Development Cooperation: Between the Global and Regional Institutions: The Case of the UN Development Cooperation Forum and the OECD Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

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This paper is a first attempt to apply the regime complex analysis to the issue area of international development cooperation mainly applied for the study of international trade and environment regimes. We focus on the interactions between the UN Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) and the OECD–led Global Partnership for Effective Development (GPEDC). Following a synthetic approach combining the realist and institutionalist IOs theories, and drawing also from the literature on the interrelations between global and regional institutions, we tried to relate the strategic actions of state actors, mainly traditional and emerging development cooperation providers, to the dynamics of the interaction between the DCF and the GPEDC, and its observed patterns: cooperation, competition and division of labour.

[주제어: International Development Cooperation, Development Cooperation Forum, Global Partnership for Effective Development, Global Governance, institutional interplay]

I. Introduction

How and why do global governance institutions interact, and with what outcomes? The response to these questions is of critical importance when it
comes to comprehending one of the central processes of the fabric of global governance. As the variety of organizations encompassing a diverse range of scopes, work, and policy issue areas grows ever denser in the current global reality, the interactions between them have come to represent complex phenomena.

These phenomena have been studied from different angles and theoretical perspectives. However, there is no integrated theoretical framework that spans the variety of organizations and their relationships. Furthermore, research points to a changing reality. One example is the relationship between the UN and regional organizations regarding security issues. In fact, contemporary reality does not accommodate a hierarchical order between the regional and global levels. Based on the increased relevance of regional approaches compared to the global UN approach, regional bodies have begun to compete with global organizations in terms of efficiency, commitment, and even legitimacy (closeness to constituencies), progressively shaping a more horizontal relationship between the two levels with mutual dependencies and shared responsibilities (Bjorn Hettne and F. Soderbaum, 2006).

The conceptual framework of institutional interplay, often referred to as regime complexity analysis, has been proposed to study more general cases of interdependencies and mutual influence between international institutions and regimes in terms of development and performance (Young, 1995; Stokke, 2001; Raustalia and Victor, 2004; Gehring and Oberthur 2004/2009; Loewen, 2006). The framework defines categories of interactions on the basis of the links existing between interacting institutions. Two different concepts are defined for this purpose:

- Nested\(^1\) institutions: institutions or organizations folded into broader institutional frameworks in the same policy area: sub regional, regional, and global organizations. The relationship between regional and global institutions is a specific case of nested institutions.
- Overlapping institutions: institutions or organizations partly intersecting in membership and/or mandates.

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1) Orang Young (2005), Regime Theory and the Quest for Global Governance.
This kind of analysis was initially developed to study trade and environmental regimes, which are regulatory in nature. It was then applied to different institutional contexts. Our aim is to extend its application to the issue area of international development cooperation by focusing on the interactions between the dyad formed by the UN Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) and the OECD-led Global Partnership for Effective Development (GPEDC).

The study of the changing landscape of development cooperation is opportune for several reasons. The establishment of the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum and the OECD - Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation has in fact marked an obvious reconfiguration in the institutional landscape at the global level. These new institutional settings, however, do not appear to be clearly differentiated, with competition over the leadership of the governance of development cooperation and/or cooperation in achieving new and old versions of development goals.

We believe that the regime complex analytical model is applicable in this context. The necessity of attributing exclusive regulatory competencies, which are central in the interplay between regulatory institutions, can be replaced by the need to avoid the duplication of efforts in an environment of scarce resources, in the case of international development cooperation, leading in a longer period to the same outcome, i.e. different modes of interactions including cooperation, competition and division of labor.

The interactions between the DCF and the GPEDC are a specific case of relations between global and regional institutions, as GPEDC is considered a region with no territorial definition. Therefore, the two institutions are nested. GPEDC is folded into the DCF in terms of membership, and both share essentially the same mandate.

Parting from the works of Gehring and Oberthur (2009), and Faude and Gehring (2014), who assume that actors have opportunities to "forum

4) Faude S., Gehring T., A Theory of Emerging Order within Institutional Complexes:
shopping” in the pursuit of their interests with possibilities of “regime shifting” (Tsebelis 1990, Busch 2007, Helfer 2004, Kellow, 2012, Hannah and Kellow, 2013), we tried to relate the strategic actions of state actors, mainly traditional and emerging development cooperation providers, to the dynamics of the interaction between the DCF and the GPEDC. The knowledge dimension of this game is of critical importance, as the two platforms are knowledge-sharing platforms and relations between traditional donors and developing countries are asymmetrical.

