馮特在德國建立正式的心理學實驗室以來，經過以弗洛伊德為代表的精神分析學派，稱作心理學的第一勢力，以華生為開創的行為主義學派，稱作第二勢力，發展至以馬斯洛為代的人本主義學派，稱作第三勢力。弗洛伊德派把人的行為的動機的重點放在深層的內在衝動與驅策上，而行為主義者們則把主要動機的重點放在外在環境的影響上。不同於他們，人本主義學派強調自我實現，強調人的主體性和個人的尊嚴，認為心理學研究的對象應該是“人的整體經驗”，包括外在行為、內在的活動，如個人價值觀、感情、意向、希求等。同時也肯認我們人類可有共通的價值觀和道德準則，提出了融合精神分析心理學和行為主義心理學的人本主義心理學。馬斯洛批判了傳統的弗洛伊德主義者，因為他們傾向於把任何東西都病理化。¹ 他同時也批判了行為主義心理學派。行為

¹ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁44。

主義心理學派把人看成實質上是反應性的，認為他是由外部刺激推動的，所以可以稱之為刺激反應的人，這種看法對自我實現人來說是完全荒謬和站不住腳的。因為他們的活動源於內部的超過源於反應的。

人本主義學派認為精神分析心理學派和行為主義心理學派的理論，不能回答會認識自我的妥當方法。他們面對喪失人性的危機狀況，把視野轉向東方傳統，而開始對人摸索新的理解。馬斯洛提出“實現傾向(The Actualizing Tendency)”，羅傑斯相信人只有一個基本動機，稱之為“實現傾向”。按照羅傑斯的理解，與其他創造秩序一樣，人也具有基本的並且先天的傾向，其目的是生存或提升而發展各種能力。志向成長並發展完全，最後達到頭等的“人存在(human-beingness)”。馬斯洛說“好人”，“好的樣品”是最有人性的。²這就是《中庸》所謂“仁者人也”一樣的表現。人性具有眾多的特徵，每一個特徵都是絕對必要的，但某一個特徵自身在確定人性時又是不充分的。孔子把人所具有的各種美德都歸屬於仁。人必須有仁，人若沒有仁，則不成其為人。馬斯洛說：

事實上，關於“真正的人(authentic person)”的每一種認真的描述都擴展到含有這種意思，即這種真正的人依靠他已有的美德，對他的環境、事實上是對普遍的社會都能採取一種新的關係。他不僅在各方面超越他自己；而且他也超越他的文化。他抵制文化適應。他變得更加超然於他的社會和他的文化了。³

他們肯認整個人類價值有共同的價值觀和道德準則，而且道德準則是內在的。他又說：

毫無疑問，人類有史以來一直在尋找具有指導作用的價值觀念和行為準則。然而他們往往把目光投向自身與人類之外去尋找一個上帝，或者是《聖經》，或者某個統治階級。我現在正在通過深刻剖析出類拔萃的人的生活來探索一種理論，這種理論認為你完全有可能找到人類一直尋找的，也必須照之生活的那種價值觀。換句話說，我相信我能通過觀察最優秀的人類代表來找到適合人類的最終價值觀。假如我站在一邊科學地描述在最好條件下的最出色的人物的人類價值觀，那麼我發現這些價值觀包括真善美在內的人類高貴的價值，也包括一些後來的價值，比如愉快，正義和歡樂。⁴

這些價值是人類本性固有的，是人的生物性質中的一部分，是本能的而非後天獲得的。⁵埃裏希·弗洛姆則主張不要把人視為衝動存在，而應該把握為關係存在，說看待自己的態度不能隔離於看待他人的，若把同我在一

2 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁154。

3 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁10。

4 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁10。

5 弗蘭克·G·戈布爾，《第三思潮——馬斯洛心理學》，頁82。

起生活的人看作不同於我的，那麼既然他人留著對我陌生的，就我自己也對我成為陌生的。可是若完整體驗自己，就可以覺悟到我自己也無異於別人的存在。這樣的思路正把人看作本質上是個倫理的存在，所以覺知到責任意識並且實踐時，才可達成自我實現的。這正是孔孟以來儒家一貫下來的意識形態。儒家認為人本是關係存在，因此不能止於個體自我實現，必須先自覺自己也無異於別人的存在而且連屬於他人，才會持有存在意義。再主體地實現自我於人際關係中，才會完成真正的自我實現。如張載說：“為天地立心，為生民立命，為往聖繼絕學，為萬世開太平。”⁶ 儒家自我實現完成於“修己安人”。為了達到這個目的，儒家首先強調“立志”。王守仁教學生篤志為聖人之學說：

只念念要存天理，即是立志。能不忘乎此，久則自然心中凝聚。猶道家所謂結聖胎也。此天理之念常存，馴至於美大聖神，亦只從此一念存養擴充去耳。⁷

王守仁用道教所追求的最上境界的“結聖胎”形容立志的重要性，意味著這個“志”遠遠超過一般所謂動機、目的、理想等的觀念。唐君毅區別心理學上所說的“志”和儒家所說的“立志之志”說。

志之古訓為心之所之，即心之活動所往。但立志之志，卻非只是今心理學上所謂意志之義，亦非全同於一般所謂理想之義。意志之一名，在心理學上，可說指現實一特定目的之一貫的行為趨向。故一切有目的的活動，無論善惡，皆可稱為意志的活動。心理學上之意志是價值判斷無關的。至於一般所謂理想，則是與價值判斷相連的。理想常是指一種為心之所對的，關於我自己，或人類社會，以至宇宙之未來之一種合理性的觀念構造、計劃、圖案之類。此理想恆為一抽象的普遍者，懸於一認識理想之心之前，而為其所對，並為人希望由自己之力，或與他人合力，加以實現的。如一社會的理想、文化的理想、個人之人生理想之類。至於立志之志，則尚不止於是。我們固可說，立志亦是一種理想。但此所立之理想，是直接為自己之具體個人立的，不是抽象普遍的。同時不只是立之為心的客觀所對，而是立之為自己之個人之心靈以至人格所要體現，而屬於此心靈人格之主體的。此即是要使此理想，真實的經由知以貫注至行，而成為屬於自己之實際存在的。故我們與其說，立志是立一個人人生理想，不如說立志是使自己之實際的存在成為一理想的實際存在。立志之志，不只是“向”一定的目的，或普遍抽象的社會文化理想人生理想，而是由當下之我之實際存在，“向”一理想之實際存在，而由前者“之”後者。此之為心之所之。由此而後志可真成為轉移變化此實際之我，超升擴大此實際之我的力量。此種志之為理想，與一般所謂理想之不同，有甚深甚深之義，不能只在文字思辨上了解便夠，必須下一真實的反躬體會的工夫，方能了悟。⁸

⁶ 張載，《張載集》，頁320。

⁷ 王守仁，《傳習錄》卷上，《王陽明全集》上，頁11。

⁸ 唐君毅，《人生之體驗續編》，頁75-76。

唐君毅說在心理學上，意志指現實一特定目的之一貫的行為趨向，是價值判斷無關的。指的正是傳統心理學的理論。到了人本主義心理學，包括價值判斷在內，以達成自我實現為終極目的的。人本主義心理學家，雖然強調自我實現，基本上只能停留於個體實現自我一個人，而被批評沒有足夠的力量擴大到整個社會，只能冷眼旁觀充滿意識的這世界。然而馬斯洛特別強調對社會的責任意識，主張通過完成人對社會的任務，達到人生目標，才是真正實現自己。儒家即本質上主張基於責任意識進行實踐，如此一來，個體就可以說是實現自我了。若這樣，陽明照儒家的責任感堅定了自己的用世之心，來實現於現實生活之中。這是“下一真實的反躬體會的工夫，方能了悟”的。

馬斯洛相信“人的這種內部本性是好的，或者是中性的。而不是壞的，所以最好是讓它表現出來，並且促進它，而不是壓抑它。如果容許它指引我們的生活，那麼我們會成長為健康的，富有成果的和快樂的。……也許用不了多久，我們就能把完善成長和自我實現的人，他的全部潛能都得到了充分發展的人，他的內在本性自由地表現自己而沒有被歪曲，壓抑或被否定的人，作為我們的嚮導和榜樣。”⁹