We support the basic idea that the development cooperation landscape is strategically shaped by traditional donor states and emerging countries that are increasingly asserting their presence in global development issues. The OECD–DAC countries use the overlapping structures of the two platforms to set norms and standards for South–South Cooperation. These norms and standards are closely related to the aid-effectiveness agenda and take human rights and good governance principles into account. After being party to the foundational meeting of the GPED (Busan, South Korea, 2011), the BRICS countries, with the exception of Russia, showed their preference for the UNDCF as the more legitimate platform to deal with development cooperation issues. They critically weakened the GPEDC by refusing to attend its Mexico (2014) and Nairobi (2016) High-level Forums. This move transformed the latter from a quasi-universal platform into a “regional platform” with different patterns of interaction with the UNDCF.

1. The United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (DCF)

The creation of DCF was part of the UN reform decided at the 2005 World Summit after the 2003 UN High-level Panel on Threats and Challenges proposal. Together with the Annual Ministerial Review (AMR), the DCF came to reinforce the political segment of the ECOSOC, whose mission was readjusted to support the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

How Competition among Regulatory International Institutions Leads to Institutional Adaptation and Division of Labor, 2014.
While the DCF is held within the high-level segment of the Economic and Social Council, the UN General Assembly resolution 61/1\(^5\) underlined the necessity to preserve an identity for the Forum distinct from the ECOSOC in order to facilitate high-level participation. This was a critical condition for enhancing the implementation of the development cooperation issues affecting the realization of the MDGs and the SDGs, after their adoption in 2015.

### 1) The Mandate of the DCF

The DCF is mandated\(^6\) to fulfil the following missions:
- Review trends and progress in international development cooperation, and give policy guidance and recommendations to promote more effective international development cooperation;
- Identify gaps and obstacles with a view to making recommendations on practical measures and policy options to enhance coherence and effectiveness, and to promote development cooperation for the realization of the internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs [and the SDGs since 2015];
- Provide a platform for Member States to exchange lessons learned and share experiences in formulating, supporting and implementing national development strategies; and
- In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, be open to participation by all stakeholders, including the organizations of the United Nations, the international financial and trade institutions, regional organizations, civil society and private sector representatives.\(^7\)

This mandate covers the dialogue, advocacy and implementation of the international development cooperation principles as well as issues of coordination.

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\(^5\) A/RES/61/16, Strengthening the Economic and Social Council, adopted in 20 November, 2006

\(^6\) Id.

and coherence of the United Nations operational activities. The key aim of the DCF is to set norms and standards and build consensus around development cooperation. This fundamentally implies the establishment of capacities of research and analysis around issues of development cooperation, a critical dimension of the Forum’s work. With the Forum’s mandate including the ability to make recommendations but not binding resolutions, research and analysis are important tools in making those recommendations.

The Forum is open to all the United Nations members and has a multi-stakeholder membership, bringing together decision makers and experts from developing and developed countries, high level representatives from UN system organisations, Bretton Woods institutions, the OECD, regional banks, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, local governments, and private foundations. With the global reach of the United Nations, the DCF then covers a virgin area in terms of positioning, occupying a niche that no mechanism had been able to cover previously.

2) The Format and Outcome of the DCF

The DCF operates in two-year cycles. Global priorities determine the specific themes taken up in each cycle, which are set through consultation within the informal DCF Advisory Group in line with the work of the international development community and the annual themes and objectives of the ECOSOC.

Its discussions are guided by the analytical report of the UN Secretary General on international development cooperation and the UN development agenda, as well as the summary of the discussions at regional and global symposia and other key meetings that are held throughout the intersessional period. The analytical studies commissioned by the DCF on meaningful issues contribute to making these discussions more substantive.

The outcome of the Forum is primarily in the form of a summary of the discussions held during the DCF plenary meeting and elaborated by the President of ECOSOC. However, the substance of the discussions is integrated into the Council’s reports for consideration by the General Assembly and, as
much as possible, in the ministerial declaration of the high-level segment of the ECOSOC. The High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and the ECOSOC Forum on Financing for Development are also mandated to take the recommendations from the DCF into account during their follow-up and review of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The summaries may be incorporated into other forums and events depending on the yearly calendar of meetings.

3) Actor Strategies During the Creation of the DCF

The negotiations over UN General Assembly Resolution 61/16, adopted without a vote, took almost a full year, quite a long period after the widely-agreed 2005 World Summit declaration. While agreeing on the importance of strengthening ECOSOC and creation of the Forum, the statements made at the moment of the adoption of the aforementioned resolution and at the official launch of the DCF in July 2007 in Geneva showed divisions between the views of the traditional donors and developing countries on the role and critical conditions for the success of the DCF.

Traditional donor countries firmly and fundamentally opposed the idea of an imposed “global governance” of development cooperation on donors and aid recipients, including the monitoring of bilateral contributions made bilaterally or through multilateral institutions. EU countries, the US, and other developed countries primarily viewed the DCF as an aid coordination mechanism in the context of the proliferation of development actors and instruments. In addition, they saw it as a place for aid donors and recipients to exchange ideas, underscoring the importance of the Forum to provide data on development assistance flows in South-South Cooperation.

On the other hand, developing countries emphasized the fact that the Forum was simply another alternative venue to those already controlled by donor countries for the discussion of aid-related issues, and that these venues have

8) American position regarding negotiations of the Ministerial Declaration on Development cooperation, during the ECOSOC High Level Segment, 2007.
so far failed to address poverty and hunger. The Group of 77 + China called for a more ambitious and comprehensive mandate to improve the governance of international development cooperation in all aspects, including the wider global economic structural obstacles hampering the attainment of international development goals, namely, funding, technology transfer, capacity building and market access. For these countries, the effectiveness of the DCF will depend to a large extent on its ability to monitor implementation and the development of criteria and benchmarks to measure the implementation, effectiveness and results of development cooperation.9)

Beyond the statements and positions officially expressed during UN meetings, it is possible to consider the frameworks of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Conference on Finance for Development (2002, Mexico) as the foundation for the creation of the Development Cooperation Forum. The DCF’s mandate appears to indicate that such a forum would not have been established if these two frameworks were not in place. The DCF is certainly a complement to the Finance for Development process, whose purpose was to address the financial issues related to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, but in the sense of a corollary.

Perhaps a causal link between the new reality of development cooperation and the formation of a new institutional setting doesn’t require much evidence. Regardless, the increased amount of ODA flowing from China and other emerging countries, which falls outside the definitions and standards of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee may be the real motivation driving the main DAC member countries to support the creation of a framework to standardize definitions and practices of the new development aid providers.

If one recalls the fact that OECD-DAC played a fundamental role in the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals10, along with the World

Bank and the United Nations, it is possible to conclude in the same sense that UNDCF was created intentionally by OECD-DAC countries in order to extend their influence over South-South cooperation.

2. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

The creation of the GPEDC was the achievement of the relatively long process of DAC opening that began in the global economic and political context of the 1990’s. It marked a further step in the transformation of the aid system that had been in place since the establishment of the OECD-Development Aid Committee in 1961.

The Development Assistance Committee consists of 30 member countries today.11) Its objectives and mandate have evolved over time. Their last revision, enacted in 2010, assigned DAC the objective of promoting development cooperation and other policies so as to contribute to sustainable development. To achieve this, the Committee should:

- monitor, assess and promote the provision of resources that support sustainable development, by collecting and analysing data on ODA and other official and private flows;
- review development cooperation policies and practices, particularly in relation to national and internationally agreed upon objectives and targets, and promote mutual learning;
- provide analysis, guidance and good practices to assist its Members and the expanded donor community to enhance the quality and effectiveness of development assistance;
- analyse and help shape the rapidly evolving global development architecture to optimise development results;
- promote perspectives on global public goods and policy coherence for development in coordination with other policy communities in OECD, and;

11) In 1961 DAC had 11 members: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Commission of the European Economic Community. Japan and the Netherlands joined shortly after the first meeting in 1960. in DAC history, OECD, 1996.
engage non-Member countries – in particular those with major development cooperation programmes – IGOs, private sector, and CSOs, so as to assure the inclusiveness of DAC’s work.\textsuperscript{12}

The DAC’s role is limited to the formulation of recommendations to member countries. The Committee has had a monitoring mechanism since its inception consisting of a peer review mechanism to assess the aid policies of member states and exchange knowledge and experience. This mechanism has contributed to the general homogenization trend of the aid policies of its members (Bural, 2006/2008, Severino and J-M. Ray, O., 2010, Blunt, 2011, Kim S. and Lightfoot, 2012, Ruth Ben-Artzi, 2013).

As previously mentioned, the DAC contributed hugely to the establishment of the currently leading development paradigm, through its report “\textit{Shaping the 21st Century: Contribution of Development Cooperation}” (1996). This report included the idea of a global partnership for development.

Following the Millennium Declaration, and in the context of the emergence of new donors and development actors, the DAC decided to collaborate beyond its membership (Ruth Ben-Artzi, 2013, Bergamaschi, 2014). The DAC’s outreach strategy of 2005\textsuperscript{13} acknowledged the need to expand its inclusiveness and to pay more attention to South–South Cooperation as it gains importance in quantitative terms. In line with this orientation, many cooperative mechanisms were launched such as the annual meetings with Arab donors, DAC–China study group and support to Russia, consisting of regular policy dialogues aimed towards fostering cooperation, primarily regarding data collection (Waltz & Ramachandran, 2010, Zimmermann, F. and Smith, K., 2011, Park, K., 2011).