此是馬斯洛在研究他周圍的成熟人格的人之後得到的結論。而且說“(內在的良心)建立在無意識或前意識地知覺我們自己的本性、我們自己的命運、我們自己的智能、我們自己的‘召喚’的基礎之上。”¹⁰ 提出實現傾向的理論根據。在儒家而言，內在的良心就是仁心良知。“良知”概念可涵蓋本性、命運、智能、召喚自己的基礎。王守仁之學強調“知行合一”、“現成良知”，推動即刻自覺與實踐，可是這責任意識具備存有論的根據，而且對此根據有明確的意識，才有必然性。王守仁以能自知自覺自證的，並且感通他人的痛苦為自己的痛苦的靈明性理解良知，建構自己，而唯有自己構成世界，世界才有意義於自己。自己構成世界。就意味著持有責任感。吾人唯有明確的責任意識，實踐就會帶著必然性，並且能夠完成自我實現，和諧宇宙，而且人人可以達到的境界。

梁漱溟非常重視心理學，肯認心理學為一樞紐或核心者，而且倫理學以心理學為基礎才會完整。他把近代西方文化視為向外發展，並且據個人本位，人們糾結於分別計較利害得失的狹小心理、個人意識及人際關係至於整個社會，遇到了種種問題。他所期待的未來，是人與人之間以融和忘我的感情取代分別計較之心，從人們性情根本處入手，陶養涵育一片天機活潑、和樂恬謐的心理，彼此顧恤，融合無間的境界。讓人類要指向的這樣的未來之路，他在人心通乎宇宙為一體而視宇宙內事為吾人生命內事的儒家傳統裏找到了。他說：“宇宙大生命者，是說生命通乎宇宙萬有而為一體也。”¹¹ 在

⁹ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁2-3。

¹⁰ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁5。

¹¹ 梁漱溟，《人心與人生》，頁61。

梁漱溟那裏，宇宙萬物都是作為宇宙本體的心的表現，所以宇宙萬有相關相通，人生息於自然之中，渾然不可分的。可是萬物之中，靈通之度發展到最尖峰的人類才可能親切體認到宇宙一體性。這是人心轉而向內以充分發揮其自覺性時才可能到達的境界。梁漱溟從“良知”與“獨知”講人心內蘊的自覺。

其曰獨知者，內心默然炯然，不與物對，他人不及知而自家瞞昧不得也。陽明詠良知詩云：“無性無臭獨知時，此是乾坤萬有基”。乾坤萬有基者，意謂宇宙本體。宇宙本體渾一無對。人身是有對性的，妙在其剔透玲瓏的頭腦通向乎無對，而寂然無為的自覺便像是其透出的光線。一即一切，一體即一，宇宙本體即此便是。人心之用尋常可見而體不可見。其體蓋即宇宙本體耳。人身雖有限，人心無限際。¹²

王守仁由良知的靈明性來說明一氣流通觀。即是說以會覺知自己，反省且驗證自己的良知，同時把他者的痛苦當作自己的痛苦的靈明性，來規定良知來構成自己至於整個世界。只能自己構成世界，世界才對自己有意義。構成世界就是意味著覺知對世界的責任意識。我們有明確的責任意識，實踐才有必然性，有必然性，可以完成自我實現以達到萬物同體之境。梁漱溟主張要把宗教與道德相聯通看待，在人類生命深處宗教與道德是同其根源的，而此根源即人心之“心靜的自覺。”¹³有“心靜的自覺”，才發顯自覺自律的道德性。同樣，也由誠敬發出來的是真宗教，因此宗教與道德，以“心靜的自覺”概念之下貫通的，差異只在世間與出世間而已。梁漱溟把學術規定為人類生活中所倚以解決問題，而人生生活上遇到的真正的問題，就是人對自身生命的問題，志同於現代心理學。他據於“從局向通”的觀念，分成人生發展為“意欲向前的理智”、“意欲適中的理性”、“意欲向後的宗教”等三個階段，各階段要解決人對物的問題、人對人的問題與人對自己的問題。至於宗教的出世間境界，達到沒有主客對立的和樂心境為人生的窮極目的。

馬斯洛也將宗教、哲學、科學合而為一，欲建立“更廣闊的心理學領域，核心在”自我實現。自我實現的人變得自信和自制得多了。支配他們的決定因素，不是社會和環境的因素了。這些內部的因素是他們自己內在本性的法則，是他們的潛能和自然傾向，是他們的天資，是他們的潛在資源，是他們的創造衝動，是他們認識自己並使自己變得越來越整合，越來越一致的需要，以及越來越了解自己的實際、自己的召喚、天職和命運的需要。¹⁴並且他們一般沒有必要從別人身上抽取出滿足他的需要的品質，一般也不看作他的工具，所以，他們很可能對其他人採取不評價、不判斷、不干預、不宣判的態度，這就使得能夠更清楚、更有洞察力地知覺和理解其他人的實際情況。¹⁵由於自我實現的人較少依賴他人，所以，他們對別人較少

¹² 梁漱溟，《人心與人生》，頁61。

¹³ 梁漱溟，《人心與人生》，頁188。

¹⁴ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁30。

既愛又恨的矛盾心理，他們既不怎麼渴望也不怎麼敵視別人，他們不太需要他人的讚揚和慈愛，他們不那麼汲汲於榮譽、威信和獎賞。他們強調的是主體自我的肯定，體現了對個體內心精神世界的關切。這正是儒家追求的“爲己之學”的形容。

三、存在認知與良知

馬斯洛認爲人作爲一個有機整體，具有多種動機和需要，包括生理需要、安全需要、歸屬與愛的需要、自尊需要和自我實現需要。他認爲當人的低層次需求被滿足之後，會轉而尋求實現更高層次的需要。這樣廣泛需要都有共同特徵，它們都就是，依照缺失(deficiency)活化的生猛活潑的體系，在活化的生猛活潑的體系裏需求什麼的。馬斯洛稱它爲“缺失動機(D-motivation)”，而且由缺失動機產生的知覺及各種精神活動過程，即由個體缺失性需要構成的認知，稱之爲“缺失認知(D-cognition)”。這種需要只能由他人及外在環境滿足，所以依靠利害得失而發動，可能會產生出他律的、排他的認識以及關係。對於安全、從屬、親愛關係和尊重的需要，只能由其他人滿足，即只能來自個人之外。這就意味著在很大程度上依賴於環境。在這種依賴狀態下的一個人，確實不能說他統治著自己或支配著自己的命運。¹⁶自我實現的人會獨立於周圍環境而存在的。馬斯洛的人本主義心理學理論的核心是人通過“自我實現”，滿足多層次的需要系統，達到“高峰體驗”，重新找回人的價值，實現完美人格。實現完美人格不能依靠外在的需求而達到的，應該更上一層樓看整體宇宙。

馬斯洛在1968年再版的《存在心理學探索》的序言中寫道：

我認爲人本主義的、第三種力量的心理學是過渡性的，是“更高級的”第四種心理學，即超越個人的、超越人的、以宇宙爲中心，而不是以人的需要和興趣爲中心的，超出人性、同一性(identity)、自我實現的那種心理學的準備階段。¹⁷

自我實現的需要是超越性的。追求真善美，將最終導向完美人格的塑造。他說：

事實上，關於“真正的人(authentic person)”的每一種認真的描述都擴展到含有這種意思，即這種真正的人依靠他已有的美德，對他的環境、事實上是對普遍的社會都能採取一種新的關係。他不僅在各個方面超越他自己；而且他也超越他的文化。他抵制文化適應。他變得更加超然於他的社會和他的文化了。¹⁸

¹⁵ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁35。

¹⁶ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁29。

¹⁷ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁6。

馬斯洛主張越過自我實現的理論結構，應該將自我以外的世界意義聯繫起來，把整個宇宙看成一個有機的整體，最後領悟到宇宙人生的真理，並達到精神自由的境界。對這樣學問，他稱之為“存在心理學(Being-psychology)”。存在心理學關心的是目的，而不是手段。也就是說，它關心的是終極體驗(end-experience)、終極價值(end-value)、終極認知(end-cognition)、作為目的的人(people as ends)。馬斯洛對這種特殊的認知，將稱之為存在認知(cognition of Being, 或 B-cognition)，與缺失性認知形成鮮明的對比。他又將存在愛的體驗，也就是父母的體驗、神秘的或海洋般的或自然的體驗、創造的時刻、矯治的和智力的頓悟、情慾高潮的體驗、運動完成的某種狀態等等，這些以及其他最高快樂實現的時刻，稱之為高峰體驗(peak-experience)。高峰體驗本身就是目的，是目的的體驗，而不是手段的體驗。自我實現的需要是超越性的，追求真善美，將最終導向完美人格的塑造，高峰體驗代表了人的這種最佳狀態。高峰體驗中整個存在被察覺。在存在認知中，體驗或對象傾向於被看成是超越各種關係、可能的利益、方便和目的。看來它似乎就是宇宙中所有的一體，似乎它就是和宇宙同義的全部存在。¹⁹ 王守仁提倡萬物一體。世界是各各存在實現自己本性的場所。整個個體表面上看，似乎獨立地存在，可是實質上是息息相關存在著。然而宇宙內整個存在中，唯有人類會自覺此有機的關聯性。我們人藉由感通能力為其內容的心的靈明性，可以統覺自己與萬物本是一體。王守仁說：“爾未看此花時，此花與汝心同歸於寂。爾來看此花時，則此花顏色一時明白起來。便知此花不在爾的心外。”²⁰ 對主體來說，當自己意識投射時，客觀對象才會呈現其真實存在。此處所謂客觀存在呈現自己於吾人面前，是指他們持著意義走進吾人心裏。若要客觀事物持著意義走進吾人的世界，主體先賦予意義給客觀事物才可能。如王守仁所說：“蓋其天地萬物一體之仁，疾痛迫切，雖欲已之而自有所不容已。”²¹ 那樣，唯對自己創造、自己賦予意義的世界，才把他人的痛苦作為自己的痛苦，接著跟隨想治癒的責任意識。王守仁以能自知自覺自證，並且感通他人的痛苦為自己的痛苦的靈明性理解良知，建構自己，而唯有自己構成世界，世界才有意義於自己。自己構成世界，就意味著持有責任感。吾人唯有明確的責任意識，實踐就會帶著必然性，並且能夠完成自己實現，和諧宇宙。

一旦達到高峰體驗就進入存在狀態。馬斯洛認為存在狀態是暫時的、超激發的、非努力的、非自我中心的、無目的的、自我批准的狀態、盡善盡美和目標達成時的體驗和狀態。²² 進存在狀態境界，在東方各大思想體系之中，“靜坐”工夫是很受歡迎的工夫方法。王守仁在龍場時，也就是“日夜端

¹⁸ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁10。

¹⁹ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁65—66。

²⁰ 王守仁，《傳習錄》卷下，《王陽明全集》上，頁108。

²¹ 王守仁，《傳習錄》卷中，《王陽明全集》上，頁81。

²² 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁64。

居澄默，以求靜一，……忽中夜，大悟格物致知之旨……。”²³ 自滁陽後，王守仁多教學者靜坐。一友靜坐有見，馳問先生。答曰：

吾昔居滁時，見諸生多務知解，口耳異同，無益於得，姑教之靜坐。一時窺見光景，頗多收效。久之，漸有喜靜厭動，流入枯槁之病。或務為玄解妙覺，動人聽聞，故邇來說致良知。良知明白，隨你靜處體悟也好，隨你去事上磨煉也好，良知原是無動無靜的。此便是學問頭腦。我這個話頭自滁州到今，亦較過幾番，只是致良知三字無病。醫經折肱，方能察人病理。²⁴

他之所以靜坐，非欲坐禪入定，因平日為事物紛拏，未知為己，欲以靜坐補小學收放一段工夫的方便之一。靜坐，可以一時窺見光景，頗多收效。可是究竟是不夠實踐動力的。

馬斯洛認為純存在心理學的危險在於它可能傾向於成為情態的，而不說明運動、定向和成長的實情。我們傾向於把存在、自我實現的狀態描繪成彷彿它們是盡善盡美的涅槃狀態。一旦你達到了涅槃狀態，你就會在那裏停止下來，似乎你能做的一切就是止於至善而心滿意足。²⁵ 他說：

存在認知與平常認知相比要被動的多，接受性更多，自然，它永遠不可能完全被動、完全接受。我發現，這種“被動認知”最好的描述出自東方的哲學家，特別是來自老子和道教哲學家。……道教“聽其自然”的概念也說的是我力圖去說的東西，即知覺可能是無所求的，而不是有所求的；是沈思的，而不是強求的。它在體驗面前可能是恭順的、不干預的、接受的，而不是強取的，它能让知覺成為其自身。²⁶

他又說：

迄今為止，在描述健康人概念時的一個主要困境，是它稍微有點靜力學的特點。由於我研究自我實現大多是在年歲較大的人身上進行的，所以自我實現傾向於被看成是最終的或最後的事態，是遙遠的目標，而不是被看成能動的，貫穿一生的運動課程。傾向於被看成存在(Being)，而不是形成(Becoming)。²⁷

他想將“存在”和“形成”及“缺失”融而為一，建立一套完整的心理學。這用東方思想概念描述的話，可以說成本體與工夫的一體。馬斯洛像他自己說道教“任其自然”的看法經常不起作用，所以表述為“有幫助的任其自然(helpful let-be)”的，一種熱愛的和尊重的道教觀來彌補實踐動力之不足

²³ 王守仁，〈年譜〉，《王陽明全集》上，頁1228。

²⁴ 王守仁，〈傳習錄〉卷下，《王陽明全集》上，頁105。

²⁵ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁40。

²⁶ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁78。

²⁷ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁22。

處。²⁸這觀念非模糊的，而且不能夠成功的保證。因為如牟宗三說道家主要是依據“為道日損”的進路提煉一種“無”的智慧。它所表現的乃是一種通過實踐工夫所達到的主觀性的“境界形態”。²⁹所以道家實踐工夫，的確沒有具體的內容。馬斯洛指存在認知和沈思思想理解的危險為它可能使人成為不太負責任的，尤其是在幫助別人方面。他曾提問過“佛陀的覺悟是純粹個人的、私人的占有物？還是他也必定屬於其他人、屬於世界呢？”³⁰他把自我實現分為“利己的自我實現”與“成為善的自我實現”，認為佛、道講求的會是“利己的自我實現”。王守仁說：“仙家說虛從養生上來，佛氏說無從出離生死苦海上來，卻於本體上加卻這些子意思在，便不是便不是他虛無的本色了，便於本體有障礙。”³¹他把佛、道兩家所達到的虛或無的境界視之為利己的。說儒家聖人只是還他良知的本色。如王艮在《鰍鱗說》說：“吾非斯人之徒與而誰與？”³²良知自然不容已地要求不止於個人的超越，而是進一步實踐由不忍之心的痛覺自然流出來的責任意識，及於人我一體，更及於物我一體，萬物都達到自由快樂之境為窮極目的。

馬斯洛一方面批判了傳統的弗洛伊德主義者，因為他們傾向於把任何東西都病理化（在極端情況下），因為他們沒有看到人走向健康的可能性，因為他們對任何東西都是透過黑色眼鏡來看的。但是，成長學派（在極端情況下）也同樣並非無懈可擊，因為他們傾向於透過玫瑰色眼鏡來看東西。而且他們總是回避病理問題、弱點問題和成長失敗的問題。一個似乎是全部邪惡和罪孽的神學。另一個似乎是根本沒有任何邪惡的神學。因此，二者都同樣是不正確和不現實的。³³比較儒家人性論，一方是站在過於性善說的立場，另一方則站在過於性惡說立場。馬斯洛認為對人性堅持一個太樂觀，一個太悲觀看待。兩者都不現實的。他主張應該兼顧兩邊，可是沒有提出適當的方法。儒家有“存天理，去人欲”工夫來解決兩難的問題。