\textbf{1) The Creation and Mandate of the GPEDC}

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), which was enacted during the fourth High-Level Forum (2011) in Busan, South Korea,

\textsuperscript{12} OECD, DCD/DAC(2010)34/FINAL, 18-Oct-2010
\textsuperscript{13} OECD/DCD/DAC/2005, DAC’s Outreach Strategy.
was a consummation of the DAC strategy of openness and inclusiveness. The GPEDC came into being in June 2012. The GPEDC replaced the DAC-Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) established in 2003 and made up of the signatories of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: 60 countries and 20 International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations.

The analysts and experts of the development cooperation issue—area agree on that the first concern of the initiators of the GPEDC was to ensure the largest possible inclusion of developing countries. From its very first paragraph, the Busan outcome document insists that the partnership is based on common goals and differential commitments. The second paragraph, as a concession to its endorsement by China, India and Brazil and South Africa, states that “the principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document in Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis”. Furthermore, South-South Cooperation is positively assessed throughout the document, and is considered as a complement to North-South Cooperation.

Even if China, India, Brazil and South Africa progressively withdrew from the processes following the Busan High-level Forum, it could be considered that initiators of the GPEDC have largely succeeded in their endeavour as 160 countries signed the Busan Partnership, i.e, a hundred countries more than the WP-EFF’s 60 country members.

The GPEDC took up the fundamental principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action: ownership, focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, transparency, and mutual accountability. These principles are underlined as being consistent with human rights, the promotion of decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and rights for the disabled, agreed upon in the UN framework. They also resonate with and must be integrated into the yet-to-be defined norms and standards applicable on South-South Cooperation.

As previously mentioned, the establishment of GPEDC marked also the expansion of the focus of the OECD cooperation system from aid effectiveness to the inclusion of development cooperation. This expansion has been criticized by tenants of the aid-effectiveness agenda in traditional donor
countries\textsuperscript{14), especially for its potential to fragilize the commitments made under the aid effectiveness agenda, through the introduction of the principle of implementation on “a voluntary base”. This evolution can be seen from another perspective as a move to give the GPEDC the same functional scope as the UNDCF whose mandate goes well beyond the restrictive notion of ODA.

(1) Main Outcome
Regarding the outcome, unlike the DCF, the GPEDC High-level Forums are sanctioned by negotiated declarations reflecting positions achieved by consensus on the assessment of the progress in the implementation of the development-effectiveness agenda and new commitments for years to come. This capacity to host negotiations and to issue agreed communiqués, even if the latter don’t commit country partners strictly, give the Partnership more autonomy and a concrete governance tool compared to the knowledge sharing and loose consensus building function of the DCF.

(2) Structure and working arrangements
GPEDC has a multi-stakeholder structure, strictly identical to DCF’s, involving multilateral institutions, parliaments, local authorities, civil society organizations, the private sector, foundations and academia. This structure accentuates the potential of the two platforms to duplicate each other’s tasks.

The GPEDC high-level meetings are held every 18 to 24 months. Besides the plenary, interested participants meet in nine additional “coalitions of the willing” (“building blocks”) to tackle more concrete issues.

The Partnership is directed by a Steering Committee whose members are designated for a two years term. It is co-chaired by three members representing the categories of countries with regard to their aid status: aid donors, donors-recipients, recipients, and is made of 15 other members representing various constituencies. During the 2nd High-Level Meeting of the GPEDC, held in Nairobi in 2016, it was agreed to add a non-executive

\textsuperscript{14) Heiner Janus, Dr. Stephan Klingebiel, Timo Mahn, How to Shape Development Cooperation? The Global Partnership and the Development Cooperation Forum, GIE, 2014.}
Co-Chair which will represent Local Authorities, Parliaments, CSOs, Trade Unions, Philanthropy and Business sector.

The Steering Committee is backed by a support team led by the OECD and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The latter’s role as member of the DCF’s Advisory Group (equivalent structure to the GPEDC’s Steering Committee) needs to be underlined as a significant element of the cooperation between the two platforms.

The GPEDC is backed by a monitoring framework designed to assess the progress achieved in increasing the effectiveness of development cooperation. This mechanism was also conceived as a complement to the monitoring mechanisms of the international development goals (MDGs and SGDs). Ten indicators\(^{15}\) were designed for this purpose and provide the basis for policy dialogue on development cooperation and its effectiveness.

Two monitoring rounds (2015-16, and 2013-14) were held to inform the High-level Forums held in Mexico and Nairobi in 2014 and 2016.

### 3. Interplay between the UNDCF and GPEDC

#### 1) Overlap Between the Two Platforms

Overlap is traditionally analyzed in terms of functions which can be approached by the mandates of the institutions, and in terms of memberships. These two dimensions can be beneficially enlarged to organizational elements and supporting structures, in the specific case of the DCF and the GPEDC.

As demonstrated in the two previous sections, the DCF and the GPEDC intersect in their core functions consisting in generating and maintaining political momentum to achieve the internationally development goals.

\(^{15}\) These indicators are related to three dimensions: national ownership and a focus on results, Inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and accountability. The 10 indicators are: An enabling environment for civil society organisations; public-private dialogues; transparency on development cooperation; predictability of development cooperation in the short and mid-term; parliamentary oversight; review of mutual accountability; gender; government and development partners use of country systems; untied aid; and the use of country-led results frameworks.
reviewing trends in development cooperation, and sharing knowledge and lessons learned. It is important to underline at this stage that the Busan declaration, as well as the final communiqués of the Mexico and Nairobi GPEDC High-level Forums, state clearly that the GPEDC has a universal scope, pushing further the similarities between the two platforms (Table 1).

The working plan of the two institutions for the 2012–2014 cycle show similarly high degree of overlap (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Overlap in Mandate and Areas of Work¹⁶)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Summit 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review trends in international development cooperation, including strategies, policies and financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote greater coherence among the development activities of different development partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the normative and operational link in the UN’s work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busan Outcome 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain and strengthen political momentum for more effective development cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate knowledge exchange &amp; sharing lessons learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure accountability for implementing Busan commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support implementation of Busan agenda at country level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Areas of Work**                             |
| Focus Areas 2012–2014                        |
| The future of development cooperation        |
| Global accountability in development cooperation |
| South–South and triangular cooperation       |
| Mexico High Level Meeting 2014               |
| Development cooperation with middle-income countries |
| Progress since Busan                          |
| Partnering for effective taxation / domestic resource mobilization |
| Business as a partner in development         |
| South–South, triangular cooperation and knowledge sharing |

Regarding the membership, GPEDC is nested into the DCF as the latter has a universal membership. It is necessary to precise that GPEDC could be seen somehow as a global institution too. Its 160 country members from all regions and levels of development give the Partnership a quasi-global reach. The analysis should take into account the large scale dimension the this platform as it has the potential to generate different effects in terms of interaction from

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those observable in the case of small regional institutions.

In terms of organizational structure, the two platforms intersect to a large extent. Each has a multi-stakeholder structure, with representatives of states (developed and developing countries), international organizations, the private sector, foundations, parliaments, local governments, and so on.

As shown in the Table 2, the UNDCF and the GPEDC have substantially the same structures with more or less the same competencies.

### Table 2. UNDCF and GPEDC Supporting Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretariat</th>
<th>UNDCF</th>
<th>GPEDC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic guidance &amp;</td>
<td>UNDESA with the support of UNDP</td>
<td>Joint Support team: OECD–DAC −UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Advisory Group: 36 members representing different stakeholders.</td>
<td>Steering Committee: 18 members from different stakeholder groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairmanship</td>
<td>Under Secretary General in charge of</td>
<td>Three countries: (1) donor, (1) recipient,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic and Social Affairs</td>
<td>(1) donor–recipient (ministerial and vice-ministerial rank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>UN members (193)</td>
<td>Busan outcome document signatories (160), minus China, Brazil, India and South Africa which have not attended any of the GPEDC High–level Forums.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2) Strategic Actions of State Actors

(1) Emerging Donors

After the endorsement of the Busan outcome document by China, Brazil, and India along with 160 countries and an equally important number of international organizations, CSOs, and private sector actors, the GPEDC gained the legitimacy that the previous OECD–DAC processes had lacked (Verschaeve Joren and Orbie Jan, 2013, Kindornay Shannon, Yiagadeesen Samy, 2012). Its relationship with the UNDCF may be analyzed as quasi-horizontal, with GPEDC boasting the advantage of having the power to issue negotiated statements and a monitoring mechanism, even though the introduction of the principle of

commitments on a voluntary basis in Busan, and its increased number of members will necessarily reduce the efficiency of the partnership in comparison with the previous OECD–DAC processes.

However, this configuration didn’t hold for long. China, Brazil, India, and South Africa decided not to attend the GPEDC High-Level Forums held in Mexico (2014) and Nairobi (2016). These countries have expressed their preference for the UN Development Cooperation Forum as a venue for discussions and deliberation on development cooperation issues at the global level. In 2011, Brazil requested a DCF every year and suggested strengthening the Forum through the addition of a negotiated outcome document instead of the summary produced by the ECOSOC’s president on the DCF plenary meetings.

The move of the major emerging economic powers brought back the GPEDC to the spaces traditionally occupied by OECD–DAC, and challenged its appellation as a global partnership. The relationship between GPEDC and DCF became more coherent with the relations between universal and regional organizations.

Two possibilities were put forth to explain the choice of China and other emerging donors:

- Their perception of the GPEDC as an OECD–driven initiative. These countries didn’t recognize the GPEDC as a legitimate platform for debating global development.
- Their limited willingness to apply standards bring more transparency and accountability into South–South cooperation.