王守仁確信“本體工夫合一”，而說：

性無定體，論亦無定體，有自本體上說者，有自發用上說者。有自源頭上說者，有自流弊處說者。……孟子說性，直從源頭上說來，亦是說箇大概如此。荀子性惡之說，是從流弊上來，也未可盡說他不是。只是見得未精耳。³⁴

²⁸ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁51。

²⁹ 牟宗三，《才性與玄理》序。

³⁰ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁110。

³¹ 王守仁，《傳習錄》卷下，《王陽明全集》上，頁106。

³² 《論語》，〈微子〉。

³³ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁44。

³⁴ 王守仁，《傳習錄》卷下，《王陽明全集》上，頁115。

所以他的門人將其教法概括為兩方面，一即“本體上說工夫”，一即“工夫上說本體”。因為“心無體，以天地萬物感應之是非為體”。王守仁提出良知概念給具體的內容，而且教人良知具足，當下會呈現。他說：“只存得此心常見在，便是學。”³⁵ 又說：

我輩致知，只是各隨分限所及。今日良知見在如此，只隨今日所知，擴充到底。明日良知又有開悟，便從明日所知擴充到底，如此方是精一功夫。³⁶

又說：“良知只是一個，隨他發見流行處當下具足，更無去求，不須假借。”³⁷ 馬斯洛說：

某人是什麼和他能成為什麼，對心理學家也同時存在的。因為，就解決了存在和形成之間的二難推理。潛能不僅僅是“將要是”或者“可能是”；而且它們現在就存在著。自我實現的價值作為目標存在著，而且它們也是真實的，盡管還沒有現實化。人既是他正在是那種人，同時又是他嚮往成為的那樣的人。³⁸

“解決存在和形成之間的二難推理”的關鍵在工夫。那工夫不異於“致良知”。馬斯洛說：

（高峰體驗的）哲學的蘊涵是驚人的。如果為了辯論我們承認了這樣的命題，即，在高峰體驗時可以更清楚地看到現實本身的性質和更深刻地看透現實的本質，那麼，這就和很多哲學家 and 神學家所說的，……當從其最佳狀態和從崇高的觀點來看時，整個存在僅僅是中性的或善的，而邪惡、痛苦、威脅等只是一種局部現象，一種不看宇宙的完整和統一，只從自我中心的或過於卑劣的觀點來看它的產物。（當然，這並不是否認邪惡、痛苦和死亡，寧可說是與它們的一種和解，是對它們的必然性的一種理解。）³⁹

我們不可不承認惡的存在，所以不僅承認善的存在，也承認惡的存在時，可使善惡成為互相對待性以相對化，再合而為整體。而且站在對某個行動善惡與否，不能明確的建立道德評價標準的情況之下，某個人的行動會被決定自從無意識方面流出來的自發性的決擇。在王守仁的說法，最被質疑的部分，就是他所說的“心體無善無惡”。《傳習錄》收錄王陽明與其弟子薛侃之間的對話：

³⁵ 王守仁，〈傳習錄〉卷下，《王陽明全集》上，頁24。

³⁶ 王守仁，〈傳習錄〉卷下，《王陽明全集》上，頁96。

³⁷ 王守仁，〈傳習錄〉卷下，《王陽明全集》上，頁85。

³⁸ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁144。

³⁹ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁73。

侃去花間草。因曰：“天地間何善難培，惡難去？”先生曰：“未培未去耳。”少間曰：“此等看善惡，皆從軀殼起念。便會錯。”侃未達。曰：“天地生意，花草一般。何曾有善惡之分？子欲觀花，則以花爲善，以草爲惡。如欲用草時，復以草爲善矣。此等善惡，皆由汝心好惡所生。故知是錯。”曰：“然則無善無惡乎？”曰：“無善無惡者理之靜。有善有惡者氣之動。不動於氣，即無善無惡。是謂至善”曰：“佛氏亦無善無惡。何以異？”曰：“佛氏著在無善無惡上，便一切都不管，不可以治天下。聖人無善無惡，只是無有作好，無有作惡。不動於氣。然遵王之道，會其有極。便自一循天理，便有箇裁成輔相”曰：“草既非惡，即草不宜去矣？”曰：“如此卻是佛老意見。草若是礙，何妨汝去？”曰：“如此又是作好作惡”曰：“不作好惡，非是全無好惡。卻是無知覺的人。謂之不作者，只是好惡一循於理。不去，又著一分意思。如此即是不曾好惡一般。”⁴⁰

視花爲善，視草爲惡，起在感情領域的現象。因善惡根據於心裏的好惡感情，而鑑賞花的時候，就會視花爲善，視草爲惡的。隨著感情行動之前，我們須先要作價值判斷。如果價值判斷的標準在感情上欣賞，就會視草爲妨礙欣賞而除去的。可是我們要用草，草就變成善。從馬斯洛的觀點看，自我包含好惡的感情，而由好惡的感情發出來的分別心會產生執著進而產生痛苦。若不論價值判斷，只從“生命”的觀點看，花與草一樣是個“生命”，所以具有同樣的價值。

四、高峰體驗與童心說

馬斯洛認爲高峰體驗是極烈的同一性體驗，而能解放一個人的創造力、自發性、表現性和特質。而且從消除病狀的嚴格意義上看，高峰體驗可能有而且的確有某種治療效果。⁴¹王守仁的龍場悟道，王艮“一夕夢天墮壓身，萬人奔號求救，先生舉臂起之，視其日月星辰失次，復手整之。覺而汗溢如雨，心體洞徹。”⁴²的體驗。聶豹“獄中閑久靜極，忽見此心真體，光明瑩徹，萬物皆備。”⁴³的體驗。羅洪先“當極靜時，覺此心中虛無物，旁通無窮，如長空雲氣流行，無所止極，如大海魚龍變化，無有間隔。無內外可指，無動靜可分，所謂無在無不在。吾之一身乃其發竅，固非形質所能限也。”⁴⁴的體驗，都屬於馬斯洛所謂的高峰體驗。他們知覺到極烈的同一性，並且的確經驗到心理治療效果。

⁴⁰ 王守仁，〈傳習錄〉卷上，《王陽明全集》上，頁29。

⁴¹ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁92。

⁴² 王艮，〈年譜〉38世條，《王心齋全集》。

⁴³ 聶豹，《聶豹集》，頁652。

⁴⁴ 羅洪先，〈答蔣道林〉，《羅洪先集》，頁298。

自我實現者的創造性在許多方面很像完全快樂的、無憂無慮的、兒童般的創造性。它是自發的、不費力的、天真的、自如的，是一種擺脫了除規和陋習的自由。而且看來它在很大程度上是由“天真的”自由感知和“天真的”無抑制的自發性和表現性組成的。幾乎所有兒童都能自由地感知，他們沒有那裏可能有什麼，什麼東西應該在那裏，那裏總是有什麼等等的先驗預期。幾乎所有的兒童，在受到鼓舞的時候，在沒有規劃和預先意圖的情況下，都能創作一支歌、一首詩、一個舞蹈、一幅畫、一種遊戲或比賽。⁴⁵馬斯洛又提出“存在遊戲(B-playfulness)”概念形容“高峰體驗”所至的境界。說存在遊戲具有廣闊無邊的或超凡的好脾氣的性質，超越了任何敵意。它可以容易地被稱之為幸福的快樂、興趣盎然或興高采烈。它既是成熟的又是幼稚的。⁴⁶