From another point of view, the emerging donors have enough reasons not to join the GPEDC given the fact that developed countries maintain their opposition to reinforcing the UNDCF through negotiated outcomes and more implementation tools. If the latter really desire a global partnership, it is much easier for them, from this perspective, to empower the UNDCF rather than create a completely new setting. Therefore, in the two cases, strategic

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18) Li Xiaoyun, Stephan Klingebiel, Crisis or progress? The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) after Nairobi, december 2016.
calculations motivate the stances of each group of countries.

(2) Traditional Donors

Outside the GPEDC processes where the OECD-DAC lead the agenda, these countries use the UNDCF as an alternative venue to achieve their objectives regarding regulation of South-South Cooperation, especially through their important contributions to the analytical work of the Forum, and consensus-building within the GPEDC with involved developing countries. This has helped them to form a strong coalition to be activated within the UNDCF.

In 2013, southern partners launched an initiative to better document South-South Cooperation under the auspices of the UNDCF as a fresh opportunity for mutual learning and better development results. The parties agreed to undertake the elaboration of a global report aiming to reach a common understanding of technical terms and methodologies in South-South Cooperation. This initiative has not yet achieved its objectives and is still in a maturation stage. However, it can be considered a first step towards the definition of norms and standards to guide South-South Cooperation.

Further research is needed to find out whether this initiative is the result of the actions of the traditional donors with a link to the discussions on this issue within the GPEDC, the analytical work commissioned by the DCF, or larger contextual (economic and political) factors. However, it has been considered one of the concrete achievements of the DCF.

The interplay analysis needs to be complemented by a systematic analysis of the knowledge contribution of traditional donors to the analytical work of the DCF, particularly with regards to how these countries use the nestedness of the GPEDC into the DCF in this particular domain. A summary analysis allowed us to verify that a certain number of analytical studies commissioned by UNDCF are financed by the development cooperation agencies of the traditional donors such as the UK DFID, German GIE, etc. translating the DCF dependency to DAC countries in this specific dimension.

The analysis needs also to be complemented by a deep consideration of the

19) UNDCF, 2014, Summary of the ECOSOC President.
preparatory work of the DCF. The high-level symposiums that prepare the DCF plenary are held in developing and developed countries to ensure, in principle, balanced inputs from both sides. However, concretely, countries submit proposals to host these kind of symposiums. Thus far, the frequency of symposiums held in an OECD member state is two times that of those held in developing countries due to financial capacities, as shown in the following table. This denotes an advantageous position of leading GPEDC countries in terms of inputs provided to the DCF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Austria, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Austria, Mali, Luxembourg, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Mali, Luxembourg, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Germany, Ethiopia, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>South Korea, Uganda, Belgium.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, in order to get a clear idea of the interplay between the two platforms, it is important to conduct a more systematic analysis of the contribution of the developing countries actively involved in the GPEDC processes, how they asses their participation in terms of impact and satisfaction, and how they perceive comparatively the DCF and the GPEDC.

3) The Mediating Role of the UNDP

The involvement of the UNDP in the secretariat and advisory groups of both platforms deserves to be emphasized. This can be considered an additional factor in the nestedness of the two development platforms.

The UNDP supports UNDESA in its analytical work, and similarly, as member of the GPEDC’s Joint Support Team, it collaborates with the OECD-DAC on the following matters:

- Methodology for monitoring the implementation of the GPEDC commitments.
- Produce and disseminate analytical work to inform political dialogue and
facilitate knowledge sharing, including reports on progress in the implementation of the Busan partnership.
- Provide advisory support on project implementation and accountability in developing countries.
- Support the organization of the GPEDC ministerial-level meetings.
- Deliver secretariat services to the Steering Committee and Co-chairs.\(^\text{20)}\)

In this collaboration, the UNDP focuses on supporting country and regional-level efforts as well as linkage with the UN development processes. The OECD, in the other hand, focuses on the conception of the monitoring framework, based on its experience and capabilities in terms of analytical work.

It is relevant to note that the two organizations have a long record of collaboration. The UNDP has taken part in the OECD-led development partnership process since the 1st High Level Forum held in Rome (2003). It was among the signatories of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and, as such, was engaged in an active process of review with regard to aid effectiveness principles\(^\text{21)}\).

As a more implementation-oriented institution, UNDP brought its worldwide network and the capital of sympathy and confidence it has among both aid donors and recipients to GPEDC. In its 2014 Report on Global Development Capacities, UNDP highlighted among its achievements its active role in bringing closer the GPEDC and DCF (UNDP, 2015).

The UNDP’s role translates in our view the position of the United Nations, as an organization independent of its state members, trying to mediate and harmonize the work of the DCF and the GPEDC, and more precisely, expresses its support for the objectives of both DCF and GPEDC to set norms and standards applicable to South-South Cooperation.

It is also important to underline the fact that UNDP is itself engaged in a

\(^{21)}\) Joint Evaluation of UNDG contribution to the Paris Declaration, two phases, 2006 and 2010.
bargaining game with the DAC members as it depends on finance provided by the latter (non-core resources), but offers instruments that the DAC doesn’t have readily at its disposal (Vatterodt, M. 2008).

4) Cooperation Between the Two Platforms: Vertical Linkage

In 2013, the GPEDC and the UNDCF, considering their shared objectives as well as their large areas of overlap, initiated a joint process aiming to explore possibilities for a more structured collaboration, strengthen complementarities and synergies, and avoid duplication for an efficient use of their respective resources.

After three informal exchanges between the Advisory group of the DCF and the GPEDC Steering Committee, an informal working group was set up in 2013 (Addis Ababa, 2013), with joint membership, tasked with proposing ways to advance shared objectives on how to:

(i) Coordinate the planning of meetings;
(ii) Share technical analysis;
(iii) Explore opportunities for joint analysis;
(iv) Mutually engage in ministerial meetings; and
(v) Facilitate frequent exchange between the two Secretariats.

The main outcome of this cooperative process was agreement between the two platforms on a general principle of division of labor and cooperation, based on their comparative advantages. In accordance with the pertinent UN General Assembly Resolutions, the group suggested the following:

- The DCF has a particular role as global body for policy advice on global development cooperation trends.
- The GPEDC has a particular role in operationalizing and advancing country-level implementation of effective development cooperation, and sharing policy lessons.
- The UNDCF can feed GPEDC contributions into UN discussions and processes on the post-2015 development agenda, including on its
financing and other means of implementation.

The group submitted a joint-action plan for the biennium 2015–2016 that took into account concerns over minimizing the implications on human and financial resources. This action plan is articulated around the following axes:

- Sharing and strengthening complementarities of technical analysis;
- Coordination and mutual engagement in events:
  - Hold back-to-back meetings where appropriate and feasible,
  - Strategic sequencing of key meetings to maintain global momentum,
  - Continue the practices of holding joint meetings of members of the DCF Advisory Group and GPEDC Steering Committee, and inviting Advisory Group and Steering Committee members as well as senior officials of both Secretariats to events of both processes;
- Exchanges among Secretariats:
  - Continue regular and open exchanges at both working and senior management levels.

This action plan has been followed by concrete actions, especially with regards to close coordination in the definition of the calendar of events of the two platforms and actions aiming to better demonstrate the complementarity of the perspectives from which the two platforms address development issues. Since 2014, each of the two platforms has organized side events during the high-level meetings of the other. This was the case in Mexico and Nairobi as well as in the 2014 and 2016 Development Cooperation Forums.

4. Cases of Cooperation and Conflict Between the Two Platforms

The two platforms cooperate closely in the framework of their mutual accountability monitoring mechanism. The UNDP hugely facilitated this cooperation as a link between the secretariats of the DCF and the GPEDC. In

fact, the DCF secretariat (UNDESA) has been supported since 2009 by UNDP and OECD-DAC – forming the Joint Support Team of the GPEDC – in the conceptual design of its periodic biannual surveys in order to review progress in implementing accountability and transparency frameworks. On its side, GPEDC conducts biannual rounds of monitoring on the effectiveness of development cooperation, including the dimensions of mutual accountability and transparency.

The DCF, which occupies the leading role on this matter due to its universal outreach, draws from the findings of the GPEDC monitoring mechanism. The two platforms identified this dimension as a priority in their cooperation aiming to jointly form and consolidate a global standard on mutual accountability in view of the achievement of the 2030 global sustainable development goals.

An example of divergent views between the two platforms concerns South-South Cooperation. The OECD-DAC members push for the definition of norms and standards to be applied by Southern development providers, including the general principle of human rights, good governance and accountability, in the framework of the GPEDC and DCF. From the same perspective, South-South cooperation should, as traditional development assistance, respond to the national priorities of programme countries, be people-centered, and involve all relevant actors, including civil society. For OECD-DAC countries, the predictability and flexibility of South-South Cooperation flows also needs to be enhanced over time. Basically, they claim that more systematic studies are necessary to give more evidence to back the common positive assessment of the South-South cooperation.

The initiative on South-South cooperation undertaken in 2013 within the UNDCF, mentioned previously, does however have the potential to evolve in a cooperative example instead of a conflicting issue.

5. Implications for Future Interrelations between the Two Platforms

The combination of the general principle of division of labor and cooperation, agreed between the Advisory group of the DCF and the Steering Committee of the GPEDC, and the elements presented in the previous section, allows to draw
the outlines of the current governance of the international development cooperation, which is not without duplication and a certain competition. On one hand, the DCF has the primacy in providing policy advice on global development cooperation trends and is privileged to host discussion concerning South-South Cooperation. On the other hand, the GPEDC has the lead on the development effectiveness agenda and prominence in advancing implementation. The two platforms complement/compete each other regarding similar functions including knowledge sharing and sustaining political momentum, at the policy level, and mutual accountability, at the implementation level.