陽明學發展至泰州學派，聖人境界同視於赤子之心。在儒家傳統，泰州學派的傳統之一就是強調赤子之心，最受批判的也是他們所主張的“赤子之心”。顏鈞質疑對自己所主張的“心之情神即是聖”時，自問自答形式回答時提出“赤子之心”，說：“夫赤子之心，天造具足其仁神者也。”⁴⁷顏鈞的理論可以說是以仁、神為核心的，他認為，天地間最可寶貴的是人，人最可貴的是心，故人是“天地之心”，心是“人身之主”，且此“心”無所不包，無所不至，神工莫測，“默朕淵浩，獨擅神聰。變適無疆，統率性融。生德充盈，潤浥形躬。親麗人物，應酬日用，自不慮而知，不學而能者也。”⁴⁸他把這仁、神概念歸結於不慮而知不學而能的赤子之心，可知他何等重視赤子之心。羅汝芳更發揮說：

天初生我，只是個赤子。赤子之心，渾然天理，細看其知不必慮，能不必學，果然與莫之為而為，莫之致而至的體段，渾然打得對同過。然則聖人之為聖人，只是把自己不慮不學的見在對同莫致的源頭，久久便自然成個不思不勉而從容中道的聖人也。⁴⁹

羅汝芳認為赤子之心的根本特徵，即是渾然無知，沒有受到後天見聞知識的熏染，所以其孩笑、啼哭、食乳、視聽等行為皆出於自然本能，是人之自然本性的流露。所以他說：“天之春見於草木之間，而人之性見於視聽之際。”⁵⁰他還以自然率性釋仁，認為赤子初生啼哭以戀母懷的自然欲求即是“仁”，而說：“赤子出胎，最初啼叫一聲，想其叫時，只是愛戀母親懷抱，卻指著這個愛根而名為仁，推充這個愛根以來做人，合而言之曰‘仁者人也’。”⁵¹剛出生的孩子依靠自然本能活動。這個時候還沒與母親分開，也

⁴⁵ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁124。

⁴⁶ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁103。

⁴⁷ 顏鈞，《顏鈞集》，頁55。

⁴⁸ 顏鈞，《顏鈞集》，頁1。

⁴⁹ 羅汝芳，《羅汝芳集》，頁74。

⁵⁰ 羅汝芳，《羅汝芳集》，頁116。

⁵¹ 羅汝芳，《羅汝芳集》，頁74。

不被一切世俗的價值判斷占領，所以純真無垢而什麼憂患都沒有。羅汝芳又說：

吾人與天，原初是一體，天則與我的性情原初亦相貫通。驗之赤子乍生之時，一念知覺未萌，然愛好骨肉熙熙怡怡，無有感而不應，無有應而不妙，是何等景象，何等快活。⁵²

所以回復到赤子之心即可達到聖人之境。李贄作〈童心說〉：

夫童心者，真心也。若以童心為不可，是以真心為不可也。夫童心者，絕假純真，最初一念之本心也。若夫失卻童心，便失卻真心。失卻真心，便失卻真人。人而非真，全不復有初矣。童子者，人之初也。童心者，心之初也。夫心之初，曷可失也！⁵³

就是主張解開約束自己的所有枷鎖，回復充滿喜悅的純真無垢的眞己。童心具有純真性和無意識性表現出完整的自我形象，即表現出完善地具備自己個性的純真無垢的全人像。可是強調赤子之心或自然本性就被批判為“任情縱慾”而導致破壞禮教，攪亂社會秩序的嫌疑。顏鈞強調“赤子之心”時，也被質疑類似的問題，他以孔子“從心所欲不踰矩”之境來回答：

夫赤子之心，天造具足其仁神者也。胎生三月之後，未有善養其天然者，所以夫子受生以至十五歲，即便通曉其不慮之知，不學之能，遂然究竟自養自操自信，只在此處做人，以保全其仁能者也。所以加時習之學，日用之仁，三十而立，四十不惑，五十知天命，六十而順，七十乃止至從心所欲不踰矩也，乃自獲全其胎生三月不慮不學之知，能為自樂。樂發颺其自全精神遂日用也，直透神妙莫測之變適也，豈輕易哉！⁵⁴

在顏鈞看來，生來具足仁神，不慮而知，不學而能的赤子之心，由於受名利聲色之誘惑，聞見知識之遮蔽，難以彰顯。他說：

自天子至於庶民，無老少男女聖凡，同此天性能，無增益也。奈何有生以後，父母溺愛，無所不盡其驕養，養至知覺，無所不盡其喜好。入塾教讀，師友無所不引其識見。凡此長驅，赤心糜爛，將如何而能復還此能之良哉！⁵⁵

由上看來，顏鈞的“赤子之心”說，不是任情縱慾，而是指經歷著人生的各個階段，最後入從心所欲不踰矩之境界，而體貼心之自然，保持心情平衡，窮極達到開心遂樂的。在他看來，能否做到“從心”，乃是把握自己“性情”、實現仁者境界的關鍵，由“從心率性”著手，才能真正達到開心自由的境界。

⁵² 羅汝芳，《羅汝芳集》，頁124。

⁵³ 李贄，《李贄文集》第一卷，頁92。

⁵⁴ 顏鈞，《顏鈞集》，頁55-56。

⁵⁵ 顏鈞，《顏鈞集》，頁37。

馬斯洛證實在如果一個到達更高的成熟水平上，兩極和衝突就被融合了、超越了、消除了。自我實現者既是自私的又是無私的，既是狂歡的又是具古典美的，既是個體化的又是社會化的，既是與別人融合在一起的又是與別人分離的，等等。這對“任情縱慾”的說法很好的對應。王艮說：

心本自樂，自將私欲縛。私欲一萌時，良知還自覺。一覺便消除，人心依舊樂。樂是樂此學，學是學此樂。不樂不是學，不學不是樂。樂便然後學，學便然後樂。樂是學，學是樂。嗚呼！天下之樂，何如此學。天下之學，何如此樂？⁵⁶

對儒家，尤其陽明學派心學，我們可稱之為“實踐心理學”、“快樂的心理學”。

五、結語

馬斯洛關注的是什麼是有道德的生活？什麼樣的人是道德的人？怎樣才能把人教育成期望和喜歡過有道德的生活的人？怎樣才能把兒童培養成道德高尚的成人？等等問題。他認為提出這樣的問題對心理學來說，是革命性的轉折。他說：

數千年來，人本主義者總是企圖建立一個自然主義的、心理的價值體系，試圖從人自己的本性中派生價值體系，而不必求助於人自身之外的權威。歷史上出現過許多這樣的理論家，然而對於群眾性的實際效果來說，他們通通失敗了。……但是，我確信在最近幾十年間，心理學在科學和技術上的某種發展，使我們有可能第一次覺得有了信心，只要我們充分艱苦地工作，這個古老的願望，即建立從人的本性中派生出的價值體系，就可以實現了。⁵⁷

他經由存在認知，至於事實和價值的融合，要建立科學的倫理學。可是他所謂的科學觀察經驗得到的，只是觀察幾個充分成熟的人來達成結論。總體上來看，缺乏具體的方法，僅止於一種宣言而已。若他看到儒家“存天理，去人欲”，“涵養省察”，“致良知”等的種種工夫方法，他的“存在心理學”更會完整的、扎實的。反過來說，儒家對心理學的發展將會做出莫大的貢獻。

■ 投稿日：2017.05.01 / 審查日：2017.05.16-2017.07.24 / 刊載決定日：2017.07.28

⁵⁶ 王艮，〈雜著·樂學歌〉，《王心齋全集》卷四。

⁵⁷ 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，頁133。

參考文獻

- 弗蘭克·G·戈布爾，《第三思潮——馬斯洛心理學》，呂明、陳紅雯譯，上海：上海譯文出版社，1970。
- 李 贄，《李贄文集》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2000。
- 梁漱溟，《人心與人生》，上海：上海人民出版社，2011。
- 羅洪先，《羅洪先集》，南京：鳳凰出版社，2007。
- 羅汝芳，《羅汝芳集》，南京：鳳凰出版社，2007。
- 馬斯洛，《存在心理學探索》，李文滸譯，雲南：雲南人民出版社，1987。
- 牟宗三，《才性與玄理》，臺灣：學生書局，1985。
- 聶 豹，《聶豹集》，南京：鳳凰出版社，2007。
- 唐君毅，《人生之體驗續編》，臺灣：學生書局，1996。
- 王 艮，《王心齋全集》，臺北：廣文書局，1987。
- 王守仁，《王陽明全集》，上海：上海古籍出版社，1992。
- 顏 鈞，《顏鈞集》，北京：中國社會科學出版社，1996。
- 張 載，《張載集》，臺北：漢京文化事業，1983。

Being-psychology and Confucianism

JUN Byungsul

Abstract

Abraham H. Maslow is one of the main founders of Humanistic psychology. According to him, modern people live with many different psychological problems, and among them, loss of values is the ultimate chronic disease. He argues that since current situations modern people are facing are more dangerous than ever in history, people should work their way out toward reaching the goal of self-realization, thereby improving such situations. He also states that Americans have already realized that political democratization and economic prosperity do not offer solutions to basic value issues, stressing the need of converting to oneself in order to establish one's values.

Maslow, in his writing *Toward a Psychology of Being*, criticizes traditional behavioristic psychology and environmental determinism. He highlights the potential of humans, as an active being, for creating something and realizing complete personality. He states that the final goal of Being-psychology is for humans to expand themselves from society to the universe and fulfil themselves as one part of the organized whole. This goal corresponds with the ultimate aim of Confucianism. Maslow is concerned about questions such as "what is a moral life?", "what makes a person moral?", "how can we raise children to be morally elegant adults?" He regards this kind of critical mind or awareness as a revolutionary transition in psychology. He tries to set up scientific ethics where truth and values fuse together through recognizing the being. What he means by "science" is scientific ethics acquired through observation and experience, especially by emulating fully mature people. However, this is just an empty statement lacking concrete steps. Confucianism has their way of practice such as "*cun tianli qu renyu*" 存天理去人欲, "*hanyang xingcha*" 涵養省察, and "*zhi liangzhi*" 致良知. If Maslow had known such ways of practice in Confucianism, his Being-psychology would have been more perfect and sound.

Keywords: Abraham H. Maslow, Being-psychology, Confucianism, scientific ethics, values

Regulations of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I . General Regulations

1. (Name)

The official name for the institute is “Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture” (hereafter, ICPC), which is an organization that belongs to the Academy of East Asian Studies (hereafter, AEAS) at Sungkyunkwan University.

2. (Objective)

ICPC primarily conducts research in the field of Confucian thought. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to provide fundamental guiding principles for humanity in a rapidly developing society.

II . Organization

3. (Constitution)

ICPC is constituted of the following: 1) the director, 2) the management committee, and 3) an editorial board.

4. (Director)

1) The director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with a specialization that conforms to the objective outlined in article I of this document. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.

2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.

3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.

5. (Assistant Director)

1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist with the director’s various tasks.

2) Assistant director(s) must be a research member of ICPC, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.

3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.

6. (Office)

1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area(s).

2) The head of the office must hold a position equivalent to or greater than that of a research professor. The head must be nominated by

the director of ICPC, approved by the management committee, and appointed by the director of AEAS.

III. Management Committee

7. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC may establish a management committee in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
- 2) The management committee shall be no larger than 10 persons. The director will serve as the head of the management committee.
- 3) Members of the management committee must be research members of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.

8. (Agenda)

The agenda for the management committee includes:

- 1) Establishing basic plans for management and research.
- 2) Declaring and/or eliminating various rules and regulations.
- 3) Settling the budget and accounts.
- 4) Other relevant management.

9. (Call for Meeting)

- 1) The director must call for any meetings of the management committee.
- 2) Meetings are valid only when more than half of all members are present. In order to settle an agenda, more than half of all members present at a meeting must agree to any decision or action.

IV. Editorial Board

10. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC includes an editorial board which discusses and makes decisions regarding ICPC publications.
- 2) The editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars both in Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
- 3) Each editorial board must be appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
- 4) Each year, the editorial board will publish the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.

11. (Call for Meeting)

More than half of the editorial board members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

* The above regulations take effect from March 1, 2000.

The Code of Management for the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

I . General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established according to article IV-10-4 of the Regulations for the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC). It comprises the regulatory guidelines for publishing the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*).

2. (Mission)

- 1) To supervise publication of *JCPC* and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing *JCPC*.

II . Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)

The editorial board is comprised of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of the editing team, and other editing team members.

4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, both in Korea and abroad.

5. (Terms)

The basic term for editorial board members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. The editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

6. (Chief Manager)

The director of ICPC is also the chief manger and supervises the editorial board.

7. (Editor-in-chief)

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC and is responsible for all editorial issues.

8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)

The head of the editing team and the editing team's other members are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of the editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting with related editorial matters.

III. Publication of *JCPC*

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)

JCPC is published twice in one year: on August 31 and February 28.

10. (Circulation)

The size of circulation for *JCPC* is determined by the editorial board.

11. (Size)

The standard size for *JCPC* is 176mm × 248mm.

12. (Editorial System)

- 1) Academic articles written in either Chinese or English.
- 2) Academic articles include: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, an abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
- 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
- 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
- 5) Regulations, bulletins, and materials other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of the editorial board.

IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)

The subject of article includes:

- 1) Confucian thought and culture in Korea and abroad.
- 2) Analysis of books, translations, or research articles on related subjects published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
- 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in the arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

No certain qualification for submission is required.

14. (Number of Words)

- 1) A length of each article is limited to 25,000 characters for Chinese and 12,000 words for English, including the abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc.
- 2) The number of words permitted for materials other than academic articles and reviews are to be determined by the editorial board.

15. (Submission Guidelines)

- 1) A general call for papers is always extended, but only articles submitted at least three months prior to the publication date are usually subjected to the review process for a specific issue.
- 2) Submissions should be forwarded to jicpc@skku.edu as an email attachment.
- 3) Abstracts in Chinese and English must include five or more keywords.

- 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author, as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part(s) of writing, must be noted.
- 5) E-mail address(es) and phone number(s) must be provided for all authors.
16. (Control of Submitted Articles)
 - 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
 - 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for published articles belongs to ICPC.

V. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)

All submitted articles must pass the reviewing process.
18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)
 - 1) In principle, the editorial board will select three outside reviewers for each submitted article and commission them to evaluate the article. If two of the reviewers agree, the article can be published.
 - 2) In specific situations, the editorial board can precede the reviewing process by selecting two outside reviewers. If only one of the reviewers recommends publication, the editorial board can decide whether to publish or reject the article based on the journal's academic standards. In such cases, the editor-in-chief is supposed to make a written report to the chief manager (the director).
 - 3) If submitted articles do not meet the basic requirements of the journal (e.g., in terms of length, subject, etc.), the editorial board can decide not to proceed with the reviewing process and return the submission to the author(s). The editorial board can also ask the author(s) to resubmit after revision.
 - 4) In principle, the board of reviewers must maintain a just and fair attitude, and should not review articles written by scholars with whom they are personally affiliated.
 - 5) For the sake of fairness, the review process will remain anonymous.
19. (Standard of Review)
 - 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%).
 - 2) The result will divide the articles into two groups: publishable and not publishable.
 - 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.
20. (Feedback time)

Reviewers must submit their feedback on each article to the editorial

board within two weeks from it was assigned to them.

21. (Reporting Back the Result)

The editorial board must report back to the author(s) as soon as the results of the reviewing process have been received.

VI. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)

This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of the editorial board agrees, provided that more than half of the editorial board's members are present at the time of voting.

*** Other Regulations**

23. (Others)

- 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
- 2) The above regulations take effect from December 20, 2006.
- 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with all other details concerning the above regulations.

The Code of Ethics and Management for the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC).

2. (Application)

This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to provide a framework for systematic investigation, management, and resolution if an unjust actions occur. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting the creativity of academic research and strengthening an ethical spirit within academia.

II. Research Ethics

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)

- 1) All authors who submit their articles to the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*) must follow this code of ethics.
- 2) All research outcomes that are mainly based on faked or fraudulent research or upon already published work without providing any new insight are regarded as forged.
- 3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving explicit and objective credit to that author is regarded as plagiarism.
- 4) Submission of one's own work that has already been presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
- 5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
- 6) Authors must take full responsibility for their presented articles.
- 7) Co-authors must make it clear which parts of the essay each author has contributed to, and take responsibility for those parts of the essay.