From this basis, it is possible to draw two main possible outcomes of the current state of interplay between the DCF and the GPEDC.

First, from an optimistic point of view, the interactions through knowledge sharing, dialogue and mutual understanding between traditional and emerging donors will lead to a form of co-governance of development cooperation, with norms and standards governing South-South cooperation progressively consolidated within the DCF and then taken up and promoted by the GPEDC. This scenario implies in the longer term that emerging countries will have no more objections to integrating the GPEDC as a compromise is reached on South-South cooperation. In that case, the GPEDC will gain more importance and more legitimacy, given its extended membership, and will necessarily gain the capacity to fulfil a political function jointly with the UNDCF. This also presupposes the establishment of a formal mechanism of cooperation ensuring a clear division of labour between the two platforms, likely on sectoral or thematic lines. This outcome could also lead to a fusion of the two platforms into a single forum, backed by implementation and evaluation mechanisms, recognized as The Global Partnership for Development Cooperation.

The second possibility is based on the assumption that the current conflictual positions over South-South cooperation and issues of mutual accountability and transparency will weaken the aid-effectiveness agenda itself. Traditional donors will be pressured not to commit to the norms and standards they have established. This includes lowering standards on human rights and good governance for these countries, and abandoning in a certain measure
costly principles such as untying aid or transparency, to clearly serve their foreign political and economic interests that are threatened by emerging countries. This scenario implies, on another level, that both developed and developing countries must accept a lowering of their expectations regarding the achievement of the shared sustainable development goals. In terms of relationship, the UNDCF will be an arena of conflicting and irreconcilable positions that threaten to further weaken the GPEDC through the withdrawal of a larger number of developing countries. This situation could lead to radical reforms that may include the creation of another institutional setting more favourable to reach compromise between the interests at stake in order to fulfil the international development agenda.

Given the capacity of mobilization demonstrated by the framework of the SDGs, and the pressure it creates on state actors, it seems more likely that the first option will come to pass.

II. Conclusion

It is possible to draw conclusions at three different levels. First, on the methodological level, given the mandates of GPEDC and DCF and the nature of their outcomes, the institutional interplay framework, while still useful for the analysis of the strategic calculations of the main players (strategies of forum shopping and regime shifting), needs to be enriched with methodological tools appropriate for analyzing interplay between institutions that are mainly tasked with providing settings for dialogue and knowledge production, operation and dissemination. The analysis and assessment of the quality and the independence of the research produced in these settings is critically important. How research topics are defined, how the research projects are attributed to research institutions (developing/ developed countries), and whether the research reports are objective and neutral are key questions. Responding to these questions will allow us to understand how the actors involved use knowledge production and lessons learned strategically to
achieve their interests while facing an asymmetrical distribution of power. This asymmetry derives from the competitive edge of developed countries that allows them to influence decision making in such settings over more or less long periods.

Regarding the actual state of interplay between the GPEDC and the DCF, it seems that some interesting features of co-governance are occurring between them interactively. The cooperation on mutual accountability and the new initiative on South-South cooperation under the DCF are promising. The shape of division of labour between the two platforms has also made appreciable headway. However, there is still a lack of mutual understanding and confidence between the two sides, reflecting the current configuration of strategic, political and economic competition between traditional donors and emerging powers. While issues such as structural barriers to access to technology and knowledge, fair trade, government subsidies, etc. will not find a settlement in the short or mid-terms, there is a possibility that the current process of consultations between the Advisory Groups of the two platforms could lead to strengthened cooperation as the learning processes taking place within the two platforms combine with the pressure stemming from the push to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

Finally, regarding the more general theoretical framework of the relationship between global and regional bodies, the previous elements of conclusion converge with the thesis sustained by Bjorn Hettne and F. Soderbaum (2006) on the case of the relations between the UN and regional organizations regarding security issues. Under the strategic action of the main state players and the cooperative process undertaken by the Advisory Groups of the two platforms with the objectives of exploiting their respective advantages and reducing duplication, the two main development cooperation platforms reached a cooperative configuration defined by the following features. On the one hand, according to the scheme of cooperation agreed upon between the UNDCF and the GPEDC in 2015, the UNDCF (global level) provides political guidance while GPEDC (regional level) focuses on implementation. On the other hand, the two platforms are in a horizontal-like relationship as the
regional level (GPEDC) is better endowed in terms of means of implementation and knowledge production as well as in terms of effectiveness records (aid-effectiveness agenda). The UNDCF as the global platform is clearly in a position of dependence on all of these issues, but still maintains primacy in terms of legitimacy and inclusiveness. Therefore, the international development cooperation issue-area does not constitute an exception in this regard.

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