4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)

- 1) The editorial board members of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
- 2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and

assume responsibility for receiving articles, the election of reviewers, and the selection of articles for publication,

- 3) Editorial board members must be silent about any personal information of all authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a misuse of their rights.
 - 4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submissions and selecting reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general board members.
 - 5) If any doubt or questions concerning ethical matters arise, the editorial board must immediately call for an investigation by the ethics committee.
5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
- 1) Members of reviewing committee of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Reviewers must follow the established regulations for providing an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and provide their honest feedback to the editorial board. If a reviewer feels that they cannot review an article assigned to them for an objective reason, they must promptly notify the editorial board.
 - 3) Reviewers must rely on academic standards and their own conscience in reviewing submitted articles. Reviewers cannot reject an article based on their own personal standpoints without sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
 - 4) Reviewers must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process of review.

III. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee

6. (Ethics Enforcement)
This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and is already in effect. The director will decide on establishing specific rules to applying these regulations.
7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)
The Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and up to five members of the editorial board. The director of ICPC is also the director of the Ethics Committee.
8. (Function of Ethics Committee)
1) Upon a suspected violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee will proceed to conduct an investigation and issue a decision, notifying the accused of the opinion of the committee. It will also report the issue to the editorial board.

- 2) When investigating the violation, the ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.
9. (Accusation of Violation)
 - 1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can continue an investigation if other evidence is discovered.
 - 2) The same process of accusation applies to both editorial board members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
 - 1) If accused of violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation conducted by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the accused violation.
 - 2) All articles under investigation will be postponed for publication until the investigation has been completed and a report issued to the editorial board. Investigations are to be completed before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)

The accused has right to defend their article. Their defense can be made before the general members of the editorial board, if the accused wishes to do so.
12. (Forms of Penalty)

Penalties which the ethics committee can impose include warnings, submission restrictions, and expulsion from membership. Already published articles can be deferred or pulled out completely. Sponsored articles, when used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, may also be subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)

Any revisions made to this regulations must follow ICPC's revision principles.
14. (Others)

Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

*** Other Regulations**

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC. It is agreed by the editorial board (October 20, 2007), and is in force since January 1, 2008.

Submission Requirements for Contributors

I. Submission

1. Manuscripts should be written in docx file and are to be submitted as an email attachment to jicpc@skku.edu.
2. Type in "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your manuscript, which includes your academic title, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone number(s), and mailing address.
3. On the first page of the body text, make an abstract of about 300 words (including five keywords or more)
4. Unless specially invited, a length of each manuscript (including footnotes) should be around 8,000 words, and should not exceed 12,000 words (font: Times New Roman; font size: 12 pt.; line space: double).

II. Style Guidelines

1. In general, we follow the editorial guidelines established in the 16th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Please consult the online information of it at www.chicagomanualofstyle.org.
 2. The citation style required by the Journal is short references in footnotes and complete citation data in the REFERENCES section. Short references contain only the author's last name, title of work (shortened if necessary), and page number(s) as in the following example: 1. Fingarette, *Confucius*, 15-16.
 3. Imagine that the readers of your article have little understanding of Asian philosophical and cultural background. Provide explanations for technical terms as well as any words or concepts which are essential to a clear understanding of your article.
 4. When romanizing Chinese terms, use pinyin system. Terms in Korean should be romanized according to the romanization system established in 2000 by the Korean government. For Japanese terms, follow the Hepburn romanization system.
 5. When historic figure(s) and state(s) are first mentioned, provide their dates in parenthesis as follows: Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), Han 漢 (206 BCE-220 CE).
 6. When you quote a passage in pre-modern Chinese texts, put the English translation in the body and the original Chinese text in the footnote.
- * For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact us at jicpc@skku.edu.

儒教文化研究所章程

第一章 總則

第一條 (名稱)

本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”(以下簡稱“研究所”),是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條 (目的)

本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主,同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究,並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展,使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

第二章 組織

第三條 (機構)

研究所的機構如下設置:1. 所長,2. 運營委員會,3. 編輯委員會。

第四條 (所長)

1. 所長必須由符合第一章規定中目的的專業的本校教授擔任,由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所,總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年,可以連任。

第五條 (部長)

1. 爲了協助所長,並分擔所長的一部分業務,所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長從研究委員中產生,由所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年,可以連任。

第六條 (研究室)

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任,須經運營委員會的審議通過,再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第三章 運營委員會

第七條 (構成)

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關的重要事項,研究所可以設置運營委員會。

2. 運營委員會由所長和10人以內的委員構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員從研究所的研究委員中產生, 由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條 (審議事項)運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。
3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條 (會議)

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有過半數以上的在職委員出席才可以召開, 出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

第四章 編輯委員會

第十條 (構成)

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜, 故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命, 任期爲2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》, 論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另行制定。

第十一條 (會議)

編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則 (施行日)本規定自2000年3月1日起施行。

《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）

本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4節編輯委員會（以下簡稱委員會）第27條第1項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條（任務）

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條（構成）

委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任（委員長）、主編、編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯構成。

第四條（編輯顧問和委員的選任）

編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長從世界各國有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條（委員的任期）

委員任期為2年，必要時可以連任。但為了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性，主編原則上是連任的。

第六條（主任）

主任（委員長）由儒教文化研究所所長兼任，主管編輯委員會。

第七條（主編）

主編由研究所所長任命，總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條（編輯部主任、編輯）

編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務，編輯輔助主任處理相關的編輯事務。

第三章 《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第九條（發行的次數和日期）

《儒教文化研究》每年兩次刊行，出版日期為8月31日和2月28日。

第十條（發行數量）

《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第十一條（開本）

實行176mm×248mm開本。

第十二條（編輯體制）

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分為論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。
5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

第四章 論文的投稿和管理

第十三條（投稿論文主題和資格）

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想為中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的分析。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文（包括學位論文）的論評和研究動向報告。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

第十四條（原稿字數）

1. 一般情況下按照中文15,000字 / 英文8,000words左右（包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等）的標準。
2. 論文以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

第十五條（論文投稿要領）

1. 隨時可以提交論文，但以本刊出版3個月前到達的論文作為該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式，投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文，需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員，並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

第十六條 (投稿論文的管理)

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序, 建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還, 所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所所有。

第五章 投稿論文的審查

第十七條 (審查義務)

刊載論文必須經過審查。

第十八條 (審查委員規定)

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文, 原則上編輯委員會將選定3名評審委員, 並委託給他們評審。論文經過審查委員2/3以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 特殊情況下編輯委員會可選定2名評審委員進行論文審查。2名審查委員中只有一名贊成刊登時, 編輯委員會可以通過內部會議決定該論文的刊登與否。而且, 編輯部主任要以書面形式向研究所的主任報告編輯部的決定。
3. 若投稿論文的長短或內容遠遠達不到本刊的基本要求, 委員會可以不進行評審而通告投稿者不可刊載, 或要求修訂後再次投稿。
4. 原則上, 審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
5. 為了保證審查的公正性, 審查全部採取匿名制。

第十九條 (審查標準)

1. 審查按照基本格式 (20%)、獨創性 (20%)、主題明確性 (20%)、邏輯性 (20%)、完整性 (20%) 來進行綜合評定。
2. 審查結果分為刊載可、否兩類。
3. 被評為不可刊載的論文, 不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第二十條 (審查結果報告)

審查委員從收到評審論文之日算起, 應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第二十一條 (審查結果通告)

委員會收到審查結果報告書後, 立即告知投稿者。

第二十二條 (稿費支付)

對於刊載文章, 支付給作者一定的稿費。

第六章 章程的修訂

第二十三條 (原則)

本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加, 並且經參加人員2/3以上的同意方可施行。

附 則

第二十四條（其他）

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。
2. 本規定自2006年12月20日起生效並施行。
3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的細部事項由委員會來決定並處理。

《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）

本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基準。

第二條（作用）

本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行為，以及不正當行為發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視為偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點，此種行為視為剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行為視為重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 接受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己公式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標準來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的

審查,並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審查,則應及時通報編輯委員會。

3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下,不能一味地依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”,也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。
4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密,不能私自公開或利用審查論文的內容。

第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條 (倫理規定的遵守)

本規定依據本會的會則制定,一經施行,立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條 (倫理委員會的構成)

倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員(5人左右)組成,所長兼任委員長。

第八條 (倫理委員會的職能)

1. 對於違反本規定的行為,倫理委員會要進行調查和議決,並將相關意見通告給當事人,然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行為時,要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密,不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條 (違反倫理規定行為的揭發)

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實,揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的,倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條 (調查以及審議)

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行為,則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查,若不配合,其行為則視為違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文,在事實查清以前應採取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條 (解釋的機會)

對於被揭發有違反倫理規定事實的會員,要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條 (處罰的類型)

倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以採取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文,若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告,也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條 (規定的修改)

此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條 (其他)

以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定, 並經過編輯委員會 (2007年10月20日) 的審議, 於2008年1月1日起施行。

投稿須知

1. 中文一律使用繁體, 英文按照一般慣例。來稿一律使用中文(或英文)制作, 請提交電子版(jicpc@skku.edu)。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分為論文題目、中文提要(300-400字)、中文關鍵詞(5個以上)、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要(大略300words)、英文關鍵詞(5個以上)等。
3. 作者簡介可置於文章的最後, 須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、Email、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式, 以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡歷。
4. 正文內容請用10.5號字, 行間距為1, 文章字數以15,000字為宜, 可以適當地增減。但最好不要超過25,000字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示, 若還要細分, 則請用“(一)、(二)、(三)……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊, 使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章內提到的一切書籍, 都要在正文後的“參考文獻”內注明。參考文獻標記序次如下: 作者,《書名》, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
如: 楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 北京: 中華書局, 1981。
 6. 1. 需要標記編者或譯者時: 作者,〈章節/論文〉, 編者/譯者編/譯《書名》, 頁碼, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
如: 張立文,〈程朱思想的時代精神〉, 楊曉塘編《程朱思想新論》, 頁1-8, 北京: 人民出版社, 1999。
 6. 2. 引用期刊內容時, 請依次注明: 作者, 文章名, 刊物名(包括期數), 文章所在頁碼。
如: 蒙培元,〈儒學是宗教嗎?〉,《孔子研究》, 2002年第2期, 頁39-46。
7. 文章正文的引用文, 採用簡式腳注標記。腳注標記方式如下: 作者, 論文名稱/書名, 引文所在頁碼。
如: 楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 頁56。
蒙培元,〈儒學是宗教嗎?〉, 頁42。
8. 若作者本人有對文章題目、文章內容的說明, 請放在當頁用腳注表示。
9. 來稿一經採用, 即付稿酬。不採用的稿件, 一律不退, 也不奉告評審意見。三個月內未接到採用通知的, 作者可自行處理。
10. 本刊對採用的稿件有刪改權, 不同意刪改者, 請在來稿中申明。
11. 本刊刊發的文章, 作者著作權使用費與稿費一次性付清。如作者不同意文章轉載, 請在來稿時聲明。

共同規約：
成均館大學、輔仁大學、馬來亞大學三校聯名學刊

本刊與《哲學論集》及《漢學研究學刊》訂定聯名期刊，互相推薦論文共同約定事項：

1. 締約雙方接受前揭兩學術期刊之間互相推薦優良的學術論文，並得接受同一作者相近論題的論文同時在兩刊物發刊。細部規定如下：
 - 1) 作為同一作者在聯名期刊同時發表的論文，其論文題目允許在同一專業課題之下，使用兩個性質相關而又可以分辨的不同的題目，分別出現在兩個期刊之中。
 - 2) 根據以上規定訂定題目的兩篇論文，其內容差異性應高於百分之八十。
 - 3) 根據以上兩規定而提出的論文，不接受作者自行投稿的方式，只接受互為聯名期刊任一方編輯部或編輯委員會的推薦論文。
 - 4) 提出推薦兩刊同時發表論文的編輯委員會，應向接受推薦方提出該論文的審查意見書，以及預計在雙方同時刊登的兩篇論文全文，以供接受推薦方的編輯委員會驗證。接受推薦方的編輯委員會，保有是否接受經由以上程序所產生的論文，在己方刊物出版的決定權。
2. 雙方所屬研究單位成員可以在以上規定之外，以個人名義自由向前揭刊物的任一方投稿。
3. 經由以上兩種方式投稿的稿件，均應依照刊登該論文的學術期刊的規定格式撰寫論文。
4. 前揭聯名期刊的雙方同意所有論文以使用中文、英文撰寫的論文為優先接受的論文。

Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture Members

Director	SHIN Jeong-Keun
Management Committee	KIM Seong Don KIM Young Han BAK Sang Hwan LEE Kun Chang LEE Ki Dong LEE Jong Kwan JUN Eun Ja CHOI Il Beom CHOI Hoon Seok
Senior Researcher	KIM Mi Young
Researchers	KIM Seseoria PARK Ji Hun SON Jung Min AN Seung Woo YOON Seo Yeon LIM Ok Kyun
Research Assistants	PARK Ji Hye SUR Heui Yeon

儒教文化研究所 研究人員

所 長	辛正根
運 營 委 員	金成敦 金暎漢 朴商煥 李建昶 李基東 李鍾寬 田銀子 崔一凡 崔訓碩
責任研究員	金美英
研 究 員	金世緒利亞 朴志勳 孫正民 安承宇 尹瑞涓 林玉均
研 究 助 教	朴智慧 徐喜延

Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

Editorial Staff

《儒教文化研究》編輯部

Editor-in-Chief PARK Youngwoo 朴榮雨 (Sungkyunkwan University)
 編輯部 主任 JO Jungeun 趙貞恩 (Sungkyunkwan University)

Editorial Members **Administrative Staff**
 編輯部 人員 KIM Mi Young 金美英 (Sungkyunkwan University)
 SUR Heui Yeon 徐喜延 (Sungkyunkwan University)

English Articles
 Sheereen RAJA (University of London)

Chinese Articles
 LIN Yu Yi 林佑毅 (Korea University)

Copy-Editing
 LEE Yong-Yun 李容潤 (Sungkyunkwan University)
 YI Jeong-Hyeon 李貞賢
 SEOL Junyoung 薛俊暎 (Sungkyunkwan University)

Mailing Address

Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
 600th Memorial Bldg. Rm 404
 Sungkyunkwan University
 25-2 Seonggyungwan-ro, Jongno-gu,
 Seoul, South Korea 03063

地址

03063 韓國 首爾市 鍾路區 成均館路 25-2
 成均館大學 六百周年紀念館 404號
 儒教文化研究所
 《儒教文化研究》編輯部

Email: jicpc@skku.edu
 Website: <http://ygmh.skku.edu>
 Tel: +82-2-760-0787~8
 Fax: +82-2-760-0789

Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

《儒教文化研究》

Vol. 29 / February 2018

Publisher CHUNG Kyu Sang
發行人 鄭圭相

Director SHIN Jeong-Keun
主任 辛正根

Editorial Office Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
600th Memorial Bldg. Rm 404, Sungkyunkwan University
25-2 Seonggyungwan-ro, Jongno-gu.
Seoul, South Korea 03063

編輯室 03063 韓國 首爾市 鍾路區 成均館路 25-2
成均館大學 六百周年紀念館 404號
儒教文化研究所
Tel 82-2-760-0787~8 Fax 82-2-760-0789

Published by Sungkyunkwan University Press,
25-2 Seonggyungwan-ro, Jongno-gu. Seoul, South Korea 03063

發行處 成均館大學 出版部
03063 韓國 首爾市 鍾路區 成均館路 25-2
Tel 82-2-760-1252~4 Fax 82-2-762-7452

Published on Feb. 28, 2018. First Edition.
版次 2018年 2月 28日 第一版 第一次 印刷

ISSN 1598-267X

